Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159


President Bush on the USS



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President Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln
On 1 May 2003, 43 days after the invasion of Iraq began, President George W. Bush landed on the deck of the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declared “mission accomplished.” In his speech, he announced that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” Now the occupation phase began with the search for the leaders of the Hussein regime. On 22 July 2003, Uday and Qusay Hussien were killed in a fire fight and on 14 December, their father, Saddam Hussein, was captured while hiding in a small hole in the ground.45
The Role of Air Power
Throughout the invasion of Iraq, Air Power became one of the primary combat assets employed. On 19 March 2003, even before ground operations began, Air Force F-117 stealth fighters, based on intelligence reports that Saddam was in the area, struck the Dora Farms complex southwest of Baghdad. While the mission went off without a hitch, and the ensuing


The Capture of the Dictator
pyrotechnical display proved to be spectacular, the goal of the attack was not successful. The next day, as ground operations began, a variety of Air Force aircraft began aerial attacks in front of the advancing ground armies striking key targets in and around Baghdad. In total, during the first day of the invasion, Coalition air forces launched more than 1,700 air sorties and missiles against Iraq. During this 43-day invasion phase of OIF, roughly 68 percent of the ordnance employed was precision-guided munitions (PGMs).  Since Turkey refused to allow Allied air assets to use their air bases to deliver troops and supplies into Northern Iraq, Coalition Forces needed an airfield in Iraq.  On 26 March 2003, C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III cargo transport aircraft airlifted nearly 1,000 paratroopers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade as well as members of the Air Force’s 86th Contingency Response Group into Bashur airfield near Erbil in Northern Iraq to help secure the airfield.  That marked the first time the C-17 had been used in a combat airdrop.  By 6 April 2003, Central Air Forces (CENTAF) leadership declared air supremacy over all of Iraq and, ten days later, the first humanitarian relief flights landed at Bashur airfield.46
In addition, to combat and supply missions, the Coalition air forces flew nearly 1,000 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sorties during the initial weeks of OIF gathering 42,000 battlefield images and more than 3,000 hours of video film. According to Capt. Greg Ball, Ph.D.’s official report, by 30 April 2003, Allied air assets numbered 1,801 aircraft, 863 of which were U.S. Air Force fighters, bombers, tankers, special operations/rescue aircraft, transport aircraft, and ISR/C3 aircraft. In the first six weeks, Coalition air forces flew more than 41,000 sorties with the U.S. Air Force accounting for more than 24,000 of this total. Likewise, Air Force C-130 aircraft transported over 12,000 short tons of materiel during the initial stages of the operation. Air Force aerial tankers flew more than 6,000 sorties and distributed more than 376 million pounds of fuel. By the end of April 2003, the Air Force had 54,955 active duty personnel in Iraq along with 2,084 Air Force Reserve personnel and 7,207 members of the Air National Guard (ANG). In addition, Air Force officials had requested support from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) for only the second time in its history. The first time had come only 12 years earlier during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although only active for four months, CRAF units transported nearly 100,000 troops to the Area of Operations.47
Among the new components used during OIF was the Air Force’s Global Mobility Task Forces (GMTF), which accompanied advanced forces and made determinations on whether or not captured airfields could be quickly converted for Coalition use as logistics hubs or Close Air Support (CAS) bases. The efficacy of these teams, in identifying suitable bases, led Allied leaders to position the first Coalition aircraft inside Iraq on 4 April 2003. These were Air Force A-10s which were stationed at Tallil Airfield.48
The War Was Over—Right!?
When President Bush declared an end to combat operations on 1 May 2003, the socio-political circumstances in Iraq had been thoroughly destabilized with little security and considerable plundering by Iraqi civilians. As this situation deteriorated, Allied forces quickly found themselves facing an insurgency brought on by a plethora of factors, including a lack of infrastructure and basic human services, as well as ethnic and religious tensions. For these and other reasons, in the years after the invasion of 2003, the Air Force maintained a continuous presence in Iraq until President Barrack Obama withdrew all combat troops in November 2011.49
Following Hussein’s capture, the U.S. turned the dictator over to the new interim Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They, in turn, created the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), made up of five Iraqi judges, to try Hussein and his aides for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. After two lengthy and, by many accounts (such as Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch), “show trials,” he was convicted of all charges and sentenced to death. While many believed Hussein likely got what he deserved, they also agreed that the process was clearly flawed.50
