Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Moscow Fails to Make Progress on Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Moscow Fails to Make Progress on Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh

Contributors: Patrick Armstrong, Vladimir Belaeff, Alexander Rahr, Anthony T. Salvia, Srdja Trifkovic

Last week Moscow made a significant effort to help advance the peaceful resolution of the two most intractable post-Soviet regional conflicts, centered around Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh. On June 21, Russia hosted the first official meeting in five years on the Transdnestr region settlement in the "5 + 2" format. But it proved to be disappointing, as negotiators were unable to agree on the resumption of the negotiating process. What did Moscow hope to achieve in taking on the two intractable conflicts? Why is there a sudden rush to finally resolve them?

In the “5 + 2” format negotiations, Moscow and Kiev act as guarantors of a peaceful solution to the conflict between Moldova and Transdnestr, the OSCE acts as a mediator, and the EU and the United States have observer status. But talks have not been held since 2006. During this time, the conflicting sides have gathered from time to time, thrown accusations at each other, and parted without making any decisions. Both sides see a different resolution – the Moldovans’ believe that the two banks of the Dnestr should be united, while the Transdnestr leadership is convinced that some kind of agreement on a civilized break-up needs to be reached.

Russia thinks that the solution of the problem should include preservation of neutral Moldova's territorial integrity within the borders of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic as of January 1, 1990. This is a position that President Dmitry Medvedev reportedly agreed to promote in order to expedite the settlement of the conflict in Transdnestr during his meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel about a year ago, in exchange for more robust German support for Russia’s concerns on European security.

However, the Moscow round of the “5 + 2” talks failed to make any progress, despite Russia applying heavy pressure on the leader of Transdnestr, President Igor Smirnov. Moscow wants to retire Smirnov by the end of the year and help elect a pro-Moscow speaker to Transdnestr’s Parliament – Anatoly Kaminsky.

Moscow upped the ante on Nagorno-Karabakh when President Dmitry Medvedev invited the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to a trilateral summit in Kazan on June 24. Furthermore, in accordance with decisions taken at the G8 summit at Deauville, France, U.S. President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy urged the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on some basic principles as a way to start resolving their dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The summit in Kazan was the latest and most advanced attempt to help Armenia and Azerbaijan to begin to end the intermittent violence that has lasted for 23 years and has recently flared up again. The two countries fought an armed conflict from 1988 to 1994, which Azerbaijan lost badly. Armenia captured about a fifth of its territory, including the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia continues to hold this land, from which all Azeris have long since fled or been expelled.

Yet, for at least the last couple of years, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and some of his ministers have engaged in a loud-mouthed, trash-talking contest with Armenia. Azerbaijan has spent the last several years rearming, spending more than the entire national budget of Armenia on its military. The resumption of hostilities is looking increasingly likely, perhaps, due to some miscalculation by one side or the other.

However, the talks in Kazan failed to produce the desired outcome – agreement on a framework to reach a final settlement, to be discussed in formal negotiations that would have been launched immediately following the trilateral meeting. The final communiqué was more than inconclusive and vague, which signals little progress on the framework for the final settlement, despite close cooperation and joint pressure by Russia, the United States and the EU. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev in particular staked a lot on this meeting, having personally worked on the draft framework agreement and having personally cajoled the two recalcitrant leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to come to Kazan.

What did Moscow hope to achieve in taking on the two intractable conflicts? Why is there a sudden rush to finally resolve them? Where is Moscow heading in Transdnestr, with its awkward position of undermining the people of Transdnestr’s aspiration to have their own state, and not join Moldova, which may finally seek reunion with Romania? Why is Russia selling out Tiraspol to please the EU? Is there some substance behind the rumor that Medvedev promised Merkel to help resolve the conflict in Transdnestr during his tenure in the Kremlin? But what does he stand to gain in return? What is propelling Medvedev to take such a pro-active position on Nagorno-Karabakh?

It is true that Medvedev has an excellent relationship with both presidents, and that Russia’s relationship with the two countries is important. But is that enough to profit from the settlement? Why is Medvedev staking so much of his personal reputation and political capital on these two obscure regional conflicts with less probability of success than Obama in his Israel-Palestine policy? Why is he rushing to deal with Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh? Is it a question of a Nobel Peace Prize, were Medvedev to really make progress on both fronts?

