Space shuttle contingency functional
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TEAM - ZARAGOZA LANDING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TEAM - DOD / EMERGENCY LANDING SITES (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE PatrickATRICK AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 ANNEX K TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
1. General. This annex describes planned communications for DOD contingency operations supporting Space Shuttle missions. It also identifies support required by reference a. for participating DOD elements and establishes general operating procedures which will be used during the execution phase of each mission. 2. Concept of Operations. a. The Support Operations Center (SOC) is the communications coordination point for all DOD contingency support operations. The DOD Communications Coordinator, call sign "CAPE OSBORN," located in the SOC, is the overall manager of the supporting communications system. This individual initiates activation of communications nets and directs real-time switching and conferencing of all circuits, both locally and at distant locations. b. During mission periods, the Landing Support Officer (LSO) at JSC and the Landing Recovery Director (LRD) at KSC provide the DOD interface with NASA for shuttle contingency support. From operating consoles within the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Mission Control Center (MCC), access is provided to appropriate NASA circuits as well as five full-period voice circuits leased by NASA for the DOD which interconnect the MCC with the SOC. These circuits are routed through the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) Communications Control Facility where they will be switched and conferenced, as necessary, for various mission support activities. c. The Eastern Range Communications Control Facility (CAPE COMM CONTROL) is the communications hub for point-to-point circuits linking the MCC, launch control center (LCC), and SOC with participating DOD contingency support forces, and for air/ground and ship/shore radio links as may be required. CAPE COMM CONTROL responds to requests from the DOD Communications Coordinator for real time changes to circuit configurations. Details of CAPE COMM CONTROL support requirements are contained in reference b. d. Communications between the MCC, the SOC, Edwards AFB, White Sands Space Harbor (WSSH), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) sites, launch abort sites (LASs), and DOD emergency landing sites (ELSs) will use a combination of NASA and DOD circuits. After the shuttle is committed to land at a selected site, high precedence Defense Switched Network (DSN) circuits may be established to provide additional communication capabilities, as required, for the DOD Manager. Record traffic will be accomplished by automatic digital network (AUTODIN). e. The primary means of communication with DOD ELSs will be by DSN and AUTODIN. These systems will be augmented, when necessary and feasible, by available assets of NASA and the DOD. Starting with receipt of the deployment order to implement this plan, and continuing throughout a mission, each augmented landing site (ALS)/ELS will communicate with the SOC via normal DSN and AUTODIN using appropriate precedence up to and including IMMEDIATE. f. When an emergency develops requiring an orbiter to land, the DOD Communications Coordinator can initiate DSN calls (up to a total of four) to the designated DOD landing site. FLASH precedence may be used, if necessary. After a call has been established, it may remain active and routed as required. These calls may also be conferenced at CAPE COMM CONTROL with circuits to the MCC or other circuits as designated. g. Following a bailout of the orbiter crew (Mode VIII), the communications mission is to provide an effective and reliable means of maintaining positive command/control to report all significant events during SAR operations. 3. Tasks and Responsibilities. a. Chief, DDMS Plans Division (DDMS-X), will: (1) Coordinate and arrange the activities of all communications required for DOD contingency support operations. (2) Ensure effective performance of communications facilities and assets committed for mission support. (3) Assist operational commanders in communications matters upon request. (4) Coordinate and arrange for additional communications, when required, to maintain an adequate DOD mission support posture. (5) Provide DOD communications coordinators for coverage at the SOC and at other locations, as required. (6) Coordinate action required for DOD navigational aid support. (7) Ensure proper and necessary frequency management. b. Director, Eastern Range (ER)/Commander, 45 Space Wing, will: (1) Provide communications support in accordance with reference b., as scheduled. (2) Refer any problems regarding DOD contingency support communications which cannot be resolved through normal channels to the DOD Communications Coordinator at the SOC. (3) Provide frequency management as required. (4) Provide protection