1ac advocacy The United States should legalize all or nearly all online gambling in the United States. 1ac warming
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1acadvocacyThe United States should legalize all or nearly all online gambling in the United States. 1ac warmingOnline gambling prohibition violates GATS commitments – it’s the acid test of WTO legitimacy Danish 13 Danish, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, Westminster Law Review, October 2013, vol. 3, iss. 1, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case”, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights At the time of its creation, the WTO was envisioned as having two major functions: legislative and judicial. The legislative function refers to the role of the WTO as a common platform for encouraging trade between its members via legal instruments such as trade agreements, as well as to maintain the body of rules followed by its members. The judicial function is performed by the dispute settlement system that is governed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). According to Keisuke Iida, the areas in which the WTO dispute settlement system has been the most active can be divided between the following five areas: adjudicatory resolution of disputes, fending off unilateralism, creation of a level playing field in international commerce, reconciliation of trade and nontrade concerns, and balancing its various other functions.7 This judicial function of the WTO is instrumental in resolving various trade related disputes between its members and its procedural aspects as well as practical efficacy have been thoroughly analysed. This article examines the actions of Antigua and Barbuda (hereinafter Antigua), a small island nation in the Caribbean and one of the smallest WTO members; which recently gained international attention following it being granted approval to suspend obligations under TRIPs to the United States of America as a result of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) authorization. The case of US – Gambling has assumed great importance for the allegations of piracy of intellectual property that were levelled against Antigua when it attempted to follow up on its authorised suspension of obligations under TRIPs. Equating a WTO approved remedy with the piracy of intellectual property by the US cast aspersions of illegality upon the entire proceedings and created a fallacious image for other nations as to the intellectual property regime in Antigua. It is thought that the final outcome of this case will set the standard for the efficacy of the WTO DSU and its usefulness to developing countries. This article also focuses on the non conventional remedy of cross retaliation under the TRIPs Agreement that can be given against errant states in cases of non compliance with the WTO rulings. This remedy is usually pursued after conventional methods for ensuring compliance fail due to a multitude of factors. For example, the complainant would be unable to impose trade sanctions upon the defaulting member, due to a wide disparity in economic strength or due to the harm it would suffer by imposition of such trade tariffs. In this situation, the complainant may choose to retaliate under Article 22 of the DSU, which allows retaliation under a different trade agreement. This unique remedy was first requested, and obtained, by Ecuador in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador)8 (hereinafter EC – Bananas III) and has been similarly requested by Antigua in US – Gambling and Brazil in US – Upland Cotton9 , with the former being authorised to proceed under it.10 Such an extreme option may only be requested by a nation approaching the WTO for dispute settlement when the biggest problem faced by it is that of making an errant state comply with the rulings or take effective measures for retaliation without jeopardizing its own economic interests. This was summed up concisely by Robert Hudec, when he noted that "enforcement is a more complex process than mere retaliation".11 2. Brief Exposition of the Stages of Dispute Resolution Mechanism followed by the WTO The WTO DSU is the mechanism provided in the WTO Agreement for Members to resolve disputes with respect to international trade. It is invoked when a WTO signatory nation has a complaint against the trade practices of a fellow WTO member and feels that it is not compliant with the rules set by any regional trade agreements or with the WTO guidelines. The system followed for settlement of disputes can be classified into 2 distinct categories: the pre-litigation and the adjudication phase. In the pre-litigation phase, also known as Consultation12 , the parties are given an opportunity to work out their differences in a mutually acceptable manner via good offices, conciliation and mediation, which are non-judicial or diplomatic forms of voluntary alternative dispute settlement as provided under Article 5.13 A large majority of disputes brought to the WTO do not proceed beyond this stage. This is mostly attributed to the parties reaching a satisfactory settlement, or because the complainant withdrew the complaint or did not to pursue the matter further.14 Consultations provide the parties an opportunity to resolve any misunderstandings as to the facts and nature of the issue in contention and thereby lay the foundation for a settlement or for further proceedings under the DSU.15 In the Uruguay Round Agreement, it was decided that in the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. Secondly, the provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement. An option provided by the DSU to its Members invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other Member, subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.16 Getting approval for use of such actions is preceded by lengthy legal procedures that the complaining nation may not palatable, given that it entails high costs and is subject to inevitable delays. While the legal burden is mitigated to some extent by the presence of the ‘Advisory Centre on WTO Law’ which provides legal aid to developing and least developed nations, the economic costs in the form of delays is a major deterrent to any nation opting to proceed under this mechanism. A WTO Member may request the establishment of