1.10Contribution to the presidential campaign of 2010
In 2010, in Rio de Janeiro, on a date which cannot be specified, RENATO DE SOUZA DUQUE, then Director of Services at Petrobras, a post to which he was appointed with the support of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT),72 had a meeting with JULIO FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO CAMPOS BARBOSA DA SILVA, in their capacity as members of Oildrive Consultoria em Energia e Petróleo Ltda. and representatives in Brazil of the Dutch company SBM Offshore N.V., and requested an improper payment of US$ 300,000.00 (three hundred thousand dollars), intended for the 2010 presidential campaign of the Workers Party.
In his statements to the first Petrobras Internal Committee of Enquiry into the SBM case, RENATO DUQUE showed that he was aware of the activities of FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO: “The deponent confirmed that he knew LUIS EDUARDO BARBOSA and that he was normally with JULIO FAERMAN, because they are partners” (Appendix 8 of the Final Report of this Committee, contained in PIC MPF/PR/RJ 1.30.001.000837/2014-68, Appendix III, Volume 4).
In the same statements, DUQUE attempted to play down the contacts with representatives of SBM, saying that he did not recall taking part in the meeting with FAERMAN regarding the P-57 bidding process and “that he used to receive many visits from companies, but few from SBM”, which contrasts with the details in Appendix 7a of the same Report, showing that he received dozens of visits from FAERMAN, his son and partner Marcello Faerman, and LUIS EDUARDO, between the years 2005 and 2011 (PIC MPF/PR/RJ 1.30.001.000837/2014-68, Appendix III, Volume 4).
It is certain, however, that RENATO DUQUE had ties with JULIO FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO CAMPOS BARBOSA DA SILVA, and that these were not only professional but personal, as shown by an intimacy expressed in 2 leisure trips to wine producing regions abroad.73
In his statement to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (statement of 20/05/2015, at 17h10m – doc. 36, this passage having been confirmed on 27/05/2015, at 11h15m – doc. 37), FAERMAN commented on the request for 300 thousand dollars for the PT presidential campaign in 2010:
“At one of the various meetings with his partner LUIS EDUARDO and DUQUE in the Services Department at the Head Office of Petrobras, DUQUE asked the deponent and his partner if they could contribute financially to the political campaign of the PT for the presidency in the year 2010, but the deponent responded in the negative. Barusco was not at this meeting, because in the meetings that he had with DUQUE, Barusco was not normally present. (...) With this request by DUQUE for a financial contribution to the PT presidential campaign in 2010, the connection of DUQUE with the party was clear, but the deponent had already heard of this connection, although not from DUQUE himself. Despite the negative reply given to DUQUE, Barusco met the deponent again and requested a contribution of 300 thousand dollars for the PT presidential campaign in 2010. On this occasion, only Barusco and the deponent were present. In the face of this request, the deponent transferred 300 thousand from his Bienfaire account in Switzerland to an account of Barusco in Switzerland. The transfer was to an account that he cannot specify, because he used to give instructions to the bank without needing to specify to which account of the transferee the funds should go.”
On this aspect, PEDRO BARUSCO had previously explained to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (statement of 20/03/2015, at 14h00m – doc. 28):
“these 300 thousand dollars were paid by FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO; that he has no further details of the meeting in which DUQUE agreed this figure with the said representatives of SBM; that, as FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO went everywhere together (even being known as Batman and Robin), he spoke with both of them about this sum of 300 thousand; that he had no need to insist on the payment, because it had already been agreed by them with DUQUE; that he does not know how the part played by Vaccari in this matter occurred, or if it actually occurred; that he knows that this request came during a time when there were efforts to increase the sums collected by the PT for the campaign, because the opposition candidate was going up in the polls; that he is unaware of any part played in this case by José de Fillipi Júnior, whom he hardly knows; that this sum of 300 thousand was paid into the account of the deponent in Switzerland; that this payment did not necessarily occur before the election, because in fact the deponent did not transfer 300 thousand dollars to anyone’s account, but simply gave the PT a credit in the form of bribes receivable; that he does not know how this payment may have been made to the PT, whether in Brazil or abroad, and whether in the form of an official campaign donation or not.”
At the time of the request by DUQUE for 300 thousand dollars for the PT presidential campaign, there was a heavy flow in Switzerland of improper payments from the accounts of JULIO FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO CAMPOS BARBOSA DA SILVA to the accounts of PEDRO JOSÉ BARUSCO FILHO, then Executive Manager of Engineering in the Services Department of Petrobras, reporting directly to RENATO DUQUE, whom he used to help in dealing with the receipt of improper payments from companies contracted by Petrobras.