of the NASA Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS) frequencies in accordance with Appendix 1. (5) Through the Commander, 45 Communications Squadron (45 CS): (a) Terminate two voice circuits from CCAFS on the Patrick AFB (PAFB) tactical switchboard for DSN and commercial access. Circuit termination should have operator supervision. (b) Provide Telecommunication Service Request (TSR) support for activation and turn down of four FLASH precedence dedicated DSN lines. (c) Provide a long-distance commercial toll account for DDMS Space Shuttle mission support. (d) Provide maintenance of the DDMS support consoles located at Patrick AFB. c. Director, Western Range (WR)/Commander, 30 Space Wing, will: (1) Provide communications support as scheduled and coordinated. (2) Refer any problems regarding DOD contingency support communications which cannot be resolved through normal channels to the DOD Communications Coordinator at the SOC. (3) Provide monitor capability of orbiter UHF communication with Honolulu tower during orbiter approach and landing at Hickam/Honolulu International Airport, HI. d. Commander, Air Combat Command (ACC) will: (1) Be prepared to provide an air-transportable satellite communication system with a capability of at least 55 channels to Cape Canaveral Air Force Station within 72 hours after a contingency landing. (Refer to Turnaround Functional Plan 3611-XX). (2) Provide mobile communications and navigational aids equipment as may be required to support contingency operations. (3) Render assistance to units providing orbiter contingency communications. (4) Provide operational UHF, VHF, and FM radios on all helicopters supporting operations IAW Annex C. g. Commander, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) will: (1) Ensure the Edwards AFB (EAFB) Contingency Coordinator's console in the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) control room has the following communications capability: (a) Talk/monitor on NASA Landing Field Prime (LFP) 1 and 2. (b) Monitor on NASA Air/ground (A/G) 1 and 2, NASA PAO Mission Commentary, and NASA Test Director (NTD) voice circuits. (c) Talk/monitor with DOD mission support aircraft on VHF and UHF nets. (d) A direct voice circuit with the EAFB Command Post. (e) Termination for the DDMS coordination voice circuit. (f) Provide a capability to communicate via secure voice on DSN and/or commercial telephone (STU III). (g) Provide a talk/monitor capability on the Edwards Medical Net and on 282.8 UHF/AM at the EMSS coordinator's console. (h) Provide a transceiver on the Edwards Medical Net for the crew van. (2) Provide termination for additional DSN calls as may be needed for support operations. (3) Provide a capability for the attending physician on board the rescue helicopter to talk on UHF or VHF frequencies during astronaut medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) flights. NOTE: This capability will be provided on a non-interference basis with normal flight operations. (4) Ensure that the on-scene commander (OSC) has the following communications available in the NASA-provided convoy command vehicle: (a) Talk/monitor with support aircraft on VHF and UHF. (b) Talk/monitor on on-scene commander net. (c) Talk/monitor with Edwards AFB Command Post. (d) Talk/monitor on fire chief net. (e) Talk/monitor on Security Police net. (5) Through the Commander, 95th Communications-Computer Systems Squadron: (a) Provide teletype communications support in accordance with paragraph 5. (b) Provide TACAN status in accordance with Appendix 2. (c) Provide the capability for the SOC to monitor 282.8, 243.0, 138.45 MHz, and EAFB fire/crash net via DSN circuits. f. Commander, 49th Fighter Wing (49FW), Holloman AFB, New Mexico, will ensure the OSC has the following communications available in the NASA-provided convoy commander vehicle: (1) Talk/monitor with support aircraft on UHF and VHF. (2) Talk/monitor on UHF point-to-point (267.3 MHz) with the WSSH contingency coordinator (WSSHCC) located in the Mission Control Center (King 1) and/or Building 300 at White Sands Missile Range. (3) Talk/monitor on the WSSH fire/crash net. (4) Talk/monitor with the on-scene security forces. (5) Through Commander, 49th Communications Squadron will provide teletype communication support in accordance with paragraph 5. g. Commander, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) will: (1) Provide teletype communication support in accordance with paragraph 5. (2) Provide two consoles in the MCC (King 1) for the WSSHCC and Emergency Medical Services System (EMSS) and/or three consoles in Building 300 for the WSSHCC, EMSS, and DDMS representative with the following communications capability: (a) A/G 1 (monitor only). (b) A/G 2 (monitor only). (c) Flight director (monitor only). (d) Public Affairs Office release (monitor only). (e) White Sands Test Facility coord. (f) WSMR range command net. (g) LFP 1. (h) LFP 2. (i) DDMS UHF 282.8 or 259.7. (j) DDMS UHF 267.3. (k) DDMS VHF 138.45 - Salinas. (l) DDMS VHF 138.45 - C station. (m) WSSH fire/crash. (n) DDMS