Working Paper high, hot and heavy: the ch-47 chinook in combat assault operations in afghanistan
Chinook Air Assaults Continue in 2011
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- HIGH, HOT and HEAVY: THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 6 CONCLUSION
- HIGH, HOT and HEAVY: THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Bibliography Interviews
Chinook Air Assaults Continue in 2011 In addition to providing support to 2d BCT, 101st CAB Chinook pilots and crews also flew air assaults in October 2010 with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3d BCT, 101st Airborne Division into the villages of Mushan, Zangabad, and Taluqan in the Horn of Panjway’i, 30 miles southwest of Kandahar City.217 Chinooks also conducted deliberate and hasty air assault missions in support of Special Operations Forces in RC-South. During one 30 day period, seven Chinooks were allocated every night for Special Operations missions. The new F model Chinooks, with moving map displays, digital advanced flight control system hover modes, common avionics architecture systems, and hovering symbology to see through dust, were nearly comparable, performance-wise, to the MH-47G models flown by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). “In the end, we were providing multiple aircraft and aircrews for multiple missions every night,” Captain Christopher Getter, B Company, 6-101 CAB, commander, later wrote. 218 Captain Getter also estimated that the 21-aircraft Chinook team at Kandahar conducted at least 250 air assaults during its deployment in RC-South. Colonel William Gayler, commander of the 101st CAB, calculated that overall the brigade flew a combined total of 363 air assaults while deployed in Afghanistan. In a 2012 interview, Gayler described how his pilots often flew what he called 3D maneuvering flight patterns, constantly changing heading, altitude, and air speed, thereby causing Taliban gunners to continually adjust for height estimates, lead angles, and range rates. “One of my tenets was never pattern set,” Colonel Gayler said, “Never do it the same way every time.”219 In February 2011, the 159th CAB replaced the 101st CAB in RC-South. Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment deployed with new ‘F’ model Chinooks, while two attached companies – B Company, 1st Battalion, 171st Aviation Regiment (HIARNG) and B Company, 1st Battalion, 52d Aviation Regiment from Alaska – were equipped with older ‘D’ models.220 The majority of the aircraft were at Kandahar, with a platoon each at FOBs Tarin Kowt and Wolverine. Chinook pilots and crews flew air assault missions in support of all the ground units in the region, including US conventional and Special Operations forces, Afghan counterparts, and Romanian and Latvian troops.221 The general trend for CH-47 air assaults in RC-South continued, often with two conventional and two Special Operations insertions per night. “Typically two [conventional] companies would air assault into an objective area, stay for a couple of days, and then extract out,” said 7th Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Darren Gerblick. “Special Operations night assaults, on the other hand, were targeted raids…in and out in a couple of hours.”222 Bravo Company, 1-52 was advised prior to deployment to expect a preponderance of general support missions – battlefield circulation in support of multiple units in the AOR. Instead, the company was divided upon arriving in Afghanistan, with half the aircraft remaining at Kandahar and the other half split between Wolverine and Tarin Kowt. Due to the priorities in the AOR, “we were immediately assigned direct support missions at all three locations,” Captain Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after redeploying to Alaska.223 The most common air assaults were night cordon and search operations, involving two Chinooks and approximately 70 Soldiers/passengers, and requiring extraction within two to five days. Speed and surprise were critical factors for success. Finally, normal air assault planning cycles were often cut short, since B/1-52 routinely supported ground units located at different FOBs/COBs and mission briefings were conducted via teleconference or secure email.224 Throughout the course of 159th CAB’s deployment, ground and air unit commanders most often chose to insert as many troops as possible with a single lift – one turn with four aircraft, for example, versus two turns with two aircraft. Generally, Chinooks, particularly ‘F’ models because of their enhanced ability to land safely in dusty environments, were the platform of choice for the 700 hundred air assault missions conducted by the 159th CAB during its tour in Afghanistan.225 Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (KS USAR) returned to OEF Afghanistan in April 2011. The company had 19 organic Chinooks, was augmented with six additional CH-47s and crews from B Company, 2d Battalion, 135th General Support Aviation Brigade, Nebraska and Colorado ARNG, and reported initially to the 10th CAB and later the 82d CAB. Three separate company detachments were established in RC-East with the aircraft and crews parceled out to Bagram Air field and FOBs Salerno and Shank. The headquarters detachment at Salerno supported 3d BCT, 1st ID and then 4th BCT, 25th ID operations, while the BAF contingent conducted ISAF-level general support missions. The crews at Shank supported 1st BCT, 10th Mountain and Soldiers from the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division who were under the tactical control of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan for village stability operations.226 Both detachments at Salerno and Shank also flew numerous