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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019
Roles in response to the
Cyber Attack
IHiS management in-charge of matters concerning the SCM system
W12 Yong
Cheng Pei Serena Director, Infrastructure Services Division, IHiS Together with Clarence, escalated incident to IHiS senior management on 9 July 2018 W
Kua
Cheong
Kee Clarence Application Service Lead for SingHealth’s clinical systems
25
(employed by IHiS) Together with Serena, escalated incident to IHiS senior management on 9 July 2018 W
Ong Leong
Seng Director, Delivery Group, IHiS
In-charge of the War Room setup to deal with the Cyber Attack
IHiS Senior Management
W27 Benedict Tan Wee
Bor Group Chief Information Officer,
SingHealth (employed by IHiS) Escalated incident to Bruce, Kim Chuan, and
SingHealth senior management W
Chua Kim
Chuan Director, Cyber Security Governance,
IHiS, and concurrently Chief Information Security Officer,
MOH Reported incident to CSA W Bruce
Liang
Chwee Bock Chief Executive Officer, IHiS, and concurrently Chief Information Officer,
MOH Reported the incident to
MOH and MOHH, and oversaw the technical response to the attack Clarence is concurrently the Deputy Director of the Chief Information Officer’s Office in SingHealth. He is an IHiS employee.



COI Report – Part IV
Page 104 of 425

Witness
marking
Name
Designated Role
Roles in response to the
Cyber Attack
SingHealth Senior Management
W31
Kwek
Yung
Chiang Kenneth Deputy Group Chief Executive Officer Organisational Transformation and
Informatics),
SingHealth Took direct charge of patient outreach and communications efforts.
18.3 Knowledge of and preparedness against APTs as at June 2018
292. In order to properly assess the incident response, it is necessary to first ascertain the extent of knowledge that IHiS and SingHealth had of APTs at the time of the attack, and who had such knowledge.
293. IHiS has informed the Committee that they were alive to the risk of APTs from as early as August 2016, and had begun sourcing for an Advanced Threat Protection (“ATP”) solution at around that time to address this threat. Bruce has explained that the deployment of ATP was originally scheduled for FY, but they faced delays in finding a suitable vendor. Eventually, the vendor was identified in June 2018, but the ATP solution was not yet implemented throughout the period of the Cyber Attack.
294. Towards the end of 2016, the Cluster ISO for SingHealth, Wee, prepared a risk assessment report for the SCM system. This risk assessment report, titled
SHS & EHA IT Security Risk Assessment for Critical Information Infrastructure
System” (the “FY16 CII Risk Assessment”) was dated 3 January 2017. The threat of APTs was flagged in two respects a) First, at Item 7, the threat of “Malware Attacks (Virus, Worms,
Trojans, Rookits, Advanced Persistent Threats, etc.)” was



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