a Panel for dispute resolution under Article 6 of the DSU, the findings of which are compiled into a final report that is issued to the disputing parties and later circulated to all WTO Members. This report by the Panel must be adopted at a meeting of the DSB within 60 days of the distribution of the report to WTO members. The scope of appeal against the ruling is limited by Article 17.6 of the DSU to “issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” During appeal, the report is considered by a 7 member ‘Appellate Body’ of the WTO, which issues its recommendations within 60 days of the notification of appeal by the disputing party, which then has to be adopted by the DSB by consensus and unconditionally accepted by the disputing parties.17 The effectiveness of any judicial process can only be seen by the results of its implementation. Under Article 21 of the DSU, if the report adopted by the DSB finds the defending Member in violation of an obligation under a WTO agreement, then that Member has to modify its policies and bring it in line with the guidelines, as well as inform the DSB of its implementation plans within 30 days of the panel report or any Appellate Body report being adopted. While the DSB is tasked with monitoring the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings,18 the task of ensuring compliance usually falls upon the member that gained the favourable ruling from the DSB. However, ensuring compliance from countries in breach of international trade rules can be difficult, especially if the victorious country is a developing or least developed nation. It has been seen in many instances that such nations are ill equipped to effectively enforce compliance with the DSB ruling since their own domestic markets do not possess sufficient economic clout for imposing trade sanctions that might significantly affect the commercial interests of the defaulting nation. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that any restrictions imposed by such countries will have a substantial impact on the economy of a developed nation. Further, a large number of nations have resisted from proceeding against defaulting developed nations fearing international political pressure and a degeneration of diplomatic relations which usually accompanies any attempts at forcing compliance with adverse rulings. Article 22 of the DSU deals with the Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions in case of members in violation of international trade rules. It states that compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. It further adds that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements. This shows that the option of compensation and suspension of concession is a secondary measure for enforcing compliance instead of standard practice in dispute settlement. Article 22.3 of the DSU lists the procedures that must be followed before suspension of obligations or concessions by the complaining party. According to it, the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment. If the general principle is impracticable or ineffective, then the complaining party can suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, or if the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement.19 The latter remedy provided in the WTO DSU is commonly known as “cross-retaliation”. Abbott defines it as the suspension of concessions in a sector of trade different than the sector in which the trade injury is suffered, including under a different WTO covered agreement. He further adds that the rationale behind suspending concessions under GATT, GATS or TRIPs is that, affected entities in the country against which trade barriers are imposed will exercise their influence on the government to bring trade measures into conformity in order to avoid bringing harm to themselves.20 3. Cross – Retaliation under TRIPs Agreement The rise of global trade in recent years has culminated in a greater transfer of goods, services and intellectual property between nations. While there has been almost equal bilateral trade in goods and services, the transfer of intellectual property has usually been from the developed nations to the developing and least developed countries. Protection of intellectual property (or the lack thereof) at the international level has therefore been a source of frustration in inter-country economic relations. Before the TRIPs Agreement came into effect, there was no effective mechanism for enforcement or provisions for the imposition of sanctions if the obligations were not met. The then prevailing system of treaties maintained by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) which regulated protection of international intellectual property did not provide, in the view of proponents of TRIPs negotiations, sufficient regulations or adequate mechanisms to enforce intellectual property rights internationally. At the end of negotiations in the Uruguay Round in 1993, the TRIPs Agreement was included as a basic component of the Agreement that established the WTO, and brought into effect in 1995.21 All TRIPs signatories are required to implement basic standards and minimum enforcement obligations in their respective intellectual property regimes, which accord sufficient protection to private holders of intellectual property. A particularly important element of the TRIPs Agreement is the system of dispute settlement established under the WTO Agreement. The TRIPs Agreement itself invokes the provisions of Article XXII and XXIII of the WTO Agreement as elaborated by the WTO DSU, which applies to consultations and settlement of disputes under the TRIPs Agreement.22 However, in certain circumstances, the WTO may allow retaliation under Part V of the TRIPs Agreement itself. This remedy is given to the complaining party when imposition of trade tariffs or sanctions will have an adverse impact on its own economy. Such an action permits a country to suspend certain intellectual property rights of the country that has violated the rules related to any Agreement under WTO. Since the retaliation is not under the same agreement which is the subject matter of the dispute, such an action is known as “Cross Retaliation”.23 The provision for Cross Retaliation under the WTO DSU was included at the behest of several developed nations