Arctic Oil/Gas Neg



Download 2.21 Mb.
Page5/63
Date18.10.2016
Size2.21 Mb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   63

Russia=Spoiler

Us-Russian relations determine outcome of future Arctic co-op


Andersen and Perry 12

(Perry, M. Charles. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, officer in the USAR, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies IFPA. Andersen, Bobby, MA in international relations from Boston University and a BA in political science from Whittier College, completed coursework at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. IFPA. "Implications for National Security and International Cooperation." New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region. Institute for Foreign Policy Relations, n.d. Web. 25 July 2014. http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf.) ʕっ•ᴥ•ʔっ♥eve

Ultimately, future cooperation in the Arctic region will remain closely tied to the quality of overall Russian- Western relations. Deeply entrenched mistrust of the United States and NATO, as well as a penchant for the idea of expansion, which resonates strongly in Russian society, will not allow relations to transform overnight. In the meantime, it should be kept in mind that Russian military presence in the Arctic is neither new nor likely to dramatically increase in the future, in light of domestic constraints on military restructuring and investment. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, most notably the icy climate, economic and military activities in the Arctic will remain fairly limited in the near term. As a result, there may now be an adequate transition period within which to begin restructuring transarctic relations in a way that fosters cooperation rather than competition with Moscow.


2NC/1NR – Link Wall

They lower prices real bad


Dlouhy 12-17 (Jennifer, "Environmentalists to challenge offshore lease sales," www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Environmentalists-to-challenge-offshore-lease-4122479.php)

Talberth noted a current glut of natural gas from drilling on land. Gas recovered offshore would compete with those supplies, possibly further suppressing the relatively low price for that fossil fuel.


OCS restrictions on drilling prevents lower prices


Lieberman 8 (Ben, Senior Policy Analyst, "Lifting the Offshore Drilling Ban: A Positive Step in the Fight against High Energy Prices," Heritage Foundation,www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/07/lifting-the-offshore-drilling-ban-a-positive-step-in-the-fight-against-high-energy-prices)

Washington must do something about the increasing price of gasoline, now topping $4 per gallon. One important step would be to tap our own supplies of oil. Yet for decades, overlapping congressional and presidential restrictions on drilling for energy in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) have stood in the way of lower prices for oil and natural gas.The President took a positive step today by rescinding the executive moratorium on exploration and production in American waters. However, Congress still needs to act in order to make this oil available.¶ Congressional Restrictions on Drilling¶ Many of America's offshore areas are off-limits to energy production. Beginning in 1982, Congress restricted more and more offshore areas through annual Department of the Interior (DOI) appropriations. The DOI has authority over the OCS, which includes most areas more than three miles offshore. Through this annual process, Congress chose to deny DOI the funding necessary to conduct leasing of new offshore areas to oil and natural gas companies.¶ These off-limits areas comprise 85 percent of the OCS-almost everywhere except the central and western Gulf of Mexico-and the congressional moratoria have become a standard feature of each year's DOI appropriations bill. Until recent years, these restrictions were easily renewed with little controversy, but with the dramatic rise in oil and natural gas prices, as well as the desire to reduce oil imports from unfriendly foreign countries, there have been several legislative efforts to roll them back. Thus far, none of these efforts has been successful.¶ Most recently, H.R. 6108, the Deep Ocean Energy Resources (DOER) Act, would allow each coastal state to decide whether and where it wants drilling off its coast out to 100 miles. Beyond 100 miles from the coast, states would not have veto power; thus, deepwater areas would be open to exploration and production. The bill also has provisions for revenue sharing between the federal government and each state that allows drilling, similar to provisions that allow drilling on federal lands. The bill is modeled after the 2006 DOER Act, which passed the House but was never considered in the Senate.¶ In addition, H.R. 2784, the National Environment and Energy Development Act, would also open up much of America's waters to energy production. Despite having 171 co-sponsors, it has yet to be allowed to come to a vote.¶ Lifting the White House Opposition to Drilling¶ In 1990, President George H. W. Bush issued a presidential directive restricting new offshore exploration and drilling. In 1998, President Bill Clinton extended these restrictions through 2012. For his first seven years in office, the current President had not seen fit to lift the moratorium, and he was unhelpful during debate over the 2006 DOER Act.¶ Now the President has lifted the executive branch restrictions and said that he will support legislation opening the OCS. If Congress is serious about addressing high energy costs, it should quickly send legislation to the President that removes restrictions on these vital energy reserves.¶ Tremendous Potential with Little Risk¶ These restrictions effectively banned new offshore energy production off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, parts of offshore Alaska, and the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Recent DOI estimates put the amount of energy in these off-limits areas at 19.1 billion barrels of oil and 83.9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas-approximately 30 years' worth of imports from Saudi Arabia and enough natural gas to power America's homes for 17 years. It should also be noted that these initial estimates tend to be low.¶ OCS restrictions are a relic of the past. They were put in place at a time when energy was cheap, the need for additional domestic supplies was not seen as dire, and the political path of least resistance was to give in to environmentalists. All that has changed, with more than a quadrupling of oil and natural gas prices since the restrictions were first imposed. Extra energy is badly needed, and the risk of producing it has been reduced. All new drilling would be subject to strict safeguards and would require state-of-the-art technology with a proven track record for limiting the risk of spills.

