Table of Contents Abstract 3 Declaration 4 Acknowledgements 5 Introduction – Liberalism, Republicanism, and the Idea of Political Neutrality 8 Part One – The Idea of Neutrality

133^ As Martin explains, Madison had greater faith in the efficacy of public opinion than did most of his contemporaries; Martin, ‘James Madison and Popular Government’, p.187.

134^ James Madison, ‘Federalist No.49’, pp.310-311; see also: Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785).

135^ James Madison, ‘Federalist No.48’, in The Federalist, pp.308-312 (p.310).

136^ Madison drew on the findings of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors – a body instituted to determine whether the Pennsylvania Constitution (1776) had been violated by any of the departments – to claim that the Pennsylvania legislature had consistently violated the constitution through both contravening the principle of trial-by-jury and assuming extra-constitutional powers; Madison, ‘Federalist No.48’, pp.311-312.

137^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.353.

138^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.48’.

139^ Section 47 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (1776) stipulated that every seven years a Council of Censors was to be convened in order to determine whether the constitution had been violated.

140^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.48’, p.311; Lewis Hamilton Meader, The Council of Censors (Providence, 1899).

141^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.353.

142^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.354.

143^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.354.

144^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.357.

145^ James Madison, ‘Popular Election to the First Branch of the Legislature (31 May, 1787), in PJM, X, pp.19-20 (p.19).

146^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.356.

147^ Sheehan, ‘The Politics of Public Opinion’, pp.615-616.

148^ Philip Pettit, ‘Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican’, European Journal of Philosophy Vol.1, No.1 (April, 1983), pp.15-38 (p.15).

149^ Rosenblatt, ‘Why Constant?’, p.440; Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (New York, NY., 1975).

150^ Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.523.

151^ K. Steven Vincent, Benjamin Constant and the Birth of French Liberalism (New York, NY., 2011), pp.180-181.

152^ Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.524.

153^ Quentin Skinner, ‘On the Liberty of the Ancients and the Moderns: A Reply to my Critics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.73, No.1 (Jan., 2012), pp.127-147 (p.130); see also: Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism; Bryan Garsten, ‘Liberalism and the Rhetorical Vision of Politics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.73, No.1 (Jan., 2012), pp.83-93 (p.86); Charles Larmore, ‘A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism’, Philosophical Issues, Vol.11, No.1 (Oct., 2001), pp.229-243 (p.236).

154^ Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Emmanuel Sieyes, Benjamin Constant et le « gouvernement des modernes ». Contribution à l'histoire du concept de représentation politique’, Revue française de science politique Vol.37, No2 (1987), pp.214-229 (p.215-217); Skinner, ‘Ancients and Modern’, p.130.

155^ Benjamin Constant, ‘De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes’, in Œuvres politiques, Tome 2 (Paris, 1874).

156^ Constant, Des réactions, p.116; p.142; Constant, Principes, pp.22-24.

157^ Constant, Principes, p.31.

158^ Constant, ‘De la liberté des Anciens’.

159^ Constant, Principes, Livre I.

160^ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris, 1986), pp.14-15. For Rousseau, the attainment of citizenship required absolute obedience to the general will and thus the relinquishment of natural rights; Jason Andrew Neidleman, The General Will is Citizenship: Inquiries into French Political Thought (Lanham, MD., 2001), pp.35-36.

161^ Rousseau, Du contrat, p.14. Constant urged that due to the nature of political power there inevitably existed discordance between the interests of the governors and those of the governed, he observed that: qu'aussitôt qu'un homme passe, n'importe comment, de la classe de des gouvernés dans celle des gouvernants, il prend l'intérêt de ces derniers; Constant, Principes, p.389. 

162^ Rousseau in fact declared in Du contrat that just as man possesses absolute power over his limbs, the social pact gives the body politic absolute power over its members; Rousseau, Du contrat social, p.31.

163^ Constant, Principes, p.53.

164^ Benjamin Constant, Réflexions sur les constitutions, la distribution des pouvoirs et les garanties dans une monarchie constitutionnelle (Paris, 1814), p.27.

