The Media and Intercollegiate Sports



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7.8.3 Bowl proliferation

The first college football bowl game was the Rose Bowl, held in Pasadena on January 1, 1902. After a 13-year hiatus, the Rose Bowl returned in 1916, and would be the only bowl game until the 1920s, when the Fort Worth Classic (1921), San Diego East-West Christmas Classic (1921-1922), and Los Angeles Christmas Festival (1924) briefly joined bowl lore. It was not until the 1930s that new, permanent bowls would emerge with the Sugar (1935), Orange (1935), Sun (1936), and Cotton (1937).3 These five major bowls (including the Rose Bowl) continued through World War II, but no new bowls were added during this time. After the war, however, there was a brief surge in the number of bowl offerings, but by the 1950s there were less than 10 in operation. The early 1960s saw the number of bowls again reach double-digits, but it wasn’t until the late 1960s that bowl numbers would permanently exceed that threshold. From there the number of bowls slowly drifted upward, reaching 18 in 1984, 19 in 1993, and 21 in 1997. The bowl lineup continued to grow to 28, where it settled for the period 2002-2006, until jumping to 32 for the 2006-2007 bowl season (Hickok, 2006).

Given the growth of the country, has the number of bowl games really increased that dramatically? In 1916, there were just over 100 million people in the United States and one bowl game. The number of bowls reached 15 in 1978, and the population was about 222 million. Since 1978 the number of bowls has doubled, but population has only increased about 36 percent (surpassing 300 million in 2006). On a per capita basis it would be fair to say that bowl games have proliferated.

While it is easy to see the expansion of the bowl lineup, it is unclear whether this has been driven by the media, educational institutions, or some other force. Division I conferences and their member universities have enjoyed the proliferation of bowls, as it has increased their exposure and access to bowl revenues. Still, other than the demonstrated willingness of fans to travel to bowl games, it does not appear that schools have contributed directly to the addition of bowl games.

A more difficult question to answer is whether the media is responsible for this proliferation of bowl games, or whether media has expanded in response to the growing number of games. ESPN began operations in September, 1979, when there were only 15 bowl games. Today there are 32, but a third of those have been added within the past decade, and it is unclear whether the creation of ESPN itself spawned significant growth or just went along for the ride. ESPN’s expansion of media coverage of sports may well have stimulated the demand for more bowl games, and recently ESPN has become directly involved in adding bowls. The New Mexico Bowl, first played in December 2006, was financed by a $2 million line of credit from ESPN. The Papajohns.com Bowl, also launched in December 2006, is owned by ESPN Regional Television (Hickok, 2006). In contrast, CSTV and the FOX College Sports channels have emerged since the expansion of the bowl system, and it is likely that their creation is more of a reaction to the growing popularity of college sports, including bowl games.

While media coverage stimulates consumer demand for the sports product and media providers have not objected to an expanding bowl lineup, there is another important set of characters in the bowl proliferation story — corporate sponsors. Local communities hosting bowl games in the early years chose simple names that reflected basic commodities that one might find in the host’s region, and possibly even in a real bowl — Sugar or Oranges, for example. Today all of the major bowls except for the Rose Bowl have a named sponsor, including the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl and FedEx Orange Bowl. Other bowls make no attempt to connect to goods broadly associated with the host city, instead naming the bowl for the main corporate sponsor — the Meineke Car Care, Outback (Steakhouse), and Capital One (financial services) Bowls. Some bowls have dropped their traditional name in favor of the sponsoring company, such as when the Peach Bowl became the Chick-fil-A Peach Bowl, and eventually just the Chick-fil-A Bowl (Hickok, 2006).

Regardless of who is responsible for the proliferation of bowl games, the media, corporate sponsors, and colleges and universities (and their fans) all perceive benefits of the system and continue to support it. But is this expansion really beneficial, and can we expect the number of bowls to continue to grow? The media benefits from the additional programming, schools like the exposure and revenue, and corporate sponsors enjoy having their name attached to widely publicized events. The problem is that with 64 teams now playing in bowl games, some teams that are considered fairly mediocre are reaching a post-season contest. Of the 64 teams playing in the 2006-2007 bowl season, six had a .500 record (6-6, with six wins a minimum requirement for bowl eligibility), and nine were 7-5. At some point bowl saturation threatens overall interest, as fans question whether teams are worth watching or even deserve to be there.
7.8.4 Rule changes

Networks, especially those centered on sports, try to maximize profits by increasing the number of contests shown. In order to fit games into traditional program timing blocks (ending at the top or bottom of an hour), there has been a push to shorten the lengths of games. Rather than shorten media timeouts and reduce the number of revenue-generating advertising slots, the emphasis has been on shortening the actual playing time.