coord. (o) Spare. (p) Red phone ring down to Holloman AFB command post. (q) Class A telephone with DSN and commercial telephone access. (3) Provide the capability to interconnect incoming DSN circuits with active radio channels, as requested by the DOD Communications Coordinator from the SOC. (4) Provide WSSH fire/crash base station at Andrea site for remote to consoles. (5) Provide protection of NASA MSBLS frequencies IAW Appendix 1. h. Commander, 496th Air Base Squadron (Moron AB, Spain) will: (1) Prepare facilities to accept, terminate, and extend FLASH DSN or International Switched Voice System (ISVS) circuits as requested by the DOD Communications Coordinator. (2) Provide teletype communications in accordance with paragraph 5. (3) Notify the DOD Communications Coordinator of any problems adversely affecting TAL site communications. (4) Provide post-landing communications support as shown in Turnaround Funcplan 3611-XX Annex K. (5) Provide TACAN status reports IAW Appendix 2. (6) Provide Mode VIII communications support IAW Appendix 1 to Annex K. (7) Record orbiter/tower UHF communications. (8) Provide space, wire pair, and an antenna pole for installation of NASA provided International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals, two UHF air/ground radios, and two UHF/FM base stations. (9) Provide for the use of datafax terminals by the NASA team. Equipment will remain on-site during non-mission periods and may be used by the DOD. i. Zaragoza AB (SAF), Spain, The DDMS Representative will: (1) Notify the DOD Communications Coordinator of problems with site communications. (2) Relay TACAN status reports which are provided by the SAFLO. j. DOD ELS Commanders will: (1) Prepare facilities to accept, terminate, and extend FLASH DSN as requested by the DOD Communications Coordinator. (2) Provide teletype communications in accordance with paragraph 5. (3) Notify the Communications Coordinator of any problems with ELS communications. (4) Provide post-landing communications support as shown in Turnaround Funcplan 3611-XX, Annex K. (5) Provide TACAN status reports in accordance with Appendix 2. (6) Record orbiter/tower UHF communications. k. Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, and Director, National Guard Bureau, will provide operational UHF, VHF, HF, and FM radios on all HC-130s and helicopters supporting operations IAW Annex C. l. Commander, USAFE, will provide operational SATCOM, UHF, VHF and HF radios on all C-130s supporting tasking in Annex C. m. Commander, Forces Command (U.S. Army), will provide operational UHF, VHF, and FM radios on all U.S. Army helicopters supporting tasking in Annex C. 4. Voice Communications. a. General. (1) DSN, FTS, and ISVS systems will be used for communication between participating DOD activities where dedicated lines have not been established. (2) Commercial toll facilities may be used when deemed more expeditious in meeting mission needs. b. Procedures. (1) Starting at L-1 day and continuing throughout the mission, the SOC can be reached by calling DSN 467-9161 and 854-5276, or commercial 321-853-9161 and 321-494-5276. Should those numbers be busy, call the Patrick AFB operator at DSN 854-1110 or commercial 321-494-1110. (2) DSN calls from the DOD Manager's staff will be initiated at the SOC. Up to IMMEDIATE precedence is authorized for calls through mission termination. Up to FLASH precedence is authorized during a contingency. (3) Secure calls may be made to the SOC by first calling the number in para 4.b.(1) above and obtaining the current STU III phone number. (4) The DDMS phone bridge can be reached at DSN 854-9401 or commercial 321-494-9401. This will be active prior to a launch at L-1 hour 30 minutes for initial contact with DOD east coast launch abort sites and P-3 units, and again at L-15 minutes through “Negative TAL” and release of DOD forces. c. Call Signs. Call signs have been established for all major participants in the SOC. Appendix 4 lists applicable call signs. 5. Teletype Communications. a. General. (1) The AUTODIN system will be used for the exchange of record communications between participating DOD support activities. (2) All message traffic for DDMS pertaining to this plan will be forwarded to the DDMS PATRICK AFB FL//DDMS-X// (3) DDMS maintains an Address Indicating Group (AIG) for Space Shuttle support as an economical form of addressing multiple commands. AIG 7016 is periodically updated and is recapitulated on an annual basis. Any changes in command addresses or routing indicators should be forwarded to DDMS-O as they occur. b. Message Handling. (1) DOD landing sites will establish procedures and coordinate with the servicing communications center to ensure expeditious handling of shuttle mission traffic. (2) IMMEDIATE precedence may be used for simulation and mission traffic starting at L-24 hours through mission termination. 6. Datafax Communications. Unclassified facsimile traffic may be sent to the SOC by dialing DSN 854-9648, or commercial 321-494-9648. The DDMS office fax number is DSN 854-2310 or commercial 321-494-2310.
