“PROJECT AID” BAD FOR MANY REASONS – MOST DOMINANT FORM OF ASSISTANCE
Jo Beall, Director Development Studies Institute-London School of Economics, 2005, Funding Local Governance: small grants for democracy and development, p. 84
Other problems were associated with the project approach itself. First, for countries with big aid programs and a large number of donors, the transaction costs of managing and accounting for multiple projects were high. In interviews conducted with government officials, many reported that over 50 percent of their time, if not more, was spent servicing the reporting needs of donors. Second, the returns were often unsatisfactory, particularly if donor governments tied procurement to their own national contractors and suppliers. A third problem was a lack of predictability in funding, related to the limited project cycle and uncertainty over whether further phases would be supported. Fourth, projects tended to have their own project management structures, which often duplicated or undermined government systems, compromising their effectiveness. This was particularly the case if project accounting eclipsed the usual structures of democratic accountability in a country. The World Bank (1998) in its Aid Effectiveness report put the issue as follows:
“Aid agencies have a long history of trying to ‘cocoon’ their projects using freestanding technical assistance, independent project implementation units, and foreign experts – rather than trying to improve the institutional environment for service provision…They have neither improved services in the short run nor led to institutional changes in the long run.”
Moreover, projects did not prove to be effective financial management instruments. Corruption was as rife within them as without and economists were concerned about fungibility. As Mosely et al. have explained, “if aid finances a project the recipient government would have undertaken anyway, then the aid money is actually financing some other, unidentified project which the aid agency does not know about and might not like.” Taken together, these arguments provided a devastating critique of projects that went beyond a call for better project design. Still, although less fashionable, projects remain an important means of delivering and administering development assistance today—though they are less often undertaken directly by donors or their consultants.
PROJECT AID SUCCESS DOES NOT CORRELATE TO OVERALL COUNTRY SUCCESS
Stephen Browne, UN Aid Program Director, 2006, Aid & Influence: do donors help or hinder? p. 44
Aid effectiveness has traditionally been based on evaluations of project performance. Agency evaluations of projects have tended to be upbeat. The proportion of “effective” projects – measured in terms of their own intrinsic objectives – is overwhelmingly the majority, and the proportion has been rising over time, giving the complacent impression of development success. But many of these successful projects have been in countries that have been least successful in terms of overall development performance, typically measured in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. The inconsistency between project results and development performance has been described as the “micro-macro paradox” (Mosely, 1987; Kanbur, 2003). Partly, the contrast is due to a failure to scale up and replicate projects. Partly, it is because project design has paid too little attention to sustainable capacity development. But mainly, macro success or failure is the result of the policy environment rather than the summation of micro development initiatives. The problem is that, where policy-based aid has been applied, the policy environment in recipient countries, and wider reform processes in general, have proved to be relatively impervious to outside influence.
Democracy Assistance Paternalistic – “Partnership” Claims Irrelevant
CONNECTING AID MISSIONS WITH DEMOCRACY GOALS MASKS UNEQUAL NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS
Maria Eriksson Baaz, Goteborg University-Department of Peace and Development-Researcher, 2005, The Paternalism of Partnership: a postcolonial reading of identity in development aid, p. 116-7
One area of competence attributed to the development worker Self concerns democracy, equality and “concern for the weak in society.” This special competence follows from an image of the Self as democratic, unconcerned with status and power positions, and with a genuine care about the weak and poor in society. This self-image, which in the context studied here is constructed in opposition to an image of Tanzanian society as undemocratic, elitist, lacking in concern for “the weak” in society, reflects longstanding and generally shared meanings attached to an enlightened Western Self. Representatives of a democratic, humanist European Self constituted an integral part of the colonial project. It defined the white man’s burden – to spread the light of democracy and equality, to liberate the Other from the reign of terror and despotism, and to install a spirit of liberty and equality. As we saw in Chapter 2, this self-image reveals the basic contradiction inherent in the colonial project – the ways in which the colonizer claimed proprietorship of a universal humanism that was not accessible to all. While colonization was legitimized in the name of liberty and equality, the colonial project and its practices displayed the limits of this self-image.
As Doty puts it, this image of a “democratic, freedom-loving, and humanitarian Western Self” has continued to inform postcolonial South-North relations (Doty 1996: 125). Interventions of various sorts have been legitimized through references to this image of the Self as guardian of democracy and development aid, and credits are increasingly provided or denied by reference to sufficient or insufficient levels of democracy.
DEPSITE THE EMPHASIS ON “PARTNERSHIP” IN DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE/CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAMS THEY ARE INHERENTLY UNEQUAL AND PATERNALISTIC
Doyle Stevick, Education Professor-University of South Carolina, 2008, Advancing Democracy Through Education: US influence abroad and domestic practices, eds. E. Stevic & B. Levinson, p. 108-9
The individuals who work for donor and recipient organizations have drastically different levels of resources, educational attainment, expertise, local knowledge, experience under oppressive and free governments, language ability and economic security, “Rhetoric of collaboration and partnership notwithstanding” (Samoff, 1999, p. 60), many partnerships “employed the language of collaboration and joint effort as they created an institutional apparatus for the leading role of international organizations” (p. 62). Control of the purse-strings and the ability to dictate the agenda went hand in hand with the transmission orientation discussed earlier. The mission-statement of IFES is representative of this paradoxical dynamic between democratic rhetoric and unequal relationships:
“Our staff is truly global, with 150 professionals from 25 countries leading technical assistance projects for international and bilateral donor organizations such as USAID, the UN, DFID, the OSCE and others … IFES’ international professionals ensure that democracy solutions are homegrown. Every IFES project team partners with local organizations, and every project is staffed by local personnel … IFES professionals work closely with local networks to deliver expertise that fits the needs of the country or client…IFES professionals provide technical assistance across many areas of democracy development. We have developed service lines and regional representation around the world that allow our professionals to deliver democracy solutions rapidly –with the innovation, experience, and results that only an organization with almost 20 years of dedicated democracy work can do.”