that believed that such a mechanism would be an effective tool to curb violation of the TRIPs agreement by developing countries, since cross retaliation against goods or services from such nations would be more effective than retaliating against the intellectual property of developing countries.24 Cross Retaliation under the TRIPs Agreement is a remedy rarely sought and even more rarely authorized. Some of the factors that come into question are whether the circumstances are sufficiently serious to justify cross-retaliation among covered agreements; According to Abbott, in the case of US – Gambling, the arbitrators did not have any difficulty accepting Antigua’s position based on factors such as (i) serious disparity in national economic circumstances; (ii) dependency on services trade leading to vulnerability to external factors; and (iii) the need for Antigua to diversify its economy.25 The procedure for authorisation to suspend obligations under TRIPs was clearly laid out by the ruling in EC – Bananas III, and that was the precedent followed by the DSB in US – Gambling as well. In the former case, the US, as a complaining party, retaliated by raising tariffs on EC goods. However, Ecuador sought to retaliate under the TRIPs Agreement citing that retaliation against EC exports of goods or services was not “practicable or effective” under Article 22.3. The argument put forward by Ecuador was that retaliation in the form of trade tariffs would harm its economy and was, in any case too small to inflict any meaningful pain on the defendant nations.26 Even after being authorized to impose sanctions and suspend obligations, Ecuador never made use of the opportunity against the European Communities on the basis that the harm to the Ecuadorian economy would outweigh the possible benefit of persuading the European Communities27 to comply with its commitments.28 A most interesting aspect about this case, apart from it being the first decision concerning cross retaliation under the TRIPs Agreement, is the complete lack of allegations of piracy of intellectual property which have been levelled against Antigua, which have been discussed below. While it is difficult to pinpoint an exact reason for this, possible explanations include the settlement of the dispute and the omission of any action towards active suspension of intellectual property. One of the major impediments to practically utilizing cross – retaliation is the problem of equivalence. The quantum of revenue that can be collected by the country by the suspension of obligations under the TRIPs Agreement is determined by the Panel based on their findings. For example, in the case of US – Gambling, Antigua claimed that it had suffered losses of approximately $3.4 billion. This was based on an assessment of the annual trade that it considered it had lost, as a result of the maintenance of the WTO inconsistent measures by the US, beyond the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation.29 The US challenged this position and claimed that the losses amounted only to $500,000. The panel disagreed with both parties and found that the losses amounted only to $ 21 million and therefore Antigua could retaliate only up-to this amount.30 ,31 This difference in valuation of damages also stretches to the valuation of intellectual property which is sought to be suspended. For example, in US – Gambling, if Antigua does suspend American copyrights or patents, then the price at which it sells the intellectual property is entirely dependent on what it determines to be the appropriate level. So, instead of selling it at its marked price, it may choose to sell it just above cost. This would create an immediate incentive for consumers to move away from American sellers who are forced to sell the same product at the marked price that is inclusive of royalties and taxes. This creates an imbalance in the trading structure, since one seller can massively undercut every other competitor and still eke out a profit. So, apart from the “illegal” gains being made by Antigua32 , there are substantial losses being suffered by the American holders of intellectual property on account of loss of royalties in addition to production costs. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is no equivalence between the gains made and losses suffered. These losses and the general American view of intellectual property infringement are the main reasons why allegations of ‘theft’ and ‘piracy’ have come into being in this case. 4. Case Study of US – Gambling (Antigua) DS285 The case of US – Gambling has become the acid test for those member states of the WTO seeking to determine whether the DSU can deliver practical and timely benefits for small and vulnerable economies. Antigua and Barbuda, a small, twin-island nation in the Caribbean Sea, is one of the smallest WTO members. The roots of the case can be traced back to the actions of the Antiguan government in the early 1990s, when, in an attempt to diversify the country’s economy, it poured significant resources to create a closely regulated and supervised cross-border gaming industry. Aided by a number of foreign investors, the sophisticated gambling infrastructure that was created helped supplement a significant decline in tourist revenues, which was the largest source of income for the island. In the following decade, online gambling became the second most revenue generating activity on the island and had become its second largest employer, with close to 5% of the country’s population working in that sector.33 According to Antigua, the effect of measures imposed by the United States was to prevent the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services and therefore threatened the livelihood of its thriving online betting services industry. Antigua alleged that the policies of the United States were inconsistent with its obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). However, in its defence, the US claimed its right to determine its own domestic policies and cited the need to protect “public morals and public order,” which is an allowable exception to the WTO rules.34 The WTO found that the measures imposed by the US regarding horseracing were applied in a discriminatory manner to foreign services suppliers as compared to domestic ones.35 The effect