In fact, PEDRO BARUSCO received in Switzerland, by way of improper payments relating to contracts between Petrobras and SBM, a total of around 22 million dollars, from the end of the 1990s until the beginning of the present decade.
On account of this facility in the financial flow, RENATO DUQUE asked his subordinate and partner PEDRO BARUSCO to strengthen the request to FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO and to receive in his Swiss account the sum agreed with them and thereafter to make a set-off of the improper payments: PEDRO BARUSCO failed to receive the equivalent amount in Brazil, relating to the improper payments obtained by these employees of Petrobras from other companies, and RENATO DUQUE took charge of ensuring that these funds went to the presidential campaign of the Workers Party.
As PEDRO BARUSCO stated, when explaining the “set-off” mechanism for bribes (statement of 26/11/2014, at 13h30m – doc. 38):
“That the deponent explains that in the year 2010, during the presidential campaign, when Serra was level with Dilma in the polls, he was requested by Renato Duque to be the intermediary in receiving a contribution of 300 thousand dollars for Dilma’s campaign; that the deponent explains that he carried out the request of Renato Duque in the following manner: as he already had the financial channels set up with SBM, he received the money from the commercial representative of SBM in his account in Switzerland, giving ‘bribe’ credits in Brazil from other companies with contracts with Petrobras, whose names he does not remember at the moment; that the deponent explains that the decision to contribute to the campaign was taken at a meeting between Renato Duque, Julio Faerman and Luis Eduardo in which the deponent did not take part; reaffirming that he was requested to proceed in this way simply because he had established channels for the transfer of money between himself and Julio Faerman; That the deponent also explains that the ‘bribe’ credits granted were notified to Renato Duque, the contribution to Mr. Vaccari having been made by the latter; That the deponent explains that the person who talked to Vaccari was Renato Duque; that he only spoke to Vaccari a few times.”
JULIO FAERMAN, through FAERCOM Energia Ltda and, with LUIS EDUARDO CAMPOS BARBOSA DA SILVA, through the said Oildrive, represented SBM and other companies in their dealings with Petrobras. With a view to maintaining and developing their influence over the official steps taken by RENATO DE SOUZA DUQUE and PEDRO JOSÉ BARUSCO FILHO, they agreed to hand over the requested amount.
According to FAERMAN, on 12 April 2010, he ordered J. Safra Bank in Geneva to transfer US$ 300,000.00 (300 thousand dollars) from account 606.422 in the name of his offshore company Bien Faire Inc. (registered in the British Virgin Islands), as a contribution to the presidential campaign. In the statements supplied by FAERMAN, the relevant entry contains the phrase “payment in favor of a client”, recording the transfer (doc. 39).
Although PEDRO BARUSCO did not identify this transfer as being the one which effected what had been agreed, he was definite in saying that the commitment was fulfilled.
The nature, origin, location, movement and ownership of these sums, the proceeds of crimes committed against the public purse, were concealed and disguised, inter alia through the use of companies set up in tax havens, especially in the British Virgin Islands.
1.11Personal favoritism
Certain members of SBM’s top management pursued policies which tended to favor persons who had committed crimes punishable by imprisonment, so that they might escape any action taken by public authorities.
One of the main documents at the outset of the investigation by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office was the Final Report of the first Petrobras Internal Committee of Enquiry, together with its appendices. In February and March 2014, over a period of 30 days, this Committee made various internal enquiries by means of visits and telephone conversations, followed by visits and meetings in the Netherlands, and heard from various persons in Rio de Janeiro, among them SIETZE HEPKEMA, then Chief Governance and Compliance Officer at SBM, reporting directly to BRUNO CHABAS, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SBM.
Although he had only joined SBM in the first half of 2011 to take up the post of Chief Operating Officer (COO), and became CEO at the end of that year, CHABAS became aware of the payments to FAERMAN and later also to LUIS EDUARDO, divided between Brazil and Switzerland, to the extent that in a Memorandum of 04/01/2012, following the receipt of US$ 2,987,500.00 from Petrobras on 25/07/2011 relating to P-57, he ordered the payment of 3% commission, totaling US$ 89,625.00; 1% to OILDRIVE, at HSBC in Brazil, in the sum of US$ 29,875.00, and 2% to Bien Faire, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, at its account at J. Safra Bank in Switzerland (doc. 40).
Thus, although it is possible to take the view that he had not had sufficient contact with SBM to embrace the system adopted at the company and proceed to direct the procedures for unlawful payments, it is clear that, as soon as these unlawful payments started coming to light, he had every opportunity to become aware that his predecessors had been carrying on company business with the aid of undercover methods.
