The Security Organs of the Russian Federation a brief History 1991-2005
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The GRUIn spite of the FSK’s frantic attempts to boost its capacity and of its own legal limitations, the lead role in intelligence collection in Chechnya was taken, de facto, by the Armed Forces’ GRU. The GRU is the 2. Main Directorate of the General Staff (GenShtab) of the Russian Armed Forces; its head (Col.-Gen. Fedor Ladygin during the first Chechen conflict, replaced by Col.-Gen. Valentin Korabelnikov in 1997) reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff. (It should be noted that prior to reforms recently and painfully imposed by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, the GenShtab planned and directed combat operations independently from the Defense Ministry, though Grachev often directly meddled with planning during the first Chechen conflict.) The GRU remains one of the most secretive security organs of the Russian Federation, and little is known about its exact composition or the full range of its abilities. The only available organigram is based on information provided by a Soviet-era GRU officer, Vladimir Rezun,48 who defected in 1989, and is thus seriously outdated and does not reflect either post-Soviet reorganizations or the capacity developed in respect with Chechnya (it is nonetheless, as a curiosity, presented here as Fig. 3). The FAS website presents additional incomplete information as to more recent organizational elements:
The GRU played a considerable role in Russia’s attempts to exploit the 1992-1993 war between Abkhazia and Georgia. While Moscow officially supported Georgia in the conflict, imposing sanctions against Abkhazia, the Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, provided considerable military support to the Abkhaz side, apparently on his own personal initiative. Anton Surikov, who as a GRU officer was directly involved in these events (many consider that he was Basaev’s kurator in Abkhazia, though he himself denies it), later stated: “That [Pavel Grachev] carried out in Abkhazia his own personal policy is true. And this, from the point of view of Russia’s interests, was a very useful and correct policy. Without Grachev Abkhazia would not have stood. He personally was the true organizer of the defense of the republic.” The Russian military, under Grachev’s command, at the very least allowed the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus to send several volunteer battalions to back the Abkhaz, which proved key to the Abkhaz victory in 1993; most probably, these battalions also received logistical support and training from the GRU. Information has persistently surfaced that the Caucasian battalions’ most talented commander, Shamil Basaev, who was named Deputy Minister of Defense of Abkhazia, was trained at a GRU base near Volgograd in 1992. The GRU also reportedly deployed its own Spetznaz unit, under Surikov’s command, tasked, between August and October 1992, with eliminating Georgian field commanders.50 The GRU has at its disposal considerable means: intelligence collection units, commando “Spetsnaz” units, and electronic and signals intelligence means, including spy satellites run out of its Center for Space Reconnaissance. Since 1993, it has secured increased funds to enter into business, and now controls a network of companies. After the 1998 crisis, however, its budgets were severely curtailed, and over 20% of its foreign residencies were closed; many officers left at this point, finding top security positions in commercial firms. The GRU’s loss of capacity abroad only increased its bitter rivalry with the SVR. There are consistent reports that the GRU has also, since Soviet times, continued to maintain teams of assassins trained to operate abroad to eliminate political enemies. This was confirmed in February 2004 when two officers from the GRU’s 5. Operational Directorate, named as Anatoly Yablochkov and Vasily Pugachev, along with a Russian diplomat, Aleksandr Fetisov, were arrested in Qatar and charged with the murder of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev (though Fetisov was rapidly expelled, the Qatari resisted all Russian pressure to free the two GRU agents and sentenced them to death; the sentence however was subsequently commuted to life in prison, and the two men were discretely returned to Russia in January 2005). The scandal publicly exposed the GRU’s limitations. As the Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer writes: A number of GRU officers, both active and retired, told me about the indignation within the service about the mishandled assassination and how the SVR botched its part of the job. … In the Soviet era, the SVR – then part of the KGB – handled covert political assassinations abroad. That know-how has now been lost. GRU special forces were trained to assassinate Western leaders in the event of a war with NATO in Europe. The only aim of such an operation would have been to eliminate the target. Misleading investigators after the fact would not be a priority. My sources in the GRU insist that their job – the actual assassination – was done well, but that the SVR failed to evacuate the agents as planned.51 Directory: wp-content -> blogs.dir blogs.dir -> Anbookstore com Copyright 2013 blogs.dir -> 3rd EurasiaTrajeco Conference blogs.dir -> Tsl 3378 – Pronunciation and tesl professor Paula Golombek blogs.dir -> Electrical engineering degree technical elective requirement blogs.dir -> Aurelia aubert blogs.dir -> Task: Choose a play in which an important theme is effectively highlighted by one specific scene or incident blogs.dir -> Press release Huawei Releases LampSit 0 for Indoor mbb blogs.dir -> Dues Increase & State of the Union blogs.dir -> Civil Division General Information Booklet blogs.dir -> Away in the basement Download 357.41 Kb. Share with your friends:
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