Theology beacon dictionary of theology


For Further Reading: Hoover



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For Further Reading: Hoover, Fallacies of Evolution,
70-72; Henry, Christian Personal Ethics, 397; Geiger, ed.,
The Word and the Doctrine, 413-18; DeWolf, Responsible
Freedom,
203-8. RICHARD S. TAYLOR

RANSOM. To ransom (verb) is to set free from captivity, slavery, or sin. The price paid or means of release is the ransom (noun). In the OT, ran­som describes (1) payment to free a slave (Lev. 25:47-48; (2) restitution for injury or damages (Exod. 22:10-12); (3) redemption (buying back) of family property (Lev. 25:24-28); (4) assess­ments substituted for a man's life (Exod. 21:30); (5) God's deliverance of Israel from Egyptian bondage (Deut. 7:8; Isa. 51:11).

NT usage reflects a centering of focus on Jesus' death. The key text is Mark 10:45 (cf. Matt. 20:28). Here Jesus describes the offering of His life as "a ransom [lutron] for many" (similarly, 1 Tim. 2:6 and Titus 2:14). Word for word, this de­scription echoes Isa. 53:10-11. A substitution is implied: God's Servant gave himself (as a guilt offering), He died for us (as sinners), in our place.


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Through His death, we have been brought back to God, set free from servitude to sin.

To whom did Christ pay the ransom for our redemption? The Early Church fathers (es­pecially the Greeks) were much exercised over this question. They interpreted the Cross as a stratagem by which God hoodwinked Satan in bargaining for the souls of men. Some theolo­gians today (e.g., Kittel) argue the opposite con­clusion: God was the recipient of the ransom. Most scholars dismiss the question as unbiblical. Certainly there is no hint that Christ's life was paid to Satan. We are reminded, however, that our ransom was costly (1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23; cf. Acts 20:28). The biblical emphasis is on the deliv­erance itself, from the thraldom of sin, not on a "deal" or transaction with a third party.

See redeemer (redemption), atonement.

For Further Reading: Jeremias, NT Theology,
1:292-94; Richardson, Theology of NT, 218-23; Kittel,
4:340-56.
wayne G. McCOWN

RAPTURE. The term Rapture is used to refer to Paul's teaching concerning what shall happen to living believers at the second coming of Christ. In 1 Thess. 4:14-17, he explains that, in addition to the resurrection of the righteous dead, "we who are still alive and remain on the earth will be caught up with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air" (tlb). The Vulgate (Latin version) rendered the word translated "caught up" as rapio, hence Rapture. Two other passages are di­rectly related to this idea, since they describe the change which will take place in believers at the Second Coming (Parousia): 1 Cor. 15:51-53 and Phil. 3:20-21. According to 1 Cor. 15:51 the Rap­ture is a mystery—that is, a divine truth which has previously been hidden but is now made known. Since OT writers did not envision a sec­ond coming, they spoke only of a resurrection of the dead. The fate of the living did not come within their purview.

In recent times, dispensationalist theology has developed the idea of a "secret Rapture." This re­lates to their view that there will be a definable seven-year period of intense persecution of the Jews, called "the time of Jacob's trouble" (Jer. 30:7). In order for this to occur, the Church must be removed from the earthly scene; consequently dispensationalists structure their eschatology to include a "pretribulation Rapture" which is secret in nature and separated, by the "Tribulation," from the Parousia. That this is a presupposition not explicitly taught in Scripture, honest dis­pensationalists freely admit.

All that one can legitimately affirm from Scrip­ture itself is that the righteous, both living and dead, will be transformed at Jesus' parousia; and as a result of the transformation, they will be caught up to meet the Lord in the air and so be ever with Him. See second coming of Christ, tribulation, dis-

pensationalism. premillennialism.

For Further Reading: Ladd, The Blessed Hope; Erick­son, Contemporary Options in Eschatology.

H. Ray Dunning



RATIONALISM. Rationalism holds to the suprem­acy of reason (ratio = "reason"). This means hu­man reason is sufficient to solve solvable problems. Rationalistic attempts at discovering truth are often associated with the philosophies of such thinkers as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spin­oza. The common base from which all ratio­nalists operate is just this: the self-sufficiency of reason; in other words, that reason is the source of all knowledge.

