Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



Download 5.91 Mb.
View original pdf
Page294/329
Date27.11.2023
Size5.91 Mb.
#62728
1   ...   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   ...   329
Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part VII
Page 371 of 425

be made available on a needs-only basis for the performance of administrative tasks. These workstations should be isolated from the internet and have no email access, to further limit the attack surface. IHiS is considering implementing such measures, and going further to physically limit access to such dedicated workstations by placing them in secured server rooms. This is a positive move and should be encouraged.
45.3 Administrative access to domain controllers must require two-
factor authentication
1080. Passwords alone are insufficient protection for domain controllers. Given the importance of domain controllers to the network, and the various ways in which passwords maybe acquired by attackers, it is crucial that FA be implemented to protect the domain controllers against attackers who have already managed to obtain passwords. Experts Dr Lim, Gen. Alexander, Vivek and Richard all concur with the recommendation to implement FA for servers.
1081. With FA in place, any attacker would be prompted fora second factor during the authentication process. MOH family accepts this. This second factor would need to be provided in addition to the user's password for the attacker to successfully authenticate and gain access as that user. Since that second factor is based on something that the user possesses (either a device, an account, or token, this would offer a good level of protection against this type of attack where the password is compromised in someway.



COI Report – Part VII
Page 372 of 425

46 RECOMMENDATION
#11:
A
ROBUST
PATCH
MANAGEMENT PROCESS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED
TO ADDRESS SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
#PREVENTION VIGILANCE GOVERNANCE
1082. The initial entry to SingHealth’s network was likely byway of a phishing email containing malicious code. The attacker was able to compromise Workstation A that was running Microsoft Outlook (“Outlook”), which was vulnerable to a publicly available hacking tool. The attacker then used the tool to drop malware onto Workstation A, which was subsequently used to escalate the attack. CSA assessed Workstation A to have been a key pivoting point in the overall scheme of the attack.
1083. In fact, a patch
99
for Outlook, that would have rendered the hacking tool ineffective, had been made available by Microsoft in late. However, this patch was not installed on workstation A as at 1 December 2017, when the malicious code was executed.
The failure to patch in a timely fashion essentially led to the success of this phase of the attack. This constituted a missed opportunity for IHiS which, if addressed, would have stopped or significantly arrested the progress of the attack.
1084. To avoid attacks through known issues or vulnerabilities, systems should be fully up to date with the latest security patches. A robust security patch management process must be implemented as a critical component in maintaining the security of SingHealth IT systems. Patching is of critical importance in a networked environment. Patches do not only ensure the security of individual devices, but also that of the network as a whole. This is because the security of a network is only as strong as its weakest link – it only takes one unpatched device for an attacker to get into a network, and from thereto move laterally through the network towards his objective. As such, a failure to patch A patch is apiece of code that can be applied to a software program after it has been installed.



Download 5.91 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   ...   329




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page