Table of Contents Abstract 3 Declaration 4 Acknowledgements 5 Introduction – Liberalism, Republicanism, and the Idea of Political Neutrality 8 Part One – The Idea of Neutrality
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Principes (1806).
437 Pamela Pilbeam, ‘Republicanism in Early Nineteenth-Century France, 1814-1835’, French History, Vol.5, No.1, pp.30-47 (pp.32-33); Pamela M. Pilbeam, The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814-1848, (New York, 2000). 438 J.P.T. Bury, France, 1814-1835 (London, 2003), pp.2-3. 439 Bury, France, p.3. 440 Rosenblatt, Liberal Values, p.155. 442 In this sense, the validity of Constant’s own justification for his willingness to work with Bonaparte on the drafting of a new constitution is certainly plausible when read in light of the Principes de politique of 1806. He had argued eight years earlier that the flourishing of individual liberty and the limitation of government were both possible under constitutionally-moderated forms of monarchy. From Constant’s musings in Mémoires, it seems clear that he possessed a genuine belief that Bonaparte could be held to a liberal framework of constitutional monarchy – one grounded in principles of individual liberty and the primacy of the national will. As Rosenblatt and others have explained, Constant’s shift of 1815 was inspired more by idealism and naivety than by cynical opportunism; Rosenblatt, Liberal Values, p.156. Kalyvas and Katznelson gone further in explaining that Constant’s shift was neither ‘opportunistic nor tactical’ but instead entirely ‘principled’; Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.529. 443 Constant, Principes (II), p.19. 444 Constant, Principes (II), pp.24-26. 445 Constant wrote: ‘Un pouvoir républicain se renouvelant périodiquement, n’est point un être à part, ne frappe en rien l’imagination, n’a point droit à l’indulgence pour ses erreurs’; Constant, Principes (II), p.24. 446 Constant, Principes (II), p.24. 447 In reference to the idea of the inviolability of the monarchy, Constant wrote that: ‘Il est évident que cette hypothèse est une fiction légale, qui n’affranchit pas réellement des affection et des faiblesses de l’humanité, l’individu placé sur le trône’; Constant, Principes (II), p.80. 448 Constant, Principes, pp.24-25. 449 Constant, Principes (II), p.25. 450 ‘Une responsabilité qui ne peut s’exercer que sur des hommes dont la chute interromprait les relations extérieures et frapperait d’immobilité les rouages intérieurs de l’État ne s’exercer jamais’; Constant, Principes (II), p.25. 451 Mary S. Hartman, ‘Benjamin Constant and the Question of Ministerial Responsibility in France, 1814-1815’, Journal of European Studies, Vol.6, No.4 (1976), pp.248-261 (p.252). 452 Constant, Principes, pp.77-78. 453 Constant, Principes (II), p.22. 454 Constant, Principes (II), p.26. 455 Constant, Principes (II), pp.30-32. 456 Fontana makes a similar point. Drawing on Constant’s description of the representative chamber as ‘pouvoir répresentatif de l’opinion’, she argues that Constant understood public opinion to be something capable of protecting freedom and ensuring the maintenance of political stability: ‘opinion’, she writes, ‘would prove the best possible support for maintenance of free political institutions’; Fontana, Post-Revolutionary Mind, pp.91-92. 457 In Principes (II) Constant noted that what was needed was something like Florence’s extraordinary council but he made clear that the Ballia was fundamentally flawed in that it possessed the authority criminally prosecute members of the governing class; Constant, Principes, pp.22-23. 458 John Jezierski, ‘Parliament or People: James Wilson and Blackstone on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty’, The Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.32, No.1 (Jan-Mar, 1972), pp.95-106 (p.96); Wood, Creation, p.345; Akhil Amar, ‘Of Sovereignty and Federalism’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol.96, No.7 (Jun., 1987), pp.1425-1520 (p.1430-1432). 459 Wood, Creation, p.345. 460 Wood, Creation, p.349-350. 461 Wood, Creation, p.350. 462 Nevis, The American States, p.622. 463 Jezierski, ‘Parliament or People’, p.104. 464 Jezierski, ‘Parliament or People’, p.106. 465 Claude H. Van Tyne, ‘Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical Study’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 12, No.3 (Apr., 1907), pp.529-545 (pp.534-535). 466 Article II of the Articles of Confederation declared: ‘Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled’; The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union; Barbara Silberdick Feinberg, The Articles of Confederation: The First Constitution of the United States (Brookfield, CT., 2002), p.29. 467 Feinberg, Articles, pp.36-37; Wood, Creation, pp.359-361. 468 Charles F. Hobson, ‘The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, The Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government’, The William & Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol.36, No.2 (Apr., 1979), pp.215-235 (pp.220-221); Ketcham, James Madison, p.113. 469 Ketcham, James Madison, pp.114-116. 470 In a letter to Jefferson he warned that without significant changes to the constitutional arrangement, circumstances could produce ‘an opposite extreme of our present situation’; James Madison, ‘From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787), PJM, 9, pp.317-322 (p.318); Ketcham, James Madison, p.119. 471 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, p.3 472 Hobson, ‘Negative on States Laws’, p.220; Madison, Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’. 473 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, pp.12-13. 