The school of empirical rationalism leans on sensory data for knowledge, and men like Fran­cis Bacon, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, to name but three pioneers, built the foundation for what today we know as the scientific method. With­out that method modern technology would be impossible. The scientist's laboratory is the most obvious symbol in our society of the empirical methodology used in the verification of truth.

Theological rationalism means dependence on what man's natural abilities teach him. Revela­tion is an impossibility; that is, no outside source can inform us. Naturalism, humanism, and liber­alism share this with rationalism: man's native abilities constitute the one single instrument for arriving at truth and the structure of belief. We are here dealing with the doctrine of the full competence of human reason. The province for gathering data, then, is exclusively that of ordi­nary or so-called verifiable experience.

This leaves little place for any such other­worldly phenomenon as mysticism, not to speak of miracles or anything at all connected with the Bible's supernatural religion. Rationalism ex­plains biblical religion developmentally; indeed, all religious experience is seen to grow from pri­mordial beginnings to maturation, from super­stition and animism to a sane and balanced grasp of reality.

Great men and movements in the history of the church have challenged naturalistically ori­ented authority. The 18th-century evangelical revival was one such thrust. Our own day is an­other such period: the advent of the Billy Gra­ham movement; before that, the theology of



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Barth and Brunner (their mission: to show the validity of revelation); the current dissatisfaction of man with his own ability to solve his prob­lems; and the accompanying move toward bibli­cal religion.

See REASON, REVELATION (NATURAL AND SPECIAL), HUMANISM, SUPERNATURAL (SUPERNATURALISM), RATIO­NALITY.



For Further Reading: James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 73-74, 428; Lewis, A Philosophy of the Chris­tian Revelation, see "Rationalism" in Index; Loomer, "Reason," A Handbook of Christian Theology, 293 ff.

Donald E. Demaray

RATIONALITY. Man, like God, is a rational being (cf. Gen. 1:26). Rationality is the ability to reason, to know and communicate logically organized truth through the higher cognitive powers of the mind.

It is important to distinguish between ratio­nalism and rationality. Rationalism regards hu­man reason as the ultimate judge and only reliable means of ascertaining truth. It places rea­son above Scripture. Evangelicals believe biblical revelation must necessarily precede and super­cede human reason. Since the Fall affected the mind (as all other faculties), man cannot know God rightly by the "unaided exercise of reason" (cf. 1 Cor. 2:4-16; 3:20).

We affirm rationality while rejecting ratio­nalism. Man should love God with all the vigor of a redeemed mind. He should train the mind and be reasonable in all things. He should en­deavor to interpret Scripture accurately, while re­fusing to permit reason to sit in judgment on Scripture as a higher authority.

Human rationality is limited: "I know in part" (1 Cor. 13:12). Some mysteries of life remain (Rom. 11:33) and await the unfolding of life yet future when we "shall know fully" (1 Cor. 13:12). The complexity of truth may appear self-contradictory to finite rationality (e.g., paradox). We must avoid being "wise in our own eyes" (cf. Prov. 3:7), and heed the command to bring "into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).

See REASON, RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE, FAITH, RATIO­NALISM.

For Further Reading: Baker's DT, 435-36; ERE, 7:370-73; Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, 17-32.

J. Wesley Adams

REAL PRESENCE. There are in general three doc­trinal views concerning the Lord's Supper. The Roman Catholic view is known as transub-stantiation, the view that the substance of the bread and wine are literally transformed into the body and blood of Christ. Luther's view is that of consubstantiation, viz., that the elements when consecrated remain substantially unchanged, but that the real body and blood of Christ are present in, with, and under the consecrated bread and wine. The unbelievers who take the elements are taking into their mouths Christ, but unto their condemnation, not their consolation. Thus, it is in the use of the elements by faith, and not in the elements per se, that Christ is present.

The view held most commonly among Protes­tants is that Christ is present in the Lord's Supper spiritually through the Holy Spirit, not in any sense physically. The elements of bread and wine are symbolic and the ritual is memorial in pur­pose and nature. This does no injustice to the confidence that the observance, when sincere and contrite, is also a means of grace.

See LORD'S SUPPER, SACRAMENTS, SACRAMENTARI-ANISM, MEANS OF GRACE.

For Further Reading: Baker's DT, "Lord's Supper," 330-32; Burtner and Chiles, A Compend of Wesley's The­ology, 262-68; Wiley, CT, 3:189-208; ZPEB, 3:978-86; Augsburg Confession; Formula of Concord.

