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Energy Transit – SLOC’s module



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Energy Transit – SLOC’s module

US Soft power is key to cooperative efforts that minimize threats to energy transit in the Indian Ocean.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)



Up until relatively recently, much of the maritime security debate has concentrated almost exclusively on its military definition and thus states have been concerned with the use of so-called “hard power” and the development of maritime strategies and maritime security policies that ignore or underplay a wide range of non-military considerations. From a military perspective, for example, “a modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control”150. As has been argued, while most strategic thinking in Australia “is locked into hard power, the oceans offer us great potential to apply soft power and creative diplomacy”151. “Soft power”, or the “second face of power”, essentially derives from the ability to shape or change the preferences of others through an appeal to the sense of attraction or duty of shared values and goals152. The emergence of US President Obama’s “new engagement” associated with the likely realisation of a broader conception of power and its use, especially the notion of “smart power”, is especially significant, not only in dealing with Indian Ocean maritime energy security threats. As a result, in addition to the military component, a much more broadly based maritime security strategy would incorporate a wide range of economic, environmental, political and social considerations and thus require greater interorganisational collaboration within states and the amelioration of “bureaucratic sclerosis” for its successful implementation153154. Furthermore, while ocean littoral states will endeavour to develop their individual maritime security strategies, in the final analysis, securing the maritime environment, which among other things involves the building of an internationally stable maritime regime as well as the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures, at a minimum will require regional and even global cooperation in the 21st century155156 . However, balancing maritime energy security with freedom on the high seas will necessitate a complex and delicate process of international negotiation157.
(Note to students: “smart power” is a relatively new idea referring to an approach that realizes that a combination involving both “soft power” and “hard power” can help with influence. It designed to clarify that authors rarely mean that solely “soft power” or “hard power is ALL that matters.)

Indian Ocean SLOC’s are key to the global economy. Boosting international maritime coop is key.



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


The militarisation of the Indian Ocean region, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increased missile capabilities, the rise in non-traditional threats and power projection by foreign militaries have not made the Indian Ocean more peaceful. Rather, the Indian Ocean can now be regarded as the most troubled region in the world. Considerable scope therefore exists for greater security cooperation and the enhancement of peace and stability in the region. The security of shipping and sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean is an issue of major strategic concern. In the first instance, sea-lane security is important to the national economies of Indian Ocean countries, specifically to their industrial and commercial sectors, since trade is their main link to global markets. The Indian Ocean is furthermore a vital transit route between the Pacific region, Africa and Europe, with vast cargoes passing through the region. Finally, the world’s most important oil and gas routes traverse the Indian Ocean. Because of the ocean’s strategic importance and the fact that the free flow of traffic can easily be interfered with, many extra-regional forces operate in its waters. Keeping the SLOCs open are vital to the global economy. Furthermore, the volatile security situation and the tensions in the Persian Gulf have stimulated foreign military intervention (the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Iraq-Kuwait War in the early 1990s, the Iraq War in 2003 and the war in Afghanistan are recent examples), while piracy, the asymmetrical threat and the flow of vital energy resources have recently caused much anxiety and the deployment of many navies. Oil and gas are central to the economic growth and development of the contemporary world. Energy security is crucial to sustain industrial and economic progress, and to meet the growing energy demands of both developed and developing states. Since the First World War, oil has also become the most strategic resource for the conduct of wars and after the Second World War the US seems to have placed increasing emphasis on securing or possibly even controlling the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. As recent history has shown, concern about attacks by states and asymmetrical attacks on energy resources and shipping is a very real issue.
(Note to students: SLOC’s – also known as “sea lanes of communication” or “sea lanes of communication” – will be a major argument on the oceans topic. SLOC’s are sea transit routes that are heavily used for trade or naval forces. Aff will argue that possible disruption of SLOC’s – via accidents, terrorists, pirates, or foreign governments – is bad for the economy, for cargo spills, or for the ability to project naval forces in times of need.)

Global economic decline risks nuclear war.



Merlini ‘11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.