On 30 December 2006, he was hanged in Kadhimiya, Iraq and buried next to his sons in Tikrit, his home town.51 Surely, at this point, the war in Iraq was finally over, and U.S. troops could come home. However, this was not the case. The shaky Iraqi government was still too fragile to survive alone, and their security forces required more training. Ironically, the bloodiest combat of the entire OIF venture came after “victory” had been declared by the President. For example, U.S. air and ground forces attacked the city of Al-Fallujah three times in 2004-2005. They eventually captured it, only to have it retaken by enemy fighters after the Americans departed. In fact, as noted, it was not until November 2011, that President Obama finally declared the campaign in Iraq over and withdrew all U.S. combat forces.52
Analysis
After more than a decade, President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq on 19 March 2003 remains controversial. As mentioned earlier, the Bush Administration attempted to justify the invasion by linking it to the events that occurred on 11 September 2001. They claimed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was part of the worldwide terrorist network and was developing nuclear, biological, and chemical WMDs that could be a major threat to, not only the United States, but all humanity. Policymakers convinced Secretary of State Colin Powell to make this case, on 5 February 2003 to the United Nations and, then, before Congress in an effort to obtain their approval to invade Iraq. Being a highly respected former general, Powell’s presentation convinced many in Congress, who had had doubts, to eventually vote for the invasion.53 Among the evidence presented was a claim that Iraq had obtained yellowcake uranium from Niger and had tubing for centrifuges, so they could make nuclear bombs. Years later Powell, by then disillusioned by those he had once worked for, publicly admitted he had been deceived because the evidence he presented was not accurate, since there were no WMDs in Iraq. He described the invasion as “Badly Flawed.”54
In retrospect, given the fact the combat in Iraq and the entire region has continued even after President Obama officially withdrew American troops in late 2011, one must re-inspect the real reasons for America’s invasion. While President Bush and his advisers, no doubt, believed they were doing what was best for the nation, their stated justifications for OIF have left rational gaps regarding all the reasons for the invasion. Even before the attacks against U.S. targets on 9/11, planning had begun to create an operational plan for the invasion of Iraq. Once the terrorists carried out their evil deeds on that late summer morning, the President realized he had to act in response to the assaults against the nation. However, once the initial response was underway in Afghanistan and the justifiable public outrage began to subside, he used the new found national unity to take revenge on Saddam Hussein for the assassination attempt on his father’s life in 1990, when the former was president.55
George W. Bush’s first Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neil, characterized the Bush White House as a world out of kilter. He described it as a place where “policy decisions were decided, not by the meticulous examination of facts and the complexities of key issues but, by a faction of ideologues and political advisors operating outside the view of top cabinet officials.” According to O’Neil, “President Bush was not fully engaged in the supervision of the executive but, was rather a paradoxical leader who was, at best, a person who was guarded and poker-faced or, worse, disinterested, weak-willed, and an instrument of larger forces.” The most extraordinary portion of the Secretary’s book was his assertion that Saddam Hussein was targeted for elimination, not in the wake of 9/11 but, “soon after Bush took office.” In fact, O’Neil’s assertions have only gained additional traction in the period since his book was first published in 2004.56
It is worth recalling that, during his inaugural address of 29 January 2001, the President described Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as the primary members of the “axis of evil.” This was the first time he employed the term, but he repeated the phrase many times thereafter, to describe governments he accused of helping terror groups and those developing WMDs. He portrayed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as rogue states which were building nuclear weapons. While these charges were justified regarding Iran and North Korea, Iraq, in retrospect, seems to have been a stretch. He declared that all were enemies of the United States and repeated these charges regularly in an effort to rally the country in support of his War on Terror.57

Those who supported and/or still support the implementation of OIF would argue that President Bush led a courageous struggle against an evil dictator, whose goals were to destroy the United States and terrorize the world. Those who opposed this policy would assert that the reason for the Iraq invasion stemmed more from personal reasons to avenge the plot to kill his father and to control oil production in that part of the world. This is not the forum to develop an argument or delve into the veracity of either of these claims. Whichever reality may be proved one day, what can be said is that the war that resulted from the OIF invasion did not end with Bush’s landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln. Would that it had!


