Risk management associated with emergency vehicle operation

APPENDICES

APPENDIX- A Emergency Vehicle Operation Survey………………………………...40

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE -1 Emergency Vehicle Operation Survey Results…………………….…..….28

INTRODUCTION

Emergency vehicle operators and particularly members of the fire service are needlessly exposed to risk while responding to and returning from emergencies in apparatus. For example, on June 21, 2002, a van carrying 11 firefighters from Oregon spun out of control. The resulting accident near Parachute Colorado killed four and injured seven firefighters (Long, 2002). In July of 2002, a crew drove their fire engine the wrong way down a one-way street struck and critically inured a seven-year old boy. The engine was returning from a fire in Brooklyn, New York (Hays, 2002). On August 12, 2002, an engine plummeted 60 feet down a California freeway embankment injuring three firefighters (Associated Press, 2002). On August 19, 2002, an Arlington County, Virginia, fire truck rolled over during a response to a motor vehicle accident. Four firefighters were transported to the hospital as a result (Kelly, 2002).

Since 1984, motor vehicle accidents have accounted for 20 to 25 percent of firefighters’ lives lost annually. When segregated by vehicle type, the majority of these losses were in privately owned vehicles; however, water tenders (tankers), and engines or pumpers rank close behind (FEMA-USFA, 2002). Fire service leaders can exert the most control over these latter categories by implementing risk management practices.

The issue of firefighter safety while responding to and returning from incidents is so significant that shortly after this applied research project was approved, the United States Fire Administration (USFA) announced the “Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative”. The initiative is a joint partnership between the USFA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the U.S. Department of Transportation/Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office. The goal of the emergency vehicle safety initiative is to prioritize recommendations on reducing firefighter fatalities through identifying and developing “best practices” based on mitigation techniques and technologies.

The problem is that Marion County Fire District No.1 has no formalized process to manage risk associated with the operation of emergency vehicles and the people authorized to drive apparatus on a comprehensive scale. Initial training & certification, coupled with a continuing education program, and a formalized policy and procedure must be synthesized into one congruent operational plan for fire district apparatus operators.

The purpose of this applied research project is to identify the components of an emergency vehicle operation program and recommend a specific course of action to prevent the death and injury of Marion County Fire District No.1 firefighters. Toward that end, descriptive research was used to identify the status of the district’s vehicle operation program, formulate positive improvements, and answer the following research questions:

1. 
   What are the risks to people and property associated with vehicle operations in the fire service?
   
2. 
   What preventive measures can be taken to reduce or eliminate the risks associated with fire service vehicle operation?
   
3. 
   What have other jurisdictions done to reduce or eliminate the risks associated with fire service vehicle operation?
   

fire district with proposed improvements to reduce or, where practical, eliminate risks and improve firefighter safety.

The Four Corners Businessmen’s Association founded Marion County Fire District No.1 (M.C.F.D) in 1940. This group originally named the organization the Four Corners Fire Department, and over the course of time, the district merged with six other fire districts. After the last merger, with the Brooks Fire District in 1968, the district became known as Marion County Fire District No.1. Currently, Marion County Fire District No.1 serves a population of 49,700 people. On weekdays, the population increases to approximately 65,000 as individuals attend community college and conduct business (Bill O’Neil, personal communication February 14, 2002). M.C.F.D. No.1 covers 88 square miles and includes the communities of Brooks, Chemeketa, Clear Lake, Four Corners, Labish Center, Macleay, Middle Grove, and Pratum. Service is provided from eight strategically located fire stations staffed by a combination of 33 career and 113 on-call firefighters. Housed in the eight fire stations are six type-one engines, two type-three engines, one heavy rescue, four tenders, three type-six engines, three squads, and two Advanced Life Support ambulances. The district responds to over 4,500 emergencies on an annual basis. District headquarters is located in Salem. Salem is Oregon’s third largest city, the state capitol, and the home of Willamette University, the oldest higher education institution west of Missouri.