deliberate and hasty air assault missions in support of Special Operations Task Force 310 in search of Taliban and Haqqani network leaders. The Operational Tempo for B/7-158 AVN jumped dramatically compared to the company’s previous deployment. “In 2005-6, we flew the ring route and conducted approximately 30 air assaults in RC-South,” said Captain Christopher Ruff, B Company commander. “This time in RC-East, we were an air assault platform…flew 12,300 hours and completed 478 deliberate and hasty combat assaults.”227 At FOB Salerno, at least two Chinooks were allocated for general support and deliberated air assaults for the BCT. During the last few months of B Company’s deployment, Chinooks flew air assaults with 4th BCT, 25th ID Soldiers nearly every night. In September 2011, during Operation NIKE 4, four Chinooks, each making three round trips, inserted Soldiers into objectives on the north and south sides of the Mangal Valley and onto the mountain-top OP Buttercup in the Lazha Mangal district, Paktia Province. Two additional Salerno CH-47s were allotted to Special Operations Task Force 310 for nightly hasty air assaults missions. The B Company crews often worked alongside Chinook pilots and crew members from Task Force Brown, 160th SAOR. “We would do a ‘one over the world briefing’ and just go,” Captain Ruff explained.228 On one such B Company Chinook raid into the Khost-Gardez Pass region, TF 310 captured Haji Mali Khan, a high-ranking member of the Haqqani network.229 On 6 August 2011, a Chinook from B Company, 7-158 AVN was shot down by a Taliban RPG in the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province. All 38 persons on board – 17 US Navy SEALs, five Naval Special Operations support staff, three US Air Force Special Tactics Airmen, seven Afghan soldiers, plus the five Chinook crew members – were all killed.230 Late in the evening of the previous day, 5 August, two Chinooks had air assaulted from FOB Shank with US Army Rangers and their Afghan partners into a different Tangi location in search of a suspected Taliban leader. Overhead ISR aircraft observed Taliban fighters leaving the objective area as the ranger-led assault force arrived. Shortly thereafter, 10 Taliban, possibly including their leader, were spotted congregating approximately a mile away from the original target site. The special operations task force commander subsequently decided to launch the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), built around a troop of Navy SEALs, to kill or capture the group of Taliban.231 A suitable HLZ was chosen, and the 33 member IRF was loaded onto a single Chinook – callsign Extortion 17 – in order to quickly mass troops on the ground and to mitigate risk to a second aircraft. Two Chinooks, however – one with passengers, one without – launched on the mission at 0222, the morning of 6 August. The empty trail CH-47 broke off short of the HLZ and began orbiting a pre-determined holding point while awaiting the return of the lead aircraft. On final approached to the HLZ, however, one of the aft rotor blades on the lead Chinook – the one carrying the IRF – was struck by a Taliban RPG. The aircraft began spinning uncontrollably, the fore and aft rotor blade assemblies separated, and the fuselage crashed in a ball of flames into a dry creek bed. Two hours later, the original Ranger-led assault force arrived at the crash site. They were soon joined by a 20-member Pathfinder downed aircraft rescue and recovery unit. By 1030, 6 August, the remains of all 38 passengers and crew members had been successfully accounted for. The complete aircraft wreckage was removed by 9 August 2011.232 The next day, ISAF Commander and Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan, US Marine Corps General John Allen reported that the Taliban who fired the deadly RPG shot had been killed in a USAF F-16 airstrike.233 Back in RC-South, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, a combined arms battalion from Fort Riley, KS, conducted 33 air assaults behind Taliban defensive positions in the Band-e/Timor region of Maiwand district, Kandahar Province. “Tankers learned the skills of infantrymen…served in every maneuver company…and conducted the majority of the air assaults,” said Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, 2-34 AR commander.234 Colonel Patrick Frank, commander of the 10th Mountain Division’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, wanted 2-34 AR off the beaten path and out in the Taliban controlled areas along the Arghandab River and in the Sur Reg Desert west of Kandahar City. Since, the battlespace had no road network, the “terrain and the enemy situation drove us to air assaults” as the primary means of maneuvering, Colonel Kidd explained.235 Nearly all 2-34 AR air assaults were search operations executed at night by company-sized elements and their Afghan counterparts, 200-250 Soldiers per assault. Typically, two or three Chinooks would fly the missions, making multiple turns with approximately 30 Soldiers per aircraft per lift. Rather than designating a single landing site, several HLZ were utilized in order to surround a village or a particular tactical objective. After 48-72 hours on the ground, the assault force was extracted, again from multiple PZs. AH-64 Apaches escorted the air assault Chinooks during infiltration and exfiltration, while F-16s or A-10s flew overwatch coverage.236 Major Nicholas Ayers, and Armor officer and battalion S-3, did nearly all of the air assault planning for 2-34 AR. After receiving mission orders from higher headquarters, Ayers prepared ground tactical plans and a preliminary infiltration plans, with proposed air corridors and HLZs. He initiated Air Mission, HLZ ISR, Apache