Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Portugal's Revolution. Schneidman, Whitney W

Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Portugal's Revolution. Schneidman, Whitney W. : Studies in Intelligence Summer 1989

85^ Kevorkov’s comments are quoted in Barrass, The Great Cold War, pp. 167-68. The interviews of Kevorkov took place in 2006 and 2007.

86^ Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 381 (link).

87^ Robert Kagan, “The Revisionist: How Henry Kissinger Won the Cold War, or So He Thinks,” New Republic, June 21, 1999 (link), p. 47.

88^ See, for example, Conquest, “A New Russia?” p. 488.

89^ Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 268.

90^ A large body of evidence relating to this crisis is easily available in English translation. See especially the Cold War International History Program collection on the “1980-81 Polish Crisis” (link). The pdf’s linked to the descriptions of each document (click the “download” button) often contain the Russian language original as well as the English translation. Of the 58 documents in this collection, 22 had already been made available in Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis” (link). The version in the working paper is still worth consulting, since it contains Kramer’s very useful notes on the documents, sometimes missing from the version in the larger CWIHP collection, and an introduction, which helps place the documents in context. Two articles Kramer published in the CWIHP Bulletin are also of fundamental importance: Mark Kramer, “Poland 1980-81: Soviet Policy during the Polish Crisis,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 5 (Spring 1995) (link); and “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981” (with Jaruzelski’s response), CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998) (link). A number of documents were published in those two issues of the Bulletin in conjunction with those two articles. For another, partially overlapping, collection of documents relating to this issue, see Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007). Some of the documents included in that collection are also available online in “Solidarity and Martial Law in Poland: 25 Years Later,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 211 (link).

91^ Mark Kramer, “Clear Goal, Flexible Means: How the Soviet Union Pushed Jaruzelski towards Action,” Lelewel Gespräche 6/2012 (link); Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981,” in Lee Trepanier et al., eds., The Solidarity Movement and Perspectives on the Last Decade of the Cold War (Krakow: AFM, 2010) (link), pp. 61-66; Mark Kramer, “Why Did the Cold War Last So Long?” in Mark Kramer and Vit Smetana, eds., Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945-1989 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 478 n. 23 (link).

92^ Wilfried Loth, “Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev Doctrine,” Cold War History 1, no. 2 (2001), p. 110 (link). Loth does not give a reference to support his claim, but the record of the meeting is available in English translation in Paczkowski and Byrne, From Solidarity to Martial Law, doc. 15, pp. 123-128, and the original Russian text of the minutes of that meeting is available on the Wilson Center Digital Archive (link). I am grateful to my colleague Dan Treisman for reviewing the Russian text for me.

93^ Matthew Ouimet, Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 165.

94^ Ibid., p. 172. Ouimet relies on the account given by a former Soviet general, Gribkov, first in a published article and then in an interview Ouimet had with him in 1995. According to Gribkov, the military leadership, almost unanimously, advised against sending troops; Defense Minister Ustinov then presented their views to the Politburo, which made the decision not to intervene militarily. Suslov was quoted as saying that “under no circumstances” would Soviet troops be sent to Poland; if a new leadership (i.e., a Solidarity-led government) came to power, he supposedly said, “we will cooperate with it.” Ibid., pp. 199-202, 249, 289 n. 142. As the reference on p. 289 makes clear, Gribkov’s account in his interview with Ouimet was Ouimet’s only source; in Gribkov’s article, he had simply stated that the meetings in question took place “in the second half of 1981.” My guess is that whereas Gribkov remembered the essence of the decision correctly, he was a bit off on the exact date. For the date of the interview, see ibid., p. 282 n. 153, and Matthew Ouimet, “National Interest and the Question of Soviet Intervention in Poland, 1980-1981: Interpreting the Collapse of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine,’” Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 4 (October 2000) (link), p. 726 n. 51.

95^ Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War,” CWIHP Working Paper no. 23 (1998) (link), p. 22.

96^ Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis,” p. 62.

97^ Politburo Commission on Poland report, “On the Development of the Situation in Poland and Certain Steps on our Part,” April 23, 1981 (link). Also quoted in Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis,” p. 52, and in Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis,” (link), p. 134 n. 214.

98^ See Suslov Commission report, quoted in Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis,” p. 52. See also Gribkov’s comment quoted in Ouimet, Brezhnev Doctrine, p. 172.

