Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part VII
Page 332 of 425

(d) Using a network to defend a network.
962. In considering the need for collective security, it is apposite to highlight Gen. Alexander’s observations No individual company can standalone against nation-state threat actors. Even if one company has strong defenses, a state aggressor will patiently probe the business entire ecosystem, or even the entire business sector seeking a point of vulnerability – and there will be one. Network visibility and automated information sharing between companies, sectors, and governments are necessary to provide a comprehensive defense. Combining the capabilities of the public and private sectors is essential. … Governments possess a monopoly on the use of force and public/private collaboration is necessary to strike back using the full spectrum of governmental power. A solid collective defense foundation will allow high-speed, automated requests for government support.”
42.1 Threat intelligence sharing should be enhanced
963. All the experts recognised that enterprises can and should purchase threat intelligence from commercial companies. This is a recommendation that should be adopted. Commercially available threat intelligence is at a basic level, and includes information on common threats across the world and the mitigation that can be done in response to these threats.
964. Apart from this basic level of threat intelligence, there are other sources of threat intelligence a) Intelligence generated by CSA from their investigations with their investigative partners b) Intelligence generated by each enterprise from their investigations and prevention and detection tools



COI Report – Part VII
Page 333 of 425

(c) Classified information provided by commercial companies to their trusted partners and d) Classified information provided by security partners in other countries.
42.1.1
Intelligence generated by CSA from their investigations with their
investigative partners
965. CSA operates an intelligence centre which analyses intelligence generated from its investigations. Where CSA is involved in containment and investigation, it will concurrently share threat intelligence from such investigations with all CII sectors so that protective and precautionary measures can betaken. The threat intelligence is proactively shared in the form of actionable items, i.e. by providing malware indicators or specific instructions. CE, CSA’s evidence is that actionable intelligence is important in order to let the enterprises know what steps to take. Dan’s evidence is that CII operators have different levels of maturity and not all CII operators will be able to analyse the intelligence and translate it into useful technical information that they can pass to their IT departments for action. Actionable intelligence is thus required, so that CII operators can consume the intelligence for immediate use. CSA thus informs the
CII of the potential threats they need to lookout for in particular systems or applications, and how they should mitigate against the threats.
967. CSA has a few modalities of sharing threat intelligence a) Alerts or advisories are sent to CII operators. In 2017, 80 alerts or advisories were sent. Where one sector is subject to a cyber attack,
CSA shares actionable intelligence to enable CII sectors to level up across the board to prevent other sectors from being similarly attacked.



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