escort, and fixed wing aircraft requests, and then developed pre-assault fire support plans and electronic warfare objectives, if required. Throughout the process, Ayers coordinated with planners and flight crews from the 159th CAB regarding mission specifics, such as rehearsals, the number of passengers per aircraft, number of turns, time requirements, resupply, and exfiltration plans. Occasionally, false insertions were executed during the insertion and/or extraction phases of 2-34 AR air assaults to deceive and confuse the Taliban.237 Army Aviation OPTEMPO remained high in Afghanistan well into 2012. All of the aircraft were being flown at three-to-four times the rate for which they were originally designed to fly. Chinooks were showing the most wear.238 HIGH, HOT and HEAVY: THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Chapter 6 CONCLUSION The CH-47 Chinook is a “prime example of the adaptability of Army Aviation,” explained Major General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer, Aviation, US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville AL.239 Designed originally to carry the MGR-1 Honest John Missile, its launcher, and support vehicles, Chinooks soon became all-purpose, heavy-lift, cargo aircraft, and eventually assumed a significant portion of the combat air assault role during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The evolution of CH-47 tactics, techniques, procedures, roles, and missions is a “credit to the innovation, vision, and imagination of modern day aviators…bread into them is a focus and mindset to support the Soldiers on the ground, enabling the Soldiers to be inserted at the critical time and place on the battlefield,” Major General Crosby, one of the few Army Aviators to have flown all models of the Chinook, continued. “The CH-47 is a critical enabler today and will be for the foreseeable future,” he added.240 Colonel Robert Marion, Program Manager for Cargo Helicopters at AMCOM agreed, noting that he anticipates “the Army will keep the Chinook in its inventory for another generation of aircrew members,” and that he expects “more of the same from the venerable Chinook and the community that loves it so much, affectionately called the Hookers.”241 September 21, 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of the CH-47 Chinook’s first flight in Ridley Township, Pennsylvania. The US Army accepted delivery of the initial CH-47 A model in August 1962, and by 1965, Chinook crews from the 1st Cavalry Division were flying combat missions – typically troop movement, artillery emplacement, and battlefield resupply – in Vietnam. The Army has steadily modernized and improved the Chinook fleet ever since. As of April 2012, approximately 1,175 CH-47s have been built by Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, the latest version being the highly sophisticated F model – either remanufactured from older D models or newly built.242 “We have a great history and a great legacy…we also have a great responsibility…to keep this aircraft flying for the next two generations of aviators.” “When you talk about our system, it’s about relevance and the benefit that we bring…as an enabler for the ground forces,” Colonel Marion told Kari Hawkins in a 2012 Redstone Rocket interview.243 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Commanding General, Army Aviation Center of Excellence agreed, noting in his Army Aviation 2030 Vision statement that “our relationship with the ground force is the best that it has ever been in our history.”244 To meet current and future full-spectrum requirements, the US Army has developed an Aviation Transformation Plan to decisively upgrade aviation capabilities based on doctrine and lessons learned from flying more than 4.2 million combat hours during OEF, OIF, and Operation NEW DAWN. Active and reserve component aviation warfighting units have been reorganized into Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) to enhance modularity and tailorability, while providing more lethal and sustainable support to ground force Brigade Combat Teams.245 Transformation efforts were hastened by the Global War on Terrorism (Overseas Contingency Operations) which effectively reduced the emphasis on large-scale conventional campaigns and focused more on balanced, multi-functional, CABs. The Army also weaned some legacy aircraft from its fleet, thereby reducing logistical and training requirements and concentrating aviation resources on the four primary helicopters remaining – UH-60, AH-64, OH-58, and CH-47. Army Aviation is continuously adding incremental upgrades and improvements to these aircraft, thereby lengthening their respective service lives, enhancing full-spectrum mission capabilities, reducing logistical footprints, and increasing speed, range, payload, reliability, and survivability.246 Currently, there are more than 3,500 helicopters in the Army Aviation inventory, approximately 500 of which are CH-47 Chinooks. The overall Army Acquisition Objective is 533 F model Chinooks by 2020.247 Army modernization upgrades planned specifically for the CH-47 include an improved Cargo On/Off Load System (COOLS) that replaces the F model’s cargo bay floor with a roller system, significantly improves loading and off-loading cargo through the ramp, reduces crew member workloads, and facilitates in-flight reconfiguration to accommodate a variety of mission requirements.248 The Cargo Platform Health Environment (CPHE) modification is an electronic diagnostic and prognostication system that monitors all aircraft vibrations, thus assisting maintenance personnel in predicting/identifying potential component failures. The Advanced Chinook Rotor Blade (ACRB), which will increase