Energy Transit – Waste Colonialism Module




US Soft power is key to minimize threats to energy transit in the Indian Ocean.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)



Up until relatively recently, much of the maritime security debate has concentrated almost exclusively on its military definition and thus states have been concerned with the use of so-called “hard power” and the development of maritime strategies and maritime security policies that ignore or underplay a wide range of non-military considerations. From a military perspective, for example, “a modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control”150. As has been argued, while most strategic thinking in Australia “is locked into hard power, the oceans offer us great potential to apply soft power and creative diplomacy”151. “Soft power”, or the “second face of power”, essentially derives from the ability to shape or change the preferences of others through an appeal to the sense of attraction or duty of shared values and goals152. The emergence of US President Obama’s “new engagement” associated with the likely realisation of a broader conception of power and its use, especially the notion of “smart power”, is especially significant, not only in dealing with Indian Ocean maritime energy security threats. As a result, in addition to the military component, a much more broadly based maritime security strategy would incorporate a wide range of economic, environmental, political and social considerations and thus require greater interorganisational collaboration within states and the amelioration of “bureaucratic sclerosis” for its successful implementation153154. Furthermore, while ocean littoral states will endeavour to develop their individual maritime security strategies, in the final analysis, securing the maritime environment, which among other things involves the building of an internationally stable maritime regime as well as the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures, at a minimum will require regional and even global cooperation in the 21st century155156 . However, balancing maritime energy security with freedom on the high seas will necessitate a complex and delicate process of international negotiation157.


More secure energy trade in the Indian Ocean is key to check illegal nuclear waste shipments. The impact is illegal nuclear waste dumping in Somalia.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)


Pressures aimed at maximising energy security have contributed to increased global demand for nuclear power, notwithstanding the Fukushima catastrophe in Japan. This in turn has led to a potential increase in environmental insecurity due to the requirement to attempt to safely dispose of larger volumes of nuclear waste materials. It is an interesting irony that, on the one hand, apart from South West Asia and South Asia, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by nuclear weapon free zones (Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Pelindaha, Treaty of Rarotonga) while, on the other hand, it is fast becoming a nuclear ocean206. Apart from the increasing number of regional nuclear weapons on land, as well as the indeterminate number on and under the ocean itself at any one time, the increasing global and regional demand for nuclear energy is having a significant impact on the structure of Indian Ocean uranium trade207. These impacts, in turn, raise a host of security questions linked to nuclear safety, uranium flows, the flows and storage of nuclear waste and the security of SLOCs in the IOR, as noted earlier. While Africa had the dubious distinction of being first choice for the dumping of European nuclear waste and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the 1980s, it was the first to respond politically to the threat of “waste colonialism”208. Prior to the ratification of the Basel Convention, many African states were especially concerned about the transboundary movement of such hazardous waste into Africa from industrialised countries and some indeed saw this process as one of the systematic dumping of nuclear waste into Africa209. At the May 1988 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers 48th Ordinary Session in Ethiopia, a resolution condemned the importation into Africa of industrial and nuclear waste as a “crime against Africa and the African