A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

Indeed, it was because the Soviets' real concern was with the German question as a whole, and not just with Berlin or the internal situation in East Germany, that western rights and thus the western powers were being targeted. The USSR wanted something from her former allies: she wanted them to keep West Germany from becoming too powerful. The western powers themselves were clearly willing to live with the status quo in central Europe, and would not use force as long as the Soviets stayed on their side of the line of demarcation. A relatively weak Federal Republic, a state dependent on her allies for protection, would have little choice but to pursue a purely defensive policy. But if West Germany became strong and independent, she would, as one Soviet leader told Dulles, be able to "speak in a different tone."⁸⁸¹ The West Germans, if they developed their power, would be more able to intervene in the event of an uprising in the east. The East Germans perhaps would be more likely to rise up in the first place if they sensed that their brothers in the west would not leave them in the lurch. And a West German intervention could have very grave consequences. It might lead to the collapse of the Communist regime in East Germany, and could conceivably lead even to general war.

And a strong West German state was above all a state with a respectable nuclear force under its own control. That force did not have to be all that large for the Soviets to feel menaced; thermonuclear weapons are so powerful that beyond a certain point the numbers do not matter much. Given enough time, a country like West Germany certainly had the industrial and technological base to build a force capable of destroying the Soviet Union, even if the Soviets were to strike first. If Germany were to develop such a force, she could engage in the poker game of controlled--or really semi-controlled--escalation. There was no telling how a military confrontation, if one ever did develop, would run its course, but from the Soviet standpoint the risks were real: a strong Germany--and that meant a nuclearized Germany--was a danger; the present situation of a relatively weak Federal Republic, dependent on her more status quo-oriented partners, was obviously to be preferred. And since the nuclear status of West Germany would be determined, in large part, by the attitude of the western powers, it was their policy that now needed to be targeted. The western governments needed to be made to feel the brunt of Soviet displeasure. So the Soviet leadership decided to put pressure on the western powers where they were most vulnerable, and where the level of tension was easiest for the Russians to control--and that, of course, meant Berlin.

The German nuclear question thus lay at the heart of Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis.⁸⁸² The Soviets often emphasized the importance of this issue. Anastas Mikoyan, a top Soviet leader, brought it up repeatedly in meetings with key western figures--with Adenauer in April 1958, with Eisenhower and Dulles in January 1959, and with the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, in January 1963.⁸⁸³ And indeed Soviet concerns had been building up for some time. When the Soviet ambassador, for example, raised the issue on April 25, 1957, the German leaders did not even bother to conceal their nuclear ambitions. Adenauer "did not deny that the FRG might become a nuclear power," and foreign minister Brentano added that "if England and other powers have atomic weapons, why should the FRG not have them?" The chancellor had in fact just made a similar point in public at a press conference.⁸⁸⁴ In 1958, the Soviets were increasingly concerned with the problem.⁸⁸⁵ And it was certainly no mere coincidence that the Soviets provoked the crisis just as a key threshold was about to be crossed--that is, at precisely the point when the German Air Force was about to acquire a certain atomic capability. The "Wagon Train" project, the training of a German fighter-bomber unit so that "it might have a nuclear capability" and the construction of a nuclear storage facility nearby--was "successfully completed" in late 1958.⁸⁸⁶

The German nuclear issue, in fact, played a major role in the diplomacy of the crisis from beginning to end. The issue was raised at the very start of the crisis in November 1958, and during the Kennedy period the Soviets repeatedly stressed the importance of this question. In July 1961, for example, their ambassador in Washington declared that a peace treaty--that is, a settlement of the German question--was "essential because things were going on in Germany which must be stopped. There was a revanchist group in Germany which was arming Germany and seeking thermonuclear weapons."⁸⁸⁷ In October of that year, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko met with President Kennedy to discuss the Berlin question. What the Soviet government had in mind was the legalization of the German borders as they presently existed, and the outlawing of a nuclear capability in both parts of Germany; the USSR, he said, "placed utmost emphasis" on this latter question.⁸⁸⁸ And these are not just isolated examples. From the mid-1950s on, the issue of "European security"--the term referred to the idea that Germany, perhaps together with certain adjacent areas, should have a special military status, above all in the nuclear area--was high on the Soviet diplomatic agenda.⁸⁸⁹