Appendices: 1. Frequency Management and Protection 2. Navigational Aids 3. Call Sign List (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 3292-3239 15 February 2003 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION 1. General. DDMS assists the Joint Frequency Panel (JFP) in frequency planning, implementation, and management of DOD operational support to the Space Shuttle Program. This support normally consists of assuring the availability of those frequencies required during critical portions of the flight and especially the landing and post-landing operations. 2. Frequency Protection. The following is a listing of key frequencies used for Space Shuttle support:
* See Appendix 2 for specific TACAN channels. 3. The MSBLS is vital for landing operations at KSC, EAFB, WSSH, and at TAL sites. At those bases where the MSBLS equipment is installed, co-channel radiation should be restricted on distance measuring equipment (DME) frequency 15460 MHz, and MSBLS frequencies 15568 MHz (Ch 6) and 15616 (Ch 8) within a radius of 60 miles. 4. Should electromagnetic interference (EMI) be noted by the orbiter, and it is suspected to be caused by the DOD, it may be necessary on a case by case basis to request cooperation in locating the source and, if deemed necessary, temporarily suspend operations. Such actions will be coordinated by DDMS with cognizant agencies. 5. Harmful interference experienced by DOD forces supporting orbiter operations should be resolved at the lowest level, in accordance with local directives. If the EMI cannot be resolved locally, the DOD Manager's Communications Coordinator will be immediately notified of the problem at DSN 467-9161 or by IMMEDIATE precedence message. Upon receipt of this notification the victim may be directed to submit an EMI report or take other action as prescribed in Air Force Instruction 10-707, Spectrum Interference Resolution Program or other applicable service directives. 6. Information provided by DDMS prior to each mission details critical phases and times of events for each mission, which include launch windows, critical orbital events, landing opportunities, etc. These are events and times when interference-free operation is vital. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 NAVIGATIONAL AIDS 1. TACAN Support. a. The following DOD TACANs are required to be operational as scheduled in the DDMS Force Prepositioning Order:
b. The following NON-DOD TACANs are required to be operational for selected missions:
2. TACAN Operation. a. DOD TACANs identified in this FUNCPLAN will be operated and maintained IAW DOD and command directives, as appropriate. Changes to those DOD TACANs designated for orbiter support operations must be validated by the DOD Manager prior to implementation. An operational TACAN is mandatory for an orbiter landing. b. DOD TACANs supporting orbiter operations will conform to military standards and tolerances. c. Status Reporting. The operational status of DOD operated TACANs identified in this FUNCPLAN will be monitored throughout the mission. All DOD stations supporting shuttle operations IAW the DDMS Operations order will report status at launch minus 7 days in the Organizational Readiness Report. Any subsequent change in operational status will be reported immediately. Status of non-DOD TACANs overseas will be obtained on an "as needed" basis. See paragraph 2.c.(5). (1) Holloman AFB TACAN. Status will be reported to the Holloman AFB Command Post and relayed to the SOC with the Landing Site Status Report. (2) Edwards AFB TACAN. Status will be reported to the EAFB Contingency Coordinator in the DFRF Control Room and relayed to the SOC with the Landing Site Status Report. (3) Patrick AFB TACAN. Status will be reported to the DOD Communications Coordinator at the SOC. (4) ALS/ELS TACANs. Status will be reported to the designated ASCO for relay to the SOC. The ASCO, at overseas sites, will attempt to obtain the status of non-DOD TACANs through normal ATC channels. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 CALL SIGN LIST
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 ANNEX L TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 SECURITY
1. General. a. Security operations in support of the Space Shuttle can be divided into several categories, i.e., protection level resources, protection of classified payloads, local traffic/crowd control, and security for safety reasons. The orbiter (OV) and the shuttle carrier aircraft (SCA) require special protection because they are high visibility national assets. The OV and SCA are designated as priority "A" or force protection priority level 1 (PL1) assets. DOD security forces should provide appropriate security measures, people, and equipment commensurate with a PL1 asset and current threat conditions. Security support plans must provide for positive and complete control over a designated orbiter restricted area in order to prevent overt, covert, clandestine, or any other unauthorized entry into the area. This annex defines the minimum Space Shuttle security support criteria for planning purposes. Additional payload security requirements will be identified by the Payload Program Office and incorporated into fragmentary orders published prior to each mission. The commander responsible for security at each potential orbiter-landing site should take into consideration the existing local environment and local threat and apply more stringent criteria when the situation demands. b. The use of force by security forces on DOD installations will be IAW DOD Directive 5210.56, Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, dated February 1992. Normally, security force personnel shall use the minimum degree of force necessary, up to and including deadly force, to prevent damage, loss, or compromise of Space Shuttle mission critical components. Deadly force shall be used as a last resort after all other means have failed. 2. Tasks and Responsibilities. a. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. (1) NASA KSC is responsible for all appropriate security support activities within the confines of KSC and the KSC local contingency area. The geographical dimensions of this area are described in Appendix 2 to Annex C. (2) The Shuttle Operations Management Center is responsible for interfacing and coordinating with the DDMS Support Operations Center (SOC) and appropriate civil law enforcement officials to provide security augmentation in the event an orbiter crash occurs off KSC property but within the KSC local contingency area. (3) NASA KSC is responsible for planning and implementing security requirements for non-DOD augmented landing sites and emergency landing sites. (4) For DOD sites, NASA KSC security representatives will act as an advisor for NASA security requirements and coordinate additional security requirements with the DDMS representative. For this purpose, Zaragoza Air Base, Spain, is considered a DOD site. b. Augmented Landing Sites. (1) The local host installation commanders are responsible for implementing DOD security support activities within the confines of their respective installations (EXCEPTION: first 24 hours at WSSH provided by 49th FW). Specific support to meet security requirements will be provided IAW the provisions of this annex and with locally developed plans. (2) The local DOD on-scene commanders (OSC)/airfield support coordination officers (ASCO) are responsible for ensuring effective and timely coordination with local law enforcement agencies/host country officials to provide security in the event an orbiter crashes off the installation, but within the accepted local search and rescue (SAR) area. Security operations within this area will be conducted IAW the provisions of local disaster preparedness plans and applicable local/host country agreements. Additional security augmentation may be requested, if necessary, through the SOC. c. Emergency Landing Sites. (1) The local host installation commanders are responsible for implementing security support activities within the confines of their respective installation. Specified support to meet security requirements will be provided initially with existing resources IAW the provisions of this annex. (2) The local host installation security officers are responsible for ensuring effective and timely coordination with local law enforcement agencies/host country officials to provide security in the event an orbiter crash occurs off the installation, but within the accepted local SAR area. Security operations within this area will be conducted IAW the provisions of local disaster preparedness plans and applicable local/host country agreements. Additional forces to augment local security may be requested, if necessary, through the SOC at (DSN 467-9161). d. Remote Area Contingency. An orbiter flight termination occurring outside the areas addressed above is considered to be a remote area contingency. Normal SAR response and established security procedures apply to orbiter remote area contingencies. (1) Inland SAR Region (CONUS). The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) acts as the federal agency responsible for directing and coordinating Federal SAR activities within the inland region of the Continental United States. A remote orbiter crash within the inland region will require a SAR mission of national importance. Upon locating the orbiter, AFRCC will contact the local authorities to establish initial security. The DOD Manager will initiate additional security measures through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). (2) Overseas SAR Region. DOD area commanders are responsible for conducting U.S. SAR activities within their respective overseas regions. All U.S. SAR activities conducted within a foreign country are closely coordinated with the host country's SAR authorities. SAR and associated security support activities in response to an orbiter crash within a friendly foreign country will be conducted IAW applicable international agreements and in close coordination with host country authorities. The State Department and appropriate U.S. embassies will be made aware of Space Shuttle orbital flights and the possibility of contingencies occurring in foreign countries. These agencies should be called upon to assist in obtaining foreign clearance and arranging for crash site security. (3) Combatant commanders will exercise operational control of forces during recovery contingencies involving interference or the use of force. Specific contingency/security response activities under these circumstances will be as directed by the CJCS. Additional guidance on this subject is provided in reference b. e. End-of-Mission Sites. Edwards AFB and White Sands Space Harbor are End-of-Mission (EOM) landing sites. These sites have a landing support convoy of vehicles and personnel, orbiter landing aids, dedicated rescue forces, and other support as required by NASA. Because of the terrain features associated with the landing, convoy, and turnaround area(s), special consideration should be given to: (1) Helicopter support. (2) Convoy procedures. (3) News media authorization, control, and escort procedures. (4) Public viewing, if allowed. (5) VIP procedures. (6) Astronaut protection and escort procedures. (7) Traffic and crowd control. (8) Medical support (location/means of transportation). (9) Public affairs. (10) Salvage assessment and payload safeguard. f. Shuttle Ferry Support Landing Sites. (1) The local host installation commanders are responsible for implementing DOD security support activities within the confines of their respective installations. Specific support to meet security requirements will be provided IAW the provisions of this annex and with locally developed plans. (2) The local DOD on-scene commander (OSC) is responsible for ensuring effective and timely coordination with local law enforcement agencies/host country officials to provide security in the event an orbiter crashes off the installation, but within the accepted local search and rescue (SAR) area. Security operations within this area will be conducted IAW the provisions of local disaster preparedness plans and applicable local/host country agreements. Additional security augmentation may be requested, if necessary, through the SOC. 3. Security Force Personnel and Equipment. As a minimum, the following personnel and equipment should be provided: a. On-Site Security. (1) OV (or a mated OV/SCA). (a) The OV (or OV/SCA) should be parked in an isolated area (preferably the hazardous payload area) which will allow the SCA to taxi to/from the parking