people” and called upon member states to introduce import bans. The resolution condemned “all transnational corporations and enterprises involved in the introduction, in any form, of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; and demands that they clean up the areas that have already been contaminated by them”210. As a consequence of this resolution, work began on an African Convention under the auspices of the OAU shortly after the adoption of the Basel Convention, since the latter excluded nuclear waste. There was therefore a concern that certain needs of African states were not properly taken into account, and thus, while the Basel Convention was a convention of the north, there was need for a convention of the south. The resultant Bamako Convention, which was adopted in Mali in January 1991, entered into force in April 1998. Of particular international concern are the five states that have neither signed nor ratified the Bamako Convention as well as a further seven that have signed but have yet to ratify. It may be that some states have stalled either signing or ratifying in order to participate in the lucrative trade in hazardous waste211. This may well be true for the six Indian Ocean littoral states of Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia and South Africa, none of which were in the original convention signatory group of twelve states. Furthermore, of these six littoral states, two have neither signed nor ratified Bamako (Seychelles and South Africa) and a further two (Djibouti and Somalia) have yet to ratify either the Basel or Bamako conventions. The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 resulted in the washing up on Somalian beaches of many containers of nuclear and toxic waste that were illegally dumped during the early 1990s212. It has been alleged that, in at least one case, a lucrative financial agreement had been reached between the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammed and certain Swiss and Italian companies to import millions of tonnes of nuclear waste from Italy into Somalia. These companies were alleged to be under the control of the Italian mafia, and the Somalian deal was said to be only one part of so-called “ecomafia” operations213. For the Europeans, the cost per tonne (US$8) represented a fraction of the likely cost of up to US$1,000 per tonne of appropriate local treatment and disposal. Given Somalia’s strategic location and its current statelessness, such illegal or unauthorised movements of nuclear waste have potentially very significant implications not only for the human security of the Somalian population, but for the Indian Ocean environment, the Indian Ocean routes along which such flows take place, as well as the lethal prospects of the potential terrorist use of such nuclear materials. It has been noted that Somalia is a “stateless war economy”, one of the requirements of which is to engage in international “commercial complicity” since its local economy is unable to meet military expenditures. Funding the war economy is achieved in various ways, including via trade by local conflict groups with international corporations and institutions in unauthorised commodities, including nuclear waste. Indeed, Somalia currently functions as a transhipment point and a supply route for a wide variety of illegal merchandise for the whole of the Horn of Africa and beyond215. This touches on another fundamentally important security challenge for the IOR. It has been pointed out that seizures of smuggled radioactive material capable of making a terrorist “dirty bomb” have doubled in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), smugglers, mainly from the former Eastern bloc, have been caught attempting to traffic such materials on more than 300 occasions since 2002, with most of the incidents understood to have taken place in Europe216. IOR-ARC potentially has a very important role as a pressure group regionally and in international forums to try and eradicate the smuggling of radioactive materials into the region and to prevent dumping into the ocean.
(Note: IOR-ARC is an acronym standing for “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation”. It is a regional organization. They have recently changed their name to The Indian Ocean Rim Association. The United States is a dialogue partner of this organization.)