165^ Constant, Principes, p.54; ‘Aucune force en dehors ne met obstacle à ce que la majorité ne s’immole la minorité ou à ce qu’un petit nombre d’hommes ne s’intitule le majorité pour dominer sur le tout. Il est donc indispensable de suppléer à cette force extérieure, qui n’existe pas, par des principes immuables dont la majorité ne dévie jamais’.

166^ Constant, Principes, p.52.

167^ Constant, Principes, p.34; S. Goyard-Fabre notes that Constant held Rousseau, Mably and Hobbes to be instigators of despotism in much the same way as Robespierre, Babeuf, and Napoleon; S. Goyard-Fabre, ‘L'idée de souveraineté du peuple et le « libéralisme pur » de Benjamin Constant’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 81e Année, No. 3 (Juillet-Septembre 1976), pp.289-327 (p.316).

168^ Constant, Principes, p.35.

169^ Constant, Principes, pp.384-386.

170^ Constant explained that: ‘Une erreur singulière que nous avons indiquée en commençant cet ouvrage et dont on doit accuser surtout Rousseau et Mably, mais dont presque aucun publiciste n’a été exempt, a confondu toutes les idées sur cette matière. L’on n’a pas distingué les principes de l’autorité sociale des principes de la liberté…La liberté n’est une puissance que dans le sens lequel un bouclier est une arme’; Constant, Principes, pp.384-386. Kalyvas and Katznelson have also picked up on Constant’s description of rights, and conclude that he thus considered rights to be independent of politics: Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.522.

171^ Constant, Principes, p.36.

172^ Constant did note that Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin and l’Abbé Sieyes had each claimed that the sovereign power had to be limited; he maintained, however, that those in favour of limited authority had been ignored in modern France; Constant, Principes, pp.35-36.

173^ Constant, ‘De la liberté des Anciens’.

174^ Jainchill, Reimagining Politics, p.282.

175^ Constant, Principes, p.79.

176^ Constant, Principes, p.34; Crucially, Montesquieu was not excluded from Constant’s declaration in Livre I of Principes that no political writer had formally rejected the idea that the ‘volonté générale’ could legitimately exercise unlimited authority over individuals.

177^ Constant, Principes, p.35.

178^ Constant, Principes, p.79.

179^ Constant, Principes, p.35. Constant’s criticism of Montesquieu was, however, unfair. In Livre XII of l’Esprit Montesquieu distinguished between ‘la liberté philosophique’ as ‘l’exercise de sa volonté’ and ‘la liberté politique’ which consisted in ‘la sûrete’. It remains unclear as to why Constant omitted to reference Montesquieu’s important discussion of the nature of liberté philosophique from his treatment of l’Esprit. However while Constant’s assessment of Montesquieu’s conception of liberty may remain incomplete, it nevertheless stands as a revealing and edifying critique of the neo-Roman understanding of the nature of personal freedom - demonstrating that Constant understood the principal antonym of individual liberty to be interference.

180^ Constant, Principes, pp.54-55.

181^ Constant, ‘De la liberté’.

182^ Constant, Principes, p.469.

183^ I am indebted to Charles Larmore for the phrasing here.

184^ Constant, Principes, pp.174-175.

185^ Constant, Principes, p.175.

186^ Constant, Des réactions politique, p.112.

187^ Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.524.

188^ Constant, Principes, pp.202-203.

189^ Constant, Principes, pp.204-205.

190^ Constant wrote: “Sans doute, si vous supposez que les non-propriétaires examineront toujours avec calme tous les côtes de la question, leur intérêt réfléchi sera de respecter le propriété et de devenir propriétaires; mais si vous admettez l’hypothèse plus probable qu’ils seront souvent déterminés par leur intérêt le plus apparent et le plus immédiat, ce dernier intérêt le portera, sinon à détruire la propriété, du moins à en diminuer l’influence”; Constant, Principes, p.205.

191^ Constant, Principes, p.207.

192^ Robert F. Williams, ‘The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and its Influences on American Constitutionalism’, Temple Law Review (1989), pp.541-585 (p.551); James Madison, ‘Federalist No.48’, p.311; see also: Benjamin Rush, ‘On Good Government’, in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush (New York, 1947), pp.3-84

193^ Brown, ‘Echoes of the Terror’, pp.529-558.