In 2006, the NCAA implemented three rule changes expressly aimed at shortening the length of football games. The first, rule 3-2-1-b limits the intermission between halves to 20 minutes. Teams may agree in advance to change the length of halftime, but the encouragement is definitely to shorten rather than lengthen (NCAA Football Rules Committee [NCAA FRC], 2006).

Two of the three rules affect the running of the clock during play. Rule 3-2-5 directs officials to start the game clock when the foot touches the ball on a free kick (kickoff), rather than when the ball is first touched by the receiving team (NCAA FRC, 2006). There is typically only a four or five second difference between when the ball is kicked and when it is received, so even high scoring games with a lot of kickoffs are unlikely to have much time shaved off the game clock.

The most significant rule change involving the clock is rule 3-2-5-e, commonly referred to as the “change of possession” rule. When possession of the ball changes, the clock stops as usual, but the referee will then restart the game clock with the “ready for play” signal. Previously, the game clock would not start until the team gaining possession began their first play of the new series by snapping the ball. Based on studies done at the Division I-A conference level, the NCAA anticipates that this rule change will shorten games by about five minutes (NCAA FRC, 2006).
7.8.5 Instant replay

One rule implemented in 2006, that some expect to lengthen college football games is the addition of instant replay. Rule 12 allows, but does not require, schools and conferences to adopt the uniform instant replay review system established by the NCAA Football Rules Committee (NCAA FRC). The replay system was implemented nationally after two years of study in the Big 10 Conference. The objective of instant replay, according to NCAA Rules Committee Chairman Charles Broyles, is to “correct game-changing errors with minimal interruption to the game” (“One replay challenge approved,” 2006).

While the replay system is intended as a safeguard against poor calls that would definitively alter the outcome of a game, there are strict limits imposed to prevent an unreasonable extension of game times. Coaches are allowed to challenge only one call per game, but only if they have a time-out remaining, and the team is charged a time-out if the call is not overturned by the replay official. The replay official also has the authority to stop play and initiate a review.

Is the implementation of instant replay a rule change driven by the media? This is difficult to determine. Out of a sense of fair play and desire to preserve the integrity of contests, the NCAA itself has sufficient incentive to implement procedures to improve officiating. Media providers want demand for the sports product to expand, and that could certainly be compromised by poor officiating. At the same time, controversy attracts viewers, so preserving some room for error also has value to broadcasters. As described above, television networks have no interest in extending game times, so there is no compelling case either way as to whether media providers should support instant replay.

Even if the media is not consciously promoting the use of instant replay, the strategies of networks and improvements in media coverage have undoubtedly played a role in creating the demand for video replay. Instant replay has long been a part of sports broadcasts, providing material for commentators to maintain audience interest by filling the time between plays. The numerous camera angles provided for most televised games allow the public to see officiating errors, and announcers are happy to discuss them on the air. Supporters of instant replay, including fans, coaches, and administrators, reason that if the technology allows us to correct errors and make the right call, we ought to use it for the betterment of the game.

Outrage over injustice is an understandable, even noble response (see Box 7.2). When our most vocal outrage is about college football, or any sporting event, one must question whether our priorities are as they should be. Sure the money, prestige, and principles of fair play are all important at some level, but in the end it is just a game … or is it?


Box 7.2 – The play stands as called … or does it?
The instant replay tool is designed to improve officiating so that the players on the football field, and not the referees, decide the outcome. Unfortunately the system doesn’t always work, as the University of Oklahoma found out in its game against the University of Oregon on September 16, 2006. The important lesson from the incident was not that referees make bad calls; that is a long-standing tradition in many sports. What the event demonstrated vividly is how the drive for national prominence and lucrative BCS payoffs has raised the stakes and sharpened the reactions of alleged victims.

