This is a tough one, as the written history of this great subject is tainted with much 'coloring', so to speak
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Theodore Dodge's description of the Battle of Tczew (Dirschau to Dodge, as he used German-language sources) is brief. He tells us the Polish cavalry was beaten back through the village of Rokitken (modern Rokitki), which was to the SW of the main area of the fighting. The Swedes cleared Polish pickets, much like the day before with their Finnish allies. They also seemingly cleared Rokitken of enemy troops, or, as other accounts say, perhaps the village of Lunau (Lunowo). Whichever village (Rokitken to the west of Tzcew, Lunau closer to the north-west), it was set ablaze. The smoke from the village provided a useful screen for Gustavus to advance his guns. The husaria were reluctant to move. Some Swedish apologists may say because they were worried about Gustavus' potential with tactics of firepower; Polish sources may state they hesitated due to the loss of all their kopias (lances). The consensus holds that there was concern among them that their German infantry allies were on the verge of defecting. If so, one can assume that they were in an inauspicious situation in this battle against Gustavus. The Swedes moved their guns forward to bombard the Polish camp while the infantry of both sides skirmished along the river. The Polish camp was in defilade from the Swedish guns, so the initial Swedish bombardment had little effect. But that wouldn't have lasted with the maneuverability of Gustavus' artillery units, and combined with the growing distrust of the German troops, the Polish troops came very close to mass panic. Koniecpolski held cohesion intact, and it was the Swedes who actually withdrew, following the injuries to their top two commanders. This is from Franklin D. Scott's Sweden: the Nation's History, Pg. 172, "...Gustav Adolf's leather-wrapped guns worked effectively, and the Battle of Dirschau (Tczew) showed the Swedes had finally learned the lesson of their humiliating defeat at Kircholm in 1605; now their cavalry bested the Polish - reputedly the best in Europe. However, the outcome of the 1627 season still failed to convince the Poles they were beaten; and they took heart from the prospect of imperial support..." To imply Tczew was a full 'exorcising of the demons of Kircholm' is an overstatement. I think the Swedes had indeed learned their lesson from Kircholm, but it actually didn't reach a point where the leather guns worked effectively to win the battle completely, due mostly to the injuries to Gustavus and Baner. It was not a complete victory. From Michael Robert's Gustavus Adolphus, Pg. 55,
In saying 'two victories' at Dirschau, Roberts is presenting the duels on the 7th and 8th of August as a victory apiece. This is from Brent Hull, who put together the wargames for Gustavus' battles, apparently consulting Radoslaw Sikora (my source is Sikora, not a 'board game'),
I somewhat disagree with what is assessed concerning 'the larger sense', but Hull (or Sikora) perhaps has a point worth considering, in terms of the immediate result. Koniecpolski did not prevent a Swedish breakout (Gustavus wasn't trying to conquer further into the interior), in the sense the Swedes were trapped within their works, thus trying to escape, and if the overland routes to Danzig were secured by the Poles, this situation hardly lasted. Gustavus convalesced for a few months, and the blockading of Danzig (Gdansk) continued by his fleet under Nils Stiernskold. When Gustavus was healthy enough to return to field duty, Putzig (Puck) was recaptured (unless my source is wrong), cutting communications with Germany again. His fleet did suffer defeat on November 28 off Oliwa from the Polish under Arend Dickman and the Scotsman James Murray. The Poles had ten ships total against the Swedes' six, but only four galleons against the Swedes' five. Dickman and Stiernskold both perished. Though a compliment to the prowess of these privateers organized by Sigismund III, it was an empty naval victory, in a strategic sense; a stronger Swedish fleet was brought up, and Gustavus drew his lines closer to the city. He achieved this by expanding his base of operations towards the south-east by recapturing Orneta (Wormditt), and Guttstadt (modern Dobre Miasto) was captured by Ake (Achatius) Tott before the winter set in. The former was stormed, the latter surrendered. From my view, the main thing Koniecpolski accomplished from the battle fought around Tczew (Dirschau) was to prevent the destruction of his smaller army by superb maneuvering and handling of his troops, when morale dropped. By December, 1627, Gustavus was back in Stockholm, mainly for the benefit of his health. I think his grand strategy against the Polish-Lithuanian was about controlling the Baltic, particularly blocking the Vistula, not significantly breaking out of his quadrilateral in Ducal Prussia, as claimed by some. He did control area as far south as Brodnica (Strasburg). Danzig's trade reached a point of becoming paralyzed, and the Polish nobility was suffering financially by having to store crops of corn one after the other while waiting to export it. Though Gustavus became more and more filled with anxiety by the actions of the Imperialists under Wallenstein in Germany, his commanders in Livonia were holding up against the enemy. This enabled Gustavus to feel confident to resume the offensive into Polish Prussia