Russia sees Europe as a “patient”
http://rt.com/politics/press/rossijskaya-gazeta/russia-sees-europe-patient/en/
Published: 30 November, 2011, 08:43
Edited: 30 November, 2011, 08:45
Evgeny Shestakov
Political scientists predict Europe’s disintegration into a center and periphery.
While Russia is decisively moving toward Asia, China is making its way to Europe.
The Higher School of Economics has hosted a round-table discussion titled: “Europe after the European Union: What’s Next?”. Such formulation of the question had initially assumed the presence of Eurosceptics among the participants.
The report, compiled by the head of the European Integration Department at the MGIMO, Olga Butorina, left no stone unturned in the assessment of prospects for EU integration. In short, things in the Old World are looking grim: from economy – financial forecasters predict the euro will not survive until Christmas, to politics – where national egoism is preventing the EU leaders from making coordinated decisions.
There is no sense in reiterating the numerous arguments, showing the European Union’s inability to, under the current leadership, overcome the crisis within the framework of the existing integration models. Experts predict that, at the current rate of development, the national debt of most EU member states will amount to 200-250% of the GDP in the next 20-25 years. And social problems – unemployment, pension fund deficits – will put another nail in the coffin of the so-called “European idea”, which has not been able to overcome the Europeans’ national egoism.
Round table participants see the future of Europe in the “reincarnation” of the European Union, but with new unifying content. Meanwhile, the old European idea has, according to experts, “completely failed”.
In this situation, does Russia need to hold on to the patient, who is “more likely to die than live”? Moscow has announced its readiness to provide assistance to the Old World, but with one exception – it will not be issued directly, but through the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, without giving up its European identity, Russia plans to create more dynamic relations with the Asian countries.
While we are taking quantum leaps East, away from the weakening Europe, China is expanding its presence in the West. China’s Central Bank is considering a possible increase of the euro share in its foreign exchange reserves. Beijing is not excluding the possibility of purchasing Eurobonds in the event they are issued, with “certain assurances” from the EU leadership. The Chinese are not yet publically talking about investing in the rescue of the Eurozone, but they are making diplomatic statements, addressed to the European Union, about the desire “to assist one-another”.
Why are problems, experienced by the EU, worry Russia but not China? Perhaps, the reason is historic memory. Opinion polls show: many Russians continue seeing Europe as an economic competitor – a hostile force, united under the NATO bloc. But the Chinese have a different perception of the Old World.
Strategically, the weakening of the EU meets the interests of both Russia and China. But our conclusions, drawn from this situation, differ. Moscow, while seeing its main economic partner grow weaker, looks to Asia with hope – whereas, Beijing sees the problems in Europe as a chance to lift its own economy. The guarantees that China will get from the EU in the event of its purchase of the Eurobonds have not been publically disclosed. But one could assume that technologies and a share in some of the Old World’s most innovative enterprises will be part of these guarantees. China, just like Russia, is interested in modernization. It sees investments in Europe as a step, providing an impetus to its own economy. The obvious weakness and “inability” of the current EU leaders are seen in Russia as in insurmountable problem, and in China – as an opportunity to negotiate about future preferences.
At the round-table discussion, most experts agreed about the inevitability of a gradual collapse of the Eurozone with a possible emergence of two, or even several, currencies, formation of a progressive European center with an economically underdeveloped periphery. Such development of events turns Russia and China into competitors in the struggle for the potential riches of the EU – technologies, real estate, enterprises. In this struggle, Russia has an advantage – the country’s geographic location and a shared cultural identity with Europe. It is important not to waste resources: the shift toward the already-formed Asian markets, which have long been divided, is a long process without any guaranteed outcomes. Meanwhile, Europe, which remains Moscow’s main trade partner, looks like a much more attractive platform for long-term investments. The only remaining question is whether or not members of the European Union, some of whom continue holding on to the negative “historic memory” of Russia, will agree to accept our money and what guarantees the EU will present as “insurance” for the provided assistance. Or, Europe could prefer having the “historically neutral” China as its creditor, rather than its closest neighbor.
The great game is to avoid war in Iran
http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/11/30/the_great_game_is_to_avoid_war_in_iran_13852.html
November 30, 2011
Dmitry Babich
No other sphere of Russia’s foreign policy is subject to such wide-ranging scrutiny as Moscow’s policy towards Iran. Conservative American analysts in think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation often view Russia as a tacit ally of Iran, turning a blind eye to its dangerous nuclear programme and ignoring the Iranian regime’s aggressive form of Islamist fundamentalism.
Israeli government officials, when visiting Moscow, persistently point to the divergence of Russia’s national interests with those of Iran, citing Russia’s own troubles with Islamist fundamentalism in the North Caucasus and, earlier, in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Obviously pursuing their country’s national interest, those Israeli officials believe in the possibility of a return to the very cold peace that existed between the Soviet Union and Iran in the Eighties, when Moscow was very wary of the effect of Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings on its Muslim minorities.
So what is the Russian authorities’ attitude now? And where does Russia’s national interest in the Iranian question lie? The truth is that the Kremlin has been sending out a whole array of signals on the issue, some of which are contradictory. On the one hand, Russia stopped selling or transiting any kind of weapons to Iran, fulfilling UN resolution 1929, which was adopted in June 2010. This meant cancelling the contract to ship S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran, which could have helped the Iranians to challenge Israel’s superiority in the air. On the other hand, Russia finished the construction of the nuclear power station in Bushehr. Where is the logic?
Actually, the logic is very simple: Russia is concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. It has no sympathy for Islamist fundamentalism but, considering Iran is right next to Russia’s border and to the borders of Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic with a several million-strong Azeri minority in Iran, it is extremely keen to avoid a war breaking out on its doorstep. It is not too difficult to guess in which direction the Azeri minority would flee from Iran in the event of it being turned into a war zone. Azeris are already the biggest Muslim minority in Russia.
Hence Russia’s strong desire to see Iran at peace with other countries and to have a peaceful nuclear programme. Incidentally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which Iran is a signatory, obliges nuclear powers to help non-nuclear countries to develop the peaceful use of atomic energy. The balancing act between Iran and the West, which Russia has to perform, however, is becoming more and more difficult. It should be said that Iran has shown remarkable restraint in its reaction to a number of regional wars in which Russia has been a party in recent years. Unlike certain Western circles, Iran never provided help to anti-Russian mudjaheddin in Afghanistan or to the Chechen rebels, and it stayed largely neutral in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite an obvious temptation to show solidarity with its
Muslim brothers.
Tehran’s restraint in Russia- related issues is ever more laudable, since Iran historically has had little positive sentiment about Russia. Modern Azerbaijan had for centuries been a part of the Iranian empire, and Georgia was in its zone of influence until the Russian tsars wrestled the territories away from Iran in the early 19th century. In his childhood, Ayatollah Khomeini was a witness to the joint Soviet-British occupation of Iran in 1941. But despite the troubled history, Iran’s rhetoric on Russia is in most cases less critical than that of some members of the EU .
The recent Western interventions in Iraq, and even more recently in Libya, make Russia suspicious of what lies behind Western hostility towards Iran. Iranian restraint in Afghanistan and the Caucasus makes Russians somewhat sceptical about the information on Iran’s support for extremists in the Middle East – a region which is becoming more and more distanced and estranged from Russia. Hence Russia’s unwillingness to see Iran condemned and punished by the West according to the Iraqi or Libyan scenario.
Dmitry Babich is a political analyst at RIA Novosti.
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