OCS drilling lowers prices


AGI 6 (American Geoscience Institute, "Summar of Hearings on Natural Gas," July 7, www.agiweb.org/gap/legis109/naturalgas_hearings.html)

James Kendell, Director of the Natural Gas Division at the Energy Information Administration, discussed recent data collected on natural gas prices. He stated that the price hike of last winter was caused by supply problems from the hurricane season and increased consumption by the electric generation utilities. However, that spike doesn't reflect a trend for the near future. "Natural gas prices are projected to be lower for the rest of 2006…down $1.12 per thousand cubic feet from last year," projected Kendell. In addition, the prospect of increased drilling may help drive prices even lower. The next witness described the potential of outer continental shelf (OCS) drilling to reduce natural gas prices. "The OCS is a major supplier of natural gas, and supplies more gas than any state other than Texas," described Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Director of the Minerals Management Service. "In recent years, the strongest growth has been in the deep water OCS (over 1000ft)…This has been a major success story, with 90 new wells being drilled," he said. He also described the effect major weather events have on the ability to recover natural gas, and stated "Since the onset of Hurricane Katrina, 9% of [recoverable Gulf of Mexico] gas has remained shut in." Future severe weather catastrophes may have a similar impact on the ability to drill, and thus cause short term price spikes. He concluded his testimony by reviewing the potential of the OCS to supply natural gas. "There are 420 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, recoverable gas," he said, "leaving great potential for expanded OCS drilling." Tom Lonnie, the Assistant Director for Minerals, Realty and Resource Protection Directorate at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), briefly reviewed the role of the BLM in exploring for and recovering natural gas. "BLM administers over 45,000 oil and gas leases, of which over 23,000 are producing… [BLM] ensures production on public lands in an environmentally friendly way," he said. Lonnie also commented that the demand for natural gas has long surpassed the domestic capacity to supply more, leaving the price of natural gas open to volatility and fluctuation.¶ Witnesses from the private sector also discussed their concern with high natural gas prices. Richard Goodstein, a Washington representative for Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., described the critical role of natural gas in producing hydrogen. "The country will need the building block of hydrogen, natural gas," he said. Hydrogen may possibly be the nation's primary transportation fuel in the next 20 to 30 years, however, the hydrogen industry across the nation is in the early stages of development. Even so, in some regions of the country, the hydrogen industry has made significant progress into the market place in recent years. "In some places in California, hydrogen is available as a cost competitive fuel…with appropriate government support, the U.S. can have a competitive edge in the development of hydrogen," reflected Goodstein.¶ Jeff Uhlenburg, President of the Donovan Heat Treating Company, described how his business struggled to operate during the last major increase in natural gas prices. Gas supply to his plant is cut off when supplies are low because electric utility demand is high. "Small business cannot compete with the electric utilities for natural gas," he said. This has a large impact on the cost of running his plant because they have to switch to propane, which is significantly more expensive than methane. Last year this resulted in major layoffs. Uhlenberg also encouraged members to allow continued development of natural gas. "Government should continue to give incentives for the market to work…and allow fast track environmental permitting as long as they meet reasonable limits on emissions," he said. In his final comments, Uhlenburg also noted the importance of energy efficiency. "Conservation and efficiency is something each and every one of us can do right. Each business should work to conserve as much as possible."¶ Paul Wilkinson, Vice President of Policy Analysis at the American Gas Association, discussed the need for greater access to natural gas reserves. He commented on several congressional initiatives to expand natural gas drilling. "Drilling in the outer continental shelf is a step in the right direction," he said. "The three major steps to reduce the price of natural gas are to unlock domestic sources of natural gas, expand infrastructure like the Alaskan pipeline, and invest in liquefied natural gas receiving terminals at our ports," he said. Before these steps are taken, "the winds of weather" will always have an effect on prices.

