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- Rehighlighting - The aff’s proliferation of space weaponry to deter adversaries is to protect capitalist interests-we read green
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4 - Rehighlighting - The aff’s proliferation of space weaponry to deter adversaries is to protect capitalist interests-we read green1AC Madeline Moon 20, a member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation from 2012 to 2015, rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities “THE SPACE DOMAIN AND ALLIED DEFENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-space-domain-and-allied-defence-moon-report-162-dscfc-17-e-rev1-fin, p. 1-10 /BL 42. Non-kinetic means, for example, cyber hacking, laser dazzling, or the emission of electromagnetic pulses, can also be used to interrupt or disable rather than destroy satellites. While considered less damaging to the space environment and potentially less traceable, many forms of non-kinetic attacks are very difficult to attribute, stirring fears of quick escalation and questions of proportionality of response in a near future conflict where space-assets would likely be involved. Russia and China are already heavily invested in this domain, ultimately seeking the means to disrupt US hegemony in space (Pellegrino, Stang, 2016). Non-kinetic means: cyber-attacks, jamming, spoofing, and dazzling 43. Because of the resulting debris, which can have a mutually destabilising impact, destroying satellites with kinetic force is not an ideal method for damaging satellite capability. Non-destructive and covert methods, such as cyber-attacks, jamming, spoofing, or dazzling are alternative means to disrupt and deny access to satellite capabilities. In fact, space warfare is more likely to involve the denial of vital information flows supporting command and control of an enemy’s forces, rather than the exoatmospheric destruction of its space-based assets. 44. By attacking a satellite’s control system, or mission package, an actor could take over control of the satellite, shut it down, change its orbit, put it on collision course with other space objects, or destroy its solar panels by exposing it to damaging levels of radiation. In addition, a satellite’s global network of ground stations might be subject to attack with potential serious consequences. 45. Rather than ASAT weaponry, cyber-attacks can instead be used to take control of a satellite or the whole communication network, including the ground stations (Suzuki, 2016). As implied above, cybersecurity and space security are inherently linked. As satellite technologies and space assets are sourced from a broad international supply base they require regular security upgrades to their software systems via remote, distributed connections, which make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016). 46. Due to the nature of their missions, the military pays more attention than commercial operators to the defence of their space systems. As a result, commercial satellite telecommunications are more often than not less resilient than military ones. Still, as commercial satellites are increasingly co-opted or leased for military communications or other civilian mission-critical functions such as air traffic control, train rail traffic, electrical grid management, and other critical civilian infrastructure, commercial satellites can be considered high-value soft targets for adversaries (Suzuki, 2016). In addition, radio frequencies for satellite communications are limited and the increase in the number of commercial and private satellites puts pressure on scarce resources. Some operators are therefore using less secure frequencies, which are easier to hack (Suzuki, 2016). 47. As such, it is clear a range of cyber threats exists against space-based systems. The large amount of data transmitted through satellites presents an opportunity for adversaries to corrupt accuracy and reliability with a relatively low probability of discovery. Examples could be: States seeking a military advantage via the theft of intellectual property; organised criminal elements with sufficient resources seeking financial gain; amateur or professional hackers showing off their skills; or even capable terrorist groups wishing to disrupt services provided by space-based assets or inflict damage on the space environment. Of course, any combination of these threats is also imaginable depending on the adversaries’s assets and capabilities (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016). 48. Satellite feeds can also be jammed via the intentional interference in signal transmission and reception through the deliberate use of radio noise and electromagnetic signals. In particular, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to jamming attacks because civil applications have not always been designed with security in mind. Often, jamming of GPS signals or other radio telecommunications can even be carried out using simple, commercially-available tools (Suzuki, 2016). By way of example, North Korea has carried out a series of coordinated jamming attacks against the Republic of Korea, which affected GNSS signals in the Seoul area and led to the degradation of infrastructure such as mobile phone networks (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016). 49. Spoofing allows an adversary to manipulate the information about the location, position and condition of a satellite. Spoofed data is relatively hard to detect. If successful, the spoofing attack could damage critical infrastructure, such as the national power grid, by introducing false timing signals, or cause economic damage by targeting trading systems in the financial services sector (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016). Spoofing could also confuse the coordination of command and control of a nation’s armed forces in a time of crisis. 50. Dazzling is a way of blinding a satellite with a laser. If the laser is powerful enough, it can even burn satellite sensors and disable them (Airbus Space briefing). Docking and rendez-vous methods are alternative ways of damaging a satellite by using electronic or kinetic force. While docking would have the benefit of not producing space debris, it would expose the attacker to detection. To mitigate the potential consequences of a docking attack, the United States and its allies are developing a programme of Space Situational Awareness, which monitors any objects approaching existing space assets (Suzuki, 2016). 51. The trend toward the development of increasingly disruptive and non-attributable non-kinetic means puts the long-term stability of the space environment at risk. Increasing dependence on space-based architecture coupled with hybrid and asymmetrical disruption tactics will create a space environment ripe for rapid escalation and instability. V. NATO AND THE SPACE DOMAIN A. WHY SPACE MATTERS FOR NATO 52. As is clear from above, improvements in space technology drive the development of advanced military systems; they are important force multipliers when integrated into joint operations. Therefore, a clear and mutual understanding of how military, civil, commercial, national and multinational space capabilities contribute to military operations in order to achieve Alliance security objectives is essential. Increased awareness about the potential for adversaries seeking to exploit their own access to space for military purposes to the detriment of Allied assets and capabilities is vitally important (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 2016). 