The Fire District has continued to grow despite state and regional unemployment figures that are nearly double the national average, a statewide economic downturn resulting in a 900 million dollar deficit to state government, and a national recession. This growth has placed increased demands on service levels, which has increased response activity. Most alarms call for a multi-unit response and the number of alarms requiring multiple box assignments is increasing. This increase in alarm activity has created an increased risk in the form of driving exposure and a higher number of interruptions during training, which has negatively influenced the quality of training provided to members of the district.

The problem is that Fire District No.1 does not have a formal process to manage the risk associated with operating emergency response vehicles and the people authorized to drive apparatus. This includes a lack of an overall standard operating guideline to train and certify apparatus operators, thus reducing the overall risk. Identifying the risks associated with emergency vehicle operation is the first step in managing risk, reducing death, and injury of firefighters. Reducing the loss of life to firefighters is one of the United States Fire Administration’s operational objectives.

Development of this applied research project is directly related to the following sections of the National Fire Academy’s Executive Leadership course: Unit One - The goal of the course is “The chief fire officer will develop the ability to conceptualize and employ the key processes used by effective executive-level managers.” Risk management is a process used by executive level managers. UNIT Three – Developing Decision Making Skills. The decision-making skills learned in the Vroom – Yetton model are applied through the implementation of the risk management project. Unit Four – Managing multiple roles as it relates to analyzing key issues, role conflicts, and ambiguities to develop a solution to problems presented. Unit Eight - Influencing as it relates to changing behaviors, attitudes, or values of those in the organization to accept change in the form of identifying the risks of emergency vehicle operation. (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], October 2000).
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review for this applied research project began at the Learning Resource Center on the campus of the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. That search revealed a substantial number of applicable technical reports, texts, and articles related to the topic of emergency vehicle operation and firefighter safety. In addition, an electronic search of the EBSCO host Academic Search Elite database revealed 55 returns under the terms “fire engine accidents,” “ambulance accidents,“ and “police car accidents.” The author refined this number to 27 after careful review. Access to the EBSCO Host Academic Search Elite database would not have been possible without the gracious support provided to the alumni of Northwest Christian College in Eugene, Oregon. Furthermore, searches were conducted at the Chemeketa Cooperative Regional Library Service, Oregon Fire Bulletin electronic listing service, the U.S. Fire Administration’s electronic bulletin service and web site, as well as subscriptions and texts purchased by the author.

Firefighter deaths have been steadily on the decline since the late 1970’s, when the average number of annual deaths was 151. For instance, from 1977 to 1981 an average of five firefighters were killed by falls from apparatus annually. However, from 1992 to 1996 only two such deaths were recorded according to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reports. In the 1980’s, the firefighter death rate dipped to 126, and in the 1990’s the average was 94 deaths. The lower death rates have been largely attributed to technological advances and engineering controls such as improved personal protective equipment (PPE), use of incident management systems, enhanced training, and safer apparatus design (Washburn, et al, 1997). Since 1993 the second leading cause of firefighter death listed by type of duty has been “Responding to and returning from alarms” according to the National Fire Data Center (2001).

The United States Fire Administration (FEMA, 2002) retrospective report on firefighter fatalities from 1990 – 2000 lists motor vehicle accidents as accounting for an average of 22 percent of firefighter fatalities during the ten-year study period. Moreover, one-quarter of those deaths were in privately owned vehicles. The fire apparatus most often involved in fatal accidents were tenders (tankers) at 19.5%, engines/pumpers at 13.8% and aircraft at 13.8%. The report further acknowledges that more firefighter fatalities occur in tender accidents than in engines and ladder trucks combined. Nearly 27% of the firefighter fatalities were ejected from the vehicles: 21% reported wearing restraint devices before the collision.

Volunteer firefighters are killed more frequently in vehicles than career firefighters. Over the last ten years, 57% of the responders killed were volunteer compared to 33% career (FEMA, 2002).

According to the NFPA, 99 firefighters lost their lives in 2001 – not including the 343 FDNY firefighters killed in the World Trade Center collapse. In the second largest grouping, 24 firefighters died responding to and or returning from an incident. Over the last ten years, it has been typical for one-fifth to one-quarter of firefighter deaths to be attributed to responding to or returning from alarms and 2001 was no exception. “Responding to or returning from alarms accounted for almost one quarter of the deaths in 2001” (LeBlanc and Fahy, 2002). Despite large fluctuations from year to year, there has been an overall gradual increase in volunteer firefighter deaths since 1994 according to the NFPA report by LeBlanc and Fahy (2002). In 2001, only two career firefighters were killed responding or returning, while 22 volunteer firefighters were killed.