Alexander Rahr, Director, Berthold-Beitz Center For Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin

Dmitry Medvedev wants to continue as president, therefore he needs to demonstrate that he has a cohesive foreign policy and has overseen diplomacy, which has strengthened, not weakened Russia. So what will people remember of his foreign policy so far? A proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic architecture that received no direct response from the West? The war in Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (a step, which still has not been supported by any other CIS state)? The “reset” and START III negotiated with the United States? This is too little, as no real progress has been achieved on joint missile defense, so Medvedev needs more substance.

Libya is obviously too hot a potato and his envoy Mikhail Margelov has not been accepted as a genuine intermediary in the Libyan civil war. Now, with a few months to go before the presidential election, Medvedev has decided to tackle conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In Transdnestr, it seems, he is willing to move forward in a direction favored by the West, namely the elimination of Transdnestrian separatism and the full reunification of Moldova.

What is Russia getting in return for that? A visa-free regime, new talks on Medvedev's proposal on a joint Euro-Atlantic architecture, Western support for Medvedev's modernization drive, possible further international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and WTO membership. 

Medvedev has obviously lost interest in artificially supporting the Smirnov regime and he no longer sees any potential political gains there. Russia’s departure from Transdnestr, on the other hand, could lead to the collapse of the self-proclaimed republic, the reunification of Moldova, EU accession for Moldova, and the formation of a free-trade zone between Russia and the EU.
It is far more difficult to understand Medvedev's rationale behind taking on Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict today, because both sides are uncompromising in their position. Medvedev can't take the side of his military ally, Armenia, because he would then lose Russia's strategic energy policy ties with Azerbaijan. Nabucco, a pipeline which weakens Russia's energy power status in the south of Europe, would immediately become a reality. Another routine failure of talks over Nagorno-Karabakh will raise the question of why they were initiated without any fresh ideas in the first place.

Srdja Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor, Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture, Washington, DC

The problems of Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh are due to the arbitrary border-drawing mania during the communist era. For reasons never fully explained, those borders are still regarded as inviolable and effectively sacrosanct, even though the manner of their creation lacked both legality and legitimacy. Geographic, economic, historical, ethnic and cultural criteria would indicate that the natural border between Ukraine and Moldova is the Dnestr. As far as the West Europeans and Americans are concerned, however, the communist-era internal boundaries – which were turned into international frontiers 20 years ago – appear to be the only legacy of the Soviet Union worth preserving and upholding.

Russia is aware that the EU and the United States will not condone Moldova’s partition and that a solution has to be based on the recognition of Moldova’s 1991 borders. In return for such acceptance, Moscow can and should demand a solution based on a mix of federal and confederal elements. That solution should be based on the Åland Islands’ successful and time-tested model of extensive self-rule. These Baltic islands, inhabited by Swedes, are under Finland’s nominal sovereignty but they enjoy firm international guarantees of their special status. Those guarantees originated with the League of Nations 90 years ago and were reiterated by the United Nations after World War II.

Accordingly, Russia – jointly with Ukraine, because their interests in Transdnestr largely overlap – should propose that Transdnestr’s self-rule be anchored in a UN Security Council resolution and additionally guaranteed by the powers currently facilitating the negotiating process, and that it will be enshrined in a new Moldovan Constitution. Moldova’s sovereignty will be affirmed, but legislative powers will be divided between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and not delegated by Moldova to Transdnestr.

An important element of the Russian proposal should be that all Moldovan international treaties will be separately ratified by the Transdnestr Assembly. If they are not so ratified – e.g. if Moldova applies and is approved for NATO membership – such treaties will not be applicable to Transdnestr. It should be accepted by the parties that Transdnestr will have the right to declare independence if Moldova at some future date chooses to unite with Romania.

Carefully developed and effectively presented, such proposals could lead to a compromise which would protect the rights of Transdnestr’s citizens while maintaining the principle of inviolable borders. It is in Russia’s interest to have this long drawn out dispute settled, and a proposal broadly similar to the one suggested here has the potential to turn into a plus-sum game.