Western leaders took it for granted at this time that the USSR had a "real fear" of Germany and were genuinely concerned about what would happen if the Federal Republic became strong and independent.⁸⁹⁰ They generally assumed that the issue of a German nuclear capability was a fundamental Soviet concern, and occasionally--although by no means invariably--conjectured that the Berlin Crisis was rooted, at least to a considerable extent, in Soviet anxieties about what the nuclearization of Germany might mean. Herter, for example, met with the top permanent official in the French foreign ministry shortly after the Soviets had provoked the crisis. The acting secretary "thought the question of preventing German possession of nuclear weapons was a key to the present Soviet attitude." The French official "agreed this was the most important single reason, probably, for present Soviet actions."⁸⁹¹ Ambassador Thompson thought at the beginning of the crisis that Khrushchev's view was that "with the completion in the next few years of West German rearmament, including the stationing of atomic weapons there, the position of the East German regime will become even more precarious." The Soviet leader, he speculated, was afraid that "West German intervention in an East German revolt under such circumstances might face the Khrushchev with the choice of almost certain world war or the loss of East Germany and subsequently of most or all of his satellite empire."⁸⁹² The British were also worried about the risk of war "if there was rioting in East Germany, and West Germany, having nuclear weapons, could not be restrained from going to the rescue."⁸⁹³ Secretary of State Rusk's view in July 1962 reflected what had by that point become the conventional wisdom. "We must remind ourselves," he said, "that the Russians really hate and fear the Germans. They are concerned about the revival of the Federal Republic and about its possible claim to nuclear weapons."⁸⁹⁴

Would the Soviets have been justified in thinking that there would be a greater risk of war if West Germany did acquire a nuclear capability of her own? Close observers like Thompson took it for granted that "a people as strong and as virile" as the Germans would not for long accept the division of their country, "particularly when they are well armed," and that given Soviet policy, it was hard to see "how Germany could ever be put together again except by force."⁸⁹⁵ And there were in fact indications that the Germans themselves were not happy with a policy that forced them to remain passive in the event of an uprising in the east. Strauss, for example, thought even in 1956 that it would be almost impossible in such an event to prevent the "West German people from trying to help their brothers across the border."⁸⁹⁶ In July 1961, he told his American counterpart that German troops could at present take no action if an uprising in the east was being crushed by the Russians because "the West was not yet ready for a showdown," but the western countries needed to prepare for a more active policy.⁸⁹⁷ And Strauss was viewed as a possible successor to Adenauer. In the mid-1950s, the chancellor himself evidently felt a certain pressure of this sort.⁸⁹⁸ And in August 1961, the German foreign minister, von Brentano, suggested to his western colleagues that in the event of an uprising in East Germany, some real action might be necessary. A formal protest would scarcely suffice; West German opinion, he said, would not "acquiesce" if German troops and the border policy remained "quietly in their barracks" while the uprising was put down.⁸⁹⁹ All this underscored the importance of the German nuclear question: if the Germans were saying these things while they were weak, what might they be tempted to do when they became strong?

So if the Soviets took the problem of German power seriously, they were not simply being paranoid. From their point of view, the problem was very real. The USSR's most basic interests in Europe were at stake. In the long run, if nothing were done, a resurgence of German power could threaten their whole position in Europe, and might even lead to war. Some action had to be taken before it was too late. The Soviets wanted to see if they and the western powers could reach an understanding that would stabilize the situation in central Europe and in particular that would keep West Germany from acquiring a nuclear capability under her own control. But first the Soviets needed to make the western powers take their concerns seriously, and Berlin was the obvious lever.

The Soviets were threatening western rights in Berlin. How far would the western powers go to defend those rights? What kinds of concessions would they be willing to make to settle the crisis? What they were prepared to accept would depend in part on how they felt about the German question as a whole--about the basic idea of a system that would limit German power, a system whose central goal was to stabilize the status quo.

The United States was by far the most important western power, and the fundamental point to note about American policy in the crisis is that the U.S. government was in the final analysis far more willing than any other western power to fight a general nuclear war rather than to capitulate over Berlin. This was a terribly difficult issue and it should not be surprising that Eisenhower's basic attitude was marked by a certain degree of ambivalence. He often took a tough line on the issue. A few months before the crisis began, when Dulles said that America's pledge to go to war if necessary over Berlin was something which he himself did not quite believe, the president "expressed surprise." Of course America would have to go to war if the Soviets attacked the city. If she failed to do so, he said, soon all of Europe would be lost and the United States would run the risk of being overwhelmed by the power of the new Communist colossus.⁹⁰⁰ And during the crisis, the president often seemed to take it for granted that if the United States were pushed far enough, a full-scale nuclear war would be unavoidable. America, he knew, was stronger than the USSR, and the Soviets would in all likelihood not push things to the point of war. But if they did, the U.S. government would have little choice but to launch a full-scale nuclear attack. As he explained to congressional leaders in March 1959, "the actual decision to go to all-out war will not come, but if it does come, we must have the crust to follow through." When the "acute crisis period" was reached, the United States, he said, would have to "engage in general war to protect our rights." His "basic philosophy" was that America had to be prepared to push her "whole stack of chips into the pot" when that became necessary.⁹⁰¹ On the other hand, he often seemed to shy away from that sort of strategy, to the point where he sometimes appeared to favor the alternative of a major ground war in Europe; on one occasion, he had to be reminded rather forcefully by the JCS chairman of what America's strategy in fact was.⁹⁰²