194^ Alan Gibson, ‘Impartial Representation and the Extended Republic: Toward a Balanced Reading of the Tenth Federalist Paper’ History of Political Thought, Vol.12, No.2 (Summer, 1991), pp.263-304 (p.265-266); Sheehan, ‘The Politics of Public Opinion’, pp.609-611; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (London, 2006), pp.4-33; Judith Shklar, ‘Publius and the Science of the Past’, Yale Law Journal, Vol.86, No.6 Federalism, pp1286-1296 (p.1290); Lance Banning, ‘The Hamiltonian Madison: A Reconsideration’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 3-28 (p.14).

195^ Gibson, ‘Balanced Reading’, p.267-268; Gordon S. Wood, ‘Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution’, in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (ed.) (Williamsburg, Va., 1987), pp.69-109 (p.83).

196^ For a detailed exposition of this argument see: Gordon S. Wood, ‘Interests and Disinterestedness’.

197^ Gibson ultimately accepts the ‘impartiality thesis’ which insists that the Madisonian system was geared toward securing the election of enlightened guardians of the public good, but he importantly claims that this aspect of Madison’s political thought has been over-emphasised. Gibson places equal emphasis on the ‘impartiality’ and ‘multiplicity of interests’ aspects of Madison’s tenth Federalist and makes the arguments that: (1) extent of territory would, under Madison’s model, produce a greater variety of interests thus making the formation of homogenous and factional majorities more difficult; and (2) that expanded electoral districts would lead to the election of disinterested representatives who would not seek to advance their own, or their constituents, particular interests; Gibson, ‘Balanced Reading’.

198^ A central contention of this thesis is that like Constant, Madison’s conception of neutrality was based on the characteristics of the institution of monarchy.

199^ James Madison, ‘From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (August 20, 1785)’, in PJM, VIII, pp,344-347 (p.345).

200^ Hume wrote that: ‘Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were most admired by ancient writers’, David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth; see also: Douglass Adair, ‘That Politics May be Reduced to a Science: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist’, Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol.20, No.4 (Aug., 1957), pp.343-360 (pp.350-351).

201^ David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.

202^ Mark Spencer, Douglass Adair, and Mark Arkin all note that Madison read, and to some degree borrowed from, Hume’s Perfect Commonwealth; Adair, ‘Reduced to a Science’; Mark Spencer, ‘Hume and Madison on Faction’, William and Mary Quarterly Vol.59, No.4 (2002), pp.869-896; Marc Arkin, ‘The Intractable Principle: David Hume, James Madison, Religion, and the Tenth Federalist’, American Journal of Legal History, Vol.148 (1995), pp.148-176 (p.149). Theodore Draper goes as far as to suggest: ‘[t]hat Hume influence [Madison’s] ideas on faction…is beyond dispute’; Theodore Draper, ‘Hume and Madison: The Secrets of Federalist Paper No.10’, Encounter Vol. 58, No.2 (1982), pp.34-47 (p.34).

203^ It is appropriate at his point to note that I concur with Adair’s detractors that Madison’s thoughts on faction were chiefly the product of his practical experiences as a legislator in Virginia during the 1780s. That said, this does not preclude the possibility that Madison’s understanding of the deficiencies of small republics was indeed influenced by Hume’s thesis in Perfect Commonwealth. Though they had different views on how to handle the problem of faction, Madison’s assessment of the drawbacks of city-state republicanism mirrored those of Hume. For the differences between Madison’s and Hume’s thoughts on faction see: Edmund Morgan, ‘Safety in Numbers: Madison, Hume, and the Tenth Federalist’, Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol.49 (1986), pp.95-112.

