The devolution

Aden Hashi Ayro is known to have traveled to Afghanistan sometime before 2001. While he was there, al Qaeda prime trained him in explosives and insurgent tactics. He ultimately returned to Somalia around 2003, where he established his own network and launched a series of operations. He is credited with multiple attacks against foreign aid workers and also is suspected in the murder of a journalist for the British Broadcasting Corp. He has since been described by multiple sources as al Qaeda’s military commander in Somalia. Ayro was killed in a May 1 U.S. airstrike.

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was involved with al Qaeda prime. He was instrumental in training warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid’s militia in 1993 and helped plan and organize the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the hotel bombing in Mombasa, Kenya, and a surface-to-air attack on an Israeli jetliner in 2002. He went on to become a part of the leadership of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) and subsequently a senior operational commander in al Shabaab. U.S. forces have targeted him on numerous occasions.

Abu Taha al-Sudani, also known as Tariq Abdullah, was al Qaeda’s leader in East Africa and received training from al Qaeda prime in explosives. He is thought to have had close ties to Osama bin Laden and other high-level al Qaeda and al Shabaab commanders. The United States has also implicated him as the main financier for various al Qaeda operations in East Africa.

Hassan Turki and SICC leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys are longtime allies and are believed to be orchestrating the Somalian insurgency. Turki also has links to al Shabaab and al Qaeda. He operated a training camp in southern Somalia and was targeted in a March 2007 airstrike but is thought to have survived. His camp was known to have housed al Qaeda-linked militants and trained al Shabaab fighters. In 2004, the U.S. government formally designated Turki as a financier of terrorism.

Gouled Hassan Dourad was part of an al Qaeda cell operated by al-Sudani and has links to al Qaeda prime. The U.S. government implicated him in a mid-2003 plot to bomb Camp Lemonier, a U.S. Special Forces base in Djibouti that hosts the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa contingent. Camp Lemonier has served as a the main U.S. operating base in the region — along with forward operating bases in Ethiopia — for many of the U.S. airstrikes on militant targets in Somalia. Dourad is currently being held at the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay.

Al Shabaab’s senior leadership clearly has extensive experience and involvement in al Qaeda prime operations. These links have helped the leaders arrange support for their group through arms shipments from Eritrea and Yemen and through increased numbers of foreign fighters sent in to support their cause. Al Qaeda prime has also voiced support for al Shabaab. In a March 2007 al Qaeda statement, Abu Yahya al-Libi encouraged the use of suicide and roadside bombings — tactics commonly associated with al Qaeda-affiliated groups — against Ethiopian troops and pro-Somalian government forces. Bin Laden and his second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have also made mention of Somalia in past recordings. This indicates that al Qaeda prime has recognized al Shabaab as a capable entity and has taken a proactive stance in order to help promote the group’s continued growth.

Al Shabaab is a somewhat loosely organized group. While there is a set command and control structure, the senior commanders usually only issue broad directives and leave the day-to-day operations to the lower-level commanders. This style of structure — along with the fact that many of the militants and low-level commanders have been working together since serving in the military wing of the SICC — means that replacing upper-level leaders such as Ayro will be fairly easy and should not greatly affect operational capabilities. In fact, some preliminary reports indicate that Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr has assumed a more senior leadership role after Ayro’s May 1 death.

Yet Ayro’s death is likely to create some short-term disruption in terms of organization within the group. This has been the United States’ tactic of late: targeting key leadership in airstrikes as a means of slowing down the growth of groups such as al Shabaab and trying to keep them in a relative state of disorganization. The United States has employed a similar strategy with success in Pakistan and Yemen, utilizing Predator drones to deliver tactical strikes on key leadership targets.

Judging from the success of the May 1 strike, the United States likely had “eyes on the target,” either via Predator drones or Special Forces personnel on the ground. The United States has also received intelligence on the location and movement of high-value targets from the Somalian government, although this intelligence is often delivered late and is difficult to act upon in a timely manner. Still, the number of successful strikes since January 2007 suggests that coordination is improving.