474 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, p.17. 475 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, p.16. 476 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, p.10; According to Joseph Planta, the neutral cantons were required by law to act in an impartial manner; they could not offer opinions and their decisions were final. There were a number of cases throughout the history of the confederacy in which the actions of neutral cantons brought about amicable resolutions; Joseph Planta, The History of the Helvetic Confederacy: Volume Two (New York, 1800), p.167, p.295. 477 Madison, ‘Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies’, p.17. 478 Madison, ‘Federalist No.18’, pp.159-161; Hamilton presented a similar case in Federalist No.17; Hamilton, ‘Federalist No.17’, in The Federalist, pp.156-159. 479 Madison, ‘Federalist No.18’, p.164; The Anti-Federal position was always that a central government had to remain largely subordinate to the constituent governments so that sufficient barriers would be in place to block the authority of a centralized authority that could descend into tyranny; Cecilia M. Kenyon, ‘Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol.12, No.1 (Jan., 1955), pp.3-43 (pp.15-16). 480 James Madison, ‘From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, PJM, X, pp.205-220 (p.210). 481 James Madison, ‘From James Madison to George Washington (16 April, 1787)’, PJM, IX, pp.382-387 (p.383). 482 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.383. 483 In terms of the realpolitik of the 1780s, Madison’s description of his position as a ‘middle-ground’ option was in many ways a stretch. However, in light of both the Blackstone-doctrine and the history of confederated unions in Europe, it seems clear that in Madison’s view the establishment of a system in which the various States were clearly ‘subordinate’ co-possessors of sovereignty was a modus vivendi arrangement. 484 In a letter addressed to Jefferson written in March of 1787, he explained that it ‘would be expedient in the first place to lay the foundation of the new system in such a ratification by the people themselves of the several states as will render it clearly it clearly paramount to their legislative authorities’; ‘Letter to Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787)’, p.318. He made the same point in his letter Washington, claiming that ‘a ratification must be obtained by the people’; Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (April 16, 1787)’, p.385. 485 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.209. 486 James Madison, ‘Reply to the New Jersey Plan’, in PJM, X, pp.55-63 (pp.57-58); James Madison, ‘Relationship between Federal and State Governments’, PJM, X, pp.67-69 (p.67). 487 Hobson, ‘Negative on State Laws’, p.226. 488 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.209. 489 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.209. 490 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.210. 491 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.383. 492 Jefferson’s hostility toward the actions of the Crown in the middle 1770s was not the product of an opposition to the idea of the royal negative itself. Instead, he rallied against the King partially on the grounds that while George III had frequently made use of the veto with respect to colonial legislation, he had contrariwise resisted its employment in his dealings with the Parliament in Westminster. Inequity, then, seemed to be the primary issue; Stephen Howard Browne, ‘Jefferson’s First Declaration of Independence: A Summary View of the Rights of British America Revisited’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 89:3 (2003), pp.235-252 (p.249). 493 ‘Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.383. 494 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.214. 495 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.383. 496 Madison, ‘Relationship between State and Federal Governments’, p.68. 497 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.214. 498 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.384. 499 Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.355. 500 Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System’, p.355. 501 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.384. 502 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.214. 503 Madison, ‘Letter to Washington (16 April, 1787)’, p.385. 504 Charles Hobson has been alone in pointing this out. 505 Madison, ‘Letter to Jefferson (24 October, 1787)’, p.212. 506 Kalyvas and Katznelson arrive at a similar conclusion when they write: “If we revisit this contemporary project [Rawls’ and Larmore’s efforts to turn liberalism into a force above politics] through Constant’s eyes we can see that this transcendental quest for neutrality is equivalent to past efforts to instantiate a de-politicized monarch”; Kalyvas and Katznelson, ‘We are Modern Men’, p.534. 507 Glen Newey, ‘Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality’, Political Studies, Vol. 45, No.2 (June, 1997), pp.296-311 (pp.297-298); Percy B. Lehning, ‘Liberalism and Capabilities: Theories of Justice and the Neutral State’, Social Justice Research, Vol.4, No.3 (Sept., 1990), pp.187-213 (p.192); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, 1987), p.23; Newey, ‘Metaphysics Postponed’, pp.301-302; John Rawls, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.7, No.1 (Spring, 1987), pp.1-25 (p.4). 508 Mayer, ‘Radical Whig Origins’, p.193. 509 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, p.343. 510 Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, p346. 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