The impact is the death of Somali populations and unacceptable toxic colonialism



Hussein ‘10

(Dr. Bashir Mohamed Hussein, PhD, Director of SomaCent Development Research Foundation – THE “EVIDENCE OF TOXIC AND RADIOACTIVE WASTES DUMPING IN SOMALIA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY” – Paper presented in Geneva – 14th Session Panel discussion on Toxic Wastes – 8th of June, 2010 – paper available via: http://somalitalk.com/sun/toxic_waste_dumping_somalia.pdf)


Although many developing countries, especially African countries, have been victim of the adverse effects of highly toxic wastes (HTW) originated from the developed countries, the case of Somalia is particularly preoccupying. The country has been subjected to extensive illegal dumping operations of toxic and radioactive wastes since the 1980s. The HTW dumping operations that have taken place both along the coast and the hinterland have extremely adverse effects on health, livelihoods and the future prospect of sustainable development of the local population. Furthermore, along with other internationally-driven illegal economic and other strategic interests (e.g. the industrial-scale Illegal Unregulated and Unreported overfishing on the part of foreign companies), the issue of the toxic wastes dumping has contributed to the perpetuation and exacerbation of the deadly effects of the armed conflict which has been going on in Somalia for the last two decades. While Somalia itself has not yet an effective government, the international community has failed to tackle the toxic waste dumping issue and other closely related internationally-driven illegal activities in Somalia. In this respect, lack of “sufficient evidence” of toxic waste dumping in Somalia is often advanced as an argument to justify the aforementioned inaction. The purpose of this case study report is to contribute significantly to the available evidence of the long-running toxic waste dumping in Somalia and its negative impact on the enjoyment of the fundamental human rights of the affected population. Drawing on authoritative sources and careful analysis, the paper concludes that the toxic wastes dumping in Somalia is real and it has compromised (irreversibly) the human health, natural environment, food security and the long-term development prospects of the affected population. And, consequently, it has denied the victims the enjoyment of their fundamental human rights including the right to life, healthy environment and food security. To reverse this tragic trend, the paper recommends a number of concrete measures including an urgent mission on the part of the Special Rapporteur on toxic wastes to Somalia, in-depth and extensive field research, the identification, isolation and reclamation of the polluted sites and full assessment of the nature and the scale of the polluting chemicals and other hazardous wastes. It also recommends the adoption of effective deterring measures against the toxic traffickers at international level. Long before the collapse of the Somali state in January 1991, Somalia was one of the least developed countries in the world. The country’s mainly pastoral economy used to rely heavily on transhumant livestock rearing, limited farming and artisan fishing. Even today, more than ever, the livelihoods of the overwhelming majority of the population depend strictly on the state (i.e. healthiness) of the natural environment. On the other hand, in the last two decades the country has been devastated by a complex combination of a myriad of problems including political violence and protracted civil war, mass displacement of the civilians caught in the conflict (both in the form of refugees in the neighboring countries and Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs), lawlessness and the lack of effective public institutions, natural disasters and unprecedented environment degradation. Aside from the naturally occurring environmental problems such as the persistent severe droughts, Tsunami, occasional flush floods and climate change, the man-made environmental emergencies facing Somalia are particularly severe. These include, inter alia, an alarming rate of deforestation fuelled by an extensive and indiscriminate charcoal burning for export to the Middle East markets, intensive illegal overfishing on the part of foreign fleets as well as extensive large-scale dumping operations of highly toxic chemical and radioactive wastes. According to many accounts including some reports released by specialized international agencies such as the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Greenpeace and other international environmentalist organizations, Somalia has been used extensively by foreign companies and their partners as a dumping ground to dispose large quantities of highly toxic waste from the industrialized countries. Although the country already had become a victim of what is sometimes called “toxic colonialism” as early as the mid 1980s, the illegal dumping of the hazardous wastes in Somalia has become a rampant phenomenon after 1990. The impact of the toxic wastes dumping has been devastating as it has gravely compromised the human health, livelihoods sources for the local population and the quality of the natural environment. Furthermore, from the international literature it is clear that, for example in the 1990s, the Somali warring parties used to accept hazardous and highly toxic wastes in exchange of army and ammunition2. It follows that the toxic wastes dumping in Somalia has been one of the main drivers of the armed conflict that has ruined the country.
(Note to students: geographically, Somalia borders the western Indian Ocean… for this module, the Aff is arguing that the largest risk of future waste shipments to Somalia is through illegal shipments emanating from Europe. Most notably, many suggest the mafia has gotten into the business of making money by charging European firms money to dispose of waste – but at a rate cheaper than the pricey disposal fees that would be charged by European governments. This – in turn – has led the mafia to dump waste off of Somalia – which has very little government apparatus to counter such actions. The Affirmative argues increased maritime enforcement could catch illegal activities – such as those practiced by the mafia – on both the Somalian Coast and throughout the Indian Ocean.)

Reject such waste colonialism as a form of racist privilege and environmental injustice



Ejiogu ‘13

Amanze Rajesh Ejiogu is a Lecturer in Accounting and Finance at University of Abertay Dundee. Prior to joining Abertay, he lectured in Accounting and Finance at the Glyndwr University in Wrexham. He holds a Bachelor degree in Law from the University of Nigeria, a Bachelor degree in Applied Accounting from the Oxford Brookes University and a Master degree in International Strategy and Economics from the University of St Andrews. He is a Member of the Nigerian Bar Association. “E-waste economics: a Nigerian perspective” – Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal Vol. 24 No. 2, 2013 pp. 199-213 – obtained via the Emerald Insight Database



The economic rationale for exporting hazardous waste to developing countries for disposal do not take into account the principles of environmental justice which include the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies. These principles can only be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn and work (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2011). The exporting of hazardous waste to developing countries has been described in studies as a new form of waste colonialism, environmental apartheid (Kimani, 2009) and toxic terrorism (O’Keefe, 1988) while other studies have highlighted a relationship between race, socioeconomic status and the location of hazardous waste facilities (Marbury, 1995; Boer et al., 1997). This has been referred to as environmental racism or environmental injustice (Lipman, 2006).