in the summer of 1628. But Sigismund III felt brighter hopes were on the horizon with the developments to the west favoring the Catholics. The Protestant were supplicating to Gustavus, and he could afford just 1,100 men, in two detachments, and some munitions for the defense of Stralsund. Gustavus didn't want to risk an attack upon Koniecpolski unless favorable to do so, with Koniecpolski thinking likewise, and the war became one of maneuver, with neither side willing to face each other without advantages of terrain or fortifications. More often than not outnumbered, the Poles began pillaging their own land to impede the Swedish source of supply. On July 15, upon moving towards Danzig, Gustavus sank a few ships of Danzig's fleet with his leather guns, including the flagship. Danzig could possibly have been reduced by hunger, but again the floods came, which forced the Swedes out of their positions along the Vistula. Gustavus was thus compelled to lift the land blockade of Danzig completely. In the late summer of 1628, around the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz), the armies of Gustavus and Stanislaw Koniecpolski, according to Polish sources, were opposite on another a few times, but with no battles taking place. Koniecpolski's dispatches to his government stated his attempts to provoke Gustavus to come out and fight, with the Swedish king refusing to come out of his earthworks. What Koniecpolski, or the Polish chroniclers didn't mention, or didn't realize, was that the excellence in the Swedish army was largely influenced by the presence of Gustavus himself, their personal commander as well as their king, at least for the Swedes themselves; he led by personal example, with no task too small or menial, even grabbing a spade himself to lessen the feeling of indignation amongst some of his mercenaries about the digging of trenches. Gustavus greatly realized the importance of field fortifications, and soon employed sappers to dig troops entrenchments and cannon positions. Thus he gave battle only when he believed appropriate. Attacking ready husaria in the open was not appropriate, as the only way for an enemy to avoid destruction by the husaria was to keep to terrain in which cavalry formations could not operate fully, evidenced at Gniew (Mewe). But Koniecpolski prudently stayed at a distance out of range of Gustavus' artillery. But the Swedes operated in the open too, though not without risk and loss, and were neither able to force a decision under their terms, and the Polish campaign of harassment throughout 1628, influenced in part by the lack of support form the Sejm for Koniecpolski, cost Gustavus some 5,000 men (some deserted). Of note is that the Swedes and their allies suffered more from pestilence throughout this war than by enemy weaponry. In October of 1628, Gustavus did successfully storm Osterode (modern Ostroda) with a force of about 4,000 men, equally divided between musketeers and cavalry. By this time Gustavus was clearly eyeing the conflict in Germany, as Denmark became his ally, albeit not completely without reservations, and he aided in the successful defense of Stralsund, though much credit goes to the Danes, who saved the port in early July, 1628. This success would soon open for Gustavus an important foothold in Germany, as well as protect his position in the Baltic. The 1,100 men sent by Gustavus to Stralsund under Leslie, of which about 500 first arrived in late June, along with the Danish fleet's destruction of several vessels sent by Sigismund to aid Wallenstein, were instrumental in the defence of the important stronghold; Tilly and Wallenstein, two noteworthy leaders who had run ragged over the Protestants since 1626, appeared to be bringing a certain overall Catholic victory. But the imperial reverse at Stralsund should not militate against Wallenstein's skill; had Gustavus not failed before Danzig? Theodore Dodge drew on Swedish sources, most notably a German translation of the Svenska folkets historia by Erik Gustav Geijer, and letters from Gustavus himself, which Dodge said were very modestly put. Dodge emphasis the Swedish accounts have many gaps, due mostly to a terrible fire in Stockholm in 1697, which destroyed a huge amount of important documents. He also wrote in a time (1890s) which since has seen superior texts. But he tells us of a battle occuring in 1628 before the serious flooding of Vistula, which compelled Gustavus to lift the blockade (from inland) of Danzig: Beginning in the late spring or early summer of 1628, Koniecpolski interrupted the Swedish grip around Danzig by assorted diversionary actions, in which he retook Putzig (Puck) again and captured Gniew (Mewe). Ake Tott, the Finnish commander under Gustavus, was ordered to watch these operations with a cavalry force, certainly his reputable Hakkapallites, who were prominent at Gustavus' first field victory at Wallhof over two years earlier. Tott had now been joined by one Torsten Stalhandske, a fine colonel who would figure prominently later in Germany. Tott apparently fell into an ambush west of a town Dodge names as Grebin, which must be modern Grabiny-Zamec (Monchengrebin). Radoslaw Sikora mentions a clash fought around Legowo in July of 1627, which is the same area. Tott broke out though being outnumbered, both capturing some prisoners and procuring valuable news of the Polish force. Koniecpolski was unwilling to attack the Swedish army, which outnumbered him and was well fortified, so he annoyed it materially. Gustavus was resolved to rid himself of this interference, and marched with the bulk of his force on the Polish army, leaving part of them before Danzig. Gustavus attacked the Poles near their camp, as Dodge tells us, "...