53. At the strategic level, NATO is well positioned to strengthen deterrence in space. NATO’s collective defence and economic prosperity rely on space-based infrastructure, and an attack on the space assets of one Ally would impact the security of all. As such, NATO needs a whole-of-alliance approach to protect its interests in space to enhance resilience and deter any threat to its space-based capabilities. At the operational level, space needs to be incorporated in NATO planning and command structures. At the tactical level, relevant training should be provided to personnel and NATO exercises should reflect space warfare scenarios wherein Allied space-assets are denied or temporarily disabled (Schulte, 2012). 54. Today’s modern operational environment relies heavily on guaranteed access to space-based architecture – Allied forces' daily training, and maintenance and execution of ongoing operations are all made capable by a vast network of shared space assets. Allied space capabilities provide a number of products and services, including: global, strategic and intra-theatre satellite communications; positioning, navigation and timing services; terrestrial and space environmental monitoring; real-time space, geological, meteorological and oceanographic situational awareness; advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; as well as NATO Shared Early Warning and transponder tracking such as Friendly Force tracking and maritime tracking (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 2016). 55. NATO’s most advanced military systems are dependent upon space-based assets in order to execute missions successfully, particularly Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs), the Alliance’s Ballistic Missile Defence programme, and the Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS), set to become operational in 2017. The AGS system consists of air, ground and support segments and will perform all-weather and persistent terrestrial and maritime surveillance in near real-time, contributing to a range of missions1 , providing military commanders with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground (GovSat, 2016). 56. Space capabilities contributing to the Alliance’s mission planning and execution at all levels of warfare come from government, military, civilian and commercial providers. NATO does not currently own any orbit spacecraft. It does, however, own and operate several terrestrial elements (e.g. SATCOM anchor stations and terminals). The United States provides the majority of space support NATO currently uses. However, in 2013, there were approximately 39 ‘military or government’ satellites owned by NATO Member States other than the US providing communication, imagery and automatic identification system detection. 57. The primary European NATO Member States who have space capabilities are France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy: The availability of a space capability in support of NATO operations, however, is determined exclusively by the nation or company that owns the satellite. It should be noted that France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have advanced and capable observation systems supporting their conventional forces today: they are the Pléiades; SAR-Lupe (radar) and Helios 2 (optical, infrared); COSMO-SkyMed; and Skynet 5 respectively. 58. Currently the SATCOM Post-2000 programme provides the Alliance with satellite communications capabilities. The British, French, and Italian governments work in concert to provide the Alliance with advanced SATCOM capabilities. Under the signed Memorandum of Understanding between the three governments, the Alliance is allowed access to the French SYRACUSE 3, the Italian SICRAL 1 and 1Bis, and the British Skynet 4 and 5 military networks (Briefings NATO officials). 59. The current contract negotiated by the consortium is for a 15-year period, scheduled to end in 2019. The NATO Communications and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA) needs a contract upgrade, however, as the Alliance’s current satellite bandwidth requirements have outpaced what is available under the current contract. Among other deficiencies, the current arrangement does not include EHF-/Ka-band capabilities, which will be critical to future Alliance SATCOM needs (De Selding, 2016). 60. To contract the necessary upgrade of its SATCOM capacity, NATO can look to eight Allies currently developing or in possession of the satellite capacity necessary for military communications; France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (De Selding, 2016). In November 2016, NATO awarded a contract to support the operational phase of the above mentioned AGS system to Luxembourg’s GovSat, an affiliate of satellite operator SES. Launching in 2017, the GovSat-1 satellite will provide an end-to-end service including the delivery of satellite capacity in commercial Ku-band and sensor data communications between the NATO Global Hawk UAVs and ground segment over the AGS operational area. With this contract, Luxembourg Authorities and the NCI Agency as procurement executive agent acquire and manage these services. 61. While the centrality of space is also recognised in NATO’s Strategic Concept, which mentions technological trends that could potentially impede access to space (NATO, 2010), NATO has not issued any policy or military strategy for space operations. So far, only the Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations provides some guidelines on the role of space support in operational planning. In 2013, NATO also released the NATO Space Handbook, which explains space fundamentals for commanders and their staff. B. NATO AND THE SPACE DOMAIN: A WAY FORWARD 62. NATO should renew its focus on space cooperation. Every NATO country relies on safe and reliable access to space assets for both commerce and military operations. However, NATO doctrine and planning have lagged and the Alliance has not issued any military strategy or policy for space operations. For example, the Joint Airpower Competence Centre (JAPCC) has proposed a narrow framework for a NATO Space Policy concentrating on the employment, coordination, and defence of space capabilities used to support NATO operations and core business (JAPCC, 2012). Any NATO policy should furthermore be coherent with existing policies, such as those of the EU and the US. The JAPCC proposes five guiding principles: 5 - Awareness - the affirmative attempts to become aware of all occurring events through the expansion of satellite capabilities - that links to surveillance and once again to capitalism. Companies use their intel and data to shut down capitalist opposition.Download 2.09 Mb. Share with your friends:
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