Energy Transit – Nuclear Materials module

US Soft power is key to minimize threats to energy transit in the Indian Ocean.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)



Up until relatively recently, much of the maritime security debate has concentrated almost exclusively on its military definition and thus states have been concerned with the use of so-called “hard power” and the development of maritime strategies and maritime security policies that ignore or underplay a wide range of non-military considerations. From a military perspective, for example, “a modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control”150. As has been argued, while most strategic thinking in Australia “is locked into hard power, the oceans offer us great potential to apply soft power and creative diplomacy”151. “Soft power”, or the “second face of power”, essentially derives from the ability to shape or change the preferences of others through an appeal to the sense of attraction or duty of shared values and goals152. The emergence of US President Obama’s “new engagement” associated with the likely realisation of a broader conception of power and its use, especially the notion of “smart power”, is especially significant, not only in dealing with Indian Ocean maritime energy security threats. As a result, in addition to the military component, a much more broadly based maritime security strategy would incorporate a wide range of economic, environmental, political and social considerations and thus require greater interorganisational collaboration within states and the amelioration of “bureaucratic sclerosis” for its successful implementation153154. Furthermore, while ocean littoral states will endeavour to develop their individual maritime security strategies, in the final analysis, securing the maritime environment, which among other things involves the building of an internationally stable maritime regime as well as the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures, at a minimum will require regional and even global cooperation in the 21st century155156 . However, balancing maritime energy security with freedom on the high seas will necessitate a complex and delicate process of international negotiation157.

Safer energy trade in the Indian Ocean is key to check several scenarios for nuclear materials escaping onto the high seas.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)


Pressures aimed at maximising energy security have contributed to increased global demand for nuclear power, notwithstanding the Fukushima catastrophe in Japan. This in turn has led to a potential increase in environmental insecurity due to the requirement to attempt to safely dispose of larger volumes of nuclear waste materials. It is an interesting irony that, on the one hand, apart from South West Asia and South Asia, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by nuclear weapon free zones (Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Pelindaha, Treaty of Rarotonga) while, on the other hand, it is fast becoming a nuclear ocean206. Apart from the increasing number of regional nuclear weapons on land, as well as the indeterminate number on and under the ocean itself at any one time, the increasing global and regional demand for nuclear energy is having a significant impact on the structure of Indian Ocean uranium trade207. These impacts, in turn, raise a host of security questions linked to nuclear safety, uranium flows, the flows and storage of nuclear waste and the security of SLOCs in the IOR, as noted earlier. While Africa had the dubious distinction of being first choice for the dumping of European nuclear waste and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the 1980s, it was the first to respond politically to the threat of “waste colonialism”208. Prior to the ratification of the Basel Convention, many African states were especially concerned about the transboundary movement of such hazardous waste into Africa from industrialised countries and some indeed saw this process as one of the systematic dumping of nuclear waste into Africa209. At the May 1988 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers 48th Ordinary Session in Ethiopia, a resolution condemned the importation into Africa of industrial and nuclear waste as a “crime against Africa and the African people” and called upon member states to introduce import bans. The resolution condemned “all transnational corporations and enterprises involved in the introduction, in any form, of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; and demands that they clean up the areas that have already been contaminated by them”210. As a consequence of this resolution, work began on an African Convention under the auspices of the OAU shortly after the adoption of the Basel Convention, since the latter excluded nuclear waste. There was therefore a concern that certain needs of African states were not properly taken into account, and thus, while the Basel Convention was a convention of the north, there was need for a convention of the south. The resultant Bamako Convention, which was adopted in Mali in January 1991, entered into force in April 1998. Of particular international concern are the five states that have neither signed nor ratified the Bamako Convention as well as a further seven that have signed but have yet to ratify. It may be that some states have stalled either signing or ratifying in order to participate in the lucrative trade in hazardous waste211. This may well be true for the six Indian Ocean littoral states of Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia and South Africa, none of which were in the original convention signatory group of twelve states. Furthermore, of these six littoral states, two have neither signed nor ratified Bamako (Seychelles and South Africa) and a further two (Djibouti and Somalia) have yet to ratify either the Basel or Bamako conventions. The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 resulted in the washing up on Somalian beaches of many containers of nuclear and toxic waste that were illegally dumped during the early 1990s212. It has been alleged that, in at least one case, a lucrative financial agreement had been reached between the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammed and certain Swiss and Italian companies to import millions of tonnes of nuclear waste from Italy into Somalia. These companies were alleged to be under the control of the Italian mafia, and the Somalian deal was said to be only one part of so-called “ecomafia” operations213. For the Europeans, the cost per tonne (US$8) represented a fraction of the likely cost of up to US$1,000 per tonne of appropriate local treatment and disposal. Given Somalia’s strategic location and its current statelessness, such illegal or unauthorised movements of nuclear waste have potentially very significant implications not only for the human security of the Somalian population, but for the Indian Ocean environment, the Indian Ocean routes along which such flows take place, as well as the lethal prospects of the potential terrorist use of such nuclear materials. It has been noted that Somalia is a “stateless war economy”, one of the requirements of which is to engage in international “commercial complicity” since its local economy is unable to meet military expenditures. Funding the war economy is achieved in various ways, including via trade by local conflict groups with international corporations and institutions in unauthorised commodities, including nuclear waste. Indeed, Somalia currently functions as a transhipment point and a supply route for a wide variety of illegal merchandise for the whole of the Horn of Africa and beyond215. This touches on another fundamentally important security challenge for the IOR. It has been pointed out that seizures of smuggled radioactive material capable of making a terrorist “dirty bomb” have doubled in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), smugglers, mainly from the former Eastern bloc, have been caught attempting to traffic such materials on more than 300 occasions since 2002, with most of the incidents understood to have taken place in Europe216. IOR-ARC potentially has a very important role as a pressure group regionally and in international forums to try and eradicate the smuggling of radioactive materials into the region and to prevent dumping into the ocean.
(Note: IOR-ARC is an acronym standing for “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation”. It is a regional organization. They have recently changed their name to The Indian Ocean Rim Association. The US is a dialogue partner of this organization.)