Link – Offshore Drilling

Offshore drilling lowers prices


Cohen 4 (Bonner, "Continental Shelf's Energy Riches a Potential Bonanza for Cash-Strapped States," National States, www.nationalcenter.org/NPA507.html)

Their plan would end the federal ban on offshore drilling for oil and natural gas, while allowing coastal states to decide whether they want energy development off their shores. America has abundant reserves of oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf. But most of the mineral-rich area is off-limits to energy exploration thanks to bans imposed by the federal government. The bans were first imposed by Congress on an annual basis in 1982, and were extended for ten years by Presidents Bush in 1990 and Clinton in 1998. Currently, only the only areas open to oil and gas exploration are in the central and western Gulf of Mexico and in some waters off Alaska.1¶ Fed by a growing population and by the proliferation of electricity-hungry high-tech gadgetry, demand for energy has soared in recent years. Yet, at the start of this decade, the nation produces 14 percent less natural gas than it did in 1973.2 Natural gas is used to heat 60 percent of America's homes and supplies electricity for 40 percent of U.S. businesses.3 Unless the widening gap between supply and demand is closed - and closed quickly - our nascent economic recovery is in jeopardy.¶ This is where the State Enhanced Authority for Coastal and Offshore Resources Act (SEACOR) comes in. Under the draft legislation, offshore state boundaries would be expanded seaward to nine nautical miles - from the current three. States would be able to control all resource development within those nine miles. Existing drilling leases would be exempted, but states would receive 27 percent of the royalties. The plan also gives states the right to veto all or part of oil and gas leasing up to 50 miles from shore proposed by the federal Department of Interior.¶ Beyond 50 miles (in 25-mile increments up to 100 miles), states could reject oil and gas leasing proposals.4 As an inducement not to exercise their veto rights, states would be offered revenues from the drilling they do allow. The more drilling allowed, the more money the states would receive. According to estimates by the House Resources Committee staffers, the proposal would generate $108 to $175 billion in revenues to states between 2004 and 2067, depending on the level of energy extracted. What's more, all 50 states would share in some of the revenue, giving inland states such as Tennessee, Missouri, Iowa and Colorado a stake in the Outer Continental Shelf.5 ¶ Dramatic advances in drilling technology have made offshore exploration environmentally safe. Indeed, as Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) pointed out in a Houston Chronicle story, those concerned about the environmental impact of oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico should really be worried about the risk of spills from oil tankers. If drilling in restricted in the waters off of the United States, needs would naturally dictate the increased use of tankers to import oil from abroad.6 Canada has already taken advantage of new, safe drilling technologies in the waters off its maritime provinces and is considering exploration and development of energy resources off its Pacific coast.7¶ By denying itself resources which are readily available to it, the United States is undermining its own future. In a recent letter to Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and Representative Billy Tauzin (R-LA), then chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 25 trade associations, including the National Association of Manufacturers, American Farm Bureau Federation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, pointed to soaring natural gas prices and their economic implications. "If there is no substantial change in natural gas policy," they wrote, "we will continue to see lost manufacturing jobs, and Americans will have an unlegislated tax of tens of billions of dollars imposed on them because of high prices caused by government restrictions on access to our nation's natural gas resources."8

Link – Capacity

Increased supply leads to lower prices


DOI 11 (Department of Interior, "Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program," Bureau of Ocean Energy MAnagement, www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/Proposed_OCS_Oil_Gas_Lease_Program_2012-2017.pdf)