In a somewhat modified form the model above could also be applied to Nagorno-Karabakh, although it is to be feared that the threat of a violent escalation there is much more serious than on the Dnestr.

Patrick Armstrong, Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada

When the Soviet Union fell apart, five of Stalin’s cartographical time-bombs exploded. After the fighting, each of the five had secured its liberty: North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh, Transdnestr and Chechnya. Of these, only Chechnya has been resolved (for the time being anyway) but only after immense bloodshed and destruction. The other four maintain their independence.

The first is a contradiction between the two fundamental principles of international relations: territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. There is, however, no means of resolution when the two principles collide as they do in these four cases. As to a third principle, uti possidetis (“as you possess”), the “international community” seems to be too squeamish to accept that the four won their independence in war and are therefore entitled to keep it.

A second difficulty is the question of who sits at the negotiating table. This issue has particularly bedeviled attempts to resolve Karabakh. Karabakh is a player, so it cannot be left out of the talks. But Baku is adamant that it will negotiate only with Yerevan. That is understandable: for Baku to admit Stepanakert as a negotiator would be to concede much of what Stepanakert demands. Hence discussions fail because one of the principals – the most important, because it won its war – is not party to them.

A third difficulty is the status quo. The four, whatever their long-term hopes may be, prefer the status quo of self-government to the visible alternatives. Stepanakert’s incentive to make Baku happy or Tiraspol’s to make Chisinau happy is low.

Fourthly, whatever the casus belli may have been – unwillingness to join Romania in the case of Transdnestr and fear of massacres in the case of Karabakh – the four gained their independence in war and much blood was shed on both sides. They feel that they earned their independence. A possible solution to the Karabakh problem has been blocked by enraged war veterans on both sides several times.

Finally, there is no outside power that can “deliver” any of them. While much commentary in the West seems to assume that all of these problems were fomented or caused by Moscow, this is not true; they were sui generis. Neither Moscow nor any other outside power can force a solution on any one of the four parties.

Perhaps there were possibilities in the 1990s to peacefully resolve these problems. For example, Kiev wisely conceded autonomy to Crimea and Chisinau to the Gagauz and these potential problems were resolved in a civilized way. But, in the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnestr and Karabakh these possibilities were not available. (Moscow did negotiate an autonomy agreement with the Chechen Parliament, but Dzhokhar Dudayev would have none of it). And so it was left to war to resolve the problems.

I do not hold out much hope for any future negotiating session to overcome these obstacles. The irony is that the end-state – something resembling the arrangement of the Åland Islands for example – is visible. But it is hard to imagine, given the five obstacles, how to get there from here.

Anthony T. Salvia, Director, American Institute in Ukraine, Kiev

It is in the interest of Russia and Ukraine that the dispute over Transdnestr's status comes to an end, and in a manner that guarantees the rights of the Russian and Ukrainian majority.

Srdja Trifkovic has put forward a possible diplomatic solution entailing the extension of Moldovan sovereignty over Transdnestr, while the legislative powers of Chisinau and Tiraspol remain separate and distinct. The arrangement would be anchored in a UN resolution. Trifkovic's model is the Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea. Finland has nominal sovereignty over the islands while international agreements guarantee self-rule for the Swedish majority.

It's a creative approach to the problem, but no diplomatic solution along these or any other acceptable lines is possible in the absence of a willingness on both sides to alter rigid, long-held positions.

For Transdnestr’s part, this will require sweeping reforms to enhance its viability as a state.
But this will not happen as long as President Igor Smirnov remains at the helm. He has led the country into a dead end. The economy is in shambles, industrial infrastructure is in ruins, social services have collapsed, political competition is stifled and people are leaving the country for lack of any prospect of a decent life.

The economy is subsidized by Russian gas, for which Smirnov charges citizens and businesses, but does not bother to reimburse Gazprom. In addition, there is much corruption in the customs service, which is headed by Smirnov’s son. Smirnov has outlived his political effectiveness. His corrupt rule is a major barrier to international recognition of Transdnestr and the country's further development. Transdnestr needs new political leadership and sound economic management. It needs to modernize. It cannot do so with Igor Smirnov at the helm. A possible alternative is Anatoly Kaminsky, the leader of the country's largest political party, Renewal.

