*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention


Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail: Aid Fails



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Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail: Aid Fails


ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSISTANCE RARELY EFFECTIVE

Madalene O’Donnell, NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2006, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, Draft Chapter for International Peace Academy, Civil War and the Rule of Law, [http://www.worldbank.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/wbi/governance/pdf/corruption_conflict_and_rule_of_law.pdf], p. 23-4

Targeted and short-term studies, several of which have been referenced above, suggest that anti-corruption commissions, omnibus programs and international conventions have not demonstrated their effectiveness and that, within institutional reform, a focus on creating a meritocracy, rather than building capacity, may have more impact on fighting corruption. Furthermore, combining decent pay with regular monitoring may be far more effective than either measure on its own. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) researchers analyzed three types of anti-corruption activities – omnibus anti-corruption programs, legal reforms, and adherence to international anti-corruption conventions -- in 24 transition countries implemented in 1999-2002. They found no discernible effect of omnibus programs or membership in international conventions on corruption but it did find that new or amended laws were associated with lower levels of petty or administrative corruption -- a reminder that administrative and grand corruption are closely related but distinct problems requiring different solutions.

Perhaps the most persistent weakness in international efforts to address corruption is that international actors are particularly ill-suited to identify politically feasible strategies and, as Ivan Krastev has argued, rarely even try. The difficulty for any government is that efforts to address grand corruption will quickly alienate powerful elites and efforts to address administrative corruption will take time. Anti-corruption commissions are popular with reluctant governments because they send an immediate signal that someone is “on the job,” but they rarely have the financial or institutional independence to escape their political masters.
CAN’T MAKE GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT “AFRICAN” CORRUPTION – STRATEGIES MUST BE ADAPTED TO SPECIFIC CONTEXTS

Michael Johnston, Political Science Professor Colgate University, 1993, Corruption and Reform, 7:189-204, p. 189-90



Individual cases of corruption have unique elements, and the nations of Africa embrace immense diversity, making it vital to adapt the anti-corruption measures to specific societies and arrays of political forces. However, recent changes in African politics, in the attitudes and perceptions of donor nations, and in the global economic and political climate make this a particularly appropriate time to think about broad new initiatives against corruption, about the prospects for more open politics, and about ways of making the two work together. While democratization may create new vulnerabilities to corruption in the short term, over the longer haul it may engage as forces inhibiting corruption some of the same private interests that are now parties to it. This is not to suggest that “macro” strategies supplant “micro”-level reforms; indeed, both must be coordinated if they are to stand of chance of lasting success.

Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail: Top-Down



ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS IGNORE THE VOICE OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS – TOP DOWN

Bruce Bailey, OECD, 2003, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practices in Fighting Corruption, July 1-2, [http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=61], p. 50

Equally important is that there appears to be a great deal of overly sophisticated analysis and diagnostic work being done at the expense of engaged participation with different stakeholders to work out strategies through discussion and consensus-building. We have learned in diverse areas from poverty-reduction to organisational improvement to listen to the direct input from key stakeholders, such as the poor, and to engage them in new policy directions, and not to just collect a lot of data and do statistical analysis. Anti-corruption work still misses much of this broad public participation input.

Areas to explore in greater depth include greater use of rapid appraisal techniques, greater collaboration and stronger participatory approaches between stakeholders and donors in carrying out diagnostic work, more common approaches and methodologies, minimising duplication of effort and action-oriented research approaches.


TOP-DOWN ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS INEFFECTIVE

Franklin Steves and Alan Rousso, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003, "Anti-Corruption Programmes in Post-Communist Transition Countries and Changes in the Business Environment, 1999-2002" EBRD Working Paper No. 85, December, SSRN, p. 29

Finally, if further research confirms that high profile omnibus programmes are not particularly effective in reducing levels of administrative corruption and state capture, bilateral and multilateral donors will need to adjust their lending strategies and policy advice accordingly. Where anti-corruption programmes are applied from the top-down, without adequate transparency and sufficient participation of civil society groups in both the formulation and monitoring of the initiatives, they may be a smokescreen for inaction rather than a sincere attempt to reduce levels of corruption.

Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail: US Can’t Solve Corruption


TOO MANY OTHER DONORS DON’T CARE ABOUT CORRUPTION

Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institute, 2011, From Aid to Global Development Cooperation, The 2011 Brookings Blum Policy Brief, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/09_global_development/2011_brookings_blum_policy_briefs.pdf#page=30] p. 32

Official reports by IFIs, along with other traditional donors and export agencies, tended to provide a relatively positive assessment of developments in the region. Many international actors focused on aggregate economic figures, minimized the importance of social, equity and governance factors, and paid little if any attention to civil society, media freedoms and anticorruption efforts. Figure 3 encapsulates part of the problem in the relationship between the international community’s policies and the governance reality in the Middle East.

In sum, initial conditions shared by many countries in the region included the low and deteriorating voice and democratic accountability, and also high youth unemployment and unequal wealth distribution, accompanied by a perceived decline in wellbeing. And citizens of many Arab countries, beyond Tunisia and Egypt, also reported declining well-being.





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