A comparison of career to volunteer firefighter deaths in 2000 reveals that 18 of the victims were volunteers, five were career, and one was an employee of a federal forestry agency (LeBlanc and Fahy, 2001). In 1999, more than the usual percentage of firefighters died responding to and returning from incidents. Of the 32 firefighters who died, 27 were volunteer, four were career, and one was an employee of a state forestry agency (Fahy and LeBlanc, 2000). Statistics for 1997 indicate that 94 firefighters died, with 25 of those deaths related to emergency vehicle operation. Twenty-one deaths were volunteers, 12 of whom were killed in collisions or rollovers, and four were career, (Washburn, et al, 1998). In 1996, 30 firefighters died responding to or returning from incidents. Twenty-nine were volunteers and one was a career employee (Washburn, et al, 1997).

Risk management associated with emergency vehicle operation is not limited to the fire service or the United States. An Edmonton, Canada constable responding to a domestic dispute struck a minivan in an intersection, leaving an eight-year-old girl seriously injured. The constable was charged with failing to yield safely and driving without due care and attention (Jenkinson, 1996). On September 30, 2002, a child was killed and several other people injured when a fire engine struck a car near Enniskillen, Ireland, a community near Belfast. Police reports indicated that the accident happened at 11:20 am but police would not comment on whether the fire engine was on an emergency call at the time of the accident (Dykes, 2002). Three civilians and two firefighters were injured in Clintonville, Ohio when the brakes failed on a ladder truck that crashed into a restaurant (Jack Sullivan personal communication, July 16, 2002). In Waterbury, Connecticut, a jury awarded 4.5 million dollars in damages to the estates of two firefighters, their spouses, and survivors of a ladder truck that collided with a tree after the brakes failed (“$4.5 Million”, 1996).

The incidents listed resulted in numerous deaths, catastrophic injuries to people (including brain damage and paralysis), psychological and emotional impairment, and damage to both public apparatus, and private property. The incidents go on and on, for example, one tender operator drove off the road, over corrected, and struck an embankment and a utility pole. The tender overturned, killing him. In another instance, a tender driver failed to stop and was struck broadside in an intersection by a private vehicle, which had the right of way. Finally, a firefighter struck a tractor head-on while negotiating a blind curve.

From 1977 to 1997, 160 firefighters were killed in emergency vehicle related collisions involving engines, ladder trucks, brush units, rescue vehicles, and ambulances. Sixty-six of these deaths can be attributed to collisions involving tenders. Most often, the driver succumbs in the collision 71.8% of the time. Passengers account for 28.2% of the deaths inside apparatus (FEMA, 2002). The majority of these deaths occur in privately owned automobiles or tenders, which often respond with only one driver. Moreover, volunteer responders, largely in rural un-hydranted areas, most often use these vehicles.

Water tenders modified for use in the fire service from other types of vehicles require proper tank baffling and design. Otherwise, they run the risk of becoming overloaded, hard to control, and unstable during emergency response. A vehicle modified into a tender carrying 2,500 gallons of water at 8.4 pounds per gallon can add ten and half tons of weight to the vehicle. These characteristics can contribute to the potential for an accident; especially in areas where volunteer drivers may have less experience (FEMA, 2002).

For many fire service organizations, emergency medical response comprises as much as 70 percent or more of their total alarm volume. It is interesting to note that in 1989, more than 6,000 U.S. firefighters were injured on the way to or from the scene of an emergency. When figures from private and third party EMS organizations are added, a more significant safety issue materializes. In fact, a number of the injuries suffered by EMS responders are related to motor vehicles (FEMA, 1994). First responders are not injured and killed during emergency response alone.

