Space shuttle contingency functional
Y. Acronyms/Abbreviations
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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- 15 April 2001
Y. Acronyms/AbbreviationsZ. Distribution (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICE Patrick AFB FL 32925-3239 15 February 2003
TASKED ORGANIZATION The following organizations are responsible for planning and conducting or assisting appropriate DOD Space Shuttle contingency support operations within their capabilities:
SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS The organizations below are responsible for planning and conducting or assisting appropriate DOT, NASA, or USA Space Shuttle contingency support operations within their capabilities:
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEMANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUPPORT OFFICEPATRICK AFB FL 32925-323915 February 2003ANNEX C TO DDMS CONTINGENCY FUNCPLAN 3610-03 OPERATIONS
1. General. a. Support Categories. This annex identifies support provided by DOD for the Space Shuttle during launch, landing, on-orbit, and contingency operations. b. Definitions. (1) Abort-to-Orbit (ATO). An ATO is designed to allow the orbiter to achieve a temporary orbit that is lower than the normal. It requires less performance and allows time to evaluate problems and then choose either an early deorbit burn or an orbital maneuvering system (OMS) burn to raise the orbit and continue the mission. (2) Best Effort. In the event of a short notice tasking, DOD forces will mobilize all available assets to assist in the successful recovery of the orbiter and crew. There is no requirement to maintain an enhanced readiness posture to support a possible shuttle emergency other than the support specifically tasked by DDMS. (3) Contingency. An operational event requiring termination of a prelaunch, flight, or landing operation, which results in substantial damage to the orbiter and/or injury to personnel or has the potential to do so. (a) Local Area Contingency. A contingency occurring when the orbiter is under the control of the JSC Flight Director and the landing or flight termination point is within the designated local area of an augmented landing site (ALS) or emergency landing site (ELS). (b) Prelaunch Contingency. A contingency occurring when the orbiter is under the operational control of the Launch Director. (c) Remote Contingency. A contingency occurring when the orbiter is under the control of the JSC Flight Director, and the landing or flight termination point is outside the area defined in paragraph 1.b.(3)(a) above. (4) Deorbit Opportunities Table (DOT). The deorbit opportunities table is a computer generated list of all landing opportunities and the associated deorbit burn times for each orbit of a mission. It is normally produced by the LSO office and includes the scheduled mission duration plus 2 additional days. Primary Landing Site (PLS). Based on the DOT, the best deorbit opportunity for each day of a mission is determined and a daily primary landing site is selected by the LSO office. Crew wake-up, daylight, weather, sun angle, cross range, and backup opportunities are some of the criteria in the selection process. The contingency response forces will be alerted to support, at least 4 hours prior to the landing time, if a landing is required. During the mission, weather may require a change to the pre-planned PLS. This will be accomplished with no less than 24 hours notice. For launch day PLS, DOD convoy forces will remain ready to support until the OV is cleared for on-orbit operation (normally L+1:30 hour) and released by the DOD Support Operations Center (SOC). End-Of-Mission (EOM). Normally two landing opportunities are identified within a 3-hour period on the expected landing day. Based on mission progress, this will be identified for affected landing sites and support activities at approximately Ld-24 hours. (5) Landing Time. NASA will designate the planned landing time from the DOTs. DOD actions, based upon the landing time or landing sequence, will be referenced with Ld minus (Ld-) or Ld plus (Ld+) a given time. (6) Launch Time. NASA will designate the launch time. DOD actions, based upon the launch time or launch sequence, will be referenced with L minus (L-) or L plus (L+) a given time. After launch, the actual launch time and launch plus (L+) times are referenced to the actual launch time. In addition, NASA uses a "T Time" for countdown purposes which contains built in hold periods and, therefore, does not reflect the actual time remaining until launch. (a) Launch Period. A time span, during which launch is intended to occur, for which the Eastern Range is reserved to support launch. This period, normally 4 hours, is used to specify airspace closures, notice to mariners, and other warnings to non-launch related organizations and individuals. (b) Launch Window. A specified period of time during which a launch must occur to satisfy technical constraints and payload