Somalia: Implications of the Al Qaeda-Al Shabaab Relationship

May 7, 2008
Editor’s Note: This is the third in a four-part series on the rebuilding of a key al Qaeda node in Somalia.
With the recent increase in al Qaeda activity in Yemen and the flow of fighters out of Iraq partially directed toward Yemen, it is likely that the country will see an influx of jihadists in the near future. Yemen is currently a relatively safe location for al Qaeda fighters’ operations. But, for a multitude of reasons, the security dynamic there is likely to change as their attacks continue and pressure upon the government to act increases.

Given Somalia’s history as a critical al Qaeda bridgehead into East Africa and its proximity to Yemen — a mere 100 nautical miles from the Yemeni coast — Somalia provides a plausible release for any jihadist influx. Its lack of a strong central authority, coupled with its porous borders and the presence of al Qaeda-affiliated groups, makes it a logical destination for these al Qaeda fighters if Yemen increases its internal security and begins to carry out counterterrorism operations.

Over the past couple of years al Shabaab and the Somalian insurgents have been trying to advance their cause by portraying Somalia as a central theater in the “war against the infidels.” In this manner, they have been trying to attract material support and foreign fighters. Up to now, most al Qaeda-linked militants have traveled to Iraq, a more traditional battleground for al Qaeda, where cells are already in place. But as U.S. operations in Iraq have progressed, it has become more difficult for the jihadists to conduct operations as successful and effective as in the past.

Therefore, some of these fighters likely will begin flowing out of Iraq in search of another cause and insurgency to support. This especially holds true if the fighters are not welcomed back by their home governments or are persecuted when they return home and need to relocate. This same dynamic occurred after the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and many Islamist militants who found themselves unwelcome at home took up the struggle in such out-of-the-way places as Chechnya and Bosnia. There was also a large segment of the displaced jihadist population that had no problem returning to their respective homelands but rather chose to continue fighting on their own accord and traveled in search of worthy causes elsewhere.

In such cases, a country with a chaotic environment and a chance to wage a jihad, like Somalia, could appear attractive. In fact, recent reports suggest that the flow of foreign fighters into Somalia has been steadily increasing in the past few months.

While this is a long-term outlook, in the short term, as the link between al Shabaab and al Qaeda strengthens, there likely will be a shift in al Shabaab’s operational doctrine. Even with the limited and unsophisticated tactical doctrine the group employs at this time, al Shabaab has been able to inflict heavy casualties among the Ethiopian forces, similar to al Qaeda’s operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. While the Somalian militants currently rely on small-unit assaults of villages and checkpoints and the occasional bombing of soft military targets, as al Qaeda’s influence grows stronger, al Shabaab is very likely to begin adopting a tactical doctrine similar to one associated with an al Qaeda-affiliated group, marking the difference between an insurgency and terrorism.

However, with the beginning of the foreign jihadist flight from Iraq and increased support from al Qaeda sympathizers elsewhere, al Shabaab has been provided the opportunity to transform Somalia into a central theater, much like Bosnia and Chechnya became central theaters for jihadist militants when opportunities to fight elsewhere evaporated. One factor that could forward al Shabaab’s cause would be an increased U.S. presence, which would in turn give the Somalian militants the opportunity to directly strike U.S. forces. If Somalia provided an opportunity for jihadists to strike directly at U.S. forces, Somalia would likely see an even greater influx of support from abroad, possibly propelling Somalia — a former “backwater” — into the forefront of the jihadist movement, alongside the likes of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Somalia: Al Shabaab and the War Against Islamist Militancy

May 8, 2008
Editor’s Note: This is the final part in a four-part series on the rebuilding of a key al Qaeda node in Somalia.
Thus far, the United States has limited its involvement in Somalia to tactical airstrikes with cruise missiles and AC-130 gunships — both standoff weapons systems — and naval interdiction operations along the Somalian coastline. There have been U.S. Special Forces and CIA paramilitary operations on the ground in Somalia, but these have been more intelligence-gathering operations than direct-strike operations (the operatives quietly locate targets for other resources to strike).

However, the United States certainly has recognized the need to be involved directly in Somalia. U.S. forces have established a central base of operations at Camp Lemonier — a former French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti — where most U.S. air operations originate. Furthermore, the United States has established numerous forward operating bases within Ethiopia to support U.S. air operations in the region.

