The Chinese Century? Some Foreign Policy Implications of China’s Move to High-Tech Innovation



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i A nanometer is a billionth of a meter, roughly equal to 3-6 atoms side-by-side. A human hair is roughly 80,000 nanometers.

ii This theme was taken from the then CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s report to the 15th CCP Congress in 1997, which reads, “We should formulate a long-term plan for the development of science from the needs of long-range development of the country, taking a panoramic view of the situation, emphasizing key points, doing what we need and attempting nothing where we do not, strengthening fundamental research, and accelerating the transformation of achievements from high-tech research into industrialization” (emphasis added). This was in turn adapted from the May 1995 decision of the CCP and the State Council to push forward China’s S&T progress, although the wording was slight different—“catching up what we need and attempting nothing where we do not” (you suo gan, you suo bu gan).

iii Estimates for total central government funding of nanotechnology vary widely, ranging from as little as $230 million for the five-year period 2000-2004 (Bai 2005: 63), to $160 million in 2005 alone (Bai and Wang 2007: 75), to $250 million in that same year (Holman et al 2006: 25). Although even the highest figures are still considerably less than the U.S. is publicly investing (as noted previously, $1.6 billion in 2010), China’s governmental spending on nanotechnology may not be far off when adjusted for differences in labor and infrastructure costs (nanotechwire.com 2005).

iv The other three science megaprojects include development and reproductive biology, protein science, and quantum research.

v See Huawei, Research and Development, R&D Investment, December 2009 (http://www.huawei.com/corporate_information/research_development.do)

vi The 863 Program (Key Technologies Research and development Program) provides grants on a competitive basis for applied research in designated sectors; the 973 Program (National Basic Research Program) funds basic research.

vii For a more detailed discussion of different centers that promote nanotechnology research, development, and commercialization, see Huang and Wu, 2010; Appelbaum et al, 2010).

viii Information was obtained in interviews at the SNPC with LI Xiaoli (Project Manager), SHI Liyi, and Min Guoquan (August 7, 2006), and with ZHU Simon (SNPC Chinese Industry Association for Antimicrobial Materials & Products; Shanghai NML Nanotechnology Co., Ltd), ZHANG Bo (Shanghai AJ Nano-Science Development Co., Ltd), and Fu Lefeng (Shanghai Sunrise Chemical Company) (August 3, 2007).

ix As one prominent example, we were told that SNPC helped to fund and manage a project involving the use of atomic force microscope tips to locate DNA molecules that involved CAS and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, which was featured on the cover of Nano Letters.

x The SNPC has three incubators, each associated with a university: one affiliated with Shanghai University, and two with the Hua Dong Science and Technology University (East China University of Science and Technology).

xi OECD (1995) “Policy Brief: China’s Governance in Transition” (September) (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/13/35312075.pdf). In 1997 President Jiang Zemin called for privatization (feigongyou, or “non-public ownership”) of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a plan that was ratified by the 9th National People’s Congress the following year.

xii As Pinto explains it, “We're doing R&D in China because they're becoming a big market whose needs are different from those in the U.S…energy will become the biggest business for the company…[China] "will be the biggest solar market in the world” (Bourzac, 2009).

xiii Other areas will indirectly fuel high-tech innovation and development – for example, health, culture, and education; and ecological environment.

xiv By some accounts China’s stimulus spending paid off, at least in terms of jobs created, the real estate market, and overall economic growth (which reportedly reached an annualized rate of nearly 15% in the second quarter of 2009) (Bradsher, 2009).

xv One “Thousand Talents” 2009 call for recruitment at the Shanghai Advanced Research Institute required that applicants have an overseas Ph.D., be less than 55 years old, hold a professorship or equivalent position “at famous overseas universities or research institutions,” and agree to work in China for a minimum of 6 months each year. The benefits were considerable: start-up research fund of no less than 2,000,000 RMB (roughly $300,000), either a salary with performance bonus or a fixed annual salary of 500,000-800,000RMB ($73,000-$117,000), and a housing subsidy of 1,000,000RMB ($150,000) (CAS 2009b).

xvi Recent prominent returnees include Robin Li, co-founder and chairman of Baidu (China’s top search engine) and Min fan, CEO of Ctrip (China’s self-proclaimed “Premier Travel Site”), both listed on the NASDAQ.

xvii Shaun Rein is Managing Director of CMR, a strategic market intelligence firm headquartered in Shanghai, and a columnist for Forbes on leadership, marketing, and China; he also writes for Business Week's “Asia Insight” section. He was previously Chief of Research for Inter-Asia Venture Management, a venture capital firm, and Managing Director (and Country Head director for China) for WebCT.

xviii Fogel also argues that the growth of the service sector is most likely considerably under-estimated in official statistics, since an unknown part of the Chinese economy is off the books; moreover, he argues that it is difficult to measure improvements in services such as education and health care.

xix For their “China Consumer Demand Model (ver 20.0),” the study drew on macroeconomic, socio-demographic, household income/expenditure, and price data from a variety of Chinese and international sources. Details about the data and model ate provided in Appendix B of the report. See Pettis (2009), however, for a critique of the McKinsey forecast.

xx Fogel acknowledges that China faces demographic challenges resulting from its rapidly-aging society, conceding that “sceptics point to many obstacles that could derail the Chinese bullet train over the next 30 years: rising income inequality, potential social unrest, territorial disputes, fuel scarcity, water shortages, environmental pollution, and a still-rickety banking system.” He concludes, however, that “although the critics have a point, these concerns are no secret to China's leaders; in recent years, Beijing has proven quite adept in tackling problems it has set out to address.”

xxi China’s 37% is extremely low by world standards. Consumption for European economies typically runs 55-65%;, the U.S. ,70-72%; emerging economies in Latin America, 65-70%; Asian economies, 50-60% (Pettis, 2009). Based on these figures, some scepticism is in order; as Pettis notes, consumption in China would have to grow faster than GDP to bring Chinese consumption in line with that of other economies; given China’s high level of (investment-led) GDP growth, this may prove challenging.

xxiiGordon Chang is the author of The Coning Collapse of China (NY: Random House, 2001). Since the publication of Chang’s book, China’s economy has approximately doubled in size.

xxiii Apart from some well-publicized cases – such as Jinggangshan University scientists who fabricated 70 papers submitted to Acta Crysytallographica – a recent survey by China’s leading scientific association found that half the respondents claimed they had colleagues who had engaged in misconduct (Cao, 2010).

xxiv China’s efforts to counter its environmental problems are well-known. China officially plans to produce a fifth of its energy from renewable sources such as wind and solar by 2020, matching Europe’s goal, according to Zhang Ziaoqiang, vice chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC). These goals are to be achieved by investing much of China’s stimulus money in low-carbon energy sources, the creation of a more efficient energy transmission system, and carbon-efficient transportation systems (Borger and Watts, 2009).

xxvThe downsides for both parties are also obvious: for China, a vast supply of funding for speculative investments in housing, office space, Olympic venues, and infrastructure that may prove to be a bubble; on the U.S. side, the loss of manufacturing jobs. While American blue collar workers may have suffered as a result, all Americans as consumers have benefited.

xxviIt is worth noting that Japan’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is almost as large as China’s (in November 2009, China’s holdings totaled $790 billion, Japan’s $757 billion). China and Japan together accounted in that month for 43% of all foreign holdings (U.S. FRB, 2010).





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