Vehicular accidents at fire stations are common as well. Activities in and around fire stations involve rapid vehicle movements as well as low speed backing and turning. Victims include firefighters and visitors unfamiliar with such activities. In addition, large vehicles often have blind spots, which enhance the potential for an accident. Most in station accidents are a result of backing up apparatus. Constructing fire stations with drive through bays and requiring a properly positioned spotter can reduce backing accidents (FEMA, 1997).

Preventive Measures to Reduce or Eliminate Risk

Patrick Henry (1736-1799) once said, “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know no way of judging of the future but by the past” (Bartlett, 1992). As this was true for Patrick Henry, so it is true for the world today. Law students prepare for bar examinations by studying case histories, and medical interns use case histories along with the philosophy of see one, do one, teach one to engrain new behaviors. The fire service too can use case histories as a powerful learning tool, providing voices of the past so that others may avoid similar incidents.

“Firehouse” magazine contributing editor Michael Wilbur (2000) suggests the fire service lead by example. “If people in the business of providing public safety are going to go out and talk the safety talk, then they themselves must walk the safety walk.” Wilbur, is referring to life saving measures a department can take to avert a tragedy, which is the adoption of a mandatory seatbelt use policy. The volunteer department Wilbur belongs to has a policy that if a person rides or drives fire apparatus without a seatbelt, they are suspended from riding for 30 days.

As early as 1992, the United States Fire Administration began publishing a brochure titled “Alive on Arrival” which listed tips for safe emergency vehicle operations (USFA, 1992). The brochure’s contents are similar to the 10 standard orders and 18 situations that shout watch-out for wildland firefighters. These orders and situations are based on the injuries and deaths of fellow firefighters. Preventive measures vehicle operators can take include: Ensuring they are qualified and fully capable of operating the vehicle; driving with due care; not exceeding posted speed limits; stopping at intersections and railroad crossings; never assuming another vehicle is aware of your presence; parking in safe locations away from hazards; using the parking brake; not moving the vehicle until all passengers are safely seated; using a competent spotter when backing; and more.

On February 7, 1997, National Fire Protection Association Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program (NFPA 1451) became effective. The standard originated as a response to a request by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in 1991. The NTSB specifically requested NFPA to emphasize that the safe arrival of the apparatus at the scene of the emergency is the first priority. The 1451 committee also wanted to produce an NFPA standard to meet the intent of NFPA 1500, section 4-2.1, “Fire department vehicles shall be operated only by members who have successfully completed an approved driver training program...” The committee’s intent was to create a document outlining a training program that produces drivers who are able to prevent vehicle accidents.

NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program, section 2-2.1 states; “The fire department shall adopt an official written risk management plan dealing with fire service vehicles.” Section 2-2.2 states the fire service vehicle risk management plan shall cover administration, facilities, training, vehicle operations, protective clothing and equipment, operations at emergency incidents, operations at non-emergency incidents, and other related activities.

Section 2-2.3, addresses the risk management plan, which shall include at least the following components: (a) risk identification; (b) potential problems determined by a risk evaluation, likelihood of the occurrence of a given problem and the severity of its consequences; (c) risk control techniques that include solutions for the elimination or mitigation of potential problems and the implementation of the best solution; and (d) risk management monitoring, be provided in conjunction with evaluation of the effectiveness of risk control techniques (NFPA 1997).

Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service published by FEMA (1996) suggests that in order to reduce or eliminate the risks in emergency vehicle operation several steps must be considered. Consider, for example, the five-step method of risk management: 1. Identify the risk exposure. This is the foundation of an integrated process of managing risks; 2. Evaluate risk potential. This involves determining the likelihood that an event will occur and the subsequent consequences; 3. Rank risks. Once the risks are determined, they should be prioritized listing those with severe potential outcomes ahead of those with minor outcomes; and 4. Determine and implement control actions that include: a. Risk avoidance - total risk avoidance is effective, however it is not a realistic approach in the fire service; b. Risk reduction – minimizing risk through planning, training, testing, maintenance of standards, and policy enforcement. This is the basis for developing standard operating procedures; c. Risk transfer – the systematic transfer of risk to other parties often through contracting work out. Before implementing control actions, a cost benefit analysis should be conducted and other interrelated factors considered; 5. Evaluate and revise actions and techniques. Because risk management is an ongoing process, continuous evaluation and revision is necessary.