The visiting and then 15th ranked Sooners led the game 33-20 with a little over a minute remaining in the contest. The 18th ranked Ducks scored with 1:12 left in the 4th quarter to cut the score to 33-27. On the ensuing onsides kick, Oregon was awarded the ball, but replays revealed that the Ducks’ Brian Paysinger was guilty of “first touching,” meaning that he (as a member of the kicking team) made contact with the ball before it had advanced ten yards forward from the kickoff. Officials on the field missed it, and the replay booth did not have access to the footage that clearly demonstrated the violation. Rather than waiting for additional video replay evidence, as they were allowed to do, the head replay official ruled that there was not indisputable visual evidence that would warrant overturning the call. Some have speculated that the decision was rushed as the replay officials felt pressure to act quickly out of media concerns. As Oregonian sports columnist John Canzano reported, “A source in the replay booth on Saturday said that [Gordon] Riese [the head replay official] found himself crunched for time, pressured by television and the on-field referee for a rapid decision, and there was such a delay in getting the video feed to Riese that he never even got to properly review the play” (Canzano, 2006a). To make matters worse, Oklahoma player Allen Patrick came away from the pile with the football, but officials on the field ruled that Oregon player Patrick Chung had already had possession.

Two plays after the controversial onside kick, Oklahoma was flagged for pass interference. The pass, however, had been tipped, negating the possibility of pass interference. That call was also not overturned; on the next play Oregon scored what would prove to be the winning touchdown, making the score 34-33 in favor of the Ducks.

Further fueling the controversy, however, was the fact that the officiating crew was from the Pac-10. Most nonconference games are officiated by a crew from the road team’s conference, which in this case would have been the Big 12. Pac-10 policy requires that Pac-10 officials be used for nonconference home games, and accepts officials from the competing conference for away games.

Officiating mistakes combined with dramatic finishes are not unusual in sports. It is also not unusual for the losing head coach to express outrage at the events, as Oklahoma coach Bob Stoops did in this case. What makes this case particularly illustrative of the stakes involved were the subsequent reactions of Stoops and University of Oklahoma President David Boren. Boren formally and publicly requested that the Big 12 Conference Commissioner pursue having the game removed from the record books, and that the Pac-10 suspend the entire officiating crew for the remainder of the season. Additionally, Stoops and Boren both indicated that Oklahoma might cancel its scheduled 2008 game at the University of Washington, unless the conference changes its rules requiring a Pac-10 crew at home games. In addition to the official outrage expressed by Stoops, Boren, and other supporters of Oklahoma, replay official Gordon Riese received numerous threatening phone calls, including one from an Oklahoma fan who told Riese that he would fly to Portland to kill Riese and his wife (Canzano, 2006a). Riese received some form of harassment (hate mail, email, phone calls, and even mobs assembling on his lawn) every day for the first 82 days after the incident (Canzano, 2006b). In February 2007, Riese revealed that he had been diagnosed with depression, and that the Pac-10 informed him that he “was not wanted in the replay booth.” (Hunt, 2007)

The game will stand in the record books, but Pac-10 officials apologized to Oklahoma for the mistakes and the entire crew was suspended for one game. The Pac-10 is considering a change in policy regarding officiating crews. By winning the Big-12 championship, Oklahoma ended up securing a place in the Fiesta Bowl (receiving a $17 million payout despite losing to Boise State University in overtime), so the financial damage was minimal compared to if Oklahoma had slipped into a non-BCS bowl (the next highest payout available was $4.25 million) Meanwhile, the debate over instant replay continues.


7.8.6 Expansion of March Madness

The history of the NCAA men’s basketball tournament (also known by the NCAA’s registered trademark name of “March Madness”) began in 1939 with eight teams. Over the years, the number of teams, the coverage, and the dollars involved have all increased dramatically. Here are some of the key dates and events:.


1946 The finals were televised for the first time. CBS broadcast the game in New York City to an estimated 500,000 viewers.

1951 The tournament was expanded to 16 teams.

1952 Regional telecasts of games occurred for the first time.

1953 The field expanded to 22 teams; the number of teams would vary between 22 and 25 through the 1974 tournament.

1954 LaSalle defeated Bradley in the first nationally televised championship game.

1963 “Sports Network” agreed to pay $140,000 for the rights to broadcast the championship game nationally through 1968.