The presidential election in December will be a turning point: either the country will elect a pragmatic new leader, or it will be saddled with another five years of Smirnov. He would have the option of two more five-year terms once Transdnestr enacts a new Constitution in September. Transdnestr needs a free and fair presidential election in which Smirnov is not a candidate. The international community, particularly Ukraine and Russia, need to pressure Smirnov to step aside. If necessary, they should apply financial and economic pressure, including freezing the bank accounts and other financial assets of Smirnov and his key associates. This policy should be closely coordinated between Kiev and Moscow.

In any case, Russia and Ukraine would be well advised to play an active part in the defense of their interests in Transdnestr, and to closely coordinate policy with one another. Their ability to do so effectively has implications that transcend the resolution of this long-simmering dispute.

As Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov has pointed out, Russia's overriding interest is in peace on its borders so as to develop internally and put aside the consequences of 70 years of Marxist-Leninist misrule. The same is true of Ukraine. These common interests constitute a firm basis for long-term strategic partnership between both countries, which is key to Europe's strategic stability and energy security. To this end, Moscow and Kiev must deepen their policy coordination not only on Transdnestr, but also on a host of other vital political, security and economic issues of mutual interest.

Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA

Considering that Moscow acts as a facilitator, but is not really one of the deciding parties in the discussions, one would argue that Moscow did not “fail to make progress.” The failure to advance is the responsibility of the parties that must reach agreement: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and the Transdnestr. No matter how hard Moscow and the other facilitators may lobby and cajole, they cannot force an agreement on the parties – just as they would not be able to prevent an agreement should the abovementioned parties choose to resolve their respective disputes.

The two disputes have different characteristics, although they are both rooted in profound ethnic differences. It is a very serious mistake to consider the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute as just a few decades old. This conflict has a centuries-old history and was exacerbated by the Soviet government, which included (perhaps perversely) regions with majority non-Azerbaijani populations in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan’s “dynastic democracy” the late father of the current President Ilham Aliyev, also President and “father of modern Azerbaijan” Heydar Aliyev joined the Azerbaijan NKGB as far back as 1944. So the Stalin-era composition of Azerbaijan has strong personal significance in 21st century Baku.

The Armenian experience of ethnic persecution and genocide in the 20th century is a sorrowful backdrop to any discussion of territorial matters. The Armenian nation and international diaspora enjoys the friendship and respect of many countries in the world, including the G8. In these circumstances, just getting the leaders of the two countries to meet again in Kazan is already a major achievement. To expect closure to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue after a few meetings is unrealistic.

It may take decades and the evolution of new paradigms to develop a solution to the problem – provided no new clashes interrupt the process. The key mediation strategy for this issue is to maintain peace and to build mutual confidence and realism through repetitive interactions of the leadership. It took France and Germany 100 years and two horrible world wars to overcome the hostility rooted in Sedan in 1870. In this light, the recent meeting was not a failure for Moscow – yet another step in the dialogue was completed. No more, but also no less.

The Moldova-Transdnestr dispute is different. Here we face active Romania irredentism which views Moldova as “Eastern Romania” and refuses to recognize Transdnestr as a subject of national self-determination. A substantial (though not overwhelming) segment of Moldovan residents are also in favor of uniting with Romania, in particularly as the latter hopes to integrate with the EU (how likely is that integration in light of the crises of weak economies within the EU is a separate topic.)

The situation in the region reminds one of the enclave problems pre-World War II (the Sudeten, Silesia, Danzig and others). Romania is involved sotto voce and its issues with Hungarian minorities and the Transylvania question is also an eerie flashback to 1940. Given the declarations of some Bucharest residents, one should be wary of supporting Romanian international behavior, lest one be pulled into a vortex resembling 1938 to 1939.

Nevertheless, the Moldova-Transdnestr dispute has a chance of quicker resolution because its historical roots are less deep, and there are stronger economic incentives for both sides to find a modus vivendi. This cautious optimism is predicated on the containment of those hotheads who want to use force as a solution. Again, in the latest round of interactions Moscow has kept the process alive – which is the most important goal at this stage.

It is unlikely that a realist like Medvedev imagines a quick solution to these issues.