In statements made to Petrobras on 21/02/2014 (PIC MPF/PR/RJ 1.30.001.000837/2014-68, Appendix III, Volume 3 – Final Report of the first Petrobras Internal Committee of Enquiry into the SBM case, Appendix 5b),74 SIETZE HEPKEMA sought to minimize the seriousness of the criminal conduct in relation to Brazil, in the presence of PHILIPPE JACQUES LEVY who, as will be seen below, followed the behavior of his superiors in trying to obstruct the proper administration of justice.
Thus, asked if the investigation in the Netherlands concerned Brazil, HEPKEMA was evasive, replying that SBM was only speaking publicly about investigations relating to two countries in Africa and one in another continent.75
When the question was repeated, HEPKEMA admitted the payment of large sums to FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO at offshore companies registered in the British Virgin Islands, but did not mention the receipt by SBM of confidential files belonging to Petrobras. It should be noted that one of the emails received by SBM containing a confidential file of Petrobras had been sent to BRUNO CHABAS himself, as described in this indictment at item “2.9. Supply of confidential information”.
HEPKEMA also made no reference to the fact that SBM had paid millions of dollars over a period of more than a decade to offshore companies without any tax invoice or bill, which made its accounting and compliance devoid of credibility, and enabled the payment of bribes on a huge scale.
It was obviously known by everyone who spoke that Petrobras, as it had done on several previous occasions, would send the results of its enquiries to the Public Prosecutor’s Office if its legal department found evidence of criminal conduct, which is what in fact happened.
The behavior of HEPKEMA is consistent with that adopted by PHILIPPE JACQUES LEVY, then the representative of SBM Offshore do Brasil Ltda and also reporting to BRUNO CHABAS, when he answered questions put by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office in Rio de Janeiro on 03/04/2014.76 Transcription: “asked about rewards or favors granted by SBM to purchasers, in particular to employees of Petrobras, either directly or through intermediaries, he replied THAT the only things that SBM gives to purchasers, including Petrobras, are Christmas cards.”
Even though LEVY was not fully aware of the millions in bribes paid in Switzerland, he knew of SBM’s offer to Petrobras employees to take part in a football tournament in Denmark in 2011, with SBM paying the expenses of transport (except for air tickets) and accommodation (email from beniciof@petrobras.com.br on 16/02/2011 at 09:04 to other employees, copy to LEVY – doc. 41), as disclosed by the Second Petrobras Internal Committee of Enquiry, held in 2015.
In 2009 LEVY issued invitations to the Formula 1 Singapore Grand Prix acquired by SBM to Mario Nigri Klein, an employee of Petrobras, who passed them on to Flávio Siqueira Júnior. Although LEVY was given time to provide clarification about the payment of hotel bills in Houston (for, among others, PAULO ROBERTO BUARQUE CARNEIRO) and other favors granted to Petrobras employees, no reply was received, as confirmed in the Final Report of the Second Petrobras Internal Committee of Enquiry.77
It can be seen that SBM’s top management, through PHILIPPE LEVY in Brazil and BRUNO CHABAS and SIETZE HEPKEMA in Europe, adopted a policy characterized by limited cooperation, which allowed the company to present itself publicly as cooperative, but which tried to escape full disclosure and action by public authorities with regard to the whole picture of bribes paid by the company in Brazil and in Africa, in favor of persons who were in command and control of these activities.
Through international legal cooperation, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office requested the Dutch authorities for statements to be made by 10 persons, namely: Jonathan David Taylor; BRUNO CHABAS; SIETZE HEPKEMA; Jean-Philippe Laures; Mike Wyllie; Hanny Tagher; Francis Blanchelande; TONY MACE; DIDIER KELLER; JULIO FAERMAN.
In one of the statements taken from Jean-Philippe Laures (doc. 42- “Second Interview with Jean Philippe Laures”), the representative of Paul Hastings made it clear that it was for SBM to decide whether to supply the public authorities with the statements or not:78
“Ms. Lammers began the interview by explaining the purpose of the interview. She also provided Mr. Laures an Upjohn warning, explaining that Paul Hastings represents the Company [SBM] and not Mr. Laures. She also explained that the interview was covered by attorney-client privilege, but that privilege belongs to the Company. She noted that the Company may choose to share the information provided by Mr. Laures in the interview to third parties, including government enforcement authorities.”
