CORRUPTION IS OFTEN INTEGRAL TO POLITICAL ORDER
Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2003, Journal of International Development, 15: 413-426, p. 415-6
Although illegal by international standards of good governance, corruption is often an integral part of the political order and may even be seen as legitimate by a significant proportion of the population. As noted in the case of market corruption, the pervasiveness of corruption in most aspects of daily life and its rewarding of individuals according to a condoned social order positively relate to its legitimacy. For example, petty corruption ensures the survival of low ranking civil servants, even if some of their bureaucratic activities are in themselves questionable.
Similarly, the corruption of politics through a system of patron–client relationships guided by private interests can ensure some degree of political stability due to the prevalence of reciprocity among political actors. In large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, such legitimacy is bounded by ties of kinship and community within which redistribution is governed by a logic of patronage. Corrupt behaviour is therefore not only driven by greed and structural forces, but also by informal codes of conduct associated with reciprocity ties within particularist and communitarian social networks (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The legitimacy of corruption is thus bounded by the legitimacy of control over resources; with conflicts arising when this control extends beyond the mutually recognized resource boundaries of social networks or fails rules of reciprocity.
While these codes of conduct do not reflect a universalistic (or Western) notion of public good, their legitimacy rests on benefits channelled down these networks, outside which non-reciprocal or even predatory relations dominate. The point is not whether corruption is illegal but whether or not it is interpreted as legitimate; that is, within the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for the elite, the military, the business community, or the general population. The obvious questions are thus which people decide upon this legitimacy and how can they be informed of the level and use of corruption to decide upon its acceptability. Social and political identities as well as access to independent media are thus crucial issues as demonstrated by the importance of corruption in political rumours, notably circulated through radio trottoir.1
CORRUPTION ALONE UNLIKELY TO PROVOKE VIOLENCE – MORE LIKELY TO PREVENT IT
Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2003, Journal of International Development, 15: 413-426, p. 419-20
Corruption alone, however, is not a sufficient factor for envious opposition groups or disenfranchised populations to violently challenge rulers. Nor does corruption systematically bring about economic underdevelopment and raise popular grievances to a state of violent rebellion. In fact, corruption can take place along with political stability and economic growth. In this respect, the legitimate or illegitimate character of corruption in political processes is a key issue. While advocates of corrupt governance are rare in the ‘international community’, the practices of many states attest to their acknowledgement that some forms of corruption can bring about political stability by buying off political opponents and restive groups, at least from the perspective of their own national interests. This strategy has even been used, with some measure of success, in conflict resolution and peacekeeping initiatives.
CORRUPTION VITAL TO MANAGING ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND PREVENTING CONFLICT
Madalene O’Donnell, NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2006, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, Draft Chapter for International Peace Academy, Civil War and the Rule of Law, [http://www.worldbank.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/wbi/governance/pdf/corruption_conflict_and_rule_of_law.pdf], p. 8
But the conflict field, given its emphasis on stability, is one of the few areas where some of the functionalist arguments for corruption retain a foothold. When corruption networks exacerbate existing societal or ethnic fault lines, it can be explosive. If corruption networks bridge these divisions among elites, however, it might have some mitigating effects. Shared economic interests of elites, it is argued, may lead them to temporarily set aside differences to get rich together – albeit at the expense of others. Some argued that this was the case, for a certain time, in both Rwanda and Macedonia. LeBillon also argues that anti-corruption reforms can be destabilizing. International anti-corruption efforts and pressure to comply with international standards in public finance and good governance may, he argues, serve as an external shock, leading either to new openings for reform or new possibilities of instability and conflict.
CORRUPTION PLAYS A VITAL ROLE IN PEACEFUL NATION-BUILDING – EMPIRICALLY PROMOTES A NON-VIOLENT ALTERNATIVE TO POWER STRUGGLES AND INTEGRATION
Robin Theobald, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Polytechnic of Central London, 1990, Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment, p. 124-5
National Integration Lastly, corruption is held to be of major significance in promoting national integration. Underdeveloped countries tend to be riven by serious communal differences such as those based upon tribe, race, caste, language and religion. In the absence of an overall consensus the distribution of public resources along communal lines may be the only way of drawing disparate segments together, of providing the necessary connections between the individual and his/her group, the state and other groups. This is the “empire-building” function which Roth and numerous others have explored and which was discussed extensively in the previous chapter.
The role of patrimonialism, or what Waterbury has termed “planned corruption” (Waterbury, 1976), in nation-building is essentially that of enabling an emerging state to move beyond a stage of protected internecine struggle by using public office to weld contending factions together. Wraith and Simpkins note that in England by the end of the seventeenth century bribery and corruption had replaced resort to armed force in the struggle for power (Wraith and Simpkins 1963, p. 60). It is highly likely that the spectacular graft which characterized the “gilded age” which followed the American Civil War played a major role in re-integration. Again the deeply-entrenched corruption without which the Mexican political system could not function (see Riding, c. 6) was crucial in enabling Mexican political development to transcend the decade of bloodletting which followed the Revolution. On this Walter Lippman cites the president of a Latin American republic explaining that he was in the process of consolidating his regime by giving his most dangerous political enemies ambassadorships with extra large grants. In the past, he explained, they would simply have been shot (Lippmann, 1978).
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