Ext #3 – Gov’t = Dehumanizing

Ext #3 – Gov’t = Dehumanizing

(Robert L. Stephens, software engineer, 6/2/04, http://robertlstephens.com/essays/essay_frame.php?essayroot=stephens-robert-l/&essayfile=002BadInfluence.html)

(Steven R. Morrison, J.D., Boston College Law School, Criminal Law, Fall 06, Dartmouth Law Journal, “Dehumanization and Recreation: A Lacanian Interpretation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, pp. 120-121, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=steven_morrison)

At this point, we have discussed how the law denies a person’s humanity. However, it creates something new in its place, since "[a]t each instant of its intervention, this law creates something new. Every situation is transformed by its intervention." The re-creation of an individual depends on what will best eliminate discordant ideas, since "[a] discordant statement [is] unknown in law." This may be seen as Lacan’s way of saying `that the law as a master will do what it must to preserve its power, that is, to preserve "the existing relations of production and the moral and social order." Therefore, if society views minorities as criminal, then the PSG will shape itself to fulfill that prophesy. If judges are seen as abusive of their discretion in judging, then the FSG will create judges that are "mere automatons, permitted only to apply a mathematical formula." lf the Sentencing Commission becomes sympathetic toward the idea of downward departures and the rigid strictures of PROTECT, then Congress will create a Commission that becomes a mere tool for a tough-on-crime policy of sentence increases. The master wants uniformity, predictability, and severity, and will censor and recreate others in its drive to achieve these goals.

Ext #4 – War = Dehumanizing

(Christopher Bennett, former director of the International Crisis Group in the Balkans, author of Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, 97, The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, compilation edited by Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, pp. 128-129)

The key to an understanding of the inhumanity of the Yugoslav wars is the phenomenon of war itself. The state of mind which is capable of committing atrocities is one which has been disturbed by war, not some mythical Balkan mentality. For war is dehumanizing; it destroys the very fabric of society and leaves psychologically unstable people in its wake, people who have lost contact with reality and are no longer in control of their own actions. After almost half a century of peace in the Western world, in which time many people have grown up without experiencing conflict, the brutality of war, albeit via a television screen, has come as a nasty shock. But war, and especially a protracted civil war, is brutal. Moreover, Westerners who are sucked into wars, such as the US troops who were engaged in Vietnam, are by no means above committing atrocities themselves.

AT: Democracies Solve Wars

Karen Kaiser & William Thompson, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, August 2001, p. 674

We infer from these results that regime type is an important predictor of dispute involvement, but rivalry conditions the relationship significantly. Democratic dyads are less likely to be involved in disputes, but that probability declines substantially in the presence of rivalry. Autocratic and mixed dyads, or non-democratic dyads in general, are more likely than democratic dyads to be involved in disputes, but the probability of dispute involvement increases dramatically when combined with the presence of a rivalry. We view these findings as support for hypothesis 3’s prediction that rivalry is a more important factor than dyadic regime type.
2. Their studies are flawed – Democracies don’t solve wars

George Kaloudis, Ph.D, International Journal on World Peace, March 2003 v20 i1 p93(2)

Professor Henderson, in this excellent work, examines the impact of democracy on war. More specifically, in Chapter I he provides an overview of the democratic peace proposition, the argument that democratic states are more peaceful than non-democratic states. In Chapter II, Dr. Henderson examines the extent to which democracies are less likely to fight each other by replicating one of the most compelling studies, Oneal and Russett (1997), of the democratic peace proposition. The results suggest that Oneal and Russett's conclusions are "the result of several questionable research design choices" that seriously undermines their thesis. In Chapter III, Dr. Henderson examines the proposition "that democracies are more peaceful, in general, than non-democracies." Professor Henderson concludes that these studies also rely "on faulty research design." In Chapter IV, Dr. Henderson "focuses on the role of democracy in extrastate wars." He finds that "democracies are less likely to become involved in these wars; however, the Western democracies are more likely to become involved in them." In Chapter V, Dr. Henderson examines the extent to which the democratic peace proposition applies to civil wars. He concludes that the democratic peace proposition "does not seem to be operative for international or civil wars." In Chapter VI, Dr. Henderson suggests "an alternative explanation of the postwar absence of interstate war between democratic states." He argues that "a combination of factors including bipolarity, alliance membership, and trade links reduced conflict among many jointly democratic and jointly autocratic states."
3. Their argument is empirically denied – as long as there are some democracies that will still fight, wars will continue

James Ostrowski; Attorney at Law, Buffalo; March 14, 2002 (Does Democracy Promote Peace? http://www.mises.org/asc/2002/asc8-ostrowski.pdf)

Rummel’s thesis crumbles at the very beginning for want of a cogent definition of peace. It is true that Rummel, at varying times and places expresses sympathy for the classical liberal state with fairly limited powers, this sympathy is not consistently manifest. He boasts that special interest group politics is a normal feature of democracy. He refers to the “ideological baggage” of classical liberalism. His enthusiasm for “democracy”, however, is repeated continuously and with little reservation. Further, his apparent personal sympathy for classical liberalism appears to play no role whatsoever in his theory. That theory vindicates modern democratic states, none of which is a classical liberal minimal state. Thus, if power kills, one should not support democracy, but a republican minimal or ultra minimal state or no state whatsoever (self-government). Asking the wrong question. Does it really matter whether democracies in general promote peace? Let’s assume that the vast majority of democracies are peaceful, but that a few are not. Would not that scenario allow for the generation of statistics which show that democracies are generally peaceful? Rummel considers this prospect, but casually dismisses it. He calls focusing on a few bellicose democracies a “methodological error.” However, let’s assume that the bellicose democracies are the most powerful democracies. Is it not then a distortion of reality to still maintain that democracies generally are peaceful? Imagine you are visiting an aquarium that features a large shark tank. There are 100 sharks in the tank. Ninety-five of the sharks are either docile or too small to injure a human. There are, however, five hungry great whites. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of the sharks are harmless, but would you swim in that tank? Similarly, we should not ask, are democracies peaceful, but is the United States peaceful? Are the other militarily powerful democracies—United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, peaceful? History shows they are not. See, Figure No. 7. As Gowa writes, “Theory suggests and empirical studies confirm that major powers are much more likely than are other states to become involved in armed disputes, including war.
4. Even if democracies are less likely to cause wars, wars will still occur in transition

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, WINTER 2005-6, http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=1ABA92EFCD8348688A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=4&id=46FB6DB413A94CA3BA62C68AC0D46181

THE BUSH Administration has argued that promoting democracy in the Islamic world, rogue states and China will enhance America's security, because tyranny breeds violence and democracies co-exist peacefully. But recent experience in Iraq and elsewhere reveals that the early stages of transitions to electoral politics have often been rife with violence.