Charles W. Carter

REALISM. Realism denotes the doctrine that uni­versal (general concepts) have an existence which is in some sense independent of the par­ticular things (individuals) that appear to the senses. The term has its origin in philosophical speculation but takes on technical meanings in such areas as politics, law, morality, education, and theology. The question whether universals have real and transcendent existence is especially important for the two main fields of philosophy known as ontology (the study of being and exis­tence), and epistemology (the study of thought and knowledge). In philosophy, metaphysics and epistemology are logically interdependent.

Realism had early beginnings in Hindu thought many centuries before its appearance in the Platonic Academy and the Aristotelian Ly­ceum in Athens. The idea of Brahman as the neuter world soul, a monistic world view, and a pantheistic conclusion are its main features.

Greek speculation came under the influence of this thinking and with modifications found state­ment in the writings of Plato and his student, Aristotle. Plato's doctrine of real transcendent universals stems from the Socratic view that only through the concept, or universal idea, is it possi­ble to obtain real knowledge. Thus Platonic real­ism is the doctrine that universals have in some sense an independent existence to their particu­lar individuations which appear to us in sense



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perception. These universals are the real forms, and appearances are merely imperfect, transitory, and inadequate representations.

Aristotle, on the other hand, contended that these universal forms found their reality only in the case of concrete individuals and partook of no real substantial being apart from them. The objects of nature are but loci of determinate po­tentialities that become actualized through the activity of these forms. In short, the concept of "horseness" in general can only become real in the individual horse, such as "Old Dobbin" or "Old Paint."

Until medieval times the position of Plato, and more especially Neoplatonism as set forth by Plotinus, was the influential philosophy for Christianity through the writings of Augustine and others. But with the rediscovery of Aristotle's complete works and their influence upon the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, Aristotelianism be­came primary in Christian teaching. Not without considerable debate, however. For the specu­lations passed from transcendent ontology into dialectics and theology, touching off a grand con­troversy during the Scholastic period over the es­sential character of genera and species, as to whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separable from particulars or existent only in perception. This argument con­cerning the nature of universals divided thinkers into hostile camps and led to passionate contro­versies, throwing all society into intellectual and religious turmoil.

At this juncture most of us wish to raise the question, So what? But we must remember that these metaphysical (ontological) stances have marked implications for such theological prob­lems as creation, God, man, faith, reason, the Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin, redemption, and Christian holiness. Space limitations do not allow explanations of its implication for each. The apostle Paul seemed to believe that the un­seen behind things transient and visible is what partakes of eternal reality (2 Cor. 4.18).

So: Realism is the belief that a general idea in the human mind refers to something beyond the mind as real as things individual. It is the con­tention that the realm of essence (possible univer­sals) is every bit as real as the realm of existence (actualities); and that the former is prior to the latter (versus modern existentialism).

See platonism, thomism, realism and nomi­nalism, modern realism, realism in theology, rep­resentative theory.



For Further Reading: "Hinduism," ER, 337 ff; Bright-man, An Introduction to Philosophy (rev.), 271-88; Person and Reality, 190-98; Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowl-
edge.
Ross E. Price

REALISM AND NOMINALISM. These terms rep­resent an apparently endless debate going back to Plato (realism) and Aristotle (nominalism) over principles of theological discourse generally, and specifically over the nature of universals— by which are meant general ideas or class terms, the opposite of particulars. Only the context of the debate changes.

Medieval or classical realism was akin to mod­ern metaphysical idealism, while nominalism corresponds to modern realism.

For theology, these terms became prominent in medieval Scholasticism, roughly a.D. 1000-1350, among scholars and schools struggling with con­cepts of faith and reason (or knowledge), seeking to interpret all of life in terms of theology. The presuppositions of Platonic realism (universal forms or ideas) had largely dominated theology, including Augustine's, until the revival of Aris­totle in the 12th century, a fact which led in turn to the revival of nominalism in the church.

Realism held that universals, which transcend space and time, have real existence apart from all particulars—which are mere transient things ex­pressing the universal form. Indeed, universals are the foundation of individual existence. They are ante rem: before the particulars; e.g., human­ity subsists as an essence quite apart from indi­vidual persons.

Nominalism stated that universals are merely names or symbols describing individuals. They are post rem: after the particulars. Only particu­lars are real; e.g., humanity does not exist, but only individual persons.

