South China Sea tensions toned down at security summit

South China Sea tensions toned down at security summit

Tensions stemming from competing territorial and maritime claims held in the SCS by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have been bubbling away for decades. However, in recent years diplomatic confrontations between the various claimants have intensified in form and frequency. Underlying these tensions has been China's determination to assert its sovereign claim to islands in the region, which fall within an expansive "nine-dashed line" covering most of the SCS.

Since 2009 there have been periodic clashes between China and the Philippines and Vietnam, while the US has also become more involved in the various disputes, strengthening defence ties with members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and criticising perceived Chinese aggression. In April 2015 the Philippines and the US held their largest joint military exercises in 15 years, while in May the Philippine and Japanese navies held historic drills close to the disputed Scarborough Shoal—an area that has been occupied by China since 2012 but which sits within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Castles of sand

The most recent escalation in the SCS dispute has centred on China's land reclamation activity in the region. Since 2014 reports have proliferated about dredging work by Chinese vessels, seemingly focused on turning reefs, atolls and rocks in disputed parts of the SCS into artificial islands. Satellite images released in April showed that China was making rapid progress in building an airstrip on the previously semi-submerged Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands. ASEAN leaders voiced their "serious concern" about China's island-building activities at a summit in April.

The root of the contention between China and the other countries is the clashing territorial claims, rather than the development of the artificial islands specifically. Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have also conducted land reclamation work and built outposts in the region, albeit not recently at the pace and scale of China. Countries that have established an occupying presence on such atolls will be hard to dislodge. Such changes to the "facts on the ground" are likely to prove irreversible.

The bigger and more important issue is over the maritime claims and the EEZs attached to man-made islands. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is clear that such entities do not possess the status of islands. As such, they do not possess a 12-nautical mile territorial sea or EEZs. Under UNCLOS, most of the SCS is made up of international waters, or EEZs belonging to ASEAN members. Artificial islands, installations and structures are not allowed to be established if they interfere with the use of recognised sea lanes and international navigation.

However, China's actions have suggested that elements within its government believe that the development of these atolls give it the right to control the waters and airspace around them. The Chinese military has been challenging aircraft entering airspace above the features, a point publicised in May by the US military when it allowed a CNN television crew to join a US surveillance plane conducting a fly-over the Spratly Islands. The flight was duly challenged by the Chinese navy and told to depart in order to "avoid misunderstanding".

China's building airstrips on the reefs, as well as reports of it moving weaponry to some man-made islands, has further stoked concerns that the land reclamation work has a military purpose. Many assume that China's goal is to enforce an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS similar to that which it unilaterally implemented in the East China Sea in 2013. Officially, China argues that its island-building activity is aimed at providing "international public services", such as search-and-rescue operations and meteorological work.

A brief lull

Against this backdrop, the SLD provided an opportunity to dampen regional tensions. The US defence secretary, Ashton Carter, was critical of efforts by any country to change the "status quo" and reiterated the determination of the US to protect international freedom of navigation. However, a call for a halt to land reclamation in the SCS was directed at all claimants, rather than just China, and Mr Carter's comments were restrained compared with those made at the same event last year by the former defence secretary, Chuck Hagel. While stressing the legitimacy of China's island-building, Sun Jianguo, an admiral who led the Chinese delegation at the SLD, refrained from direct criticism of the US in his speech and signalled that an ADIZ was not yet under consideration.

These warmer words may raise hopes about a possible ratcheting down in tensions and even a diplomatic resolution to the problem. ASEAN is pushing for the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct (CoC) to help to guide interactions in the SCS, a discussion in which China is participating. In the longer term it is possible to envisage a solution under which the various claimants agree to recognise the control that each exercises over the various reefs and atolls, with fisheries and mineral rights being shared, and China's access rights being guaranteed. Although China's rhetoric on the SCS has been unyielding, there may be private acknowledgement that it could struggle to defend militarily the features, some of which lie over 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.

Persistent risk

More likely, however, is that tensions in the SCS will rumble on and that a diplomatic solution will remain a distant prospect. China's president, Xi Jinping, is due to visit the US in September, which may have explained efforts to smooth over disagreements at the SLD. But China's underlying determination to enforce its sovereignty claims remains unchanged and island reclamation work will continue. Tellingly, the main theme of an official defence white paper released by China on May 26th was the safeguarding of its "maritime rights and interests". The pace of discussions between China and ASEAN over a CoC remains glacial. Rather than search for compromise, China is leveraging its financial largesse to stall regional opposition, such as in the form of Mr Xi's One Belt, One Road initiative.

Meanwhile, there are signs in the US that attitudes toward China are hardening. This will continue as the country gears up for presidential and congressional elections in 2016. ASEAN countries do not want to be forced to choose between the US and China. But strong nationalist sentiment gives little room to back down over claims. The Philippines has sought international arbitration over whether China's territorial claims in the SCS are consistent with UNCLOS, with a decision expected in late 2015 or 2016. Vietnam gave tacit approval to the Philippine-initiated trial and is also mulling legal action against China. Meanwhile, Indonesia, which has traditionally taken a "neutral" stance over the dispute, is adjusting its position, wary that China's nine-dashed line extends to its Natuna Islands. Its president, Joko Widodo, has described China's territorial claims in the SCS as having "no basis" in international law.

Those involved in the SCS dispute are keen to avoid a military clash. However, with tensions unlikely to fade away and in the absence of a regional crisis management system, the risk that an accidental confrontation or political miscalculation could spiral into an incident threatening to regional peace and stability will persist.

NYT

Asia Pacific