Escaped waste hurts the ocean and unsafe travel could cause an accident risking huge death tolls.



Van Dyke ‘2

Jon M. Van Dyke is a Visiting Professor at Berkeley Law. He has taught International Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii. He is a leading practitioner in environmental and ocean law. He served as faculty for the Environmental Law Program at the School of Law at the Univ. of Hawaii – “The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials” – Ocean Development & International Law – vol 33:1, 77-108 – available via Taylor & Francis Database


Although the international community has taken some steps to address the risks created by the movements of ultrahazardous radioactive cargoes, important gaps still exist in the legal regime governing these activities. An apparent consensus has been reached at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to make the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks Aboard Ships (the INF Code) mandatory and to seek some clarification of the standards governing shipboard safety. But still lacking are agreements regarding salvage responsibilities, liability of shippers for damages, revision of transport cask safety standards to meet maritime accident conditions, obligations to consult regarding the best routes and to provide advance notification to concerned coastal states, the preparation of environmental assessments, and contingency planning to handle shore emergencies and salvage responsibilities. Until agreements are reached on these important matters, the shipment of these extremely dangerous or “ultrahazardous” materials will continue to violate fundamental norms of international law and comity because they place coastal nations that receive no benefit from the shipments at grave risk of environmental disaster without any legal protections. Because the shipments of ultrahazardous radioactive cargoes are increasing, it is highly advisable for concerned nations to negotiate regional protocols delineating the legal regime that applies to these maritime transports. A draft model protocol is attached at the end of this article which may provide guidance on this effort. It is also appropriate for concerned nations to consider bringing a claim against the shipping nations under the dispute resolution mechanisms established by the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. Such a claim would be based on the failure of the shipping nations to comply with their obligations under the convention to prepare and distribute environmental impact assessments, consult with affected nations, prepare emergency contingency plans, and agree to an effective liability regime in the event of an accident. Because of the grave potential risks created by these shipments and because of the failure of the shippers to meet their obligations to protect coastal nations from these risks, coastal nations may be justified under international law to take unilateral or regional action to block future shipments. During the past decade, international fears have been caused by a new cycle of sea shipments of large cargoes of highly radioactive or radiotoxic nuclear materials. In November 1992, Japan shipped 2,200 pounds (one metric ton) of plutonium in a refitted freighter called the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan, going around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa and then south of Australia and New Zealand before turning north to traverse the Pacific to Japan.1 In February 1995, the British vessel Pacific Pintail carried 28 canisters of vitrified high-level nuclear waste (HLW) in glass blocks, each weighing 1,000 pounds, going around Cape Horn at the tip of South America and then across the Pacific. In early 1997, the British vessel Pacific Teal carried 40 such canisters, going around Africa and then up through the Tasman Sea. In January 1998, the British vessel Pacific Swan carried 60 HLW canisters, going through the Caribbean and then through the Panama Canal. The Pacific Swan made a similar voyage in March 1999, carrying 40 cylinders of HLW through the Mona Passage (between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic) and then through the Panama Canal. From July 21 to September 27, 1999, the Pacific Pintail and the Pacific Teal traveled from France to Japan carrying 446 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 40 mixed plutonium/uranium oxide (MOX) fuel elements. This transport was routed around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, across the southern Indian Ocean, and then up through the Tasman Sea and the western Pacific Islands to Japan. Because each vessel was armed with three 30 mm cannons (with a 10-kilometer range), assault rifles, shotguns, hand weapons, body armor, gas masks, and a high-speed armed boat staffed by 13 U.K. Atomic Energy Authority officers,2 they were deemed to be providing armed escort for each other, although it is hard to imagine that a vessel carrying the MOX