requirements. (7) Sites. See Appendix 1. (a) Abort-Once-Around (AOA) Site. An AOA may be executed if the orbiter does not have enough energy to attain nominal orbit but can maintain a suborbital flight path or if a systems failure will not allow on-orbit operations. The orbiter will make one revolution around the earth, reenter, and land at one of three identified AOA sites. An AOA takes approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes. (b) Augmented Landing Site (ALS). ALSs have shuttle unique landing aids, Space Shuttle-trained fire/crash/rescue forces, NASA representation, and other support as called for by NASA. ALSs support transoceanic abort landings (TALs), AOA landings, daily PLS, and EOM landings. (c) Emergency Landing Site (ELS). These sites offer a landing location for emergency landings. Most of these sites do not have prearranged support. Only a clear runway and an operational TACAN or DME is required. ELSs would be used primarily for a major system malfunction. Currently there are 55 ELSs, of which 23 are DOD sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C). Annex C identifies ELSs that also provide LAS support. DOD ELSs are normally preferred over non-DOD sites because of the availability of organic security, medical, and turnaround infrastructure. ELSs will develop plans to ensure the airspace (defined in Tab A, Appendix 1 to Annex C) is clear with as little as 90 minute notice from notification to landing. Runway dedication should occur on initial notification of landing. ELSs that do not perform LAS duties will receive biennial training from a DDMS training team. (d) End-of-Mission (EOM) Site. These augmented sites have a landing support convoy of vehicles, personnel, orbiter landing aids, dedicated rescue forces, and other NASA-required support. (e) Launch Abort Site (LAS). A ELS that also provides launch support. This includes: RTLS (KSC), ECAL sites, TAL sites, DRLASs, and PTAL sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C and the specific definitions within this section). These sites will have much shorter notification times for an orbiter landing and require a higher posture for launch. Activation depends on the specific inclination and the reason for the abort. (f) Return to Launch Site (RTLS). RTLS is an abort profile that is executed if a problem develops during the initial stages of launch. After the solid rocket boosters burn out and separate, the orbiter continues the ascent but performs a maneuver so the main engines can drive it back toward the launch site. The external tank is separated and the orbiter glides to a landing at Kennedy Space Center. The maneuver takes approximately 25 minutes from launch to landing. (g) Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) Site. Designed to allow the vehicle to achieve a suborbital trajectory that results in the orbiter landing on a runway in Europe or Africa, (based on inclination). TALs are ALSs and are the most desirable LAS abort option. Currently there are 4 TALs, of which 2 are DOD managed sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C). In this situation, the external tank is jettisoned and the orbiter glides to a landing in approximately 35 minutes. Moron receives annual training from a DDMS training team. Underburn Landing Site. A subset of the ELSs, these sites provide the orbiter with a landing opportunity in the event of an underburn during deorbit operations. East Coast Abort Landing Site (ECAL). Designed to allow the vehicle to land after the loss of two or three main engines, when energy is not sufficient to land at KSC or a TAL site. Requires a manual left-turn maneuver. Currently there are 15 ECALs, of which 7 are DOD sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C). ECALs are only used on high inclination launches and activation depends on the specific inclination. All DOD ECALs, except Dover AFB are activated for 51.6 degree inclinations. Dover AFB is currently activated for only 57 degree inclination launches. Each ECAL will develop a plan to ensure the airspace (defined in Tab A, Appendix 1 to Annex C) is clear with as little as five minute notice from notification to landing. It is highly recommended that ECAL base commanders dedicated their runways from launch until released by the DDMS support operations center (approximately L + 8 minutes). DOD ECALs will receive annual training from a DDMS training team. Down Range Launch Abort Site (DRLAS): Designed to allow the vehicle to land after the loss of two or three main engines, when energy is not sufficient to land at KSC or a TAL site. Requires a manual down-range maneuver. Currently there are 11 DRLASs, of which 3 are DOD sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C). Activation depends on the specific inclination. All DOD DRLASs, are activated for 51.6 degree inclinations. NAS Keflavik is activated for only 57 degree inclination launches. DRLAS should have 15 – 20 minutes notice to clear their runways and shouldn’t require dedication. However, it