*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention

AT: Cosmopolitanism

Maria Eriksson Baaz, Goteborg University-Department of Peace and Development-Researcher, 2005, The Paternalism of Partnership: a postcolonial reading of identity in development aid, p. 50

The search seems to be for mastery. In his article “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture” Ulf Hannerz describes cosmopolitanism as, first of all, an orientation, as “a willingness to engage with the “Other,” entailing “an intellectual and esthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity” (Hannerz 1996: 103). But he also emphasizes the ways in which this willingness is shaped by an ability to master the culture of the Other:
“the willingness to become involved with the Other, and the concern with achieving competence in cultures which are initially alien, relate to consideration of self as well. Cosmopolitanism often has a narcissistic streak; the self is constructed in the space where culture mirror one another. Competence with regard to alien cultures itself entails a sense of mastery, as an aspect of the self. One’s understandings have expanded, a little more of the world is somehow under control…The cosmopolitan’s surrender to the alien culture implies personal autonomy vis-à-vis the culture where he originated. He has his obvious competence with regard to it, but he can choose to disengage from it. He possesses it, it does not possess him (Hannerz 1996: 103-4).

**NEGATIVE**

*Harm Answers*

--Morality

Real Security Interests Trump Morality

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 423

The more sophisticated objections come in two forms. One is that the world is still a dangerous and essentially anarchic place, where “real” security and economic interests must trump the moral concern to see the triumph of democracy and human rights. It would be nice if Saudi Arabia and China were democracies, but securing trade and financial relationships with these countries is more important. Similarly, the US needs Russian cooperation on strategic arms reduction, and in containing nuclear arms proliferation, Islamic terrorism, and the spread of Iranian influence, more than it needs Russia to be a democracy. By the same token, moderate and friendly Arab autocracies, the argument goes, have kept at least a cold peace with Israel and a broader stability in the Middle East region, which accounts for nearly half of world oil reserves and supplies more than a third of the world’s oil exports. Moreover, they have been reliable sources of cooperation in the war on terror, even if the US has had to look the other way while they torture suspects handed over to them. Indeed, since September 11, 2001, there has been a tendency to work with any regime, no matter how repressive, so long as it presents itself as an ally in the battle against terrorism, just as the US allied during the Cold War with any dictatorship that was willing to cooperate in the struggle to contain Soviet and communist expansion. Common to both approaches has been a simplistic, monolithic view of the threat and a failure to think clearly about the long-term costs of embracing illegitimate regimes.

--Terrorism

Democracy Promotion Does Not Decrease/Increases Terrorism

Lael Brainard, Brookings Institute-International Economics, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 18

But as discussed earlier, the “freedom agenda” is a path fraught with uncertainties because of the inherent tension between the principle of supporting open, democratic societies and the practical need to work with existing regimes on urgent problems. This tension between short-term stability and longer-term reform in the U.S. security agenda cannot easily be resolved, as pointed out by Francis Fukuyama: “We need in the first instance to understand that promoting democracy and modernization in the Middle East is not a solution to the problem of Jihadist terrorism; in all likelihood it will make the short-term problem worse, as we have seen in the case of the Palestinian election bringing Hamas to power.”
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TRANSLATES INTO CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Lael Brainard, Brookings Institute-International Economics, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 20-1

--Corruption/Good Governance

Good Governance Advantage Answers: Frontline

EXTERNAL PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE UNDERMINES GOVERNANCE CAPACITY

Martin Doornbos, Institute of Social Studies-The Hague, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 386-7

For all the heightened concern with the promotion of “good governance” in Third World countries, it is quite conceivable that one effect of the various external initiatives and involvements in this regard is, paradoxically, to reduce rather than strengthen Third World governments’ capacity for policy-making and implementation. At the micro-level the externally-induced creation of autonomous institutions for improved management may undermine local government capacity. Diversion of aid flows via NGOs may similarly weaken the government departments charged with responsibility for the areas concerned. Demands for compliance with contradictory instructions from different donors may result in confusion and distortions in addition to overburdening qualified manpower which is in short supply. Above all, it is in the essence of conditionalities that the setting and assessment of standard of proper policy-management is shifted to various donor headquarters across the globe. Moreover, donor coordination increasingly sets the limits and targets for national policy-making, leaving the governments concerned with limited space for autonomous action. The price of enhancing external accountability may thus be the progressive erosion of policy-making capacity. Notwithstanding the powerful thrust of these new strategies, however, Yusuf Bangura aptly observes that:

“Neo-liberalism has no theory of the state or of state formation and offers limited clues by way of policy on how to respond to the problems of de-institutionalization and the erosion of local level expertise. State systems have tended to further diminish in quality and reach in most countries where free market reforms have been attempted. Economic reforms cannot be effective in situations where the state is incapable of carrying out its primary roles of regulation, mediation and social protection.”