1969 NBC paid $547,500 for the rights to televise the tournament finals. It was the first time net tournament income exceeded $1 million.

1973 NBC paid $1,165,755 for broadcast rights, surpassing the million-dollar mark for the first time. It was also the first time the championship game was broadcast in prime time, drawing an estimated 39 million viewers.

1975 The tournament field was expanded to 32 teams, and the term “Final Four” was used officially for the first time by the NCAA.

1979 The tournament bracket grew to 40 teams. The championship game between Michigan State (with Earvin “Magic” Johnson) and Indiana State (with Larry Bird) received a record rating of 24.1 (percent of households with televisions viewing). To this day it is the highest rated college basketball game of all time.

1980 Eight more teams were added to the tournament field, bringing the total to 48 teams.

1981 “Final Four” becomes a registered trademark of the NCAA.

1982 A three-year, $48 million television agreement between CBS and the NCAA began. It was the first year that the “selection show” appeared on live national television.

1983 The tournament was expanded to 52 teams, with four of the teams playing into a 48-team bracket.

1985 The tournament field expanded to 64 teams, eliminating the first-round byes that were necessary under the previous bracketing systems. The 23.2 rating of the championship game between Villanova and Georgetown is the second highest rated college basketball game of all time. CBS and the NCAA began their second three-year contract.

1988 The NCAA and CBS began their third three-year contract; CBS broadcast all regional semifinal games during prime time.

1991 The NCAA and CBS began a seven-year, $1 billion contract.

1995 CBS and the NCAA extended their agreement through 2002, replacing the 1991 contract with one worth $1.75 billion.

1996 The NCAA expanded coverage of the tournament to the Internet, creating the first web page for the Final Four. Preliminary rounds of the tournament were added to the NCAA’s web page the following year.

1999 CBS and the NCAA signed a new 11-year, $6 billion contract for tournament coverage through 2013. CBS is scheduled to pay the NCAA $764 million in the final year of the contract. The agreement includes rights to not only television programming, but also to radio and internet broadcasts.

2000 The tournament adds another team to the tournament, creating a “play in” round between the 64th and 65th seeds. The tournament nickname “Big Dance,” is registered by the NCAA.

2001 The NCAA and Illinois High School Association are granted a trademark for the term “March Madness.”

2002 CBS expands the tournament selection show to a full hour; ESPN airs its first broadcast of a first round game.

2005 CBS contracts with CSTV.com to provide internet coverage of the first 58 tournament games. CBS buys CSTV in November for $325 million.

2006 The Ratings Percentage Index (RPI), used in seeding teams in the tournament, is released to the public for the first time.

Source: http://ncaasports.com/basketball/mens/story/9033549


It is unclear how much of the tournament expansion was driven by media pressure, but as the numbers suggest, both the NCAA and broadcasters (CBS, in particular) benefit from the relationship. Participating colleges and universities also have reason to support the expansion, as the additional attention they receive is seen as a positive tool for cultivating donations and applications for admission.
7.8.7 Media timeouts

Media (television and radio) timeouts are a way to ensure that networks have a sufficient number of advertising slots to sell. NCAA basketball games have two twenty-minute halves of play. Depending on the media coverage for the event and the local or national media agreement, there can be as few as zero or as many as four media timeouts each half. For national television coverage, for example, there are media timeouts roughly every four minutes of play, occurring at the first dead ball after the 16-, 12-, 8-, and 4-minute marks in each half. With restrictions, regular team timeouts can also be extended as media timeouts (Bilik, 2007).

Why might media timeouts matter? The frequency of play stoppages can have a significant impact on how a coach manages a game or builds a team. Depending on the type of media coverage, teams can call five or six timeouts each game. Timeouts serve three main functions for a team: (1) providing rest for players, (2) stopping the opponent’s momentum, (3) stopping play to conserve time or reorganize in the waning moments of a game. With an additional four timeouts in each half of a televised basketball game, coaches are better able to conserve timeouts for the endgame. This may carry additional advantages for networks, as frequent timeouts at the end of a close game provide even greater opportunities to secure advertising revenue.