may be necessary for base commanders to dedicate their runways from launch until released by the DDMS support operations center (approximately L + 8 minutes). DOD DRLASs will receive annual training from a DDMS training team with the exception of Keflavik, which will receive training within 6 months of intended use. Post-Transoceanic Abort Landing Site (PTAL): Designed to provide the orbiter the opportunity to land at runways in Europe, Africa or at Diego Garcia after the TAL sites are no longer reachable and reaching orbit or AOA are not options. Post MECO sites would be used primarily for a major system malfunction after the TAL opportunity. Requires a manual maneuver. Currently, there are 8 PTALs, of which 2 are DOD sites (refer to Appendix 1 to Annex C). Activation depends on the specific inclination. NSF Diego Garcia is activated for all inclinations and Souda Bay is only activated for 40 degree inclination launches. PTALs will develop a plan to ensure the airspace (defined in Tab A, Appendix 1 to Annex C) is clear with as little as 35 minute notice from notification to landing. It is not necessary to dedicate their runways at launch. Runway dedication should occur on initial notification of landing. DOD PTALs will be released from LAS duties by the DDMS Support Operations Center (approximately L + 10 minutes). NSF Diego Garcia will receive annual training and Souda Bay will receive training within 6 months of intended use from a DDMS training team. c. NASA Publications. NASA documents identify support requirements, establish operational concepts, and describe procedures for conducting various phases of Space Shuttle missions. NASA documents provided to DOD organizations tasked in this plan are reviewed by DDMS and may be used only as reference documents. (DDMS published documents will be used by DOD contingency support personnel). d. DOD Range Support. The Eastern Range (ER) has been designated in DOD Directive 3200.11 as the lead range and is the primary DOD point of contact for range-related support requirements. ER coordinates range support from all participating DOD ranges. Accordingly, range requirements in support of Space Shuttle operations are not included in this plan. 2. Areas of Operations. Specific geographic areas are designated at the launch and landing sites to define varying levels of responsibility and response times for contingency operations. See applicable appendices. 3. Concept of Operations. a. General. In each of the designated operating areas, NASA has identified support requirements to be provided by the DOD. Where appropriate, NASA has established a management structure to interface with the DOD in providing this support. b. Execution. When executing this plan, the DOD Manager will exercise tactical control over participating DOD forces through the DOD Support Operations Center (SOC) to the on-scene commanders. The DOD Manager will make the necessary mission-level decisions affecting support operations. Upon receipt of the force prepositioning order, tasked commanders are responsible for providing and/or conducting support operations as outlined in this plan. Commanders will complete required actions and report operational readiness in accordance with Annex P. c. Deployment. DOD resources will deploy to meet in place/on station times, or alert requirements identified in this plan. d. Alert. Required alert postures will be IAW this plan. e. Personnel. Commanders of organizations providing support will select personnel to meet their tasking requirements. Positions requiring special pre-mission training will only be filled by properly trained personnel. Refer to reference a. for training requirements. f. Equipment and Facilities. DOD organizations will make use of existing and available equipment and facilities to support Space Shuttle requirements. Should additional equipment or facilities be required for unique support, they will be identified to DDMS for validation and proper funding. Specialized equipment will normally be provided or funded by NASA. See Annex D. g. Employment. DOD contingency support operations will be conducted within the practical operating capabilities and limitations of the participating personnel and available equipment. Ground fire/crash/rescue and orbiter crew member aided egress support at Edwards AFB, White Sands Space Harbor, DOD ALSs, and DOD ELSs will be accomplished in accordance with reference b. h. Search and Rescue (SAR). (1) Should the orbiter have an inflight mishap which results in a crash or bailout, SAR will be conducted in accordance with established national or international procedures. The DOD Manager exercises tactical control over all participating DOD forces through the DOD SOC Director to the on-scene commander. The SOC will be the single point of contact to pass information to the SAR Mission Coordinator and will keep the DOD Manager, National Military Command Center (NMCC), and NASA management informed of mission progress. During the launch phase, a SAR Mission Coordinator