fuel could effectively protect another vessel by chasing after or interfering with an attack by a terrorist vessel. The ships “adhered to a request by the [South African] government to stay out of South Africa’s territorial waters and its larger marine EEZ.”3 One crew member suffered a damaged collarbone and a head injury when he fell during heavy seas in the South Indian Ocean and was airlifted by helicopter to Australia on August 28, 1999.4 The Pacific Swan left Cherbourg, France on December 29, 1999, carrying 104 containers of vitrified HLW and traveled through the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal, on its way to Japan.5 A year later, the Swan again made the journey, this time with the largest cargo of nuclear waste ever carried: 192 canisters of HLW, and this time traveling around Cape Horn at the tip of South America, arriving in Japan in February 2001.6 Almost simultaneously, the Pacific Pintail and the Pacific Teal went around the world the other way, around the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa, carrying 230 kilograms of plutonium and four tons of uranium contained in 28 MOX fuel assemblies.7 During this shipment, European transport officials suggested that one or two such shipments of plutonium fuel will be made each year for the next 15 years. These shipments present risks of a magnitude totally different from any previous ocean cargoes. Each of the nuclear waste canisters contains 17,000 terabecquerels in beta-gamma activity.8 The Pacific Swan, for instance, carried a staggering 96,000,000 curies of radioactivity when it traveled around Cape Horn in January 2001. The MOX fuel on the 1999 and 2001 shipments of the Pacific Teal and Pacific Pintail could be easily converted to provide the materials needed to build dozens of nuclear weapons.9 These long-lived, highly radioactive and radiotoxic nuclear materials could endanger large coastal populations or produce wide-spread, long-term radioactive contamination of the marine environment. They are extremely difficult to handle and the equipment necessary to salvage them in the event of an accident has not yet been developed.10 British representatives acknowledge that in the event of a vessel sinking “it was quite apparent that recovery from some places would not be possible.”11 But a sinking may not be the most dangerous foreseeable event. If a vessel carrying such a cargo collided with another vessel causing an intensely hot and long-lasting shipboard fire, then radioactive particles could become airborne, putting all nearby lifeforms in grave danger of catastrophic health impacts.
(Note to students: Terabecquerels are a measurement unit for radioactivity….. An example of how the Aff might solve is through agreements on safer canisters or better maritime policing security vs. illegal activity – dumping, terrorists, etc.)

Ocean harm risks destroying all life on Earth.



Craig ‘3

Robin Kundis Craig has a background in several disciplines. She served as a member the U.S. National Research Council's committee to assess the effects of the Clean Water Act’s regulation of the Mississippi River. She is currently a Professor at Florida State University College of Law. She is a leading environmental law scholar who has written important works on water and ocean and coastal issues. Professor Craig is the author of The Clean Water Act and the Constitution (Environmental Law Institute 2004), Environmental Law in Context (West 2005). Professor Craig also served as a tenured professor at the Indiana University-Indianapolis School of Law.[2], Winter, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, Lexis



The world’s oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable. “Occupying more than seventy percent of the Earth’s surface and ninety-five percent of the biosphere,” oceans provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life, both aesthetic and economic, for millions of people worldwide. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the ocean to humanity’s well-being: “The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate.” Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. In addition, many people assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world’s seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact to future generations. (It continues…) More generally, “ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorous, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements”. In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet’s ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem’s ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, “indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable. Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: If we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, 863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." 864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.




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