area without towing. If possible, this should be in a restricted area enclosed by security fencing. (b) One two-man mobile exterior Security Response Team (SRT), with immediate response capability. (c) Establish a 200' entry control perimeter using ropes and stanchions and three close boundary sentries (CBSs): Two interior CBS and one CBS positioned at the entry control point. If local intelligence indicates an increased threat, additional boundary sentries and response forces will be assigned. (d) If vehicle towing is required, provide three one-man mobile SRTs as required: one lead and one trail patrol vehicles and a vehicle to conduct a security sweep of the convoy route. (e) During hours of darkness, the parking area will be light using available ramp lights and/or portable security lights (4 recommended). (2) SCA (without OV). (a) Establish a entry control perimeter using ropes and stanchions at least 50' from the SCA and two close boundary sentries (CBSs), one as an entry controller. If local intelligence indicates an increased threat, additional boundary sentries and response forces will be assigned. (b) One two-man Security Response Team (SRT), capable of immediate response. (3) Payloads. While the payload is on the orbiter, the security provided for the orbiter is sufficient. When payloads are outside the OV security zone, protection measures will be established as required and should include: (a) When the payload is moved, two one-man mobile SRTs are required, one as lead vehicle and one as trail vehicle. (b) While awaiting transportation, establish an entry control perimeter with two CBS, one used as a entry controller. (c) One two-man SRT. b. Security Force Qualifications. Security force members selected to provide physical security for the orbiter, SCA, and payloads at DOD installations must meet the following minimum requirements (whenever possible): (1) U.S. citizenship. (2) Primary duty in security or law enforcement. (3) Qualified with assigned weapon. (4) Secret clearance. (5) Security personnel supervisors involved in orbiter landing operations will be trained IAW the DDMS Training Plan. Security supervisors will provide appropriate briefings to security personnel regarding orbiter hazards and safety procedures. c. Security Equipment Requirements. (1) The Security Forces personnel will have vehicles which are compatible with the local operational environment. Vehicles will be clearly marked and equipped with emergency lights, siren, mobile radio, and loudspeaker system. (2) A portable non-tactical radio for each assigned post and patrol. (3) Security forces members will be armed with an M-16 and the applicable amount of ammunition as identified in service directives. (4) Ropes and stanchions or other suitable barriers are required for each restricted area. Local plans tailored to local conditions will determine the amount of rope and stanchions required to support the mission. (5) Sufficient restricted area signs or other appropriate warning signs (1' x 2') are required for each restricted area. Signs should be posted every 100 feet along the perimeter and at each corner of the restricted area. Signs must be in English and, when appropriate, in the host nation language. (6) Approximately eight National Defense Area signs and an entry control point sign are required if a contingency flight termination occurs off installation within the United States, its territories or possessions. (7) Four NF-2 light units, or equivalent, should be used to provide lighting around the orbiter or SCA/OV. If existing hangar or ramp lighting is adequate, fewer lighting units may be used. (8) Other individual equipment such as helmets and body armor should be available. 4. Primary, Secondary and Augmented Landing Site Security Support Operations. Be prepared to address security concerns listed in paragraph 2.e. above for EOM landing sites. Forces will accomplish the following: a. Prelanding Operations. (1) A defined area containing runways and the staging area for landing support and rescue operations will be established and entry into the area will be controlled by an Entry Authority List (EAL). This can be accomplished by controlling access routes and providing surveillance over likely avenues of approach. Preferably, only one entry control point will be established. (2) As a minimum, 24 hours prior to landing, a close visual check of the full length of runway(s) will be made to detect any foreign object that could damage the orbiter. Controlled areas will be checked to identify any unauthorized personnel. Visual checks should be made with the assistance of helicopters, if available. b. Initial Landing Operations. Immediately upon orbiter roll out, a restricted area will be established. Size of the area will depend upon existing hazardous conditions as determined by the OSC. A 2000 ft radius may be used for planning purposes. NOTE: A U.S. citizen with a secret clearance must remain with the orbiter from landing through arrival of the NASA Deployed Operations Team (DOT). c. Towing/Convoy Operations. Security protection must be maintained during ground movement of the orbiter, SCA/OV, payload, and airborne support equipment (ASE)/ground support equipment (GSE). (1) Conduct a visual check of the tow route for safety and security hazards immediately prior to convoy operations. Periodic sweeps of the tow route, especially in wooded areas or in terrain with reduced visibility, will be accomplished by helicopter, if available. (2) Provide a lead and trail patrol vehicle. Should the convoy stop, the entry control and close boundary functions will be performed by the patrols. (3) Have rope, stanchions, and signs to set up a restricted area should the convoy stop. (4) Maintain an immediate response capability consisting of a two-man SRT (orbiter only). d. Payload Operations. All orbiter payloads will be protected as high value and sensitive equipment. The following are additional requirements for DOD payloads: (1) The team leader of cargo operations will prepare and authenticate Entry Authority Lists and only U.S. citizens with a secret clearance will be given access to the payload bay. This EAL will also be authenticated by a security forces member in the grade of E-6 or higher. (2) Access to the orbiter crew compartment is limited to U.S. citizens with a secret clearance until covers are attached to the windows with visual access to the payload bay. (3) Access to the restricted area will be controlled by U.S. security forces personnel with a secret clearance. Only U.S. citizens with a minimum of a secret clearance will be granted unescorted access. Personnel granted unescorted access will be listed on an authenticated EAL by security forces personnel in the grade of E-6 or higher. Personnel not having a secret clearance will be escorted and will not be given access (to include visual access) to the payload bay, classified material, or ASE/GSE. (4) When the payload is removed from the orbiter, measures will be taken to ensure visual access to the payload and ASE/GSE is denied. (5) The payload will be stored in a facility under U.S. control, if possible. When the payload is in storage, establish a restricted area and man IAW paragraph 3.a.