Ext #1 – No Risk
Terrorists, including al Qaeda, all lack the expertise to use a nuclear weapon.
Mueller ‘9 (John, Prof. Pol. Sci. – Ohio State U., in “American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11”, Ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, p. 197)
Moreover, no terrorist group, including al-Qaeda, has shown anything resembling the technical expertise necessary to fabricate or deal with a bomb. And contacts — "academic," it is claimed — between Pakistani scientists and al-Qaeda were abruptly broken off after 9/11 (Albright and Higgins 2003: 54-55; Suskind 2006: 69-70, 122). In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 11, 2007, FBI Director Robert Mueller, who had been highly alarmist about the terrorist potential in previous testimony, was stressing that his chief concern within the United States had become homegrown groups, and that, while remaining concerned that things could change in the future, "few if any terrorist groups" were likely to possess the required expertise to produce nuclear weapons — or, for that matter, biological or chemical ones. If dealing with enemies like that is our generation's (or century's) "central battle," it would seem we are likely to come out quite well.
Threat of US retaliation prevents WMD use.
James Campbell, United States Navy, Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on technology, terrorism and government information, April 22, 1998
Perhaps a much more compelling constraint to terrorist employment of WMD is the concept of "backlash."19 Backlash manifests itself in two distinct forms e.g., government reaction and public reaction. Backlash occurs when an "act" of terrorism exceeds the acceptable violence threshold of the public. The result of this is twofold: as first, a loss of constituency (popular support and legitimacy) for the terrorist group may occur; and second, the targeted regime or government may adopt extraordinary efforts to eliminate the terrorist group. Backlash therefore represents a significant constraint to the use of WMD. Backlash is also applicable to state-sponsored terrorism. Indeed, the state sponsor of a WMD attack would risk a response of massive retaliation from the United States following such an event. In both cases, WMD use can be convincingly self-defeating.
Ext #2 – No Tech
No risk of nuclear terrorism – can’t get WMD
Gerold Post, M.D., Elliot School of International Affairs, November 2, 2001 (RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS AND RESTRAINTS, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/Nuclear_Terrorism/post.pdf) (MHHARV2168)
Moreover, this matrix is concerned only with motivations and constraints, and does not consider resource and capability. Weapons experts regularly identify weaponization as a major constraint to mass CBW terrorism. The resources and technological capability to carry out a large-scale attack would, in the judgment of many in the weapons community, require resources and technological skill only found at the state level. Similarly, the resources and technological skill required to develop a nuclear weapon would normally be found only at the state level, but a state supporting terrorism could supply a weapon to the terrorist group it supports, although given the risk of retaliation should its nuclear facilitation be discovered, there would be significant constraints against a supporting state releasing a weapon to a terrorist group without strict controls. Some of the perpetrators in the matrix, such as individual right-wing extremists, might be highly motivated to cause mass destruction, with no psychological or moral constraint, but would lack the technological capability and resources to mount more than a small local radiological attack.
Terrorists can’t build bombs with small amounts of material
Karl-Heinz Kamp, Political Scientist, AUSSENPOLITIK: GERMAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW, 1995, p. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/au_pol/kamp.htm (MHHAR3512)
Nuclear weapons initially require weapon-grade fissile material and a host of other "exotic" raw materials in sufficient quantities and quality. The amount of fissile material depends on the accessible level of development - the more basic the functional principle of the nuclear weapon, the greater them amount of fissile material required. Weapons which need no more than one kilogram of plutonium mare currently only realisable in the huge nuclear laboratories of the superpowers . They require technologies (such as, for example, what is known as supercompression), which are currently not even mastered by the other Western nuclear powers, let alone by any non-governmental nuclear aspirants. Apart from nuclear materials the production of nuclear weapons requires highly qualified personnel from the fields of physics, chemistry, metallurgy, electronics as well as a special know-how.
Terrorists will only use conventional weapons – stigma and lack of tech
Morten Bremer Maerli, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, November 2, 2001 (THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/Nuclear_Terrorism/maerli.pdf) (MHHARV2585)
Terrorists operate in contexts of enormous uncertainty and anxiety, and may thus prefer known means. If a target is regarded as too challenging, other targets may be chosen, while the tactics of the group remain the same. Alternatively, well-known tactics may be further developed, as painfully evidenced September 11, 2001.The use of weapons of mass destruction could, moreover, stigmatize the terrorist group and could render any political aspirations hard to accomplish. Conventional off-the-shelf weaponry and well-known approaches are thus likely to remain the major tools for the bulk part of traditional terrorists.
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