Frequency of play stoppages also impacts the use and possibly even the recruiting of players. Fitness becomes less important in a game where play is interrupted frequently, and a team attempting to “run its opponent into the ground” with an up-tempo style of play will find it more difficult to wear them down. While a slower game and frequent play stoppages would seem likely to deter fans, the continued and growing popularity of college basketball would suggest that this is not a problem.


7.9 Media-prevented (or at least discouraged) Changes in College Sports

All of the divisions except for I-A have a playoff system for football. Though the media lacks the authority to stop implementation of a playoff system at the top level, there are at least three good reasons why they would discourage such a change.



First, implementation of a playoff system would either dismantle or weaken the attraction of the bowl games. In 2006-07, there were 32 bowl games played from December 19, 2006 to January 8, 2007, up from 28 games in the four previous years. All of these bowl games are important to network profitability. In 2003-04, the Walt Disney Co. (broadcasting through ABC and various ESPN channels) held the television rights to 25 of the 28 bowl games, including the four BCS games. ABC reported to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics that they had lost money on the BCS games that year. The commission’s assessment was that ABC’s claim was probably accurate in a narrow sense, but that overall the Walt Disney Co. likely turned a profit from the venture. The Knight Commission report (Frank, 2004) indicated a number of factors that may not have been included in ABC’s analysis:
1. Shoulder (ancillary) programming (pre- and post-game shows) revenue was likely not included in ABC’s report. Not only do these programs generate advertising revenue, but production costs are relatively low, especially given that no rights fees must be paid.

2. Profits from network-owned affiliated stations are typically not included in the national network’s income statements. As such, local advertising revenue that would accrue to the affiliate owner was probably not included in ABC’s testimony before the commission.

3. The non-BCS bowls broadcast by ABC and ESPN generated positive net revenue for Disney. The commission concluded that the broadcast rights fees Disney paid many of the bowl games were “less-than-market value.” This allowed Disney to reap profits and use the money to subsidize the BCS broadcasts.
Second, and perhaps less recognized, implementation of a playoff system threatens to weaken interest in the regular system. Under the current BCS structure, every game counts, at least for the contending teams. With a playoff system, once a team qualified for the postseason, interest in regular season games would wane. Early season games would also diminish in importance, as there would be less concern about losing an early season match-up. To contend for the national championship in the BCS system, teams with even one loss often find themselves on the outside looking in. If the playoffs were fed, for example, by conference champions, the early season inter-conference match-ups would lose their significance. Keeping the BCS means keeping the regular season more interesting for fans, and maintaining viewers each Saturday (and Thursday, Friday, and sometimes Sunday) in the fall. As University of Georgia coach Mark Richt claims, “I think college football has the most exciting regular season of any sport because there is not a playoff system. The whole season is a playoff system” (“Bowl games,” n.d.).

A third reason for opposing a playoff system is that the BCS, like the system it replaced, is controversial. Seemingly as important as any other tradition in college football is the annual debate over “Who’s number one?” The debates over specific teams, as well as the general controversy of bowls versus a playoff system provide volumes of material for sports talk-shows and other non-event sports programming. Recent examples illustrate clearly why the issue is so contentious among fans and sports experts in the media. In 2001, the University of Nebraska was ranked #2 by the BCS, but only #4 in both the coaches (USAT/ESPN) and sportswriters’ (AP) polls. Nebraska was selected as the national title opponent of #1 University of Miami, despite Nebraska taking its first loss late in the season to the #3 ranked University of Colorado, the eventual Big 12 champion (but with two regular season losses). The University of Oregon, ranked #4 by the BCS, but #2 in the two main polls, and also with only one loss, was overlooked for the title game. Miami dominated Nebraska 37-14 in the 2002 Rose Bowl, easily winning the national championship. Meanwhile, in the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, Oregon dismantled Colorado 38-16 (“All-time results,” n.d.)

