Review of International Political Economy
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Notes i We understand regulation as specific rules, promulgated and enforced by a state, or actors who are recognized by a state or states as legitimate regulators, and intended to govern the behavior of actors in a given area of activity. ii For a review see (Krasner, 1984). See Keohane and Nye (2002) for discussion of the complexities of global governance in an interdependent world. iii For the need for more work on preferences see (Frieden, 1999). Previous work emphasizing materialist motivations include (Frieden, 1991; Rogowski, 1989; Hiscox, 2003). iv For a complementary strategy, see recent work adapting sociological insights (Widmaier et al., 2007; Blyth, 2002; Seabrooke, 2006; Jabko, 2006; Woll, 2008). v This is of course not a new observation to us; it goes back at least to Keohane and Nye (1977). Nonetheless, its implications for the international role of domestic market rules remains underexplored. For a current example see, (Elbe, 2008). vi A notable exception is (Singer, 2007), who uses a rationalist approach to examine regulatory preferences for transgovernmental cooperation. vii The major exceptions that we are aware of are (Pierson, 1996; Ikenberry, 2001; Spruyt, 1994; Ikenberry, 1988a; Meunier and McNamara, 2007; Newman 2008a; Posner, 2005; Raustiala, 2004). Fareed Zakaria’s (1998) theory of ‘state-centered realism’ also has many important features in common with historical institutionalism. viii We are grateful to Paul Pierson for laying out this argument about the differences between legislative institutions and policy institutions. ix On the importance of sequencing, see (Pierson, 2004; Zysman, 1994). Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol argue that there are “specific organizational structures the presence (or absence) of which seems critical to the ability of the state authorities to undertake given tasks. In turn, the presence or absence of organizational structures is connected to past state policies, thus underlining the need for historical as well as structural analysis if specific state capacities and incapacities are to be understood” (Evans et al., 1985). x To keep our argument tractable enough to be published in article form, we do not explicitly seek to build international institutions into our account here, although we note that our claims may easily be extended to include them. xi At the domestic level see (Ziegler, 1995). xii See (Simmons, 2001). By focusing on public policy regimes, we allow such capacities to vary by sector and time. This overcomes a major limitation of earlier work that identified differences in weak and strong states (Migdal, 1988). xiii This argument layers an interactive systemic component to earlier work on foreign economic policy. See (Katzenstein, 1976). xiv Here we build on the earlier work of Katzenstein (1976) and Ikenberry (1988). xv On the importance of the EU-US relationship for issues of international market regulation see (Drezner, 2007). xvi For the case of China, for example, see (Bach, Newman, and Weber, 2006). Directory: data -> people -> aln24 aln24 -> Domestic Institutions Beyond the Nation State: Charting the New Interdependence Approach aln24 -> Transatlantic Flight Fights people -> Work experience people -> Meredith K. McKittrick people -> Michael a. Stoto people -> Georgia Institute of Technology Download 123.46 Kb. Share with your friends:
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