FDNY Battalion Chief Larry Hatton (1989) advocates several measures that can be implemented to reduce or eliminate the risk when operating emergency vehicles. The measures include: 1. Communicating with the off going shift or in the case of a volunteer organization listing apparatus concerns on an announcement board or radio alerting system. 2. Inspect the station, the apron, and the roadway outside the station. 3. Have a method of tracking street closures and out of service hydrants.

When responding to an alarm, proceed in an orderly, rapid fashion to the apparatus, be certain of the exact location of the incident, and determine the route to be taken. Dress completely, then board the apparatus. When all riders are on board, double check to see that everyone is seated with safety belts fastened. En-route, avoid bad intersections, do not depend on your warning lights or siren, be aware of stopping distances, and know the limitations of the driver and vehicle.

As part of the USFA’s Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative, numerous recommendations were published after their second forum held August 22, 2002 in Kansas City, Missouri. Those recommendations include development of model legislation for fire apparatus drivers, development of model operating procedures with enforcement criteria, and model highway incident scene marking based on current Department of Transportation (DOT) standards. Other recommendations encourage use of reflective markings, initiating layered – modular training programs for all levels of an organization, proficiency testing, performance assessments, certification and recertification programs, use of traffic control devices to enhance responder safety, further research on a wide variety of topics, and implementation of a driver safety awareness campaign (USFA, 2002).

In September of 1989, a train in Catlett, Virginia struck a fire engine. The post incident investigation report published by the U.S.F.A. pointed out the use of the incident command system reduced difficulties of organizing resources in such a stressful incident (USFA, 1989). Furthermore, the report identified that NFPA standard 1002 Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications did not include procedures for traversing railroad crossings, especially those without automatic warning devices.

The State of Virginia has adopted a training curriculum that applies to fire apparatus operators. The training is designed to meet the standard established by NFPA 1002. The training program is taught throughout the state on a voluntary basis.

Similarly, the State of Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training (DPSST) has approved emergency vehicle driver training curricula including that developed for the Volunteer Firemen’s Insurance Service. As in Virginia, participation in the Oregon DPSST certification standard is strictly voluntary on the part of the fire department and the curriculum meets the intent of NFPA 1002.

On August 10, 2002, Eriks J. Gabliks (personal communication), Director of Training for DPSST, issued a statewide memorandum to all fire service organizations concerning the “Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative.” The memorandum emphasized the department’s primary objective of preventing firefighter injury and death. In addition, DPSST has established a comprehensive lending library of fire service training materials to improve firefighter and driver safety.

In order to determine what other jurisdictions had done to reduce or eliminate the risks of operating fire service vehicles, 42 fire departments were surveyed of which 19 (45%) responded. When asked if their state required the use of seat belts, 95%

responded affirmatively and 5% did not indicate. However, only 89% of the organizations mandate the use of safety restraint devices.

Initial and ongoing driver training programs such as mandatory response safety courses and defensive driving can help reduce accidents (Wilbur, 1998). Of the organizations responding, nearly 80% require all drivers to pass a driver training program. When driver qualification and training programs are considered, 47% of the respondents reported meeting the NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications. In addition, 47% required drivers to

re-qualify on a recurring basis.

Periodic checks on drivers’ licenses can be used as a tool to prevent potential litigation. A Department of Motor Vehicle check should be done on each individual every three years. This report is to be secured from local sources by the fire district (Ayers, 1997). Of the responding organizations, 68% conduct drivers’ license checks for violations.

Training programs should include, but are not limited to, emergency vehicle operations courses as well as a state recognized defensive driving courses

(Wilbur, 1998). Eighty-nine percent of the organizations surveyed require drivers to participate in a skill based driving course using each type of apparatus they are apt to drive. The remaining eleven percent do not require a skill based driving course with specified apparatus.

Overall, the literature search revealed that there are national standards for professional qualifications, driver training programs, and risk management practices. More important however, is the fact that each locale manages their vehicle operation program in a manner that allows for great diversity.