204^ Adair, ‘Reduced to a Science’, pp.345-346; Roy Branson, ‘James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.40, No.2 (Apr.-Jun., 1979), pp.235-250 (p.235-237). Spencer claims that Madison first read Hume long before 1787, and perhaps even prior to his enrolment at Princeton. Spencer convincingly speculates that Madison may have read Hume as a child when he was formally educated by Donald Robertson, an Edinburgh-educated Scot who acquired many of Hume’s works for his school library. It is also certain that Madison encountered Hume’s thought at a deeper level while studying at Princeton; Spencer; ‘Hume and Madison’, p.875.

205^ In The Papers of James Madison, these fragmentary notes are entitled, ‘Notes for the National Gazette Essays’. James Madison, “Notes for the National Gazette Essays’, in The Papers of James Madison, Robert Rutland et al. (eds.) (Charlottesville, 1983), XIV, pp.157-169.

206^ That Madison chose to organise the Notes into thirteen chapters spanning a one-hundred page document has prompted speculation as to whether they were intended to form the basis of a philosophical treatise; Sheehan, ‘Public Opinion’, p.611.

207^ Madison cited Aristotle’s Politics Book V, to contend that the cycles in governments were influenced by ‘public opinion’ could thus differ dramatically between political societies; Madison, ‘Notes’, in PJM, p.163; see also: Sheehan, ‘Public Opinion’, p.618. Howe notes that in justifying the constitution, the framers consistently avoided appeals to the traditional, or civic humanist, interpretation of history; Daniel Walker Howe, ‘Why the Scottish Enlightenment was Useful to the Framers of the United States Constitution’, Comparative Studies in History and Society, Vol.31, No.3 (July, 1989), pp.572-587 (p.583).

208^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, p.157

209^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, p.158.

210^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, p.159.

211^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, p.159.

212^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, pp.159-160.

213^ Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book XII, Chapter XVI.

214^ Madison, ‘Notes for National Gazette Essays’, pp.158-159.

215^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.355.

216^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.355.

217^ Like Constant, Madison fully accepted the efficacy of constitutional monarchy as an institution capable of providing political neutrality. Madison’s attempted to replace monarchy with an alternative neutral institution is explored in the final section of this thesis.

218^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’.

219^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.357.

220^ Dr. Samuel Johnson defined the term neutral as: ‘one who does not act or engage on either side’; it is highly likely that this is what Madison understood by the term; see: Samuel Johnson, Johnson and Walker’s Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1755), p.490.

221^ James Madison, ‘James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 24, 1787)’, in PJM, X, pp.205-219 (p.214).

222^ Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (October 24, 1787)’, p.214.

223^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.126; see also: Hamilton, ‘Federalist No.9’.

224^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.124.

225^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, pp.124-125.

226^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.125.

227^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.125.

228^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.124; Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (October 24, 1787)’, pp.212-213.

229^ Arkin, ‘Hume, Madison, and the Tenth Federalist’, p151.

230^ Madison, ‘Federalist No.10’, p.125.

231^ Gordon Wood’s central contention is that Madison’s federalist theory was centred on establishing a ‘patrician-led classical democracy’ in which representatives would be superior to local, or particular, interests; Wood, ‘Interests and Disinterestedness’, p.83.

232^ Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’.

233^ Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (October 24, 1787)’, pp.212-213.

234^ Jackson T. Main, ‘Sections and Politics in Virginia, 1781-1878’, The William & Mary Quarterly, Third Series Vol.12, No.1 (Jan., 1955), pp.96-112 (pp.97-98); Ambler, Sectionalism, p.3; Norman K. Risjord and Gordon DenBoer, ‘The Evolution of Political Parties in Virginia, 1782-1800’, The Journal of American History, Vol.60, No.4 (March, 1974), pp.961-984 (pp.963-964).

235^ Westward expansion ensured that the political divide in Virginia was between representatives of Northern Neck region and their counterparts in the Southside; Main, ‘Sections and Politics in Virginia’, pp.103-104.

236^ Risjord, ‘The Evolution of Political Parties’, pp.963-964

237^ It is on this point that the discord between Gibson and Madison’s pluralist commentators is most apparent. The keystone of the pluralist case is the contention that Madison expected the electoral system of an expanded republic to produce a multiplicity of interested groups or parties within congress, resulting in the neutralisation of faction

Download 0.95 Mb.

Share with your friends: