Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File

AT: Space Junk

Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without directly creating any debris. This type of "co-orbital" ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before contact.

AT: Space Militarization

1. Space Militarization is forbidden right now under the Outer Space Treaty

U.S. Department of State, Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, January 27, 1967 http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm

The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, was the second of the so-called "nonarmament" treaties; its concepts and some of its provisions were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that Treaty it sought to prevent "a new form of colonial competition" and the possible damage that self-seeking exploitation might cause. In early 1957, even before the launching of Sputnik in October, developments in rocketry led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. The development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957. The Soviet Union, however, which was in the midst of testing its first ICBM and was about to orbit its first Earth satellite, did not accept these proposals. Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space and celestial bodies. Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues, nor would it agree to restrict outer space to peaceful uses unless U.S. foreign bases at which short-range and medium-range missiles were stationed were eliminated also. The Western powers declined to accept the Soviet approach; the linkage, they held, would upset the military balance and weaken the security of the West. After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Unions position changed. It ceased to link an agreement on outer space with the question of foreign bases. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the General Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of objects carrying nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963, welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space. The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of any provisions for verification; the capabilities of its space-tracking systems, it was estimated, were adequate for detecting launchings and devices in orbit. Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the United States in 1965 and 1966 pressed for a Treaty that would give further substance to the U.N. resolution. On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The U.S. draft dealt only with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the Treaty, and by September agreement had been reached in discussions at Geneva on most Treaty provisions. Differences on the few remaining issues -- chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration -- were satisfactorily resolved in private consultations during the General Assembly session by December. On the 19th of that month the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the Treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25 the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967. The substance of the arms control provisions is in Article IV. This article restricts activities in two ways: First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction. Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers. After the Treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated in jointly planned and manned space enterprises.
2. Impossible – too expensive
Two of the biggest members of the Space Race don’t want space mil US actions Will face some serious beating.

Norman Polmar, analyst, historian, and author specializ-ing in naval and strategic issues, 2/08 http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004003.html

Russia and China -- enemies for most of the Cold War -- have joined together to propose a new treaty to ban space weapons. The proposal comes a little more than one year after China demonstrated that it possessed an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability. Russia (at the time the Soviet Union) and the United States had earlier demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites in orbit. In January 2007, the Chinese employed an SC-19 ballistic missile to fire directly at and destroy an outdated Feng-Yun-1C weather satellite at an altitude of 527 miles above the earth. Two previous ASAT attempts by China may have been intentional "misses" for test purposes. Reportedly, at the time of those earlier missile launches the U.S. intelligence community believed that China was close to proving the ability to hit an orbiting satellite, but some officials were taken by surprise when the ASAT capability was demonstrated, creating a massive field of space debris. Now China has joined Russia in proposing a ban on all weapons in space. The proposal was voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 12 February at an international disarmament conference in Geneva. "Without preventing an arms race in space, international security will be wanting," he told the conference. "The task of preventing an arms race in space is on the conference's agenda. It's time ... to start serious practical work in this field," he said. The existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967 -- formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies -- bans the build-up or stockpile of weapons, including nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction in orbit, and their installation on the moon. But the treaty does not address the shooting down of satellites. (To date 98 countries are states-parties to the treaty, while another 28 have signed the treaty but have not yet completed ratification.) In calling for a ban of all types of weapons in space including ASAT systems, Lavrov explained, "Weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction. And this, in turn, is fraught with a new spiral in the arms race both in space and on the earth." He also criticized the U.S. government's plan to expand the ballistic missile defense system into Europe: "We cannot but feel concerned over the situation where ... there are increasing efforts by the United States to deploy its global ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] system," Lavrov said. "The desire to acquire an anti-missile 'shield' while dismantling the 'sheath', where the nuclear 'sword' is kept is extremely dangerous," he added. The U.S. government has ongoing talks at this time with the leaders in Warsaw and Prague that are address a proposal to install ten ABM interceptor missiles in Poland and associated ABM radars in the Czech Republic. The Eastern European-based ABM components are being put forward by the United States to deter rogue states -- presumably Iran -- from attacking Europe with ballistic missiles. While many individuals and groups in the United States as well as Europe question the need for and effectiveness of an ABM system, the anti-satellite issue is of general interest to all virtually all parties. The massive and all-encompassing use of satellites for intelligence collection, missile launch warning, navigation (especially GPS), communications, and weather forecasting make them invaluable to civil and military activities on a continuous basis.

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