There was a moderate realism; e.g., humanity exists as a structure embodied in particular hu­man beings, but not independently. It is in re: in the particulars.

In connection with realism the contributions of John Scotus Erigina (c. 810-77) and Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), both in the Platonic tradition, were important. Roscellinus (1070-1125) was a thorough nominalist, while William of Ockham (1300-1350), 200 years later, es­poused nominalism in connection with valid claims to knowledge on empirical grounds. Peter Abelard (1079-1142), Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) who attempted to synthesize Aristotle with Christian faith, and Duns Scotus (1265-1308) each represent different forms of moderate real­ism.

Certain tendencies or trends may be observed. Realism, inasmuch as reality transcends space­





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time experience, was congenial to the idea that "faith leads to understanding," rather than the opposite view. In doctrine, the idea of humanity as a single reality with each individual within the universal essence, made possible certain views of the origin of souls and of original sin in Adam. On the other hand, nominalism questioned the view of a universal church deriving its reality from the hierarchy, and opposed transub-stantiation (that the real body and blood of Christ are present in the Eucharist) among other controversies. Nominalism stressed individual development rather than community or col­lectives. The emphasis on the data of sense ex­perience gave impetus to the scientific method. Starting from particulars to solve problems tended to a loss of absolutes and to humanistic answers. In Ockham there was a separation of "valid" knowledge from matters of faith.

The extreme forms of either position tend to be destructive of rational thought and thus call for some mediating position.

See philosophy, theology, thomism, platonism,

realism in theology.

For Further Reading: Burkill, The Evolution of Chris­tian Thought; Tillich, A History of Christian Thought; Gonzales, A History of Christian Thought, vol. 2.

Arnold E. Airhart

REALISM IN THEOLOGY. As related to theology, the exponents of realism may be separated into three classifications.

Extreme Realism. Hinduism's speculation as to the nature of reality suggested that it is one sin­gle generic nature, partaking throughout of one common life-principle. With its idea of Brahman as the neuter world soul, it set forth a monistic world view and resulted in a sort of dynamic pantheism in both philosophy and theology. Brahman is the life principle and source whence all things proceed, by which all things are sus­tained, and to which all things return. Material existence in nature and man (individuals in matter) is a movement away from true reality. Concrete existence is therefore evil and illusory.

Salvation was deemed possible through knowledge of the identity of the finite self with the self of the universe. To this must be added knowledge of the total unreality of material exis­tence. All is sheer illusion.

This salvation through acquired understand­ing called for a process of highly disciplined meditation under the most favorable physical conditions possible. Thus one might achieve the highest religious state when all desire for exis­tence is gone and the finite soul is reabsorbed into the absolute real being of the infinite world soul. Later, Buddhism would refer to this re-absorption as Nirvana, using the Sanskrit term indicating "a blowing out, or extinction."

Holding as it does to a single generic nature in which individuals have no real (only illusory) separate existence, and are mere modes or man­ifestations of the one neutral world substance, extreme realism amounts to pantheism. There­fore it can have no place in Christian theology, and most Christian theologians dismiss its con­sideration with but a sentence or two. Yet we must acknowledge it as one of the three forms of theological realism. Shades of such realism reap­pear in the Scholastic period in the teachings of Amalric and John Scotus, who suggest that as the world of phenomena has come from God, so it will return to Him and abide in Him as one un­changeable individual eventually. We might sur­mise that neorealism's conception of neutral entities may be borrowed from Hinduism and its neutral world soul.

The Christian theologian will argue that sub­stance is more than that which takes its stance in a subway below experience in the form or classi­fication of neutral entities. Substance is "experi­enced efficient cause." It is what endures and what acts; it is not a blind abstraction; it has po­tentiality, and though it may be either simple or complex, it is dynamic reality. This is its basic es­sence.

Moderate, or Higher Realism. One of the chief exponents of this type of realism is the Cal­vinistic theologian William G. T. Shedd. He holds that species are individualized by propagation but partake of one unitary generic nature. He would allow that nominalism is true for non-propagatable entities such as inkstands, which, though making up a general concept, have no common nature. Species, he contends, have a specific nature, an invisible dynamic principle, which is a real entity, not a mere concept.