It is likely that the United States’ involvement will increase in Somalia, due to the growing presence of al Qaeda-linked militants — namely al Shabaab — and partly due to the increase in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. For now, the United States seems content with providing support to Ethiopian operations, and any growth would be in the form of air, naval or Special Forces assets. However, regardless of any increase, Somalia is likely to remain on the periphery of the war against Islamist militants, with Iraq and Afghanistan remaining at the forefront for the time being. This is not to say that the situation in Somalia is not a concern for U.S. military planners; rather, at this point, there is little more that can be done without a sizable shift in U.S. forces’ presence in the region.
The Outlook for al Shabaab
If this situation plays out as STRATFOR sees it, the link between al Shabaab and al Qaeda might strengthen over time, and the flow of weapons, explosives and jihadists through Yemen, Eritrea and elsewhere might continue, but al Shabaab is not likely to drastically increase in size or strength in the long run. Up to this point, the combination of Ethiopian and pro-government forces and limited U.S. action has not defeated the insurgency, though it has managed to keep them slightly off balance; at the same time, the insurgents have not defeated the Ethiopians or the Somalian government the Ethiopians are backing.

If history is any indication, al Shabaab and the local al Qaeda nodes will fade away over time. Al Qaeda nodes in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the Sinai and the Philippines have risen up in the past, only to be dismantled and reduced to a much lesser level by government crackdowns aided by international assistance from countries such as the United States.

However, it is important to note that Somalia has a different dynamic. Jihadist movements have the potential to thrive where there is chaos — as in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border areas — but do not do as well in countries with a strong central government. Because of the vacuum of state power in Somalia, al Shabaab has an opportunity to thrive.

Eventually, increased U.S. and Ethiopian operations — especially with increased intelligence gathering and sharing — will take their toll on al Shabaab and destabilize the group’s core command and control structure, weakening its operational capabilities. However, al Shabaab does pose a very real threat. Without continued counterterrorism efforts — in combination with efforts to stabilize Somalia and establish a strong central authority — al Shabaab could help re-establish al Qaeda’s foothold in East Africa and create serious security issues both in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa.

Al Qaeda: Creative Recruiting for Suicide Bombers

Umar Hamza bin Laden is one of 19 children reportedly fathered by the renowned global terrorist. Instead of aspiring to become a Western pop singer or calling for peace between Muslims and the West on CNN like some of his other siblings, Umar Hamzah bin Laden has apparently followed in the footsteps of his father in Afghanistan, where he reportedly resides with his Saudi mother.

Umar Hamza is widely recognized in jihadist circles. A poem he allegedly wrote for his father in 2003 is posted on a jihadist Web site where the young man is praised by jihadist sympathizers as a successor to his father. Now, it seems the younger bin Laden allegedly has been tasked with recruiting minors from 13-16 years old to form small jihadist cells in their areas of residence. According to the source, Umar Hamza is focused on recruiting minors with low IQs or with mental disabilities or those who come from broken homes. The jihadist group is especially intent on boosting recruitment in the West African state of Mauritania, where a jihadist presence has reared its head in recent months and where poverty and homelessness among children is high.

Al Qaeda’s apparent focus on recruiting minors is revealing of the group’s desperation. It is well known by now that al Qaeda is attempting to counter serious shortages in recruits since its ranks have been depleted, particularly in Iraq where the group has been severely hampered by U.S-allied armed Sunni groups.

Though al Qaeda is facing some rough times, the group’s reaching out to mentally disabled minors is also a sign of the group’s innovation. Capable militant groups will learn to adapt to a changing security environment in order to sustain their operations. For example, in 2003 it might have been relatively easy for a suicide bomber in Iraq to storm a security checkpoint, but it is now far more difficult for an adult male with a bulky vest to get close to his intended target. Iraqi insurgent leaders eventually learned that it was a lot easier and more effective for a woman in a loose-fitting abaya to pass security checkpoints than for a man, leading to the more prevalent use of female suicide bombers in attacks. In the end, it is more effective for these groups to preserve their more skilled or “mentally stable” operatives for the purposes of bomb-making, planning, fund-raising and recruiting than to expend them on suicide missions — thus the need to seek out mentally ill or troubled youths and drug addicts who can be convinced that their salvation will come only from sacrificing themselves in martyrdom missions. Though these foot soldiers might have low skill levels, they are key to the group’s ability to sustain a regular tempo of attacks.