the CH-47’s lift capacity by 2,000 lbs, is expected to be operational by 2015. Also, the cockpit armor panels in D and F models are scheduled to be replaced by a Multi-Impact Transparent Armor System (MITAS) which is 30% lighter and affords comparable ballistic protection. Additional modifications include a cargo ramp gunner seat for the crewman operating the ramp-mounted M240H machine gun and an improved engine control unit that increases reliability, maintainability, and troubleshooting capabilities.249 As a result of the early effectiveness of CH-47s in OEF, the Army expanded the role of Chinooks beyond the division asset level and began assigning Chinook companies (12 CH-47s) as organic units of General Support Aviation Battalions within each CAB. As the numbers of FOBs/COBs rose in Afghanistan and as the BCT assigned areas of responsibility grew in size, the Chinook’s superior range capability and high/hot operational proficiency became all the more beneficial in support of both combat air assault and resupply missions.250 Operational demands for Chinook support continued to mount as payload weights – vehicles, mission equipment packages, Soldiers’ combat loads – increased over time. Technologies built into the CH-47F models improved situational awareness and allowed pilots to land more safely at night and in degraded visual environments (dust and brown-out landings), thereby lowering risks for passengers and crews.251 In the February 2012 Army Aviation Vision 2030 statement, Major General Crutchfield warned, however, that “incremental improvements or upgrades to the current DoD rotorcraft fleet, which is nearing the limits for decades-old technology, will not fully meet future joint service operational requirements…we will seek to execute change that is beyond the capabilities of today’s aircraft.”252 Vision 2030 calls for a re-examination of Army Aviation’s roles, missions, and organization in order to redesign, equip, and staff an aviation force that is effective, adaptive, flexible, lethal, and efficient in the face of potentially uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing future operational environments. When confronted with a broad spectrum of possible threats, Army Aviation must be capable of providing ground commanders with sufficient multi-dimensional mobility to outmaneuver any enemy on any battlefield. Vertical lift, like that provided by the CH-47, is unrestrained by troublesome terrain and will remain a critical combat multiplier well into the 2030 timeframe. Current Army Aviation core competencies – reconnaissance/security, attack, air assault/air movement, and aeromedical evacuation – will likewise remain unchanged, as will the requirement to fly faster, further, day or night, in unfavorable visual environments, and in adverse weather conditions. As for the air assault core competency component, future vertical maneuver missions will require sufficient lift capacity to transport complete ground teams to designated objectives and adequate speed/range to rapidly close with enemy forces at extended distances.253 In May 2011, a specially equipped US Army MH-60K helicopter crash-landed at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan during Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR. Abbottabad is situated at the 4,000 ft. level in the foothills the Pir Panjal Mountain range. Air temperature there on the night of the accident was above normal for that time of year. The Black Hawk experienced an aerodynamic condition known as “settling with power,” the ship’s tail rotor struck the 10-foot high compound wall, and the aircraft crashed into the courtyard. No one on board was seriously injured, however the helicopter could not be flown and was subsequently destroyed in-place by a demolition team following completion of the mission. The downed MH-60K carried a crew of three plus 13 passengers, and was retrofitted with heat signature reduction components, a radar-evading paint scheme, and a noise-reducing tail rotor assembly system. The added stealth technology modifications made the aircraft heavier than a standard MH-60.254 Settling with power typically occurs on landing approaches involving slow forward airspeeds, flight path angles greater than 30 degrees, and with vertical or near-vertical rates of descent higher than 300 feet per minute. Despite applying full power, the excessive sink rate cannot be reversed, rotor efficiency is lost, and the helicopter settles into its own downwash as engine power is insufficient to stop the descent. The high, hot, and heavy flight conditions encountered at Abbottabad were precisely those that had prompted Army commanders to favor CH-47 Chinooks for air assault operations which involve elevated HLZs, high temperature days, and excessive payload weights. Following the successful mission in Abbottabad, the crew and passengers from the downed helicopter were extracted by Chinooks. Since a significant proportion of Afghan terrain is above 6,000 ft. mean sea level, thousands of OEF combat assault missions were conducted in high, hot, and heavy conditions, in which Chinooks outperform all other Army Aviation assets. By utilizing CH-47s, ground force commanders can bring along more of their critical assets, such as mortars, motorcycles, and ATVs, thereby enhancing speed, mobility, and firepower after reaching the HLZ. The Chinook’s large payload capacity also allows ground commanders to land their entire force in a single lift, thus getting the force into action faster, while minimizing the risk of a small initial force being attacked or a helicopter being shot down during multiple lifts and consecutive landings at the same HLZ. These same benefits apply during the extraction phase