will be located in the SOC to assist the SOC Director in responding to contingencies outside the local area and interface with the appropriate rescue coordination center (RCC). Upon declaration of a contingency by NASA, the SOC Director will initiate a response from dedicated forces that are on alert and contact the appropriate organization/agency to coordinate the SAR effort. (2) The National SAR Plan establishes geographic divisions of responsibility to include maritime, inland, and overseas regions. The maritime SAR region is divided into two sections, the Atlantic maritime area and the Pacific maritime area. Inland SAR is a single region consisting of the continental United States. The overseas region includes Alaska and all other portions of the globe not within the maritime and inland areas. (3) A SAR Coordinator is the official within a given area or region responsible for organization and coordination of SAR operations. Each SAR Coordinator has RCCs which coordinate with SAR units (resources) to conduct operations. The RCC serves as the focal point for mission planning and coordination of SAR resources. If additional SAR resources are needed, the area commander tasks those forces as requested by the RCC. For SAR missions in overseas areas, combatant commanders conduct operations only after considering the laws, policies, and SAR capabilities of all countries potentially involved. Geographic responsibilities of the SAR Coordinators are established as follows: (a) Atlantic Maritime Area: Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic area (b) Pacific Maritime Area: Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific area (c) Inland SAR area: Commander, Air Combat Command (d) Overseas regions: The appropriate combatant commander i. Salvage Support. (1) Recovery/salvage of the orbiter or its components will be a priority effort. Salvage operations will be performed in the event a contingency has occurred that precludes returning the orbiter to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) via normal ground turnaround operations. Salvage operations will not start until all fire/crash/rescue operations are complete and the site is secure. Because each contingency situation produces a unique set of requirements, this section will only attempt to establish interfaces and policies which will lead to a coordinated NASA/DOD effort. NASA has overall responsibility for the operation. The DOD will provide administrative, logistical, and specialized equipment as requested, if compatible with operational commitments. (2) The most probable location for a salvage operation is in the vicinity of the launch and landing sites. Contingency response forces prepositioned at the specific location (DOD and/or NASA) will likely be the first personnel on scene. Initial actions will be IAW this plan and directed toward crew member rescue, protection of personnel and property, and security of the site. NASA will brief civilian organizations or agencies on hazards and requirements when responding to a contingency site outside the designated local areas. Coordination will be effected with the State Department, as required, for a salvage effort on foreign soil. (3) Except as required to protect life and property, no action will be taken to move flight hardware, payloads, or disturb the site in any manner. The OSC will control access and collect/preserve evidence until arrival of the NASA Mishap Investigation Team (MIT). This team will deploy to the mishap site within 24 hours. DDMS will provide a representative to this team. NASA will stand up a Recovery Management Team (RMT) to coordinate support from KSC/JSC to the orbiter site. The RMT, through the SOC, will coordinate real time DOD support requirements and provide assistance. DDMS will have a representative on the RMT to coordinate DOD support. (4) After approval by the MIT, the NASA Deployed Operations Team will assess the vehicle condition to determine salvageability and devise a salvage technique plan. If the contingency occurs over water, NASA will determine search and salvage objectives. NASA may request, through DDMS, that the DOD Supervisor of Salvage (SUPSALV) determine salvageability, devise a plan, and direct operations. SUPSALV will coordinate directly with the NASA On-Site Salvage Manager who is responsible for oversight of the recovery and reconstruction effort, and keep DDMS informed of actions. (5) SUPSALV will direct salvage operations of the Underwater Search and Salvage Team (USST) from their own command center and will be the focal point for all salvage information, reports, and records. The 45th Operations Group, PAFB, will provide a representative to the USST if a DOD payload is involved. (6) The SOC Director will coordinate real time requirements and keep the DOD Manager and the NMCC informed of operations. j. Reporting. Reporting will be in accordance with Annex P. 4. Coordination and Control. Commanders of tasked organizations will establish interfaces with DDMS and on-site NASA management. This will ensure a coordinated response by dedicated forces and the timely dissemination of information to management personnel. The basic concepts discussed in Annex J and the appendices of this annex will be used in establishing the interfaces. 