In 2006, Big Ten rivals Ohio State and Michigan were undefeated and ranked #1 and #2 in the polls until their annual meeting in November. Ohio State defeated Michigan 42-39 in a game that some billed as the national championship game. Certainly it left some fans hoping for an Ohio State-Michigan rematch in the BCS title game. Michigan’s loss, however, dropped them just below the University of Florida, also with one loss (to Auburn, who finished 10-2) but with perhaps the toughest schedule of the one-loss teams. Ohio State and Florida squared off in the 2007 BCS championship game, but many fans were left unsatisfied with the selection process. Michigan fans were initially upset, but their claim was weakened by a decisive 32-18 loss to USC in the Rose Bowl. The University of Wisconsin (11-1) also had cause to be upset, not so much because they deserved a chance at the national title, but because as the third place team in the Big Ten, they were excluded from a $17 million BCS game in favor of the $4.25 million Capital One Bowl. The strongest objections came from fans of Boise State University, the undefeated team from the mid-major Western Athletic Conference that defeated a highly-regarded University of Oklahoma team in the Fiesta Bowl. The final twist came when heavily favored Ohio State, predicted by some to win in a rout, were instead blown out by Florida, 41-14. In the end there was one team that went undefeated, another that won the BCS championship, a conference looking like it had been vastly overrated (the Big Ten), and many people calling for some type of a playoff system.

The BCS system is even more controversial when there are more than two undefeated teams. It creates a situation where teams can go undefeated in the regular season, win their bowl game, and despite no one beating them, still not receive a share of the national title or even the opportunity to play for it. In 2004, there were four undefeated teams at the end of the regular season (the Universities of Southern California, Oklahoma, Auburn, and Utah). #1 USC crushed #2 Oklahoma 55-19 for the title in the 2005 FedEx Orange Bowl, while #3 Auburn and #6 Utah were left out of the BCS Championship game. Auburn defeated Virginia Tech University 16-13 in the Nokia Sugar Bowl, remaining undefeated, and made their claim for a share of the national championship. Utah soundly defeated the University of Pittsburgh 35-7 in the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, also remaining undefeated, but the Utes did not press their case as legitimate co-champions (Utah’s #6 BCS ranking, despite being undefeated, was largely the result of a relatively weak schedule).

In years where there are more than two legitimate contenders for the title, the non-championship bowl games take on added significance in the eyes of viewers. In 2001, both the Rose and Fiesta Bowls drew close fan attention, especially from those already critical of the team selection process for the national championship game. In 2004 the Sugar Bowl drew closer scrutiny as fans and experts looked for a sense of Auburn’s legitimacy as a claimant to the national title.

Such controversies stimulate debate and provide material for ancillary programming, but the important question for media providers, and their taste for the BCS, is how viewership is affected. Table 7.2 shows the Nielsen Media Research ratings for BCS National Championship games and other selected BCS games. For comparative purposes, most non-BCS bowl games garner ratings from 0.8 to around 6.0. Ratings represent the percentage of households with a television watching the game. Nielsen Media Research estimates that there are 111.4 million “television households” in the United States, representing approximately 98 percent of U.S. households and over 283 million people.

As Table 7.2 reveals, the highest rated BCS National Championship Game was the 2006 Rose Bowl between undisputed #1 USC and #2 Texas, attracting over 35 million viewers; it was also the highest rated college football game since 1987. The 2003 Fiesta Bowl, another uncontroversial championship game (between Ohio State and Miami), drew just over 29 million viewers. The controversial national title games of 2004 and 2005, however, averaged only 22.7 million viewers, and the 2005 Orange Bowl, the BCS title game between USC and Oklahoma, was the lowest rated BCS championship game since they began. The 2002 Rose Bowl between Miami and Nebraska was the second lowest rated BCS title game. The 2004 Sugar Bowl, the controversial title game between LSU and Oklahoma (USC was left out despite a top ranking in both the Associated Press and USA Today/ESPN polls; all three teams had one loss) was the third lowest rated BCS national championship game. While the debates over who belongs in the championship game generate a lot of activity in ancillary programming, it does not appear to benefit the media provider of the game itself.
Table 7.2: BCS Bowl All-Time TV Ratings (1998-Present)
Ranking Bowl Year Teams Rating