PROCEDURES

This applied research project was conducted to develop a framework from which a comprehensive emergency vehicle operation program could be developed specific to the needs of Marion County Fire District No.1 in Salem, Oregon. In order to be effective, the research needed to determine the risks to people and property and identify preventive measures that can be taken to reduce or eliminate risks associated with emergency vehicle operation. The next step was to determine what other jurisdictions had done to reduce or eliminate risks associated with emergency vehicle operation.

Using descriptive research methodology, a search of the literature available at the National Emergency Training Center’s Learning Resource Center was conducted in June of 2002. Using the terms “firefighter injuries,” “traffic fatalities,” and “accidents” the online catalog of the LRC was searched, which resulted in numerous articles, applied research projects, and multi-media materials relating to the topic. In late June, news of a fatal accident involving Oregon firefighters in Colorado was received while attending the Fire Academy. This story and others involving fire apparatus accidents were followed through the print media and online news services. Information and data collection continued into August of 2002 with an online search of the EBSCO host Academic Search Elite database that resulted in three hits under the term “Fire Engine Accidents”; two hits using the term “Ambulance Accidents;” and 55 hits using the term “Police Car Accidents.” This number was narrowed to 27 relevant articles after closer review. Additional searches were conducted in Salem, Oregon, at the Chemeketa Cooperative Regional Library Service, using the term, “Accidents”, 303 sources were found.

In the fall of 2002, 42 fire service organizations were contacted to determine what they had done to reduce or eliminate risk associated with fire service vehicle operation. The organizations were selected because their demographics were similar in size, organization, population, or geography to M.C.F.D. No.1. Using a set of ten questions, each organization was asked to provide answers related to operation of emergency vehicles and the depth of driver training (Appendix – A). A total of nineteen (45%) responded.

Information was also obtained from periodicals, journals, and textbooks purchased by the author.

Literature Review

The literature review began at the National Fire Academy’s Learning Resource Center on June 19, 2002. Several Executive Fire Officer applied research projects were photocopied at a local copy center and shipped back to Salem, Oregon, for review. Using research methods learned while attending Northwest Christian College and from the National Fire Academy Executive Development class, notes were taken to document quotes, ideas, and excerpts deemed applicable to the research questions. These notes were categorized and collated citing each source and brought back to Salem for review.

Information was also gathered from electronic listing services, news services, and bulletin boards. In the fall of 2002, 42 fire service organizations were asked to respond to ten questions to determine what they had done to reduce or eliminate risk associated with fire service vehicle operation.

Limitations and Assumptions

This applied research project was limited to the three initial research questions and the concept of managing the risks of emergency vehicle operation. Moreover, in order to apply relevant and current information, the researcher limited review of information to that published after 1989. The majority of reference material is dated from the mid-1990’s and early 2000’s.

The ten questions asked of 42 fire service organizations is a limitation in that it represents only a small sampling of the fire service. The organizations queried were chosen because their demographics were similar in size, organization, population, or geography to M.C.F.D. No.1, a limitation in itself. It was assumed that only knowledgeable individuals responded to the questions and that they did so honestly. No statistical analysis was made to determine the margin of error in the results of the survey instrument.

The six-month period imposed by the National Fire Academy for applied research projects did not allow for a more comprehensive review of the literature and more

in-depth broad-based research.
RESULTS

The research provided information that can be used by Marion County Fire District No.1 to develop a formalized process to manage risks associated with the operation of emergency vehicles and the people authorized to drive apparatus on a comprehensive scale. In addition, the following questions were answered:

The research findings clearly indicate that a substantial risk of death or serious injury to people exists. According to the National Fire Data Center (NFDC), the operation of emergency vehicles is the second leading cause of firefighter death when listed by type of duty (2001). In the twenty-year span of 1977 to 1997, 160 firefighters were killed in emergency vehicle accidents that included engines, ladder trucks, brush units, rescues, and ambulances. According to FEMA (2002) over 41% of these deaths occurred in tenders. The United States Fire Administration found that over 6,000 firefighters were injured in 1989 traveling to or from the scene of an emergency (FEMA, 1994). The incidents listed resulted in numerous deaths. Injuries to firefighters and citizens included brain damage, paralysis, loss of limbs, psychological and emotional impairment.