- the exact locality, curiously, is not known, - and by his sharp initiative well kept up, the mobility of his foot and his vastly superior artillery, defeated them with a loss of 3,000 men, four guns and fourteen flags, and drove them well up the Vistula. Koniecpolski fell, heavily wounded...Here was a general engagement with a high percentage of loss, and yet even the battlefield is neither named, nor can be identified. This war was the monarch's schooling, as Gaul was Caesar's, or Spain Hannibal's; but we know as much of Hannibal's Iberian, and much more of Caesar's Gallic, battles than we do of these..." I believe Dodge read sources claiming this, and it is possible that a reverse upon Koniecpolski took place, but I think the scenario of Tott breaking out of an ambush is credible, being he led fast-moving cavalry, even if he was heavily outnumbered. But a loss of 3,000 Poles in the ensuing clash, in which they suffered a reverse, is almost certainly magnified. But I would hate to think people could completely concoct battles. It makes sense to me: from Dodge's description, Gustavus aggressively attacked by tactical surprise when the situation favored his combined arms. We also know that Koniecpolski withdrew from his positions at Gniew (Mewe) and Grudziadz (Graudenz), while Gustavus occupied Marienwerder (modern Kwidzyn), Brodnica (Strasburg), Nowe (Neuenburg), and Swiecie (Schwetz). Moreover, one cavalry detachment of reiters under one Heinrich von Baudissin undertook a gallant raid to the gates of Warsaw, while Wrangel made a bold foraging expedition inland from Elbing (modern Elblag). But Baudissin was captured and exchanged, and the Poles could manuever and gain, but not to the same degree (in terms of gain), and couldn't follow up small tactical surprises, which were achieved by guerilla-style attacks; they simply didn't possess the quantity of troops, particulalry infantry. But when the winter of 1628 approached the situation was practically unchanged from the previous year, and Gustavus had had serious difficulty in provisioning, a predicament due mostly to Koniecpolski's pillaging of the land. Basically, if we can believe the battle described by Dodge, Gustavus had been skillful in his maneuvering by compelling Koniecpolski to a campaign of harassment, but this in turn gained fruit for Koniecpolski, in that he effectivley began impeding Swedish offensive operations and freedom of movement. But the balance was restored by this aggressive field victory by Gustavus, which I want to believe occured (though no other account I have seen seems to mention it), though not completely what Gustavus had desired for his strategic purpose - the destruction of the Polish army. Sigismund III became more implacable than ever, providing some reinforcements for Koniecpolski's army and refusing Dutch mediations to bring about a peace. With the auspicious conditions of the Catholic situation in Germany, along with their promised aid to him in the form of Imperial auxiliaries, the prospect of Spanish naval presence in the Baltic, extant support from the Sejm, and Danzig's continued holdout against Gustavus, Sigismund III was emboldened to not only drive the Swedes out of Poland and Livonia, but eventually carry the war into Sweden itself, and again attain one of his initial goals, to lay claim (reclaim, technically) to the Swedish throne of his ancestors. However, the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II, educated by the Jesuits and a Catholic zealot, did not monetarily sustain Sigismund III as had been agreed, and the Polish treasury was regressing, thus Gustavus' ability to maintain his footing around Danzig was facilitated, so he resumed the blockade. He was also helped by reinforcements - including about 2,000 reiters from Germany under the Rheingraff (Rhinegrave) Johann Wilhelm, the Count of Ren, who was the son of Herman Wrangel. But Koniecpolski was able to confine himself to guerilla-style operations and occupy strong positions, and Gustavus would not be goaded into fighting the Poles on their terms, in the open field before he could deploy infantry and artillery support, which he did achieve once, if we can believe Dodge, who also tells us Gustavus was,
Basically, neither side could bring about a field engagement on terms one would accept, a sign of two terrific commanders who each identified the strength of the other. In January of 1629, Gustavus was in Stockholm discussing foreign politics with his council, and Koniecpolski was in Warsaw with the Sejm, probably for similar reasons. It was fully determined in Sweden by this time that Gustavus should at no distant date move in to assist the Protestant cause in Germany. On February 1, 1629 Herman Wrangel, with a force of 5,337 men, of which 3,400 cavalry were cavalry, was determined to relieve pressure on the isolated garrison of Brodnica (Strasburg); he fell upon the threatening Polish army, some 5,000 in number under Stanislaw Potocki, in its winter quarters to the east of the town. A battle was fought near Gorzno (Gurzno), where six Choragiews, composed of husaria and their supporting lighter kozac cavalry, initially made some headway, but the Swedes didn't break, and well-drilled musketeers drove off the enemy