Net pipeline imports of natural gas, primarily from Canada and Mexico, are projected to decline ¶ ¶ about 14 percent annually from 2.23 tcf in 2009 to about 0.04 tcf in 2035. This decline is due to ¶ ¶ reserve depletion and growing domestic demand in those countries, along with abundant supply and accompanying lower prices in the United States. Net imports of liquefied natural gas are ¶ expected to decrease from 0.41 tcf in 2009 to 0.14 tcf by 2035. Some have speculated that the ¶ United States could even export liquefied natural gas during peak world demand periods, ¶ especially in light of the much higher natural gas prices prevailing in other markets. ¶ Meeting Energy Needs ¶


Natural gas abundance lowers natural gas prices


IER 12 (Institute for Energy Research, "Abundant Natural Gas Means Low Prices, Increased Trade Potential," www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/04/19/abundant-natural-gas-means-low-prices-trade-potential/)

The abundance of domestic natural gas supplies has pushed down the futures price of natural gas by 59 percent since it peaked last summer at $4.85 per thousand cubic feet. Recently, the natural gas futures price dipped below $2 per thousand cubic feet. The last time it went below $2 was January 28, 2002, when it hit $1.91. [viii]


David Impact

Collapse leads to global nuclear war, spills over, and leads to loose nukes – comparatively the largest impact


David 99

Steven R., professor of political science @ the john Hopkins U, Foreign Affairs, January/February, LN



AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918 -- 20 has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups -- the Russian Mafia -- increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

Loose Nukes Impact Extension


Secession leads to loose nukes – chechens will use them against moscow

Allison 4

Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, September/October. “Nuclear Terrorism: How Serious a Threat to Russia?” Russia in Global Affairs, http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/660/nuclear_terrorism.html.

A careful reader of the discussion in the Russian and American national security community could conclude that Americans are more concerned about the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack than are Russians. Specifically, American experts have described more vividly potential nuclear terrorist attacks on U.S. soil than have Russians, at least in the writings and conversations that are publicly accessible. Why this is the case is a puzzle. No one doubts that in Chechen fighters Russia faces serious, capable, determined adversaries. Moreover, if Chechnya succeeded in capturing, stealing, or buying a nuclear weapon (or material from which they could make a nuclear weapon), their first target would surely be Moscow, not New York or Washington DC.

Leads to global access to nuclear weapons – will undoubtedly be used on russia


Allison 5

Graham, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Google Book



Chechen separatists have a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and material to use in their campaign against Russia. Aside from the submarine plot, Chechen militants made off with radioactive materials from a Grozny nuclear waste plant in January 2000; stole radioactive metals- possibly including some plutonium- from the Volgodonskaya nuclear power station in the southern region of Rostov between July 2001 and July 2002; and cased the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia. Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist organizations are among their largest sources of financial support. While the Chechens’ target of choice for their first nuclear terrorist attack will surely be Moscow, that fact provides little comfort for Americas. If the Chechens are successful in acquiring several nuclear bombs, their Al Qaeda brethren could well find themselves the means to match their motivation.

Nuclear terrorism on Russia means extinction—Russia has a “dead hand” device that will set off in response to a nuclear attack—this isn’t a myth and the most qualified expert in the field says it exists


Rosenbaum 7

Ron Rosenbaum, award winning journalist and author, 8/31/2007. “The Return of the Doomsday Machine?” Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2173108/pagenum/all/