Nevertheless, the Dutch authorities could not respond to the request for international cooperation made by the Brazilian Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office because SBM Offshore N.V., headed by BRUNO CHABAS, invoked the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship, that is to say, it raised with the public authorities the secrecy of information obtained by a law firm (Paul Hastings), engaged by it to make an investigation which was intended to be a substitute for an investigation by the state. The Dutch authorities noted as follows, as per the official translation (doc. 43):
“The Brazilian authorities have requested witness statements and information from ten persons. These interviews took place in the context of the internal enquiry by SBM. FIOD79 has statements and non-privileged information from Jonathan Taylor, an ex-employee of SBM who posted an article on suspected irregular payments by SBM on Wikipedia. In addition, there is an interview with Jean-Philippe Laures. The interviews with the other eight persons were not provided by SBM to FIOD because SBM relies on the confidentiality between lawyer and client.”
All this behavior is consistent with the initial allegations posted on Wikipedia by Jonathan David Taylor:80
“- It soon became clear to the former employee that this approach, referred to by SBM’s Chief Governance and Compliance Officer Siezte HEPKEMA (‘SH’) as ‘containment’, was nothing less than a cover-up of major and crucially important elements of SBM’s criminal activities. Despite protesting against this approach to the Chief Executive Officer Bruno CHABAS (‘BC’) and CGCO SH, he was told very clearly, in particular by SH, to participate in this ‘containment’ (ie. cover-up) in the way SBM wanted, under threat of ‘coming to the end of the road’. Faced with such duress, the former employee had absolutely no choice but to leave SBM.”
By acting in this way, BRUNO CHABAS, SIETZE HEPKEMA and PHILIPPE LEVY sought to help persons referred to in this indictment, employees of SBM who had committed crimes punishable by imprisonment, such as active corruption, to escape from actions by public authorities.
1.12Criminal gang or association
As can be deduced from the factual narrative, those involved formed part of a group of more than three persons in a durable and stable manner with the specific aim of committing certain crimes on more than one occasion, including fraud in bidding processes, active and passive corruption and breaches of employee secrecy, among other offences, with the common objective of enriching themselves in the contract negotiations of Petrobras in which SBM participated.
ROBERT ZUBIATE knew JULIO FAERMAN and DIDIER KELLER from the time they worked for the American company IMODCO, and kept up the relationship when they started to work for SBM.
In this capacity, ZUBIATE and FAERMAN dealt directly with PAULO ROBERTO BUARQUE CARNEIRO (FAERMAN being best man at his wedding), who was already known to ZUBIATE, in order to make illegal payments to him.
ZUBIATE and DIDIER KELLER fixed the commission payments to FAERMAN at levels which allowed the payment of bribes. DIDIER KELLER supported the payment of commissions to FAERMAN by way of FAERMAN’s offshore companies, which did not issue bills or tax invoices to SBM, with which they never had any kind of contract.
Shortly after the agreement regarding improper payments to CARNEIRO, there was the agreement for payments of the same kind to PEDRO JOSÉ BARUSCO FILHO, a colleague of CARNEIRO in the Naval Engineering Department (Exploration and Production Department – DE&P) of Petrobras.
In 2005, FAERMAN summoned LUIS EDUARDO CAMPOS BARBOSA DA SILVA to work with him. LUIS EDUARDO had been highly recommended by BARUSCO and agreed to the receipt of commissions in bank accounts in Switzerland in the name of offshore companies and to the passing on of monetary sums to Petrobras employees.
At this time JORGE LUIZ ZELADA started to receive unlawful payments. He was a junior colleague of PEDRO BARUSCO, who was now in the Services Department, reporting to RENATO DUQUE, an ex-colleague of BARUSCO in the DE&P.
In 2011, DUQUE, Director of Services at Petrobras, who had benefited from illegal payments made by FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO to BARUSCO, formed, along with ZELADA, then his colleague as International Director of Petrobras, and the two SBM sales agents, the “Wine Fraternity”.
As from 2008, “TONY” MACE, who had also known ZUBIATE during his period at SBM Houston (2002 to 2007), in his capacity as KELLER’s successor as CEO of SBM, maintained the financial structure and level of contractual commissions paid to FAERMAN and LUIS EDUARDO which allowed them to make direct payments to CARNEIRO, BARUSCO and ZUBIATE, as well as ZELADA. MACE, like KELLER, ordered payments to offshore companies, now to FAERMAN and also to LUIS EDUARDO, without any contract or issue of invoices.
Unlawful acts were performed as a consequence of this criminal gang or association up to the beginning of 2012, when money transfers were still taking place between the offshore company accounts of the accused in Switzerland.
Below is a diagram of these associations:
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