From a broader epistemological perspective too the formulation of criteria of “good governance” as “conditionality” raises questions and issues of wider political implication. The strategy rests on the assumption that it is possible in principle to search for universally valid criteria of proper management and policy-making: “good governance is good governance,” no matter where or by whom (or for whom). This presumption, however, touches upon increasingly controversial issues within organization theory, social philosophy, cultural history and other disciplines. Here, there is growing recognition that Western rationality-based premises of the phenomenon of modern bureaucracy, and even the Western model of liberal democracy, represent discontinuity with other cultural traditions. Thus the question that asserts itself is whether it is possible to conceive of general standards of “good governance” that would be acceptable to both external and internal political actors. This must be addressed, irrespective of the further question as to whether or to what extent the imposed nature of the instruments concerned is acceptable to recipient countries.
PROBLEMATIC TO EQUATE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE WITH DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS – MULTIPLE REASONS

Stephen Browne, UN Aid Program Director, 2006, Aid & Influence: do donors help or hinder? p. 38-9

Undemocratic regimes and dictatorships may hinder development progress, or they may not. There are also democracies that have been inclusive and transparent (like Bolivia), but have failed to prevent continuing impoverishment. Others have been more successful. A democratic governance paradigm is misleading for several reasons. For one thing, democracy is difficult to define. It has been simplistically equated with the holding of national elections. Between 1974 and 1999, multiparty elections were introduced for the first time in 113 countries. But although the practice has become much more widespread, elections do not, of themselves, assure legitimation of a regime or prevent the emergence of dictatorships. The claim is always made that bad leaders can be voted out of office. But history shows that bad leaders can also be voted in, and that they can manipulate electoral systems to ensure their re-election. Another problem is that different facets of democratic governance are poorly correlated. There can be effective government – in the administrative sense – without the legitimation of democracy. This case can be made for many socialist countries. Also, there are no simple paths of evolution toward democratic governance. Countries move into and out of democracy and authoritarianism.

Because agendas cannot be formulaic and one sized, and there are no simple normative checklists to describe the situation in any one country, the problem confronting donors is how to “score” governance: what relative weights are to be given to different aspects of democratic governance, such as government effectiveness, inclusiveness, human rights and transparency? In reality, practice prevails over principle, and it is the political and commercial expediencies of donors that determine their weightings.

There are at least two other problems. While aid has purportedly flowed increasingly to support more democracy and better governance, there is little evidence to show that it has had a positive influence. Fundamental and sustainable changes in institutions and policies are rather impervious to outside influence. Results have tended to undermine the whole rationale for large-scale, policy-based lending by the multilateral banks. Aid may, in fact, even have a perverse effect. This debate over efficacy of aid conditionality merits its own chapter, coming next.

The second difficulty has been civil conflict. Although there has been a significant fall in the number of civil wars during the 1990s in every region except Africa, there are still one billion people living today in low-income countries “that have been unable to adopt and sustain policies and institutions conducive to development” (Collier et al, 2003). These countries pose a special challenge for donors. How can good governance be built on the back of no governance? These “failing states” are the subject of Chapter 5.
LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE COMPLICATED

Ayan M. Alsayed, Counselor in International Education and Development, 2008, Advancing Democracy Through Education: US influence abroad and domestic practices, eds. E. Stevic & B. Levinson, p. 78-9

Donors often describe the civic education programs they fund as intended to address issues of governance by promoting democracy. However; this understanding of how democracy, civic education and governance are linked is simplistic. Not all democracies demonstrate good governance, and not all countries with good governance are democratic. For example, Indonesia has some elements of democracy, but suffers from bad governance, which is reflected in very high levels of corruption. In Singapore, by contrast, the government restricts freedom of speech and association, but is greatly respected for its otherwise good governance and low levels of corruption. Clearly the relationship between governance and democracy is more complicated that is often presented. Donors interested in civic education programming need to be aware of the nature of the relationship between governance and democracy in the countries they are supporting, and develop programs that support strengths in each area.

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