Saudi Disad



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ASU 2011

Steven Murray Saudi DA

***Saudi Disad***


***Saudi Disad*** 1

***Saudi Disad*** 1

1NC Saudi DA 4



1NC Saudi DA 4

***Uniqueness*** 6



***Uniqueness*** 6

UQ – US-Saudi relations Low 6



UQ – US-Saudi relations Low 6

Relations UQ – No one Trusts Anyone 8



Relations UQ – No one Trusts Anyone 8

***Links*** 9



***Links*** 9

2NC Link Wall 9



2NC Link Wall 9

Link – Democracy Assistance 10



Link – Democracy Assistance 10

Link – Arab Spring 11



Link – Arab Spring 11

Link - Bahrain 13



Link - Bahrain 13

Bahrain Link UQ 14



Bahrain Link UQ 14

Link - Shiites in Bahrain 15



Link - Shiites in Bahrain 15

Link - Appeasing Iran 16



Link - Appeasing Iran 16

Link – Egypt 17



Link – Egypt 17

A/T: Relations Resilient – Oil 18



A/T: Relations Resilient – Oil 18

A/T: Relations Resilient – Security 19



A/T: Relations Resilient – Security 19

***Impacts*** 20



***Impacts*** 20

2NC Proliferation 20



2NC Proliferation 20

Saudi Prolif Dominoes 22



Saudi Prolif Dominoes 22

A/T: Deterrence 23



A/T: Deterrence 23

A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable 24



A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable 24

A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb 25



A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb 25

A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable 26



A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable 26

Iran Prolif Good 27



Iran Prolif Good 27

Saudi Prolif Terrorism 29



Saudi Prolif Terrorism 29

Impact - Terrorism 30



Impact - Terrorism 30

Impact – Dollar Heg 31



Impact – Dollar Heg 31

Ext: Relz key to dollar heg 33



Ext: Relz key to dollar heg 33

EXT – Oil Security 34



EXT – Oil Security 34

Impact – Regional Power Projection 35



Impact – Regional Power Projection 35

Impact – Middle East Stability 36



Impact – Middle East Stability 36

Impact – China 37



Impact – China 37

EXT – China Fill-In 39



EXT – China Fill-In 39

***AFF Answers*** 40



***AFF Answers*** 40

Relations Low 41



Relations Low 41

EXT – No Link 42



EXT – No Link 42

US-Saudi Relations Resilient 43



US-Saudi Relations Resilient 43

EXT – Relations Resilient: Oil and Security 44



EXT – Relations Resilient: Oil and Security 44

Saudi Prolif Good - Iran 46



Saudi Prolif Good - Iran 46

Saudi Prolif Good - Stability 47



Saudi Prolif Good - Stability 47

EXT – Saudi Prolif Inevitable 48



EXT – Saudi Prolif Inevitable 48

A/T: Saudi Prolif – Incentive/Means 49



A/T: Saudi Prolif – Incentive/Means 49

A/T: Saudi Prolif – Iran Alt Cause 51



A/T: Saudi Prolif – Iran Alt Cause 51

Prolif: Not Bad 52



Prolif: Not Bad 52

A/T: China Aggression 53



A/T: China Aggression 53

1NC Saudi DA


Unique Link - pushing democracy assistance will collapse US-Saudi relations

Tarpley 2011 (Press TV interview with Webster Griffin Tarpley, author, journalist and lecturer from Washington, June 18, "Saudi Arabia alarmed by US intentions" http://www.presstv.com/detail/189582.html, SRM)

Webster Griffin Tarpley: Well, I think we have to start from the premise that the Saudi royal family is very afraid and they've been afraid of course for decades, but more recently they're very afraid because they've seen the Mubarak government brought down by a US-sponsored colored revolution run by Samantha Powell and Michael McDowell here from the National Security Council in the White House and they're horrified by that. So you could say that Saudi Arabia is in play and that's the big strategic factor at the present time. At the beginning of June we had a very interesting op-ed here in the Washington Post by Prince Turki al-Faisal saying that if the US blocks the creation of a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in September there would be disastrous consequences for US Saudi relations. And I take it that you look at Prince Bandar -- his trip to Pakistan and China -- Saudi Arabia is trying to find security solutions, which do not involve the US because they can see that the US is fomenting the troubles in Yemen; that the US has fomented the troubles in Bahrain -- both of those are means to destabilize the kingdom.


Relations decline over the Arab Spring will drive the Saudis to proliferate

Guzansky July 1st, 2011 (Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. He joined INSS after serving at Israel's National Security Council; "TEHRAN TESTS SAUDIS' NERVE ON NUKES", LEXIS, SRM)

UNTIL recently it appeared that US security guarantees would be a preferred alternative to Riyadh's pursuit of a nuclear option. However, the combination of Iran's steady nuclear progress and Riyadh's growing frustration with Washington's ``Arab Spring'' policies threaten to drive the Saudis in precisely this direction. As a leading Arab state and as Iran's ideological-religious rival and main competitor for regional influence, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to sit quietly should Iran obtain military nuclear capability. The same week that the UN nuclear watchdog raised new concerns of ``undisclosed nuclear-related activities in Iran'' it was reported that Saudi Arabia was to build 16 nuclear reactors at a cost of more than $US300 billion.
Saudi prolif leads to fast regional prolif

Center for Contemporary Conflict 2004 (“Conference on WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century” http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si_3_8/si_3_8_ruj01.pdf)

James Russell from the Naval Postgraduate School presented an argument that the strategic problems facing Saudi Arabia are causing it to consider acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the context of upgrading and/or replacing its CSS-2 missiles bought from China in the late 1980s. Russell outlined a set of changing strategic circumstances, which are combining to bring the issue of nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh. First, the U.S. relationship upon which Saudi Arabia’s security has been founded is in an uncertain state. Second, the region environment is becoming more threatening due to Iran’s nuclear aspirations and the prospect of a Shi’a-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and reduce the maneuver room available to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums. A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclear would cause a cascade of regional proliferation. Potential internal instability within the Kingdom also makes Saudi Arabia a particularly dangerous proliferation case. Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program, in addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestive of an interest in nuclear capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limited—the United Stated cannot push Saudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close. Discussions of the issue raised the question, “Are Saudi nuclear noises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?


Rapid prolif causes pre-emptive nuclear war.

Heurlin 2005 (Jean Monnet Professor of European Security and Integration at the Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen, and Sten Rynning, "Missile defence", p 162-3)

Arms control and non-proliferation regimes have often been criticized for delaying but not preventing proliferation. However, delay may be worth while, as rapid proliferation in principle creates the most dangerous situations. Kenneth Waltz argued, in his famous and controversial |981 article, that more nuclear proliferation might be a better option than less, because the possession of nuclear weapons tends to make the politicians in charge more responsible and reduce the risk of war.” Yet Waltz also argued that rapid proliferation is extremely dangerous, as it encourages pre-emptive strikes in order to prevent the proliferation as well as leaving the nuclear newcomers without the necessary security measures. By 2004, the basic Waltzian argument on the positive effects of proliferation still holds for major powers. However, we have had negative experiences in the Middle East with respect to the use of non-nuclear WMD, and terrorists have appeared on the international stage. Terrorists are actors different from states and governments, and except for nationalist terrorist groups, they do not have territories to defend. They are thus comparatively free to act in the era of proliferation, and a broad range of counter-proliferation measures are therefore to be preferred in addition to the cost-enhancing MD project.




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