Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
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- AT: Turkish PKK Conflict
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AT: Turkish Loose NukesTerrorists unlikely to obtain nuclear weapons or materials from Turkey Ozcan 10 Yurter Ozcan is a Marcia Robbins-Wilf young scholar in the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Yurter Ozcan, “New U.S. National Security Strategy and Implications for Turkey”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 5-10-10. Pg 1. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1456). Although Gen. Jones did not include Turkey in his remarks; it is possible to draw conclusions that would be directly related to Turkey. In order to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or materials, the Obama administration will continue to seek support from a broad international coalition. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and an important ally in the region, Turkey will be looked up as a reliable partner that will act in accordance with such coalition. In this regard, Turkey's possible abstention from voting for sanctions at the UN Security Council will be regarded as negatively as voting against sanctions. Security checks theft from Turkey Asia Times 10 [Asia Times Online, 4/16/10, “Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LD16Ak02.html] In actuality, the threat of terrorists acquiring a working nuclear device are relatively remote. Building nuclear weapons is a complex and resource intensive business; if it were not, more countries would already possess them. That leaves the option of stealing a weapon. But pilfering a nuclear weapon is not simply a case of planning a sophisticated smash-and-grab operation. Nuclear weapons have multi-layered security systems, both technological and human. For example, access to nuclear facilities and weapons follows strict chains of command. Warheads are usually stored in several different pieces that require a cross-expertise and technical sophistication to assemble. In addition, they employ security features called Permissive Action Links (PAL) that use either external enabling devices or advanced encryption to secure the weapon. Older security systems include anti-tamper devices capable of exploding the device without a nuclear chain reaction. Not to mention that effectively delivering a nuclear device comes with its own hefty challenges. Thus, there are many serious obstacles to terrorists actually obtaining and setting off a nuclear bomb. AT: Turkish PKK ConflictNo conflict Turkey Defense and Security Report 10 “Executive Summary” Turkey Defense and Security Report 1/1/10 pg 5, EBSCO We believe momentum is building towards some form of political settlement in Turkey’s long-standing conflict with the terrorist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). That said, we stress that a quick resolution is not part of our core scenario and highlight several key risks which suggest that recent moves toward conciliation remain tentative at best. A group of 34 militants from the PKK surrendered to the Turkish Army on October 19, claiming that they were laying down their arms to support Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s policies to grant ethnic Kurds greater social and cultural rights. After being questioned by ministry of justice officials, all 34 guerrillas were released without charge. Following the release, Erdogan called on all PKK supporters to return to the country, and permanently end the decades-long insurgency. While a relatively minor tactical victory for the government, the surrender is a positive signal that Ankara’s effort to improve ethnic Kurdish rights is having a positive impact on the conflict.
Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, ’10 http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf Even if the political will was in place, it would be difficult for Turkey to develop a nuclear weapon given the safeguards and treaties that are in place. Turkey would have to violate not just the NPT, including the AP, but presumably the various test ban treaties as well. It would have to build enough reprocessing or enrichment capacity to make nuclear weapons without the international community noticing, a difficult task. Any effort to build a nuclear weapon would almost certainly be discovered, and the consequences for Turkey would outweigh the benefits of having a nuclear weapon. The most likely scenario for nuclear proliferation originating in Turkey doesn’t come from the Turkish state, but from any of the non-state actors in the region. There are many groups operating in the region acting independently of the established governments. Independent terrorist groups are much harder for the international community to influence and since the 9/11 attacks in New York have been seen as the primary nuclear threat to national security. Turkey won’t nuclearize—US conventional umbrella would fill in. Perkovich 8 George Perkovich, Ph.D., vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of its non-proliferation programme, James M. Acton, physicist, lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, March 2008. [Adelphi Paper 48(396), Chapter One: Establishing Political Conditions to Enhance the Feasibility of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 15—40] Recent US discussions of the importance of seeking a world free of nuclear weapons have elicited intense, albeit quietly expressed, concern that this prospect could encourage nuclear proliferation by casting doubt on the viability of extended deterrence, that is, on the commitments made by Washington to project its military power to deter aggression against its allies and friends. Most prominently, it has been suggested that Japan might reconsider its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons because of a fear that US extended deterrence might be withdrawn.24 (Turkey is also frequently cited in this regard.) The reasons for this are not immediately clear. The US would only eliminate its last nuclear weapons at the same time as all other actors, including China, eliminated theirs, with verification and enforcement provisions negotiated to all states' satisfaction. In this scenario, the nuclear threats against which the US currently provides an umbrella nuclear deterrent would have been removed. The US would presumably maintain its security commitments to allies and be prepared to meet these commitments with conventional means. The conventional balancing requirement could be met by building up US and Japanese capabilities to substitute for the loss of nuclear deterrence - assuming this were still necessary in the absence of Chinese nuclear weapons - or by conventional arms control.
H. Sonmez Atesoglu, Professor of Economics @ Clarkson University, Holds a Ph.D. from U of Pittsburgh, Former Economist @ the IMF, Winter 2001 (“Turkish National Security Strategy and Military Modernization” – Strategic Review) p. 26 The reaction of the United States, the leader of NATO, to Turkey's decision to build a nuclear force would be critical. These two close allies are bonded to each other with common core national interests in the geopolitical region that Turkey is beginning to dominate. Turkish security managers would be very careful not to alienate the United States and might consider the political costs involved in going nuclear to be high compared to the benefits. Turkey will not develop nuclear weapons—too many costs. Udum 6 Sebnem Udum, Ph.D., candidate in International Relations at Bilkent U., visiting instructor at the Turkish Military Academy, November 2006. [56th Pugwash Conference Cairo, Egypt, Paper presented at the 2006 ISYP Conference, 9-10 November 2006, Cairo, Egypt, “Turkey’s Non-Nuclear Weapon Status -A Theoretical Assessment,” http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pic/56/1-8-Udum_ISYP_BD.pdf] Having said that, I argue that Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a viable decision: If Turkey decides to go nuclear, international pressure will be intense: Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective. It ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardize this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, relations with the United States are too important to be jeopardized: The United States is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, that would impair micro and macro balances. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, i.e. against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it is Iran, there are other more powerful actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target.14 Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. Tropical Cyclones documents -> Cbp and Trade Automated Interface Requirements Appendix: pga december 22, 2015 documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Ace abi catair customs and Trade Automated Interface Requirements documents -> Mobile audio/video recording systems documents -> Cartographic Concepts for Realizing a Location Based umts service documents -> 1/ Background Statistics Human development index rank Download 2.71 Mb. Share with your friends:
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