5. Contingency Response Modes. The Space Shuttle Program will use the following modes to identify a specific contingency situation. Upon declaration of a mode, the OSC will initiate the proper response action. Local plans will include procedures for response to each applicable mode. a. Launch Pad Modes. (1) Mode I - Unaided egress from the launch pad. The crew will egress the orbiter and use the slidewire system to escape from the launch pad. (2) Mode II - Aided egress from the launch pad. The closeout crew assists the flight crew to egress from the orbiter. The slidewire system is used to escape from the launch pad. (3) Mode III - Aided egress from the launch pad. Fire/crash/rescue crew assists the flight crew to egress from the orbiter. The slidewire system is used to escape from the launch pad. (4) Mode IV - Aided egress from the launch pad. Fire/crash/rescue crew assists both flight crew and closeout crew to egress from the orbiter and launch pad. The slidewire system is used to escape from the launch pad. b. Landing Modes. (1) Mode V - Landing mishap on or near runway (Unaided Egress/Aided Escape) and accessible to ground crews. Flight crew egresses the orbiter and the fire/crash/rescue crew aids them in escaping from the landing area. (2) Mode VI - Landing mishap on or near runway (Aided Egress/Escape) and accessible to ground crews. Fire/crash/rescue crew enters the orbiter to aid the flight crew to egress from the orbiter and escape from the area. (3) Mode VII - Landing mishap off the runway (Aided Egress/Escape), not accessible to ground crews. Fire/crash/rescue crew, transported by helicopter, enters the orbiter to aid the flight crew to egress from the orbiter and escape from the area. c. Flight Mode. Mode VIII - Bailout of the orbiter crew during controlled gliding flight or following a catastrophic breakup which the crew compartment survives. d. Egress Condition Red. When a catastrophic condition posing a serious threat to life or limb of the rescue force is imminent, the NASA Test Director, Flight Director, Complex Safety Officer, Fire Chief, DOD OSC, NASA Convoy Commander, orbiter crew, or the appropriate rescue team leader may declare an Egress Condition Red. In the absence of additional commands, the rescue team leader or OSC will direct the immediate evacuation and pull back of all rescue forces to 1250’ from the orbiter (more if the situation dictates). 6. Astronaut Crew Alpha Codes. Each astronaut is uniquely identified by an Alpha Code (i.e., “A,” “B,” “C,” etc.) located on their helmets, boots, gloves, and harnesses. The Medical Condition Codes (MEDCODES) below will be used in conjunction with the astronauts’ Alpha Codes when rescue/medical personnel are relaying information over radio, telephone or other non-secure modes of communication. Example: "Echo is MEDCODE three." 7. MEDCODES. Medical personnel will use the following codes to relay the medical condition of orbiter crew members and/or injured rescue personnel during contingency support operations. Non-medical personnel will relay these codes only when specifically requested by attending medical personnel. Do not amplify medical conditions beyond these codes unless specifically requested by NASA/DDMS medical personnel. To protect the astronaut's privacy, MEDCODES should only be associated with the crewmember's Alpha Code. Do not associate a MEDCODE with a name or crew position when transmitting MEDCODES in the clear. a. MEDCODE 0 - Patient severely injured beyond reasonable expectation of survival or deceased. b. MEDCODE I - Condition critical, patient requires immediate care and evacuation. c. MEDCODE II - Condition fair to poor, patient's need for care is not so acute, but will require care before evacuation. d. MEDCODE III - Condition good to fair, patient with injuries which do not require hospitalization; some medical care may be needed, but not on a time critical basis. 8. Training/Exercises. Information pertaining to DOD training/exercises at both CONUS and non-CONUS landing sites, orbiter post-landing operations (including hazard detection and assessment), and flight crew egress is contained in references a. and b.
Appendices: 1. Space Shuttle Landing Sites 2. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida 3. Launch Contingency Bailout Area 4. Edwards AFB (EAFB), California 5. White Sands Space Harbor (WSSH), New Mexico 6. Moron Air Base (MAB), Spain 7. Zaragoza Air Base (ZAB), Spanish Air Force (SAF), Spain 8. Ben Guerir, Morocco 9. DOD Emergency Landing Sites (ELS) and Launch Abort Sites (LAS) 10. Potential Space Shuttle Hazards - Planning Information 11. Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA)/Orbiter vehicle (OV) Ferry Operations
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