But whatever his misgivings, the president went along with the prevailing view that force might have to be used and that a certain risk of general war would therefore in the final analysis have to be accepted. West Berlin was not militarily defensible in any normal way, the argument ran, so the freedom of the city depended on America's ultimate willingness to escalate up to the level of general nuclear war. It was not as though the United States intended to launch an all-out nuclear attack as soon as the first convoy to the city was stopped. The plan was first to probe Soviet intentions through the use of limited military force. If that failed, the next step was a major military operation, involving perhaps a single division. To engage a force of that sort would be a serious military undertaking. If the USSR chose to attack it, it would be crossing the critical threshold: the "fat" would be "in the fire." The United States would not commit any additional forces to the Berlin operation, but instead, in the words of the key policy documents, "resort would have to be made to general war."⁹⁰³

This had been America's basic strategy for the defense of the city since the end of the Truman administration, and the coming of the crisis changed very little. The military authorities in particular still strongly supported this kind of strategy. Indeed, both Norstad and the JCS favored a more rapid use of force than Dulles thought prudent.⁹⁰⁴ The American military leaders in general--as the British summed up their thinking--believed "that the time for a show-down with the Russians was at hand, and they were prepared to go the lengths of a real test of strength, up to the point of 'losing a division or two,' to show their determination. They were hardly prepared to discuss whether their plans made military sense, but were obsessed by the need to maintain their right of access by road, no matter the cost."⁹⁰⁵ General Twining's views were particularly extreme. The JCS chairman wanted a confrontation with Russia over the issue. "We certainly have to stop this somewhere," he said in December 1958. "We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should force the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it."⁹⁰⁶ But the consensus view at this point, shared by both military and civilian leaders, was that America's whole position in Europe depended on her willingness to defend her rights, and that the country therefore had to be prepared in the final analysis to risk general nuclear war over the issue.⁹⁰⁷ Top American officials therefore reached the conclusion that the United States "should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin--even at the risk of general war."⁹⁰⁸ Dulles's view at this point was typical. The Soviet demand to liquidate western rights, he said, was "outrageous both in tone and substance," and to give way "would be a disaster."⁹⁰⁹ The western position in Berlin was "legally and morally unassailable."⁹¹⁰ The Soviets, moreover, were also relatively weak in military terms. If the West stood firm, he thought that there was not one chance in a thousand that the Soviets would "push it to the point of war."⁹¹¹

This did not mean, however, that the Eisenhower administration was simply going to dig in its heels and take an intransigent line in the crisis. It preferred for two reasons to take a more moderate stance. To begin with, the United States was the leader of an alliance and could not set policy on a purely unilateral basis. The western alliance had to be kept together, the views of the major European countries had to be taken into account, and the fact was that those allies were leery of military action. In December 1958, for example, the U.S. government had tried to get the two other western powers with responsibilities in Berlin to accept the principle that force would be used if necessary to maintain land access to Berlin, and that contingency planning would proceed on that basis.⁹¹² But the British were unwilling to make that sort of commitment; the French attitude was more equivocal. If the allies were to be brought along, the U.S. government needed to tread more softly. In that way the alliance would remain intact, and the Europeans would probably accept tough measures when the time came, even if they were unwilling to commit themselves to particular military plans in advance.⁹¹³

And allied support was of considerable importance. To be sure, the United States was physically capable of taking action on a unilateral basis, and indeed plans had been worked out for the eventuality that she might have to act alone. The goal of the contingency planning was to conduct operations that would ultimately force the Soviets to accept the fact that general war was imminent, and thus oblige them to back down. The United States had the forces needed for this purpose, and also the legal right to deploy those forces from German territory as this strategy required. But the American government disliked the idea of carrying the entire burden. It felt that the responsibility needed to be shared: it was very important that Germany at least, and probably one other major ally as well, go along with what the United States proposed to do.⁹¹⁴

There was a more fundamental reason for American moderation in the crisis, and this had to do with the U.S. government's basic approach to the German problem. American policy was essentially defensive in nature. The United States was willing to live with things as they were and felt that the Soviet Union should do likewise. A formal acceptance of the status quo might be out of the question: Soviet control of eastern Europe, and especially of eastern Germany, could not be recognized as legitimate.⁹¹⁵ But both sides understood what the fundamental political realities were, and if conflict was to be avoided, they needed to find some way of dealing with each other on the basis of those realities.