Furthermore, insurgent leaders have developed a variety of insurance policies to ensure a successful attack, regardless of the bomber’s mental health. Such methods include remotely detonating the suicide bomb from a getaway vehicle parked near the attack site, tying the hands of the bomber to the steering wheel of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and having a gunman on site to shoot the suicide bomber and automatically trigger the release on the bomb should the attacker get cold feet.

The Israelis and Sri Lankans have come across a few interesting suicide lingerie cases as well. Back in 2005, a female suicide bomber was caught at an Israeli checkpoint with 20 pounds of explosives stitched in her underwear. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, one of the early users of suicide bombing as a tactic, have even devised a suicide brassiere; last November, a mentally disabled Tamil Tiger bra bomber unwittingly blew herself up outside the office of a Tamil minister.

Regardless of ideology, religion, language or purpose, militant groups worldwide will continue to learn from each other and adopt new tactics to maintain an upper hand in their insurgency. While suicide bombing may be a decades-old phenomenon, the ingenuity surrounding the tactic is very much alive.

Mauritania: The Unlikelihood of al Qaeda's Threat

Al-Wadoud joined many other voices in condemning Mauritania’s most recent coup. He accused the coup leaders of being backed by Western powers such as the United States and France, and he urged Mauritanians to “wake up and prepare for the war; the cross is marching toward you.”

In fact, the United States and France also condemned the coup. Both countries withdrew all nonhumanitarian financial assistance to the country Aug. 8 — a move other European countries are contemplating. The United States specifically has worked closely with Mauritania since 2003 to increase the country’s counterterrorism capabilities and provided training and funds to the country’s cash-strapped military. Together, the United States and France cut off slightly more than $20 million in assistance to a country whose military expenditures in 2005 were estimated at $80 million.

Attacks in Mauritania began to be linked to AQIM in December 2007, but militants there have not displayed the capability to carry out sophisticated attacks. Militants used AK-47s to attack French tourists on Dec. 23, 2007, and Mauritanian border guards four days later, in incidents that led to the cancellation of the 2008 Dakar Rally. On Feb. 1, militants opened fire on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital. The ensuing gunbattle with guards caused no casualties; bystanders were wounded, but no embassy staff members were harmed. Finally, on April 7, gunmen linked to AQIM exchanged fire with security forces in Nouakchott, leading to the deaths of one police officer and one militant.

These attacks showed rudimentary tactics with little or no preoperational planning. While the significant drop in defense funding will hamper Mauritania’s ability to control the new al Qaeda threat, it is fairly clear that groups associated with AQIM in Mauritania simply cannot mount a large-scale, coordinated attack at this point.

And the development of a mature militant Islamist movement takes time and resources. For example, AQIM cells in Algeria have been very active. Based out of the hills east of Algiers, the group has mounted a steady, successful campaign against state security forces since the 1990s, before the group (previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) joined al Qaeda. Militants have conducted roadside bombings and suicide attacks using vehicle-borne explosives. They have targeted the military, police and tourist sites with alarming success. However, Mauritania does not have Algeria’s history of jihadist activity, and there are no signs that AQIM expertise is flowing to Mauritania from Algerian cells. AQIM cells in Morocco have had similar trouble gaining traction and largely have been contained.

Considering the effort that it would take to start a genuine insurgency there, Mauritania is not as strategically important to AQIM as Algeria. Compared to Mauritania, Algeria carries a higher international profile and hosts more Western tourists, and Algiers is a cosmopolitan city with many Westerners and Western interests. Mauritania relies on fishing and hosts no significant Western interests. Furthermore, the two countries’ main cities are separated by 1,700 miles of barren desert — a significant challenge to transporting people and supplies.