(3). Entry to the area will be limited to U.S. citizens with a secret clearance whose names appear on an Entry Authority List authenticated by the appropriate payload manager and security forces personnel in the grade of E-6 or higher. Where available, facilities will be provided for the storage and destruction of classified material. Local security plans will detail the capability for storage and destruction of classified material and the availability of secure voice and data communications. Host installation security officers will brief arriving NASA/DOD personnel on the current threat assessment and procedures to follow in the event a team member is approached by someone attempting to gain information. Personnel will not discuss classified information with anyone outside the NASA/DOD team. Discussions involving unclassified information will be limited to a need-to-know basis. e. Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA). (1) A restricted area will be established for the SCA (without OV) immediately after landing and should be marked by ropes and stanchions no closer than 50 feet from the SCA in each direction. One U.S. CBS, to provide entry control and one CBS will be posted around the SCA. (2) A visual inspection of the runway and taxiway will be conducted prior to landing and takeoff. f. Ferry Flights. DOD is responsible for providing security at a DOD installation: Immediately upon landing of the Ferry Flight pathfinder aircraft, the DDMS Ferry Flight Officer, NASA Security Officer, and NASA Safety Representative should be met by the Airfield Operations Manager and a base security representative. They will be provided samples of the mission specific ferry badges by the NASA Security Officer and the Entry Authorization List (EAL). The host security officer will provide on request a current threat assessment. Park the SCA/OV in a clear secure area defined by a 700 foot radius. This area must remain secure until NASA Safety personnel have declared the SCA/OV "safe.” A restricted area extending 200 feet outward from the wing tips, nose, and tail of the SCA will be established using ropes, stanchions, and "Restricted Area" signs. All personnel on the approved mission specific EAL shall be authorized access with escort privileges into the 200 foot restricted area. Access should be permitted when presented with a picture identification badge and the mission specific ferry badge. Taxiing aircraft and official airfield vehicles must remain outside the 200 foot restricted area. Security lighting will be provided during hours of darkness. Should the landing of the SCA/OV result in a media event where the press and/or the public are afforded viewing privileges, local procedures must be established to control media, crowds, spectators, and possible public disturbances. Refer to public viewing, section annex F, appendix 2. The following procedures applies: (a) Any press/viewing site should be located outside the clear zone. (b) Any vehicle "drive by" viewing will not violate the clear zone. (c) If general public viewing is approved, a viewing site will be located no-closer-than 700. The distance is often greater and is dictated by the configuration of the landing site and the location of the SCA/Orbiter parking area. (d) Any public affairs plans developed to support ferry flight stopover locations should be consistent with the above requirements or instructions. g. Entry Control Procedures. (1) During all orbiter operations, the number of personnel allowed into the restricted area must be strictly controlled. Personnel must exchange their NASA/DOD identification picture badge for a hazardous operations exchange badge at the EOM site. The security entry controller will not admit more than the maximum number of personnel allowed to enter without concurrence of the NASA Operations Manager. Upon leaving the restricted area, all personnel will surrender the hazardous operations badge and retrieve their picture badge. (2) Smoking is not permitted within the area. Flame producing devices must be surrendered before entering the restricted area and placed in a metal container. (3) Access to the restricted area will be limited to fire/crash/rescue personnel until the arrival of the DOT. NASA security representatives on the DOT will brief DOD security personnel on entry control procedures. h. Traffic/Crowd Control. It is essential that all runways be available to orbiter flight crews during approach and landing and that there be no interference with normal and contingency post-landing operations. A traffic control plan must be developed to meet this requirement. Local procedures must be established to control media, crowds, spectators, and possible public disturbance. Develop plans in coordination with DOD public affairs, NASA representatives and local security directives. i. Off-Site Security. Off-site refers to security operations required off designated landing runways, taxiways, parking areas, hangar facilities, etc. In addition to the on-site security identified in paragraph 3.a., security managers will be prepared to support off-site operations. Off-site security operations will normally be conducted IAW appropriate national or international procedures, disaster preparedness plans, or local security operational plans and instructions addressing appropriate security for that specific protection level