horsemen. Potocki had no pikemen to protect his cavalry. Wrangel, not being pulled into a frontal attack wished for by Potocki, boldly outflanked the Poles with his own cavalry. After suffering many losses, Potocki withdrew with the rest of his army (the casualties he suffered amounted to half his force) towards Torun (Thorn), to the south-west. A Swedish pursuit inflicted between 500-2,000 Polish losses (depending on the source), with 30-300 losses suffered by the Swedes (again, depending on the source). Akin to every other battle fought in this war, the clash around Gorzno (Gurzno) is filled with controversial details. What we do know for certain is that it was a Swedish victory, and though it carried little strategic significance; Wrangel was too far south with a relatively small force, thus couldn't take Torun. Wrangel hastily headed back northwards. But Swedish prestige was revived, and Polish confidence began to languish. Many of Polish magnates desired peace, but Sigismund III, under pressure from the Dutch and Brandenburg ministers, was willing to consent to only a tenuous truce, one which could easily be broken. Again, Swedish cavalry, and thier allies, was improving, but it still required advantageous format, numbers, and maneuver to best the Polish cavalry. They were about to learn in the upcoming summer that without this asset, they would get beat. Gustavus met Christian IV of Denmark in Februaury, 1629, with the meeting achieving nothing, in terms of the Danish king's further involvement in the Protestant cause, as he concluded a peace with Ferdinand II, at Lubeck on May 27,1629; Christian IV was given very permissive terms. Though he was forced to renounce all his territorial ambitions in Germany, he was allowed the recovery, without indemnity, all the territory occupied by the Imperialist armies. Ferdinand II was ensuring that Denmark was now out of the conflict, thus the task of supporting the Protestants of northern Germany and protecting Stralsund now devolved upon Gustavus alone. Not only did the Protestants disdain the settlement between Christian IV and the emperor, but even Pope Urban VIII denounced the act as scandalous. But Gustavus, whose delegates were refused admission at Lubeck, saw it coming, and realized that Christian IV had forfeited all credibility as a champion of Protestantism or a protector of the German princes. If the Edict of Lubeck left Gustavus alone, it also enabled him with his hands free. He was now prepared to let the war in Polish Prussia slowly subside, but Wallenstein, resolving to prevent Gustavus from entering the German theater, changed that for the time being. The Poles had no love for the German Hapsburgs, and had expressed an unwillingness to accept substantial auxilliary forces of Imperialists from the West. But the recent debacle at Gorzno caused them to think better of the Imperialists from Germany; Wallenstein persuaded the Sejm to admit an army of no more than 12,000 men and some artillery under Hans Georg von Arnim to join the Poles. Gustavus, arriving back in Poland in June of 1629, had a total troop strength in Ducal Prussia now numbering some 23,000 men (over 15,000 infantry, over 7,000 cavalry), but they were dispersed throughout many garrisons. Koniecpolski commanded 18,742 men (7,942 cavalry); confident, Koniecpolski arrived back into the field. Gustavus learned of the approaching Arnim and marched south to intercept him with 5,450 horse and 1,900 foot, thus the amount under Arnim was probably the approx. 5,000 figure many sources claim. But Gustavus failed, and Koniecpolski and Arnim junctioned at Grudziadz (Graudenz) on June 25, 1629 (about 3-4,000 imperial infantry were still on the way). They agreed to attack Marienwerder (modern Kwidzyn), some thirty miles north of them, but two days later, Koniecpolski then insisted to immediately go after Gustavus in a cavalry pursuit; now vastly outnumbered here in the region, Gustavus had concluded to cut-and-run north to Malbork (Marienburg), to the safety of his forts, where he could sustain his control of the Vistula delta and the coastal areas around the Frishes Haff, which he hoped to achieve by operating from his entrenchments. I have read that Gustavus retired towards Malbork only after a sally of his was repulsed by Polish positions around Grudziadz, but other accounts state this action occured in September, 1628 (unless a different incident). At this time, Gustavus was at peace with Ferdinand II, which led this action to be seen by the Swedes as a gratuitous act of war and a breach of the comity of nations, to which Gustavus sent a protest to Wallenstein. But it wasn't a breach of any treaty, and the act achieved its purpose - to retard Swedish interference in Germany. Having sent a body of foot and horse to reinforce his garrison at Kwidzyn (Marienwerder), which is some twenty miles directly south of Malbork, Gustavus, on June 27, 1629, retreated north with his force disposed in four battle groups: advance guard, battle guard, artillery guard, and rearguard. He and Wrangel had 2,150 cavalry at the advance; Zakarias Pauli led the battle guard with 700 horsemen; the artillery guard of 750 cavalry and 1,260 musketeers guarding eight heavier guns (6 and 12 pounders), and the rearguard comprised 1,950 cavalry with about sixty musketeers and ten smaller 3 lb. guns, led by the Rheingraff Johann Wilhelm (or Download 114.5 Kb. Share with your friends:
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