IFES’s statement of philosophy clearly articulates the value of local knowledge and involvement in democratization, and yet, despite the emphasis upon “home grown solutions” (which are “ensured” by their professional) the language all implies transmission: solutions are “delivered” by professionals who “provide technical assistance.” That all projects are staffed by local personnel hints at the power imbalance involved. The American leader of another partnership was more blunt about the balance of power in his relationship: when one of his Baltic partners followed the money and engaged in project work with Americans who had managed to procure this partner’s usual source of funding, he noted that, “I didn’t punish him for cooperating with our competitors.”
These imbalances result in unequal relationships and complicate the possibility of the participants engaging in free and open discussion. These problems are particularly acute among partners who are largely dependent on foreign funding for their own economic security, an issue that is explored in the next section. Domestic partners may be less than forthcoming about their own views and problem if they want to cultivate their donors’ good will by agreeing with their positions or by making them feel important or needed. Wedel called this tendency the:
“ritual of listening to foreigners, in which the naïve but self-assured Westerner would encounter the shrewd Pole, who deftly charmed his guest while revealing nothing of what he truly thought…Many Poles had mastered the sophisticated art of impressing Westerners while maneuvering to get what they wanted. “(Wedel, 201, p. 3)
SHIFT TOWARDS “PARTNERSHIP” IN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS HAS NOT CHALLENGED UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIIPS
Maria Eriksson Baaz, Goteborg University-Department of Peace and Development-Researcher, 2005, The Paternalism of Partnership: a postcolonial reading of identity in development aid, p. 6-7
As several writers have shown and as is evident from the continual return and topicality of the debate, the creation of a non-paternalist, equal relationship has proven difficult in practice. Those few studies that have addressed the questions of partnership more specifically conclude that it is often poorly reflected in the practice of development aid. As Emma Crew and Elisabeth Harrison (1998:188) contend, “a yawning chasm remains between the stated goals of development and its practices and outcomes. Ambitious aims of partnership…often appear disappointingly empty.”
While few studies have analyzed and theorized “the problem of partnership” directly, one quite common position seems to be that concepts such as participation and partnership function as political slogans to hide other motives. This perspective often features implicit and explicit assumptions about intentions. Partnership is presented as “empty rhetoric,” as “a tactic” that functions to mask other goals, such as lowering the costs of development aid or the restoration of accountability in order to legitimate continued presence in the face of increasing criticism. According to this perspective, partnership fails to materialize in practice simply because “the developers” never had the intention of creating a “more equal relationship” in which “local actors progressively take the lead.”
PARTNERSHIP DISCOURSE SERVES INSTRUMENTAL PURPOSE – NOT REALLY ABOUT ADDRESSING UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP
Maria Eriksson Baaz, Goteborg University-Department of Peace and Development-Researcher, 2005, The Paternalism of Partnership: a postcolonial reading of identity in development aid, p. 7
This book is critical of such a conclusion. The partnership discourse should not, of course, be idealized as reflecting an unambiguous intention or wish to re-create power relations. While it has a normative, moral dimension, it also serves an instrumental purpose. As Crewe and Harrison put it, “many recommendations about partnership, by both practitioners and academics have more to do with management of projects than with challenging power relations” (1998: 75). According to Brinkerhoff (2002:7) “The most obvious motivation for establishing a partnership is the desire to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of development efforts.” That the partnership discourse is related to efforts to increase sustainability is evident. Except for more general formulations – disavowing paternalism and emphasizing equality – the concepts ownership and responsibility are often featured in partnership policies. Responsibility and ownership are here connected to the partner. As stated in the DAC policy quoted earlier, partnership means that partners should “assume greater responsibility for their own development.” The emphasis on ownership and responsibility must be seen in relation to a perceived need to enhance sustainability. The supposed lack of sustainability is today often attributed to partners; organizational and institutional capacity and aid-dependence. One solution proposed is to “improve partnerships” – “the partners of aid agencies are expected to achieve self-reliance through capacity building” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 70). The other concepts that often feature in partnership policies – openness, transparency and mutual goals -- must also be seen as reflecting this perceived need to enhance sustainability by “improving partnerships.” It is often emphasized that partnership means that the partners share and work towards the same goal and that the relationship must be transparent and open.
Hence discourses on partnership and sustainability overlap in a way that makes it difficult to separate them. However, even though the partnership discourse is related to, and influenced by, other discourses such as sustainability or aid dependence, this does not mean that partnership should be seen as empty rhetoric, as a conscious tactic, which reflects nothing more than a move to restore legitimacy by enhancing sustainability. This would be too simple.
Share with your friends: |