Total Manpower Strength 46,000

Summary

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  Primarily a coastal defense force; ill-equipped (mostly outdated Russian equipment) and ill-supplied
  
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  Limited capability in terms of total coastal defense outside of 12 miles off the coast and for special operations insertions into S. Korean territory – cannot defend coast/territorial waters out to 200 m out to see
  
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  Past decade it has a constant combat ship strength of cca. 840 vessels – with economic problems degrade training/operations capabilities as well as maintenance due to lack of purchasing power for parts, with 20-30 percent of surface fleet in engine/hull repair or in dry docks or graving docks, with an additional 10-15 percent of the surface fleet is stored on land; in the open and tunnels, meaning that major repairs would need to be completed to make them operational
  

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  Submarine forces in better condition/state of readiness, however numbers are declining due to aforementioned problems
  

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  Navy responsible for sinking S.Korean ship last March – submarine torpedo action
  

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  Hindering factors for the Korean People’s Navy (KPN)
  

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  Limited training
  
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  Obsolescing equipment
  
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  Poor material materiel condition of combat ships
  
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  Unsophisticated Electronic Warfare equipment
  
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  Shortage of modern equipment
  
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  Inefficient/inadequate logistics system
  
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  Too much bureaucracy
  
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  Poor command and control
  
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  Moderate morale
  

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  Were the KPN to engage in a conflict, it would be able to conduct limited short-term and defensive operations, namely
  
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    Deploy attack surface and submarine attack forces to the Yellow and East Seas to disrupt commercial shipping to ROK and Japan/serve as an obstacle to an attacker
    
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    Interdict into Japan’s eastern ports with midget and coastal submarines
    
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    Conduct special operations landings
    
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    Conduct two-batallion-brigade and multiple company-battalion sized amphibious lift ops to ROK
    
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    Patrol sized crafts can’t operate outside of 50 miles off the coast
    

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  In a conflict with ROK and US, the vast majority of KPN surface ships however submarines would be able to continue to fight longer