In fact, the biggest battles of OIF took place between 2004 and 2011. American casualties during the invasion had been minimal by any count. Iraqi military members killed in action totaled 4,000-7,000. Since 1 May 2003, the U.S. has suffered roughly 4,500 KIA and 28,500 WIA. Depending on the source, the Iraqis endured 200,000-1,000,000 casualties, with two-thirds being civilians. Worst of all, the combat in the region is far from over. With the advent of the savage new threat known as ISIS or ISIL in the Iraqi/Syrian area, the possibilities of peace seem bleak! Clearly, the invasion opened this Pandora’s Box, and those who took over national leadership have been unable to close it.58
Like Karbala, the battles that made up the invasion story will be argued about for some time to come. However, one issue that can and should be briefly examined is the role of Air Power and why it was not employed as it had been in the First Persian Gulf War. During the implementation of Operation Desert Storm prior to the initiation of ground action, Coalition air assets executed an extensive air campaign that so totally softened the enemy defenses that most of their front line forces surrendered in droves--often to reporters. Those who did not were slaughtered by aircraft such as those along the “Highway of Death.”59



The Highway of Death, 1991

The success of these operations cannot be underestimated. With this precedent in hand and with the massive number of sophisticated aircraft present for the Allies to use, why did the U.S. military and/or the Bush Administration opt to launch a classic land invasion? Ironically, as the initial phase of OIF unfolded, more and more air strikes were used not only to clear the way for the ground troops but to carry out decapitation raids to destroy Iraqi C3 resources. At Karbala alone, the Coalition used fighter bombers, helicopter gunships and, even massive B-52 bombers, which kept the number of Allied casualties to a minimum. Had they implemented the same plan as they had in 1990-1991, one wonders if the results might not have been more advantageous to both sides. With less urban ground fighting, there might have been less collateral damage, and the war might have ended sooner. That would have been better for all the people involved.


Some Final Thoughts
We will never know what might have happened. History does not allow for do-overs. What is clear is that the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003 and overthrew the brutal and cruel regime of Saddam Hussein. In doing so, American and Iraqi forces fought many battles before and after President Bush declared “mission accomplished.” The bloodshed in and around Karbala was only one a part of this combat. In Iraq and Syria the dying has not ended. New demons, like the masked members of ISIS/ISIL have become the new threat. While most Americans and Iraqis long ago wearied of this war and the suffering that goes with it, the future seems destined to spawn more battles like Karbala or worse.

Notes:



1For more on this period in Islamic History, see Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State, (London: Routledge, 2001).

2 Paul W. Westermeyer, “U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 January-1February 1991,” Washington D.C., United States of America: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps. http://www.usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/U.S.%20Marines%20in% 20Battle%20Al-Khafji%20%20PCN%20106000400_1.pdf p. 32; Martin N. Stanton, “The Saudi Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigade,” ARMOR Magazine, (1 March 1996), Fort Knox, Kentucky: US Army Armor Center, pp. 6–11, https://www.knox.army.mil/enter/ArmorMag/backissues/ 1990s/1996/ma96/2saudi96.pdf p. 10 [hereafter Saudi Guard]; Michael W.; Fred Halliday, “The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections.” International Affairs (Blackwell Publishing) (April 1991), Vol. 67, No. 2, p. 12.

3 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War,” International Security (Autumn 1991) (The MIT Press), Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 5–41, doi:10.2307/ 2539059. JSTOR 2539059, . 29, [hereafter “How Kuwait Was Won.”]; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf War, 1990-1991: Diplomacy in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 342; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 439; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells us About the Future of Conflict,” International Security (The MIT Press) (Autumn 1996), Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 139–179, doi:10.2307/2539073. JSTOR 2539073;  pp. 144-5. For three excellent histories of the Air War see, Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1992), [hereafter Storm Over Iraq]; John Andreas Olsen, Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm (London: Routledge Press, Inc., 2003); Thomas A. Keany and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare: Air Power in the Persian Gulf (New York: Naval Institute Press, 1995).James Titus, “The Battle of Khafji: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Air University, (September 1996), https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1996/ari/ titusj.pdf, p. 4.

4This Day in History, “Bush announces the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 19 March 2003, History Channel, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bush-announces-the-launch-of-operation-iraqi-freedom.