1 Rose 2006 Texas – USC 21.7*#

2 Orange 2001 Florida State – Oklahoma 17.8*

3 Sugar 2000 Florida State – Virginia Tech 17.5*#

4 BCS Championship 2007 Florida – Ohio State 17.4*

5 (tie) Fiesta 2003 Ohio State – Miami 17.2*#

5 (tie) Fiesta 1999 Florida State – Tennessee 17.2*

7 Sugar 2004 LSU – Oklahoma 14.5*

8 Rose 2004 Michigan – USC 14.4+

9 Rose 2000 Wisconsin – Stanford 14.1

10 Rose 2001 Washington – Purdue 14.0

11 (tie) Rose 2002 Miami – Nebraska 13.9*

11 (tie) Rose 2007 USC – Michigan 13.9

13 Orange 2005 USC – Oklahoma 13.7*

14 Rose 1999 Wisconsin – UCLA 13.3

15 (tie) Sugar 2001 Miami – Florida 12.9

15 (tie) Fiesta 2006 Ohio State – Notre Dame 12.9

17 Rose 2005 Texas – Michigan 12.4

18 Orange 2006 Penn State – Florida 12.3

19 Sugar 1999 Ohio State – Texas A&M 11.5

20 (tie) Fiesta 2002 Oregon – Colorado 11.3+

20 (tie) Orange 2000 Michigan – Alabama 11.3

20 (tie) Rose 2003 Oklahoma – Washington State 11.3

23 Fiesta 2001 Oregon State – Notre Dame 10.7

24 (tie) Orange 2003 USC – Iowa 9.7

24 (tie) Orange 2004 Miami – Florida State 9.7

26 (tie) Fiesta 2000 Nebraska – Tennessee 9.5

26 (tie) Sugar 2005 Auburn – Virginia Tech 9.5+

26 (tie) Orange 2002 Florida – Maryland 9.5

29 Sugar 2007 LSU – Notre Dame 9.3

30 Sugar 2003 Florida State – Georgia 9.2

33 Sugar 2002 LSU – Illinois 8.6

34 (tie) Orange 1999 Florida – Syracuse 8.4

34 (tie) Fiesta 2007 Boise State – Oklahoma 8.4

36 Fiesta 2005 Utah – Pittsburgh 7.4

37 Orange 2007 Louisville – Wake Forest 7.0


* - Denotes BCS National Championship Game

+ - Denotes game involving “jilted” team, as described above

# - Denotes match-up of the only no-loss major conference teams
Sources: “TV ratings,” (n.d.); Barron (2007); Consoli (2007)

The 2006-07 bowl season was the first in which a stand-alone BCS championship game was played after the New Year’s bowl games. It is unclear whether the teams involved in the BCS games were less appealing, or whether the addition of a later title game decreased interest in other BCS bowls, but the Fiesta, Orange, and Sugar bowls all finished in the bottom ten of all-time BCS game ratings. Interestingly, the Rose Bowl, broadcast by ABC on January 1st, drew its usual ratings of around 14. The other three bowls were broadcast by FOX, who broadcast them over the three day span of January 1st through the 3rd. Further research is needed to establish why the ratings dipped, but expect FOX to closely examine its broadcast and promotion strategy, and perhaps even support the move toward a more traditional playoff system.


Fast fact. One compromise under discussion is a “plus one” system. Under such a system the top four rated teams in the BCS would square off in traditional bowl games, with #1 v. #4, and #2 v. #3. The winners would play one week later to settle the national championship.
Though controversies about who belongs in the title game appear to hurt those ratings, they can provide a boost to the other BCS games, particularly those involving the jilted team(s). For example, the 2004 Rose Bowl, the non-title game between USC and Michigan, was the highest rated BCS non-championship game, drawing almost equal ratings to that year’s title game between LSU and Oklahoma. However, neither the 2002 Fiesta Bowl (Oregon v. Colorado) nor the 2005 Sugar Bowl (Auburn v. Virginia Tech) drew ratings that would make up for the shortfall in the title game.4 In fact the 2005 Rose Bowl pitting Texas v. Michigan drew more viewers than the Sugar Bowl, even though neither Texas nor Michigan could make a claim for the title. Given the likely boost to ancillary programming, but the negative impact on the ratings for the main event, it is unclear whether controversy over the BCS rankings serves media providers’ interests. In any case, it does not appear that the media is anxious to give up the BCS system in favor of a playoff.

While the media have some good reasons to support the BCS rather than a playoff system, it should be noted that they are not the dominant player in making this decision. Despite the media’s financial influence, the major conferences and their member schools (the “cartel within the cartel”) have little interest in giving up a system that has lucrative payouts, provides national exposure, and allows half of the participating teams to end their season on a positive note.



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