99^ Notes of Politburo meeting, October 29, 1981 (link).

100^ The policy, Andropov noted at the December 10 meeting, had been formulated at the previous Politburo session; he also pointed out that Brezhnev had taken this basic line on earlier occasions. See Politburo session, December 10, 1981, in Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis,” (link), doc. 21, p. 164.

101^ Politburo session, December 10, 1981, in Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis” (link), doc. 21, pp. 164, 165, 166, 168. See also Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, pp. 335-36. The notes of the December 10 meeting were first published in English in conjunction with Kramer’s article on “Soviet Policy during the Polish Crisis” in 1995; the document in question is on pp. 134-37 (link). That document had been published in a Russian journal the previous year; see Mastny, “Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland,” pp. 8 (n. 4), 29 (link).

102^ See Kramer, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland” (link).

103^ Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis,” p. 57 (link).

104^ See the evidence that Kramer himself presents; ibid., pp. 58-59.

105^ The Poles were looking for an assurance that if they could not cope with the crisis, the Soviets would send in troops, but the Soviets seemed reluctant to give that assurance. See ibid., p. 60.

106^ Ibid., p. 60.

107^ Notes of December 10, 1981, Politburo meeting (link).

108^ Gen. Nikolai Leonov, Likholet’e (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), p. 281, quoted in Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War” (link), p. 30 n. 67. The passage is quoted at much greater length (and translated differently) in Roy Medvedev, “The Unknown Andropov: Crisis in Poland, 1980-81,” Russian Studies in History 44, no. 3 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 83-84. Medvedev quotes from the 1997 edition of Leonov’s memoir and gives a different page reference.

109^ Leonov, Likholet’e, quoted in Medvedev, “Unknown Andropov” (link), pp. 83-84.

110^ Briefing given by Kania’s supporter, Deputy Prime Minister Barcikowski, October 2, 1981, quoted in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 527.

111^ Alexander Chubarian had heard this story from Andropov’s son, and told it at the Lysebu I conference. Lysebu I, pp. 81-82.

112^ Politburo session, December 10, 1981, in Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations” (link), doc. 21, p. 165.

113^ Pocantico conference transcript (link), p. 106. Emphasis in original text.

114^ As Vadim Zagladin later recalled, even Brezhnev had to maneuver “between the advocates of orthodox communism and de-Stalinization”; Zagladin credited him with “at the very least preventing the former from dominating the latter.” Kolesnikov, “Gorbachev’s Aide Zagladin” (link).

115^ Chernyaev diary for 1972 (link), entries for June 3 (p. 24) and December 16 (p. 35), and the postscript (p. 40); Chernyaev diary for 1973 (link), entries for February 3 (p. 4), April 16 (pp. 28-29), May 19 and 22 (pp. 38-39), June 6 (pp. 41-42), June 24 (pp. 46-47), July 14 (pp. 50-52), October 14 (p. 64), December 17 (p. 75).

116^ Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 408.

117^ Lysebu I, p. 52.

118^ Elliot Goodman, “Disparities in East-West Relations,” Survey 19:3 (Summer 1973), p. 89.

119^ Elbridge Durbrow, in Kohler and Harvey, The Soviet Union, p. 198.

120^ Gus Weiss, “Duping the Soviets: The Farewell Dossier,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 39, no. 5, 1996 (link).

121^ The author, Gus Weiss, does not even suggest that the document it came from was one of the nearly 4000 documents Col. Vetrov (codenamed “Farewell”) provided to French intelligence, who then passed them on to the U.S. government; the Farewell material, though, was the subject of his article.

122^ John Finney, “Brezhnev Said to Assure East Europe That Accords With West Are a Tactic,” New York Times, September 17, 1973, p. 2 (link).

123^ William Beecher, “Brezhnev termed détente a ruse, 1973 report said,” Boston Globe, February 11, 1977.

124^ Tom Braden, “Détente: Soviets Testing New Strength,” October 21, 1979 (link).

125^ Kiron Skinner et al., Reagan in His Own Hand (New York: Free Press, 2001), p. 118 (link).

126^ Joseph Douglass, Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988), pp. 9-10; Thomas Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 294 (link).

