During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the I, V, and VI Corps were "hollowed out" during the course of the buildup to provide troops for the Kuwaiti theater. The Iraqi VI Corps covered Iraq from south of Baghdad to the northern boundary of the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. It was responsible for the Majnoon Island area north of Basra and had a dedicated "Marsh Command" as part of the corps. At least one source claims [apparently in error] that at the time of the Gulf War the II Corps was responsible for the southern Iranian front,, and that VI Corps was responsible for the Syrian front, where it commanded a total of six infantry divisions of the regular army.
VII Corps
The Iraqi defensive organization continued for a short distance west of the Wadi al-Batin. The Iraqi VII Corps placed five infantry divisions on line there, supported by an armored division. However, the Iraqis did not anticipate a major attack in this area or further west. The terrain just west of the wadi they considered unsuitable for tanks, since there were lots of boulders and sabkhas of quicksand. (Initial terrain analysis by the CIA came to the same conclusion.) Moreover, there were no roads in this area, and the Iraqis firmly believed that units trying to operate away from roads in the desert would simply get lost. This view ignored the profound change which the introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS) had made in desert warfare. In addition, they anticipated that the Coalition would limit any offensive to Kuwait itself, because of Arab reluctance to attack other Arab states. As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. By the end of G + 1, five Iraqi VII Corps infantry divisions, one in US VII Corps zone in the tri-border area, were in jeopardy of being isolated on the front lines. The Iraqi 12th Armored Division, in front of the 1st UK Armoured Division, was engaged with Coalition armored forces as it attempted to maintain a LOC for the 47th, 27th, and 28th Infantry divisions along the US VII Corps eastern flank. From west to east in front of the Iraqi VII Corps, the 48th, 25th, 26th, 31st, and 45th Infantry divisions were engaged by American VII Corps armored and mechanized infantry divisions and rendered combat ineffective. By the end of G + 1, the Iraqi forward corps were assessed as combat ineffective - no longer capable of conducting a coherent defense in sector. It was apparent the Iraqi corps commanders could not see the battlefield and did not understand the scope and intent of Coalition ground forces operations. The Iraqi IV Corps could use forces in a limited counterattack, but was unable to offer more than isolated pockets of resistance. Iraqi front line forces had been outmaneuvered by the Coalition ground offensive. Baghdad Radio, at this point, reported that Saddam Hussein had ordered his forces to withdraw from Kuwait. In the American VII Corps' sector on 26 February the American 1st Armored Division fired heavy artillery and rocket preparatory fires into Al Busayyah shortly after dawn, and by noon had advanced through a sandstorm to overrun the small town. In the process, the American troops completed the destruction of the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division and, once in the objective area, discovered they had taken the Iraqi VII Corps headquarters and a corps logistical base as well. More than 100 tons of munitions were captured and large numbers of tanks and other vehicles destroyed.
IX Corps
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, a number of new divisions were raised from mobilized reserves and young volunteers. These units were temporariliy placed under the IX Reserve Corp and the X Reserve Corps. In late 1990 IX Reserve Corps deployed to southern Iraq with at least four divisions. The 47th Infantry Division and 48th Infantry Division were eventually deployed with VII Corps, while the 45th Infantry Division and 49th Infantry Division remained attached to the IX Reserve Corps, deployed at some distance from the front. Some sources suggest that at least one other unidentified division remained attached to IX Corps. Other sources suggest [probably in error] that the 26th Infantry Division, a unit of the regular Army, was attached to IX Corps [in fact it was almost certainly attached to VII Corps].
X Corps
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, a number of new divisions were raised from mobilized reserves and young volunteers. These units were temporariliy placed under the IX Reserve Corp and the X Reserve Corps. As many as eight reserve divisions remained in the vicinity of Baghdad under the command of the X Reserve Corps. Samarra was reportedly the site of the headquarters for X Reserve Corps.
1st Mechanized Division (1 - 27 Mech and 34 Armd Brigades)
As the ground offensive progressed, by 25 February 1991 Iraqi units' ineffectiveness became more clear. The Iraqi 36th Infantry, 1st Mechanized Infantry, and the 56th Armored Brigade established hasty defensive positions south/southwest of Al-Jahra, northwest of Kuwait City. During the Gulf War, the US 2d Armored Division's Tiger Brigade advance split the seam between the Iraqi III and IV Corps, overrunning elements of the Iraqi 14th, 7th, and 36th Infantry Divisions, as well as brigades of the Iraqi 3d Armored, 1st Mechanized, and 2d Infantry Divisions. During four days of combat Tiger Brigade task forces destroyed or captured 181 tanks, 148 armored personnel carriers, 40 artillery pieces, and 27 antiaircraft systems while killing an estimated 263 enemy and capturing 4,051 prisoners of war, all at a cost of 2 killed and 5 wounded. By 24 February 1991 Iraqi regular army units constituting the second echelon in Kuwait were directed to reposition themselves. Concealed by the dense smoke of the oil fires that were ignited beginning 21 February, parts of what was left of the second echelon of the Iraqi army -- 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, 3d Armored Division, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, the 10th Armored Division and the 12th Armored Division -- were in a movement toward Basrah. On 25 February 1991, the American I MEF advanced against the fiercest resistance it encountered during the ground offensive. In the American 2nd MARDIV sector, an Iraqi armored counterattack was repulsed by the 6th Marine Regiment using a combination of CAS, artillery, tanks, and TOW missiles. Attacked by aircraft as they formed for the attack south of Kuwait City, the Iraqis were reduced to less than brigade strength by the time they actually attacked the regiment. Attacking on schedule, the 2nd MARDIV, with the Tiger Brigade on the left, 6th Marines in the center, and 8th Marines on the right, advanced against elements of the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division and 1st Mechanized Division that had assumed defensive positions on the high ground to the north and northwest and in an area of buildings and fences known as the "ice-cube tray". Weather combined with intense smog from burning oil wells reduced visibility to a few yards. Fighting in near darkness, Marine M1s of the 2nd Tank Battalion (supporting the 8th Marines) and the Tiger Brigade, equipped with the M1A1 and enhanced optics, proved particularly successful at engaging armor at long ranges. Other Marine tank crews, in M60A1 tanks, relied on crew skill to outfight the enemy. In the "ice-cube tray", tanks and infantry cleared buildings and trenches at close ranges in the darkness, finally securing the area after 2200 against stiff resistance.
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