With regard to Berlin in particular, Eisenhower felt that there were very real problems here which needed to be dealt with on a practical basis. Berlin was over a hundred miles behind Soviet lines. The western allies had only gone there in the first place because they had assumed Germany would be run on a unified basis. But as the Cold War set in, as the two German states were established, the city became a kind of albatross. At the end of the war, Eisenhower, as he now recalled, had foreseen "what a trouble the thing was going to be." But Roosevelt and Churchill had just dismissed those concerns out of hand: "Oh, we can get along with Uncle Joe." Even "at the time he knew better," and now "everything he had feared had come to pass."⁹¹⁶

But what could be done now? The problem was not just that for military reasons, an outpost like Berlin might not be tenable over the long run.⁹¹⁷ Even if one assumed that the West could maintain its presence there indefinitely through sheer resolve--that is, through an ultimate willingness to risk nuclear escalation--that in itself might not be enough to save the Berliners. As Eisenhower pointed out over and over again, the Communists could undermine the economic life of the city by effectively cutting off trade between Berlin and West Germany, even if allied military convoys remained free to move through the corridors. The movement of goods into and out of the city was in practice subject to Communist control. "The East Germans," he said, could therefore "stop all economic connection with West Berlin. They could make West Berlin a dead weight on us." He in fact "did not see how a city like West Berlin, surrounded by hostile elements who could hamper and harass at will, could long survive."⁹¹⁸

The United States was certainly not going to capitulate to the Communists or abandon the Berliners, but the whole situation was a mess--a "can of worms," Eisenhower called it--and he very much wanted to find a way out. The United States had stumbled into this situation because of mistakes made at the end of the war; it had clearly been an "error," he thought, to try "to control Germany from Berlin, so far behind the Russian lines."⁹¹⁹ America had ended up, for political reasons, assuming a military position that was "wholly illogical."⁹²⁰ The West, he said, had "made a mistake in 1944 and 1945 and must now find a way to pay for it."⁹²¹ Some arrangement had to be worked out to normalize the situation without sacrificing the interests of the Berliners. "We will not," he said, "abandon our rights and responsibilities--unless there is a way made for us to do so"--that is, unless acceptable alternative arrangements were worked out.⁹²² And that alternative might involve giving West Berlin a special status, making it "somehow a part of West Germany," or bringing in the U.N. to help guarantee the freedom and security of the city. But it would not necessarily include the continuing presence of western troops. Indeed, Eisenhower thought that "the time was coming and perhaps soon when we would simply have to get our forces out."⁹²³

In his dealings with the allies, Eisenhower never actually proposed a settlement involving the withdrawal of western forces from Berlin. But he very much wanted to work out some sort of practical arrangement which would protect everyone's basic interests. If that arrangement involved dealing with the East Germans on the access routes, his inclination (and Dulles's as well) was to work things out on that basis: "I suppose in this kind of low level business we would have to go along if we were going to keep things straightened out."⁹²⁴ Some things were worth fighting for. The freedom of West Berlin could not be sacrificed. America would not allow herself to be humiliated, would not capitulate to Soviet threats, and would not accept the collapse of her whole political position in Europe. These things were real. But the whole question of whether it was the Soviets or the East Germans who exercised the controls on the access routes, with whatever that implied about the recognition of the East German regime by the western powers, was more metaphysical. One could hardly imagine going to war over such issues. So if they had to, and as long as access to Berlin remained open, Eisenhower and Dulles were prepared to deal with the East German officials.⁹²⁵

This by no means meant that the West would be accepting the legitimacy of the East German state or giving up on German reunification as a long-term goal. The West Germans might claim that to deal with East German officials and allow them to stamp documents on the access routes was a step toward diplomatic recognition and acceptance of a divided Germany and thus had to be ruled out. But this was just a theory, and one could just as well argue that to treat the East Germans as agents of the USSR, regardless of what the Soviets said, was to underscore the western claim that East Germany was still under effective Soviet occupation, and that the regime there was just a puppet state, with no legitimate authority of its own.

The basic feeling was that the theoretical issue of what constituted "recognition" and what "recognition" meant was not of overwhelming importance. The American government was therefore not opposed in principle to increased contacts with East Germany. Dulles himself "doubted the practicality of total non-recognition of the existence of something which is a fact." One had to recognize facts, he told the German ambassador, even if one does not like them: "To pretend the enemy does not exist is not a very realistic or practical policy."⁹²⁶ And one basic fact, as Eisenhower put it, was that "East and West Germany were not going to be reunified for a long time," that reunification was not a realistic answer to the Berlin problem, and that one had to work out some sort of modus vivendi.⁹²⁷ If the solution involved dealings with the East Germans, even movement toward the de facto acceptance of that regime and toward stabilization of the status quo in central Europe, the Americans themselves could easily live with that.