5For varying views on preparations and justifications for OIF, see Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basra, Baghdad, and Beyond: U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Adventure in Iraq, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Keven M. Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership, (Norfolk, Virginia: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (USJFCOM), 2006); Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror, Ithaca, New York: Ithaca Press: 2007).

6See Note 3.

7For more on the air war see, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) David A. Deptula, “Parallel Warfare: What Is It? Where Did It Come From? Why Is It Important,” found in William P. Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on the U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 127-156, [hereafter “Parallel Warfare”].

8Ron Dick and Dan Patterson, Aviation Century: War & Peace in the Air, (Eden Prairie, Ontario: Boston Mills Press, 2006), p. 242.

9Tim Ripley, Air War Iraq, (United Kingdom: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2004), pp. 49-72, [hereafter Air War Iraq]; Article, “Iraq War Timeline,” CNN.com, no date, http://www. warchronicle.com/iraq/news/timeline_iraq_war.htm, [hereafter Timeline].

10Air War Iraq, 55-59; Timeline. For details on the Marine strike forces during the Iraq Invasion, see Lt. Col. Michael S. Groen and Contributors, Occasional Paper, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy, (Quantico, Virginia: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), pp. 138-173, 190-203, [hereafter With the 1st Marine Division]

11See, Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), [hereafter In the Company of Soldiers]; NBC Enterprises, Tom Brokaw, forward, Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Insider Story, (Kansas City, Missouri: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 2003). The Third Infantry Division is also known as the Marne Division or the “Rock of the Marne.” It was formed in 1917, at the outset of the U.S. entry into World War I, and its garrison headquarters are located at Fort Stewart, Georgia. During OIF it was a major component of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

12Todd A. Davis, The Global War on Terror: 9/11, Iraq, and America’s Crisis in the Middle East, (Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Corp., 2005), pp. 52-65, [hereafter Global War on Terror].

13News Story, “Iraq shows off Apache crew,” BBC News, 25 March 2003, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/2883043.stm; News Story, “Downed Apache Blown Up To Keep Secrets From Iraq,” (London) Evening Times, 25 March 2003; News Story, “Downed Apache Blown Up With Missile,” New Straits Times, 26 March 2003, http://news.google.co.uk/ newspapers?; News Story, “The ‘Apache’ farmer’s tale,” BBC News, 23 April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/296971.stm.

14Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 147-153.

15Ibid.

16For more on the supply efforts during OIF, see Eric Peltz, John M. Halliday, Marc L. Robbins, Kenneth J. Girardini, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battle Logistics and Effects on Operations, U.S. Army Contract No. DASW01-01-C-0003, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Arroyo Center, 2005), pp. xviii, 6, 18.

17Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 150-153; Jonathan Bernstein, AH-64 Apache Units of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, (United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2005), p. 49, [hereafter AH-64 Units].

18Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 151-154; Bernstein, AH-64 Units, pp. 49-50; Col. David Eshel, “Deadly Scourge of the US Helicopter Pilots in Iraq,” no date, http://defense-update.com/newcast/0207/analysis/analysis-100207.htm.

19PBS, Interview with Thomas E. White, 31 January 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/white.html.

20Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 150-152; John Gordon, et. al., “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” RAND Corporation, 2005, p. 87, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ documented briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf.

21Timeline; Article, “U.S. Apache Pilots Taken Prisoner,” CNN, 24 March 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/24/sprj.irq.apache.attack/index.html.

22Timeline.

23Geoffrey Mohan and Tracy Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins Near Baghdad, U.S. Forces Confront Hussein's Ultra-Loyal Republican Guard,” Los Angeles Times, 25 March 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/25/news/war-iraq25, [hereafter “Key Battle Begins”]. Also see, Ripley, Air War Iraq, pp. 87-98.

24Mohan and Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins.”

25Timeline; Ripley, Air War Iraq, pp. 98, 115-124.

26Mohan and Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins.”

27News Story, “U.S. Forces Battle Republican Guard Near Karbala,” Fox News, 2 April 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/04/02/us-forces-battle-republican-guard-near-karbala.html, [hereafter “U.S. Force Battle Republican Guard”]; Article, “Jersey family watched a quiet boy grow Cpl. Michael E. Curtin,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/901719/posts; Article, “With grief and resolve, Ft. Stewart salutes 4 dead,” Los Angeles Times, 6 April 2003, http://www.latimes.com/chi-030410316apr01-story.html.
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