However, Mauritania does offer a place for AQIM members to hide out and train for attacks elsewhere in Northern Africa. Though the new Mauritanian junta has promised to crack down on al Qaeda elements, the portion of the Sahara in northeast Mauritania is virtually ungovernable. It is mostly controlled by nomadic tribes that are not necessarily loyal to the government in Nouakchott and provide cover to militants in return for cash. Mauritania’s military is incapable of carrying out sustained missions in the area; and after the military funding cutoff, it likely will have even less reach than it did before.

Physically, there is not much stopping AQIM from establishing itself in the deserts of northeastern Mauritania — there are reports that it already has. But as AQIM continues its focus on Algeria, it cannot spread too far from the Mediterranean coast without risking becoming stretched too thin. Establishing and maintaining supply lines over such inhospitable terrain is risky and requires considerable manpower. If AQIM begins increasing its reliance on the deserts of Mauritania as a safe haven, it could be a sign that the group is under pressure in Algeria, a country whose security apparatus is far more adept than Mauritania’s.

Ultimately, al-Wadoud’s call to arms for the people of Mauritania was a publicity move for AQIM. The coup — something that happens in Mauritania about every two years — was an opportunity for AQIM to point out the country’s poor record of consistent governance and take advantage of disillusioned Muslims ripe for recruiting to send to more important areas such as neighboring Algeria. There is no question that AQIM would like to have a successful presence in Mauritania. But so far, it has lacked the ability, and it will have to make a large investment there first.

From the New York Landmarks Plot to the Mumbai Attack

In July 1993, U.S. counterterrorism agents arrested eight individuals later convicted of plotting an elaborate, multistage attack on key sites in Manhattan. The militants, who were linked to Osama bin Laden’s then-relatively new group, al Qaeda, planned to storm the island armed with automatic rifles, grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In multiple raids on key targets combined with diversionary attacks, they aimed to kill as many people as possible.

The planned attack, which came to be known as the “Landmarks” plot, called for several tactical teams to raid sites such as the Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and U.N. Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and a midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIPs traveling from lower Manhattan to various New York-area airports. The militants carried out extensive surveillance both inside and outside the target hotels using human probes, hand-drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed notes were taken on the layout and design of the buildings, with stairwells, ballrooms, security cameras and personnel all reconnoitered.

The attackers intended to infiltrate the hotels and disguise themselves as kitchen employees. On the day of the attack, one attack team planned to use stolen delivery vans to get close to the hotels, at which point heavily armed, small-cell commando teams would deploy from the rear of the van. Stationary operatives would use hand grenades to create diversions while attack teams would rake hotel guests with automatic weapons. The attackers planned to carry gas masks and use tear gas in hotel ballrooms to gain an advantage over any security they might come up against. They planned to attack at night, when the level of protection would be lower.

The targeted hotels host some of the most prestigious guests in Manhattan. These could have included diplomats like the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who traditionally keeps an apartment in the Waldorf-Astoria, or even the U.S. secretary of state, who is known to stay at the Waldorf during U.N. sessions. They also host various business leaders. If successful, the attackers doubtless would have killed many high-profile individuals key to New York’s stature as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

Meanwhile, the plots to detonate explosives in the Lincoln and Holland tunnels would have blocked critical transportation infrastructure, sowing chaos in the city as key escape routes were closed off. And VIPs seeking to escape the city via the midtown heliport would have been thwarted by the attack planned for that location. In fact, the heliport attack was planned to be carried out using watercraft, which also could have been used to target transport ferries, further disrupting transportation in and out of Manhattan. The New York City Police Department could plausibly even have quarantined Manhattan to prevent the attackers from fleeing the city.

With the city shut down and gunmen running amok, the financial center of the United States would have been thrown into chaos and confusion until the attackers were detained or killed. The attacks thus would have undermined the security and effectiveness of New York as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

At the time, U.S. counterterrorism officials deemed that the attack would have had a 90 percent success rate. Disaster, then, was averted when federal agents captured the plotters planning the Landmarks attack thanks to an informant who had infiltrated the group. Along with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing just four months earlier, which killed six people but was intended to bring down both towers, the United States dodged a major bullet that could have been devastating to New York.