The risks are extended beyond the fire service when public utilities such as power poles are struck and damaged, private automobiles are hit broadside in intersections (Dykes, 2002), ladder trucks collide with buildings, and pedestrians are run down in the street by fire apparatus (Hays, 2002).

The losses to the individual and organization include costs to replace or repair damaged apparatus, loss of protection to the community while apparatus is being repaired, and replacement of private property damaged by the emergency vehicle. Moreover, there is a monetary and non-monetary cost to the individual, caused by early retirement, loss of wages, psychological and emotional counseling, increased health care, and personal care. In addition, the organization suffers with a tarnished reputation, increased cost of worker’s compensation, insurance premiums, and litigation (USFA, 1991). In one case, a jury awarded one survivor and the estates of two firefighters $4.5 million dollars in damages after a ladder truck crashed into a tree (“$4.5 Million”, 1996).

2. What preventative measures can be taken to reduce or eliminate the risks associated with fire service vehicle operation?

The fire service must require successful completion of ongoing driver training that explains local and state laws as well as district rules and procedures. In addition, they should adopt a vehicle operation training program that incorporates “NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program” and “NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications.” The training program should include case histories so that others can learn from the past (NFPA 1997).

Furthermore, the fire service should mandate and enforce the use of seatbelts or shoulder restraints. National Transportation Safety Board statistics include several examples of accidents in which unrestrained firefighters died in accidents whereas restrained firefighters survived (Perry, 1998). Seatbelt use will save the lives of many. Remember, nearly 27% of the firefighter fatalities were ejected from the vehicles and only 21% were reportedly wearing restraint devices before the collision (FEMA 2002). The Howells, New York volunteer department has adopted a policy that if a person rides or drives fire apparatus without a seatbelt, they are suspended from responding for 30 days (Wilbur, 2000).

All organizations must insist that drivers reduce their speed when responding to emergency and non-emergency incidents. A slower response by a tender should not delay the initial attack, according to Perry (1998). Other preventive measures include driving with due care, stopping at intersections and railroad crossings, never assuming another vehicle is aware of your presence, parking in safe locations away from hazards, using the parking brake, not moving the vehicle until all passengers are safely seated, and use a competent spotter when backing (USFA, 1992).

FDNY Battalion Chief Larry Hatton (1989) suggests briefing the oncoming shift of apparatus concerns. A volunteer organization can list apparatus concerns on an announcement board or send a message via their alerting system. Conduct an inspection of the station, the apron, the roadway outside the station, and develop a method of tracking street closures, along with out of service hydrants. When receiving an alarm, proceed in an orderly rapid fashion to the apparatus; do not run. Determine the exact location of the incident and identify the route to be taken. Dress completely, then board the apparatus securing individual seatbelts. En-route, avoid accident-prone intersections, do not depend on your warning lights or siren, be aware of stopping distances, and above all know the limitations of the driver and vehicle.

Fire departments should adopt an official written risk management plan dealing with fire service vehicles. The risk management plan should cover administration, facilities, training, vehicle operations, protective clothing and equipment, operations at emergency incidents, operations at non-emergency incidents, and other related activities. In addition, the risk management plan should identify a process to identify risks of emergency vehicle operation and potential problems determined by a risk evaluation. The plan should recognize the likelihood of the occurrence of a given problem and severity of its consequences, risk control techniques that include solutions to eliminate potential problems and the implementation of the best solution. Risk management monitoring should evaluate the effectiveness of risk control techniques (NFPA 1997).

According to preliminary reports by the U.S. Fire Administration’s Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative, preventive measures include: development of model legislation for fire apparatus drivers; development of model operating procedures with enforcement criterion; and a model highway incident scene marking system based upon existing standards from the DOT. In addition, recommendations consist of using modular training programs for drivers at all levels of an organization, proficiency testing, performance assessments, certification and re-certification programs, use of traffic control devices to increase responder safety, implementation of an awareness campaign, and conducting further research (USFA, 2002).