"The nuclear doomsday machine." It's a Cold War term that has long seemed obsolete. And even back then, the "doomsday machine" was regarded as a scary conjectural fiction. Not impossible to create—the physics and mechanics of it were first spelled out by U.S. nuclear scientist Leo Szilard—but never actually created, having a real existence only in such apocalyptic nightmares as Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. In Strangelove, the doomsday machine was a Soviet system that automatically detonated some 50 cobalt-jacketed hydrogen bombs pre-positioned around the planet if the doomsday system's sensors detected a nuclear attack on Russian soil. Thus, even an accidental or (as in Strangelove) an unauthorized U.S. nuclear bomb could set off the doomsday machine bombs, releasing enough deadly cobalt fallout to make the Earth uninhabitable for the human species for 93 years. No human hand could stop the fully automated apocalypse. An extreme fantasy, yes. But according to a new book called Doomsday Men and several papers on the subject by U.S. analysts, it may not have been merely a fantasy. According to these accounts, the Soviets built and activated a variation of a doomsday machine in the mid-'80s. And there is no evidence Putin's Russia has deactivated the system. Instead, something was reactivated in Russia last week. I'm referring to the ominous announcement—given insufficient attention by most U.S. media (the Economist made it the opening of a lead editorial on Putin's Russia)—by Vladimir Putin that Russia has resumed regular "strategic flights" of nuclear bombers. (They may or may not be carrying nuclear bombs, but you can practically hear Putin's smirking tone as he says, "Our [nuclear bomber] pilots have been grounded for too long. They are happy to start a new life.") These twin developments raise a troubling question: What are the United States' and Russia's current nuclear policies with regard to how and when they will respond to a perceived nuclear attack? In most accounts, once the president or Russian premier receives radar warning of an attack, they have less than 15 minutes to decide whether the warning is valid. The pressure is on to "use it or lose it"—launch our missiles before they can be destroyed in their silos. Pressure that makes the wrong decision more likely. Pressure that makes accidental nuclear war a real possibility. Once you start to poke into this matter, you discover a disturbing level of uncertainty, which leads me to believe we should be demanding that the United States and Russia define and defend their nuclear postures. Bush and Putin should be compelled to tell us just what "failsafe" provisions are installed on their respective nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines—what the current provisions against warning malfunctions are and what kinds of controls there are over the ability of lone madman nuclear bombers to bring on the unhappy end of history. As for the former Soviet Union, the possible existence of a version of a doomsday machine is both relevant and disturbing. In the Strangelove film, the Soviet ambassador tells the president and generals in the U.S. war room that the device was designed to deter a surprise attack, the kind of attack that might otherwise prevent retaliation by "decapitating" the Soviet command structure. The automated system would insure massive world-destroying retaliation even if the entire Soviet leadership were wiped out—or had second thoughts. As a result, some referred to it as the "dead hand" doomsday device. It is Dr. Strangelove himself, the madman U.S. nuclear strategist played by Peter Sellers, who detects the flaw in this plan. After being apprised of the system's existence by the Soviet ambassador, and the likelihood of its being triggered by a U.S. bomber on an unauthorized mission to nuke its Soviet target, Dr. Strangelove exclaims: Yes, but the ... whole point of the doomsday machine ... is lost ... if you keep it a secret! Why didn't you tell the world, eh? In other words, a doomsday machine kept secret is no good for deterrence, only for retaliation by extinction. Did the Soviets actually design a variation on a doomsday device and not tell us about it? And could an accidental or terrorist nuclear attack on Putin's Russia (by Chechens, for instance) trigger an antiquated automated dead-hand system and launch missiles capable of killing tens, maybe hundreds, of millions at unknown targets that might include the United States? Up until Aug. 10 of this year, I would have thought these questions were best consigned to the realm of apocalyptic film fantasy. But on that day I came upon a startling essay in the London Times Literary Supplement. It was a review (titled "Deadly Devices") of a book recently published in the United Kingdom: Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Superweapon by nuclear-age historian P.D. Smith of University College London. (It will be out in the United States in December.) The TLS reviewer, Christopher Coker (who is on the faculty of the London School of Economics), asserted that the book demonstrates that "only after the Berlin Wall had been breached and ... the Cold War began to thaw did military analysts realize the Russians had actually built a version of the [doomsday] device. The details of this top-secret Soviet system were first revealed in 1993 by Bruce G. Blair, a former American ICBM launch control officer, now one of the country's foremost experts on Russian arms. Fearing that a sneak attack by American submarine-launched missiles might take Moscow out in 13 minutes, the Soviet leadership had authorized the construction of an automated communication network, reinforced to withstand a nuclear strike. At its heart was a computer system similar to the one in Dr. Strangelove. Its code name was Perimetr. It went fully operational in January 1985. It is still in place."

Even if chechens won’t use nukes, russians will


Pandita 1

Dr. K.N., obtained his M.A. in Persian from the Panjab U and Ph.D. in Iranian from Teheran U, He served as a long time as professor in the Persian Department and the Centre of Central Asian Studies @ the Jammu and Kashmir U, http://www.kashmir-information.com/KNPandita/article9.html



