Aristotle believed he had an answer to the difficulties presented by ambiguity. ‘Since we cannot introduce the realities themselves into our discussions,’ he stated, ‘but have to use words as symbols for them, we suppose that what follows in the words will follow in the realities too.’ The problem is that ‘whereas words and the quantity of sentences are limited, realities are unlimited in number’ (quoted in Robinson, 1941, p.144). This, then, is the first part of the continuum: an individual gives a name to a nebulous collection of thoughts and ideas. Examples include noticing a similarity between two objects or ideas, or having a similar feeling when in the presence of two otherwise completely different people. Often the connection between the two or more ideas or concepts can be difficult to explain to other people. This left-hand side of the continuum is most closely related to vagueness; I will name this part ‘Generative ambiguity’.
As we began to see in Chapter 2 through the work of Tornero (2004) and Buckingham (2006), there are three main problems with ambiguous terms. The first is subtle: the symbol can be mistaken for the thing signified. In any field relating to technology the particular technology can become more important than what it affords. Second, the proliferation of terms confuses the landscape, with terms being either all-embracing or narrow in focus. Third, borrowing existing words and established terms (for example ‘literacy’) as part of the definition can hinder debate. As the number and applications of terms multiply, its descriptive (and therefore useful) power diminishes.
This ambiguity regarding the application and meaning of terms often takes the form of a ‘zeugma’. Zeugmas are figures of speech that join two or more parts of a sentence into a single noun, such as ‘digital literacy’. It is unclear here whether the emphasis is upon the ‘digital’ (and therefore an example of a prozeugma) or upon the ‘literacy’ (and therefore a hypozeugma). Which is the adjective?
Within the part of the continuum of ambiguity we have identified as ‘Generative ambiguity’, no aspect of the ambiguous term is fixed. This leads to definitions of terms that are so ambiguous as to be almost vague in the way discussed in the introduction. Some definitions, for example, assume that the ‘digital’ takes precedent (often leading to functionalist, procedural definitions) whilst others assume that it is the ‘literacy’ part that is important (usually leading to more of a ‘critical literacies’ approach where the digital element is played-down).
Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930;2004) documented the various ways in which language (within a literary setting) could be ambiguous. This ranged from the least ambiguous (metaphor: two things are said to be alike) through to the most ambiguous (two words, in context, mean opposite things). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865) is ambiguous at the level of Empson’s sixth and seventh types of ambiguity. Take, for instance, the Queen in the story who admonishes Alice for a lack of imagination, stating that at Alice’s age she would often believe six impossible things before breakfast. Readers are often left in a situation where either a statement sounds nonsensical so they have to invent the meaning (the sixth type of ambiguity), or two words within the same context mean opposite things (the seventh type of ambiguity).31 These two ambiguities, along with the fifth type of ambiguity (the author discovers their idea in the act of writing) form the part of the continuum of ambiguity I have identified as ‘Generative ambiguity’ (see Appendix 1)
One of the many definitions given by Gilster in Digital Literacy is, ‘the ability to understand and use information in multiple formats from a wide range of sources when it is presented via computers’ (Gilster, 1997, p.215). This can be seen as a form of the sixth type of ambiguity as, in defining the ambiguous term, Gilster introduces yet more ambiguity. What counts as a ‘format’, a ‘source’, or even a ‘computer’? Gilster evidently has in mind something that makes the term ‘digital literacy’ make coherent sense in his particular context. Those outside his context, however, may struggle to make this definition readily applicable.
Generative ambiguity is using old words in new ways. Robinson, who built upon Empson’s work, explains succinctly this paradox:
‘Here then is the difficulty; we hope to get a perfectly new idea from time to time; but we can only use the old words with which to get it, or a new one that has to be defined in terms of the old; and the old words only mean the old things. So we are apparently condemned always only to rearrange the old notions.’
(Robinson, 1941, p.149)
How, then, can we ever express originality? Are we destined for an eternity of ‘deckchair-rearrangement’? Robinson explains that originality is, in fact, possible by hinting at new ideas through the use of old words in new ways. This works through the principle of relational univocity, a ‘reaction of the context with the old sense’ (p.149) which destabilises the old meaning of a word through its use in a new context (or being yoked with another in a novel way). Robinson cites Aristotle’s explanation of ‘healthy’ as an example of relational univocity: ‘healthy’ can be applied to things as diverse as ‘healthy’ exercise (causation), a ‘healthy’ complexion (indication), and ‘healthy’ roses (possession) (p.143). ‘[E]ach particular case has to be learned from the context,’ states Robinson, with relational univocity being ‘a bond that holds together the various meanings of an ambiguous word’ (p.143). Indeed, it is through such bonds that terms move from the Generative to the Creative form of ambiguity; aspects of the hinted idea coalescing in ways that can be transmitted such they leave a similar impression upon others.