resource. For security operations within the United States and its territories or possessions, commanders may designate a contingency site off federal property a National Defense Area and conduct operations IAW references a., f., and local command directives. (1) Within the Designated Local Contingency Area. (a) Security will be an integral SRT of contingency response force (CRF) operations within the designated local contingency area. Security managers will develop procedures to respond with the CRF and secure a contingency site. See Annex C. (b) Response will be coordinated with the appropriate DOD OSC so as to not impede rescue operations. (2) Outside Designated Local Contingency Area. (a) There are no specific dedicated security forces required for response outside the designated local contingency area. Responses will be as required to fit the particular situation. (b) Requests for response will be initiated by the SOC through the NMCC. Specific support requirements will be coordinated at that time. j. DOD Medical Facilities. The following are minimum requirements that will be used at DOD medical facilities for the protection of astronaut flight crew members, their families and recovered property in the event of a landing or mishap. (1) The Base Security Commander should appoint an astronaut protection liaison officer to coordinate with NASA Security in the event that emergency support becomes necessary. (2) Escort and traffic control plans should be established by the Base Security Commander and coordinated with local area law enforcement agencies in the event of a mishap. (3) In the event that the astronauts are evacuated to a DOD medical facility, they must be isolated from other patients (preferably in a private room) and protected by security forces personnel. A NASA Security Representative will coordinate the details of access control and security requirements with designated authorities. (4) Items removed from astronauts (i.e., personal items, clothing, etc.) must be labeled and stored, preferably in sealed plastic bags, in a designated secured area. (5) Unarmed NASA uniformed security personnel can supplement local law enforcement/hospital security upon request. (6) DOD medical facilities must coordinate the release of all information to the public and news media with a NASA Public Affairs Representative. (7) Local law enforcement or DOD hospital security personnel may be required to provide VIP protection for astronaut family members if requested by NASA Security. (8) A secure waiting area (room) should be provided for astronaut family members. (9) DOD medical facilities should provide appropriate space for a command post within the facility to be utilized by NASA Security, the mishap team, public affairs office and local law enforcement personnel. 5. Emergency Landing Site Initial Security Support Operations. Immediately upon orbiter roll-out, a restricted area will be established. Size of the area will depend upon the existing hazardous conditions as determined by the OSC. A 2000 ft radius may be used for planning purposes. NOTE: A U.S. citizen with a secret clearance must remain with the orbiter from landing through arrival of the NASA DOT. Prepare to address security concerns listed in paragraph 2e above for EOM sites. a. Unless proper towing equipment is available, the orbiter will remain at the full-stop location until this equipment can be obtained or the NASA Rapid Response Team (RRT) arrives. The restricted area will be maintained and access limited to essential fire/crash/rescue personnel, or the orbiter crew. b. If possible, security should be provided IAW paragraph 3.a.(1). If manpower is not available to meet these requirements, reference should be made to the local base priority checklist and afforded the appropriate security for that specific protection level resource. c. The NASA security representative on the NASA RRT will coordinate follow-on security requirements and provide appropriate access lists. 6. Security Administration. Local support plans published at primary, secondary and augmented landing sites will include appropriate security and traffic control annexes. Provide a copy of support plans to: a. HQ AFSPC/SF, 150 Vandenberg Street Suite 1105, Peterson AFB, CO 80914-4560; HQ USSPACECOM/J34, 250 South Peterson Blvd, Ste 116, Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3040, HQ SMC/SDA, 2420 Vella Way Suite 1467, Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659; and DDMS, 1201 Edward H. White II Street Room S-107, Mail Stop 7101, Patrick AFB, FL 32925-3239. b. Questions regarding this annex should be directed to the DOD Manager's Assistant for Space Shuttle Support Security (HQ USSTRATCOM/J34), address same as above. Telephone DSN 692-5528 or commercial 719-554-5528. c. Direct coordination between tasked organizations is authorized. Keep DDMS, Patrick AFB, Florida, and the DOD Manager's Assistant for Security, AFSPC/SF, informed on all Space Shuttle security support planning activities. d. Security Incident Reporting. Reporting of all incidents affecting the security of the orbiter, payload, SCA, or any of the associated equipment will be reported IAW local directives. The DOD Manager, HQ AFSPC/SF, DDMS, HQ SMC/SDA, and NASA KSC Security will be an addressee on all reports.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003 ANNEX P TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 Directory: main main -> Thirteenth Maine Regiment main -> Sra: Imagine It!, Themes, Taking a Stand, Ancient Civilizations Ecology, Great Expectations, Earth in Action, Art and Impact, Level 6 main -> The Significant Properties of Software: a study main -> Temperature and somatic growth effects on otolith growth of larval Atlantic menhaden, Brevoortia tyrannus main -> Jl. K. S tubun 2c no. 57 Petamburan Jakarta Barat main -> Why did they commit this attack main -> Untying the Knot? Assessing the compatibility of the American and European strategic culture under President Obama main -> Sra: Imagine It!, Themes, Risks and Consequences, Nature's Delicate Balance, a changing America, Science Fair, America on the Move, Dollars and Sense, Level 4 [Grade 4] main -> The Internet on Strike Katrin Henry Download 2.5 Mb. Share with your friends:
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