US companies inevitably produce dual use tech with China regardless of relations which makes their impacts inevitable- PWC proves
UNZ News 16 [UNZ&CO, Provides Training for International Trade Experts, “Enforcement of U.S. Government Export Control Regulations”, 6-20-2016, https://www.unzco.com/export-enforcement/]-DD
On June 28, 2012, Pratt Whitney Canada (PWC) pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act and making false statements in connection with its illegal export to China of U.S.-origin military software used in the development of China’s new Z-10 military attack helicopter. PWC, its U.S. parent company United Technologies Corporation (UTC), and UTC’s U.S. subsidiary Hamilton Sundstrand (HSC) agreed to pay $75 million as part of a global settlement with the departments of Justice ($20.7 million) and State ($55 million) in relation to the violations. $20 million of the penalty can be suspended if UTC applies it to enhance its compliance program. The high-dollar penalty and the debarment are a direct result of various aggravating factors. First, PWC appeared to apply its own favorable interpretation that its exports were for commercial or dual-use engines that were used in the Z-10 so they were not subject to the ITAR. PWC also provided electronic engine control software, made by HSC in the U.S. and modified for the military helicopter. The government said PWC took such actions so it could make money, as opposed to it being an honest misinterpretation of the ITAR. Also, PWC allegedly lied to the U.S. government many times in its 2006 disclosure to the U.S. government regarding the violations. While the financial penalties certainly are a big deal for UTC, HSC and PWC, for the rest of you reading this article, the key issue is how does the debarment of PWC impact your ability to do business with PWC involving “defense articles” controlled by the ITAR? These examples are just a few of the relatively serious cases that have occurred recently. As you can see from these cases, the violations were not immediately identified but were ultimately found and enforcement actions were taken. Cases involving the illegal export of night vision devices and related technology and the export of aircraft navigation systems designed for military end use with a stated end use for civilian aircraft are also well-known examples. In all of the cases internal compliance controls were either nonexistent, inadequate, or simply not followed. The end results were severe penalties as a result of enforcement action by federal law enforcement agencies acting both individually and jointly.
A2 AI
It takes way too long to even develop AI with the intelligence of a lizard- no existential threat, the most dangerous AI we have come up with for a long time to come just has the capability to clean dirt off of floors which means no risk of a threat