3. What have other jurisdictions done to reduce or eliminate the risks associated with fire service vehicle operation?

The research revealed that there are nationally published standards and criteria for professional qualifications of apparatus operators, for driver training programs, and risk management practices. However, each political entity or subdivision manages their vehicle operation program in a manner that allows for great diversity, subjective enforcement of rules, and little consistency.

A post incident investigation report published by the U.S. Fire Administration pointed out how the use of the incident command system reduced difficulties of organizing resources after a fire engine was struck by a train in Catlett, Virginia (USFA, 1989). Furthermore, the report identified that NFPA Standard 1002 Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications did not include procedures for traversing railroad crossings, especially those without automatic warning devices.

The State of Virginia has adopted a training curriculum that applies to fire apparatus operators. The training is designed to meet the standard established by NFPA 1002. The training program is taught throughout the state on a voluntary basis (USFA, 1989).

Similarly, the State of Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training (DPSST) has approved emergency vehicle driver training curricula including that developed for the Volunteer Firemen’s Insurance Service and the United States Fire Administration. Both curricula reference NFPA 1002 as the standard for the psychomotor skill portion of the program. As with Virginia, participation in the Oregon DPSST certification standard is strictly voluntary on the part of the fire department. However, if an organization wants to certify their responders under the DPSST guidelines, the agency must be accredited by DPSST, which regulates participation for quality and consistency.

On August 10, 2002, Eriks J. Gabliks, Director of Training for DPSST issued a statewide memorandum to all fire service organizations concerning the “Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative.” The memorandum emphasized the department’s primary objective of preventing firefighter injury and death. In addition, DPSST has established a comprehensive lending library of fire service training materials to improve firefighter safety.
Table 1

EMERGENCY VEHICLE OPERATION SURVEY RESULTS

Forty-two fire departments were surveyed to determine what those jurisdictions had done to reduce or eliminate the risks of operating fire service vehicles. The survey instrument consisted of ten questions (Appendix – A). Nineteen, or 45%, of the recipients responded. When asked if their state required the use of seatbelts, 95% responded affirmatively and 5% did not indicate. However, only 89% of the organizations mandate the use of safety restraint devices.

According to Wilbur (1998), driver-training programs such as mandatory response safety courses and defensive driving can help reduce accidents. Of the organizations responding, 79% require all drivers to pass a driver training program. Forty-seven percent of the respondents reported meeting the NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications, 63% met local requirements, and 37% reported meeting state standards. In addition, 47%

required drivers to re-qualify on a recurring basis.

Training programs should include, but are not limited to, emergency vehicle operations courses (EVOC) as well as a state recognized defensive driving course (Wilbur, 1998). Eighty-nine percent of the organizations surveyed require drivers to participate in a skill based driving course using the type of apparatus they are permitted to drive. However, the remaining 11% do not require a skill based driving course with specified apparatus.

Periodic checks on driver licenses can be used as a tool to prevent potential litigation. A Department of Motor Vehicle check should be done on each individual every three years. This report should be acquired from local sources by the fire district (Ayers, 1997). Of the responding organizations 68% conduct drivers’ license checks for violations.

When asked how many hours of initial training drivers receive, 47% reported requiring 25 or more hours, 31% require between eight and twelve hours, and 1% each require 13-20 hours and 21-24 hours. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents reported firefighters receive less than 15 hours of continuing education and or skills practice annually, and 26% reported 16-25 hours. When asked if their organization had a written standard operating procedure or guideline governing drivers or their training, 89% reported they did while 11% did not.

Unexpected Findings

During the research process the author discovered that there was a standard governing fire service vehicle operations training program. Published by the National Fire Protection Association, the intent of standard number 1451 is to outline a training program that produces drivers who are able to prevent vehicle accidents.

In addition, the research data revealed a stark contrast in the high number of volunteer firefighters killed and injured annually compared to the lower number of career firefighters. Alarmingly, 21% of the survey respondents did not require a driver training program and the majority (63%) of the driver training programs were governed locally. Only 47% meet or exceed the standards of NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications. Lastly, the research showed that safe emergency vehicle operation is not an American phenomenon, but transcends internationally as well.