1. Science diplomacy fails – politicizes science
Kerr, The Guardian staff writer, 6/28/2009
[David, "Using science for soft diplomacy," http://www.deccanherald.com/content/9949/using-science-soft-diplomacy.html]
With this new focus, however, come warnings about the dangers of mixing science and diplomacy. And of course if scientists were simply to become pawns in an inter-state power play then the whole thing collapses. Scientists should and do have more self-respect and dedication to their field of inquiry than that. Science diplomacy works when there is shared interest and that is scientific progress – not leveraging state power through the proxy of science.
2. US science diplomacy not key – not zero-sum
Kerr, The Guardian staff writer, 6/28/2009
[David, "Using science for soft diplomacy," http://www.deccanherald.com/content/9949/using-science-soft-diplomacy.html]
Science diplomacy need not be a zero-sum game in which what is good for one nation state is necessarily bad for another. The imperatives of globalisation have brought into sharp focus the need for countries to collaborate on a multitude of issues.
3. Status quo solves – Obama boosting science diplomacy now
Koenig, Science staff writer, 6/5/2009
[Robert, "Fuzzy Spots in Obama's Science Diplomacy," http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/06/fuzzy-spots-in.html]
Administration officials are scrambling to add substance to President Barack Obama’s new Middle Eastern science diplomacy initiatives, mentioned Thursday in his speech in Cairo. The President promised new “science envoys,” centers of excellence, and a “technological development” fund for the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. The State Department and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) were working today to bring those words into focus.
“Details of these initiatives will be crafted in discussion with officials in the nations where they will be based,” said OSTP spokesman Rick Weiss. Nina V. Fedoroff, science adviser to the Secretary of State and the Agency for International Development, said that proposals for centers of excellence “have been bubbling up from several different directions” with emphasis on issues such as agriculture and public health.
A State Department fact sheet explained that the United States “will work with educational institutions, NGOs and foreign governments” to decide the focus and location of such centers.
The new “science envoys” program could follow the lines of a bill sponsored by Sen. Lugar (R–IN) and approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that would deploy prominent scientists on missions of goodwill and collaboration. Fedoroff said such efforts would dovetail with evolving State Department science diplomacy programs.
Obama also announced a new regional fund to support technological development in Muslim-majority countries. The fact sheet said the fund would help pay for “S&T collaboration, capacity development” and innovations with commercial potential.
4. Cutting ITER funding is destroying U.S. credibility in science diplomacy
Steir, ’08 (Ken, “Using Scientists as Diplomats”, Time, 3/7, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1720538,00.html)
Scientific cooperation has long had a critical, if unsung, supporting role in international diplomacy, helping to rebuild economies from the ashes of World War II and eventually winding down the Cold War. But despite these successes, critics say Washington's record of integrating science and technology into foreign policy in recent years has been decidedly mixed. That was one of the themes raised at the recent annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), where scientists lamented that Washington continues to short-shrift international scientific cooperation, which is increasingly regarded as a crucial tool of soft power for spreading prosperity and enhancing American competitiveness. Critics say this is particularly unfortunate at a time when science is more than ever a truly global enterprise, especially for solving challenges such as energy and climate change. The latest example of this, they claim, is Congress' recent failure to appropriate any funds this year to the $20 billion multi-national fusion power project (ITER) being constructed in southern France. The landmark R&D project is aimed at demonstrating the scientific and technical feasibility of fusion power, and the U.S. has pledged to cover 10% of the cost over 10 years. "That's unbelievable, a major international agreement, you worked on it for 24 years — that just confirms in people's mind our reputation as a really lousy international partner," said Norman Neureiter, who has had key roles in Washington's science and technology policy for over 40 years. "For the leading scientific nation in the world to have a reputation like that is really destructive in my view."
AT: Secession
1. Groups don’t want secession
Kamal Shehadi, Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1993, Ethnic Self Determination And the Break Up of States, p. 74
The third objection to border changes is that allowing for such changes will lead to the proliferation of states, with detrimental effects on regional stability and economic development. The reality, however, is that few entities will attempt to secede and fewer still will survive if they do. Small entities with little or no indigenous bases of military or economic power cannot survive on their own and will want to join with other states.
2. Alt cause – governments are empirically unwilling to negotiate with secessionist groups – means conflicts are inevitable
Walter, 2003.(Barbara F., Associate Professor Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at University of California, San Diego, December, “REPUTATION AND WAR: Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Review. Vol. 5, no. 4)
The most intractable civil wars in the last half of the twentieth century were not ethnic civil wars or ideological civil wars. The most intractable conflicts were those fought over territory. Between 1940 and 1996, combatants fighting territorial civil wars were 70 percent less likely to initiate peace negotiations than combatants fighting any other type of civil war.1 And once begun, these negotiations rarely brought peace. In only 17 percent of the cases where a government faced rebels who sought independence or greater regional autonomy did the government agree to accommodate the rebels in any way. This pattern was confirmed in studies of inter-state disputes. Luard (1986), Holsti (1991), Goertz and Diehl (1992), and Vasquez(1993) each found that territorial issues are one of the most frequent sources of war, and that competing governments are less likely to resolve disagreements over territory than any other issue. And Hensel (1996) found that territorial disputes are more likely to escalate, to produce a greater number of fatalities, and be more conflictual than non-territorial confrontations. Unlike most other issues, governments show a surprising unwillingness to negotiate over land in order to avoid or end otherwise costly conflicts. Why do governments so often refuse to negotiate over territory, and under what conditions will they agree to negotiate and make some accommodation for greater autonomy or independence?
Share with your friends: |