An example of relational univocity is given by ETS (the US Educational Testing Service)when they define ‘digital literacy’ as:
‘[T]he ability to use digital technology, communication tools and/or networks appropriately to solve information problems in order to function in an information society.' (ets.org). It comprises 'the ability to use technology as a tool to research, organize, evaluate, and communicate information, and the possession of a fundamental understanding of the ethical/legal issues surrounding the access and use of information.’
(Lankshear & Knobel, 2006, p.23)
This definition uses ‘technology‘ as a shorthand for simultaneously a tool, a technique and an attitude, and is clearly an attempt at using relational univocity to convey an otherwise hard-to-grasp and rather nebulous concept.
Abbott, acutely aware that Empson’s seven types of ambiguity pertained to literary creations, attempted to provide a positivist framework for ambiguity in the social sciences. He noted that ‘even though positivist social science has been shown to be in principle impossible, the vast majority of social-science effort (and funding) is in fact spent doing it.’ (Abbott, 1997, p.358). He therefore considers ambiguity in a formal manner, coming up with seven types of ambiguity that can be mapped directly onto Empson’s earlier structure. These later conceptualisations of ambiguity are useful in that they not only give names to the seven types of ambiguity but provide real-world (as opposed to literary) examples of ambiguity in practice.
Figure 6 - Trajectory of ambiguities
At the level of the fifth, sixth and seventh type of ambiguity, Abbott indicates that individuals have to do some real work to make sense of the idea being grasped at. The most ambiguous form, that which Abbott names Interactional ambiguity, occurs when ‘the meaning of an indicator is ambiguously defined by the interactional context of its production’ (Abbott, 1997, p.365). The example given by Abbott is when the author of a survey has in mind a particular audience when framing a question but, when it comes to be answered, the interviewee is unsure as to which audience that is. This maps directly onto Empson’s seventh type (two words in the same context mean opposite things); the word ‘wicked’, for instance, in youth culture means exactly the opposite (cool, fun) to more standard definitions (wrong, evil).
Abbott’s sixth form of ambiguity, which he names Contextual ambiguity is produced, he states, ‘out of the manifold indeterminacy of the variable correlation matrix’ (Abbott, 1997, p.364). In other words, variables in one context (e.g. ‘digital’ and ‘literacy’) may be linked with certain other variables (e.g. ‘curricula’), whereas in another context they would be linked with different variables (e.g. ‘economic competitiveness’). This is particularly problematic with the concept of ‘digital literacy’ given the indeterminate nature of what both ‘digital’ and ‘literacy’ mean in any given context. Again, this maps onto Empson’s scale, with his sixth formulation being a statement which ‘says nothing’ so readers have to invent their own meaning. Using the example of ‘digital literacy’, readers think they know what is meant by the term, but because of its highly contextualised nature (and the difficultly in expressing this context in totality) it cannot be conveyed in a meaningful way.
The fifth type of ambiguity defined by Abbott is Narrative ambiguity, occurring because of the ways in which the fluctuations of everyday life can shape one’s response to a given stimulus. Abbott gives the example of interviews which come ‘at a particular moment in a life narrative, a moment that shapes responses decisively’ (Abbott, 1997, p.363). Empson’s fifth type of ambiguity involves an author discovering their idea in the act of writing which, if extrapolated and generalised, is what Abbott is also concerned with: ambiguity resulting from natural fluctuations in human narratives. An example of this is Erstad’s attempted definition of digital literacy which, instead of clarifying the issue, seems to become more ambiguous as each word is added:
‘One of the key challenges in [developments of everyday practices] is the issue of digital literacy. This relates to the extent to which citizens have the necessary competence to take advantage of the possibilities given by new technologies in different settings.’
(Erstad 2008, p.177)
The tension between the connotative and denotative elements of the definition exists due to the associated tension between making oneself clear and making the definition as widely applicable as possible.
These, then, are the three types of ambiguity within the Generative phase of ambiguity. They are ‘generative’ in the sense that they involve the coalescing of ideas, the coming together of various elements out of which emerges something new. The ambiguity is fragile and tenuous, held in tension between various ideas and elements and, because of this, difficult to communicate. Ideas in the Generative ambiguity phase require a great deal of effort in order to move them into the phase of Creative ambiguity, where they can be understood and worked upon by a larger number of people.
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