of an operation as well. Ground commanders can get their troops out more quickly and avoid leaving behind smaller groups awaiting additional lifts/aircraft. Completing an air assault mission in a single lift also simplifies route planning. The number of HLZs is reduced and the possibility of having to land in the same zone twice is eliminated. “It’s much easier to plan a route for two CH-47s than for six UH-60s,” Captain Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after returning to Alaska from Kandahar.255 Based upon the CH-47’s unqualified success in the combat air assault role in Afghanistan, ground unit commanders are likely to request continued Chinook support in future operations/conflicts. Putting more forces on an objective in a shorter period of time in a high, hot, and heavy environment is an obviously desirable capability. Anticipated improvements to the Chinook, such as increased payload, range, speed, survivability, and digital interoperability, will doubtlessly enable the aircraft to continue as the workhorse of Army Aviation well into the 21st century.
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY: THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Bibliography Interviews Allred, Colonel John. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Part 2, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December 2010. Allred, Colonel John. interview by the author, 5 April 2012. Anders, Colonel David P. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 2009, 6. Andersen, Lieutenant Colonel Reik. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 February 2011. Ayers, Major Nicholas. interview by the author, 8 May 2012. Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Clint. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011. Baltazar, Major Franklin. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 May 2007. Benchoff, Lieutenant Colonel Peter. interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011. Bender, Captain Robert. interview by the author, 17 May 2012. Bradley, Lieutenant Colonel Walter. interview by the author, 9 March 2012. Bricker, Colonel Paul. interview by the author, 10 March 2012. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011. Buchanan, Harry. interview by the author, 18 May 2012. Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel Robert. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 May 2011. DeMartino, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 April 2011. Dichairo, Colonel Joseph. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 August 2007. Donovan, Jr., Colonel George T. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 January 2009. Evarts, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Kyle. interview by the author, 13 March 2012. Gayler, Colonel William. interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 2012, 19. George, Colonel Randy. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 January 2011. Gerblick, Lieutenant Colonel Darren. interview by the author, 26 April 2012. Glenn III, Colonel Harry C. interview by the author, 19 March 2012. Gunter, Major John. interview by the author, 16 March 2012. Hagenbeck, Lieutenant General Franklin. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2007. Hummer, Major William. interview by the author, 27 March 2012. Hurlbut, Colonel Daniel. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 February 2011. Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe. group interview by the author, 14 March 2012. Jenkinson, Lieutenant Colonel Brett. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 and 11 February 2011. Kidd, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher. interview by the author, 8 May 2012. Lutsky, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen. interview by the author, 11 April 2012. McNeill, General Dan. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team,Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2008. Mulholland, Brigadier General John. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 May 2007. Nicholson, Brigadier General Lawrence. interview by the United States Marine Corps History Division, 9 June and 17 August, 2010. O’Brien, Lieutenant Colonel John, Post Historian, Fort Campbell, KY. interview by the author, 14 March 2012. O’Steen, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 February 2011. Oclander, Lieutenant Colonel David. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011. Ossinger, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary. interview by the author, 10 March 2012. Owens, Colonel Kevin. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 and 10 December 2008. Pearl, Lieutenant Colonel Brian. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 May 2011. Royar, Colonel Kenneth. interview by the author, 7 May 2012. Ruff, Captain Christopher. interview by the author, 25 April 2012. Shields, Lieutenant Colonel Burton. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 February 2011. Slaughenhaupt, Lieutenant Colonel Carl. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 May 2011. Stogran,Lieutenant Colonel Patrick. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2007. Sturek, Lieutenant Colonel Frank. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 October 2008. Sturek, Lieutenant Colonel Frank. interview by the author, 23 March 2012. Townsend, Colonel Stephen. interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2007. Valencia, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jimmy. interview by the author, 26 March 2012. Wilson, Major Jared. interview by the author, 23 March 2012. Download 0.52 Mb. Share with your friends:
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