127^ Note the tone, for example, in which these “clandestine reports” were discussed in CIA, “Soviet Strategic Arms Programs and Détente: What Are They Up To? SNIE 11-4-73 (link), September 10, 1973, p. 10. The reports, moreover, are not even mentioned in some of the main CIA documents from the period dealing with Soviet aims. See especially CIA report, “Détente: The View from the Kremlin,” April 25, 1975, CREST system (link), and CIA memorandum, “Soviet Détente Policy,” May 23, 1974, CREST system (link); and National Intelligence Estimate, “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” January 12, 1977, CREST system (link).

128^ “Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View: Report of Team ‘B’,” December 1976 (link).

129^ Ploetz, “Breshnews Langzeitstrategie,” p. 77.

130^ Ibid., p. 55.

131^ Ibid., pp. 55-56, 58-66, 76.

132^ Ibid., pp. 66-69; the quotation from Zagladin is on p. 66. For the English version of the original passage, see V.V. Zagladin, gen. ed., The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 68. For the main document adopted at the conference, see British Communist Party, Documents of the World Communist Conference—June 1969 (London: British Communist Party, 1969).

133^ Ploetz, “Breshnews Langzeitstrategie,” pp. 57-58. For the English original, see Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), pp. 100-113, esp. pp. 106-108.

134^ Ploetz, “Breshnews Langzeitstrategie,” p. 70.

135^ Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington: Brookings, 2001), p. 237.

136^ Wettig, “Entspannung, Sicherheit und Ideologie,” p. 76.

137^ Wettig, whose general interpretation is not too different from Ploetz’s, at points also simply assumes that Ponomarev’s comments reflect the thinking of the whole Soviet leadership. See Gerhard Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” Cold War History 9, no. 1 (2009) (link), pp. 86 (the source given in n. 31 for the general claim here about what the “leaders in Moscow” believed is a letter from Ponomarev), and 89-90 (again, the source for a general claim about what the Soviet leaders felt given in n. 56 is the record of a meeting with Ponomarev).

138^ Chicherin to Lenin, February 15, 1922, and Lenin to Chicherin, February 16, 1922, V.I. Lenin, Collected Works 45 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 474-75, 720 n. 577; and Draft Decision on the Talks of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa, February 24, 1922, V.I. Lenin, Collected Works 42 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 403 .

139^ A number of German scholars, working mainly with the former East German archives, have produced some important work on this subject. See especially Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion den Kalten Krieg verlor, pp. 121-252; Michael Ploetz und Hans-Peter Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung? DDR und UdSSR im Kampf gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss (Münster: Lit, 2004); Udo Baron, Kalter Krieg und heißer Frieden. Der Einfluss der SED und ihrer westdeutschen Verbündeten auf die Partei “Die Grünen” (Münster: Lit, 2003); Michael Roik, Die DKP und die demokratischen Parteien 1968-1984 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); and Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive,” esp. pp. 90-93.

140^ Lysebu II (link), pp. 22-23. Note also Brutents’s comments on this point on p. 26.

141^ Thomas Johnson, American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book III: Retrenchment and Reform, 1972-1980 (National Security Agency: Center for Cryptological History, 1998) (link), p. 81. The redacted version included in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 260, November 2008 (link) did not include this material; the passage cited in the following footnote was also deleted from that version. The more complete version, released following an appeal, is posted on the National Security Archive’s Electronic Briefing Book 441, September 2013 (link). For a guide to the British sources, a good place to start would be Len Scott, “Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 2 (2007) (link). There is also a research guide covering this material on the British National Archives website (lihaslamnk).

142^ Johnson, American Cryptology, Book III (link), p. 82. Anderson, it was reported there, “had acquired a box of top secret CIA National Intelligence Digests (NIDs), the unwitting courtesy of an NSC staffer who had been in the habit of taking them home for a little bedtime reading. After a marital falling out, his wife took the accumulated NIDs to Anderson, who kept them in his office and used them in his columns over a period of years.”

143^ Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 30-31, 55, 86-87. DCI William Casey was supposed to have personally planted a listening device in the office of a senior official in an unidentified Middle Eastern country. Ibid., p. 147. On these matters in general, see Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), esp. pp. 143-44, 152-53, 163-65. There is also important material on the subject in Haslam, Russia’s Cold War.

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