of this US policy on the Antiguan economy was enunciated by Antigua’s Finance Minister Harold Lovell, when he said that “[T]he economy of Antigua and Barbuda has been devastated by the United States’ government’s long campaign to prevent American consumers from gambling on-line with offshore gaming operations…result[ing] in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs and seizure by the Americans of billions of dollars belonging to gaming operators and their customers in financial institutions across the world.”36 It was with such sentiments that Antigua approached the WTO DSB. On 21 July 2003, the WTO DSB established a panel at the request of Antigua to resolve the dispute. Both the panel and the Appellate Body found certain measures of the United States to be inconsistent with some obligations of the United States under the GATS. On 20 April 2005, the DSB adopted the report of the panel, as modified by the report of the Appellate Body. The resulting DSB recommendations include, inter alia, that the United States bring the measures found to be inconsistent with the GATS into conformity with its obligations under that agreement. In April 2006, the United States informed the DSB that it had implemented the recommendations, while Antigua disputed the claim. After the consultations between the two nations failed, Antigua took recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU and requested for the establishment of a Panel,37 which concluded in its report that the United States had failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. This report was subsequently adopted by the DSB in May 2007. In June 2007, Antigua requested authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the United States of concessions and related obligations of Antigua under the GATS and the TRIPs Agreement. This was opposed by the US stating that it (i) objected to the level of suspension of concessions and obligations proposed by Antigua and Barbuda and (ii) claimed that Antigua and Barbuda’s proposal did not follow the principles and procedures set forth in Article 22.3 of the DSU.38 In December 2007, it was determined that the annual level of nullification or impairments of benefits accruing to Antigua should be US$ 21 million per annum and that Antigua may request authorization from the DSB to suspend obligations under the TRIPs Agreement at a level not exceeding US$ 21 million annually.39 The grant of the Award to Antigua was seen as a great victory for the people of the island nation. This was evident from the statement of Dr. John W. Ashe, Antigua’s Ambassador to the WTO, when he said that, “This is a smashing success for Antigua in every possible way. The report will sweep away any lingering doubt that Antigua has obtained a clear and convincing win over the United States in this matter. It is now time for the United States to meet its international trade obligations to Antigua and work with us in a constructive manner to resolve this dispute.”40 However, even after the release of the Award, the United States failed to comply with the rulings and denied all Antiguan efforts for a fair negotiated settlement. On the basis of conclusions and determinations of the Arbitrators in the Award and in accordance with Article 22.7 of the DSU, at the DSB meeting on 28 January 2013, Antigua requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions and other obligations to the United States in respect of intellectual property rights under Sections 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPs Agreement.41 The most recent development in the case took place on 25 April 2013, when Antigua, in its communication to the DSB said that it has so far not any seen substantial progress on compliance by the United States with the DSB’s decision or in achieving a settlement with Antigua and Barbuda.42 Justifying its complaints, Antigua bemoaned to the DSB that “[T]his matter is now ten years old, and the lack of progress in the case is a very disappointing reality for Antigua and Barbuda. The long campaign conducted by the United States authorities to shut down the online gaming industry in Antigua and Barbuda has borne bitter fruit. An industry that was once the second largest employer in Antigua and Barbuda, employing over 5% of the population, now lies in ruin. Thousands have been made jobless, and many thriving companies have collapsed, due to actions that this body has ruled to be contrary to world trade rules.” It further went on to add that “After more than five years of patient negotiation, Antigua and Barbuda has come reluctantly to the view that only utilization of the authorization for cross-retaliation received from the DSB on 28th January will move this matter forward. As a party to all the major international conventions that protect the rights of IP stakeholders, Antigua and Barbuda sees this trade remedy as having far-reaching effects that may not necessarily be able to be contained.” After making such an obvious threat, Antigua concluded by stating, very allegorically that “In fact, we suspect that once that Rubicon has been crossed, all the King’s horses and all the King’s men may not be able to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. So, before we set our foot to that path, we appeal to the United States to make one last effort at bringing its complex bureaucratic structure to a decision that will avoid unpredictable consequences.”43 As of June 2013, Antigua had not initiated any proceedings aimed at profiting from suspension of the intellectual property obligations owed to the US. However, many reports seem to suggest that it may soon set up a website for the sale of American intellectual property, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken.44 In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings. However, whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws. The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter without any breach in its legality. Further, the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum. Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures. Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has also raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs. Download 160.34 Kb. Share with your friends:
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