It is the belief of this type of realism that the species has inlaid (inherent) in it all that evolves from it. It contains all the individuals that may come from it by propagation. Its specific nature has a real, not nominal, existence. When a spe­cific vital substance is in view, then realism is true. When a nonspecific (inorganic substance) is in view, then nominalism is correct. Inkstands are not propagated from a common nature. The concept is but a general term partaking of no transcendent reality. Its only reality is in some particular model.

On the other hand a species contains a prim­itive, invisible, and propagatable substance. It is



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441



created as a single nature and exists as such prior to its distribution by means of propagation.

The chief concerns of theological realism are to explain: (1) the racial nature of mankind; (2) the racial nature of human depravity; (3) the racial nature of death as sin's penalty; and (4) the racial nature of mankind's redemption through Christ.



  1. Human nature is racial. Man is the man­ifestation of the general principle of humanity in union with a given corporeal organization. Hu­man nature as a general principle existed an­tecedently (chronologically and logically) to individual men. It is a res, an essence, a sub­stance, with a real objective existence in time and space. John and Mary are the revelation and indi­vidualizations of this general substance which is the species or genus. Each is only a subsequent modus existendi, human nature being the essence of each.

What God created was not an individual man, but the species homo, generic humanity—an in­telligent, rational, and voluntary essence. As such it manifests itself in a multitude of individu­als. Thus each human is an individualized por­tion of the race. The species as a single nature was created and existed prior to its distribution by means of propagation.

  1. Human sin is corporate. The sin of Adam and his generic complement, Eve, was the sin of this generic substance which thus became the subject and bearer of guilt and depravity. Nu­merically it was the same substance which con­stitutes each of us individual men and women.

Thus all men have sinned in Adam. "In Adam's fall, we sinned all." God contemplates all men as actually one with Adam in his sin. And since the whole race was involved in Adam's sin, the whole race is punished for that disobedience so that all must die. Furthermore, hereditary de­pravity in each human is truly and properly sin, involving guilt as well as pollution. These are passed on to successive generations through propagation. Shedd affirms that the soul is origi­nated by psychical propagation even as the body is by physical propagation. So each man "re­ceived and inherited the corruption that was now in human nature, and subsequently acted it out in individual transgressions" (Dogmatic The­ology, 2:89). "The individual man derives and in­herits his sinful disposition from his immediate ancestors but originated it in his first ancestors" (94).

With the exception of C. A. Strong, not many theologians have subscribed to this higher real­ism.



Lower Realism. According to this theory indi­vidualizations always characterize seminal and germinal essences of their species, as they exist in aggregate in their progenitors. They have their germinal existence in a racial progenitor. So the contention is that the human race had its germi­nal existence in Adam. It therefore identifies Adam's posterity with himself in the one original (first act of) sin. This rudimentary existence of all men in Adam included the soul as well as the body.

The aim of lower realism is the same as that of higher realism, i.e., so to identify the offspring of Adam in a real oneness with him in the primitive transgression that they may be justifiably charged with a guilty participation in that sin. Thus the common guilt is charged to the account of seminal existence in Adam when he commit­ted the first sin.

This lower realism is open to the doctrine of seminal guilt, guilt for all ancestral sins; and the denial of any share in Adam's personal repen­tance on the part of his offspring.

Whether the souls of all his offspring so existed in Adam is open to question by many theolo­gians. Augustine was in serious doubt of it. Cal­vin rejected it, and in his rejection was followed by most of the Reformed thinkers. If in the na­ture of Adam there existed such an aggregate of individuals, then he must have lacked the uni­tary essence of a single personality. It must also be remembered that sin can be predicated only of persons.

The common reaction to this realistic in­volvement of all of Adam's descendants in his personal guilt is twofold: (1) No one believes that he acted thousands of years before he was born. To act before one exists is impossible. So unless one adopts the theory of multiple incarnations and the transmigration of souls, and the karma of one or many previous existences, he wants to re­ject guilt for Adam's transgression. (2) One wishes to ask why the descendants of Adam are responsible for, and guilty because of, his first act of sin and not for his subsequent sins. Shedd's answer is that his postlapsarian sins were mere violations of the moral law, not of the human race's probationary law (2:88).

Against theological realism it may be argued that the human race has no such cohesion in en­tity. Mankind is not to be regarded as a racial thing. It has no actual coalescence like that of a body of water where the individual drop is swal­lowed out of meaning and existence. This is not to deny that the race originated in one human pair, and carries a common human nature in all of its individuals. Nor is it to deny the basic fact





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