Tthis decision of the Taliban came on the heels of a significant development in Moscow. Only two days ago, Moscow announced that Russian Federation had formulated a new security doctrine that was an improvement on the one announced in 1996. The Acting President, Vladimir Putin approved the 21-page doctrine. Among other things, it says that Russia would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if the insurgents and other destabilizing forces out to work towards disintegration of Russia, threatened its integrity and sovereignty. Some political analysts think that this step has been taken in the background of intensified fighting in Chechnya and the possibility of its escalation. But others think that for some time, Moscow has been uneasy with what it has called the steady encroachment of NATO in Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, Russian disapproval of NATO’s role began with the latter’s air attacks on Yugoslavia, once a strong East European ally of the erstwhile Soviet Union. That marked the determination of Russia not to allow the Western powers to sideline her in European and global strategies as a power and make her irrelevant. In another development, the 41-member European community is sending its delegation to Moscow to discuss Chechnyan situation. The British representative, John Russell, heading the delegation, has made no bones of what the delegation intends to convey to Moscow. He said that the European community might consider expulsion of Russia from its membership if it does not halt what it calls violation of human rights in Chechnya by the Russian troops. Nobody doubts the double standards employed by the European community and the US in regard to the violation of human rights. The imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq depriving millions of infants from milk and essential medicines are not considered violation of human rights by them. Likewise, the heavy bombardment of Yugoslavia destroying the vital infrastructure in that country and crippling civilian administration with disastrous consequences for the populace are not violation of human rights in their lexicon. Chechnyan affair is much more complicated than what may appear at the surface. If it were just a separatist movement, perhaps its resolution could be envisioned in terms of negotiations. But Chechnya is the hotbed of Islamic fundamentalist activities aimed at disintegration of Russian Federation by fanning religious frenzy among the local Muslim population. The Wahhabi ideology emanating from Saudi Arabia with strong and effective disseminating centres in Pakistan and Taliban Afghanistan, is entrenched in  Chechnyan Muslim segment. Apart from ideological subversion, the Chechyn fighting men are provided with an inventory of latest automatic and other lethal weapons forming part of the supplies made earlier by the Americans to the Afghan mujahideen during the war with Soviet Union. Now the Chechyn separatist cadres receive enormous arms, ammunition and funding directly from a number of Islamic organizations world over, and indirectly from some of the theocratic Islamic States with an agenda of boosting Wahhabi ideology in the Caucasus and Central Asian region. The role of Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi Islamic warlord responsible for the bomb attacks on two American embassies in Africa in August 1998 resulting in the killing of several hundred innocent people, cannot be overlooked. Osma is reported to be hiding in Afghanistan and is protected by the Taliban. Talks between Taliban and American authorities for the extradition of Osma have not yielded any result, The Taliban proudly say that Afghans don’t betray a guest. But there is something more than that in the story. There are rumours that the 15-year old daughter of Osama Bin Laden is married to Mull Omar, the Taliban chief. Though some Taliban official sources have tried to contradict this rumour, yet it is getting rounds again. As such, extradition of Osama, as demanded by the Americans, may never materialize. This must have been one of the factors that made the Taliban decide to grant recognition to Chechyn Republic. The Afghan fighting force - Taliban - have, evidently, become the strong muscle for propagation and dissemination of Wahhabi ideology. This means that the Taliban and their cohorts among known extremist organizations would be taking on Russia even if the Chechyn crisis is somehow resoloved. This is the agenda of these organizations. Significantly, the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami chief has recently pronounced that they would not allow Pakistan’s military regime to sign CTBT under the US pressure because the nuclear bomb produced by Pakistan belonged not only to Pakistan but also to the entire Muslim ummah. In other words, it means that in the context of Chechyn crisis, it is not only the separatists, but the entire Islamic ummah that is pitted against the Russians. Pakistan (its extremist religious organizations or the regimes) would undoubtedly give a befitting response to Russia if the latter decides to use nuclear weapons in Chechyn war. Do we have the real nucler flash point in Kashmir or in the Caucasus?

AT: Europe Key



With gas production dropping in the U.S. Russia sees the US market as a key focal point of natural gas exports in the future.


Millerj 8

Alexy, Chairman of Gazprom , Gazprom, invites you to tap Russia's natural gas 6/27/08, Commodity Online http://www.commodityonline.com/news/globalview/Gazprom-invites-you-to-tap-Russias-natural-gas-9977-3.html

Global challenges require global efforts for their resolution. For this reason, the sphere of our interests in not limited to the European continent. It is well known that gas production has been steadily dropping in the United States in recent years (by more than 30 billion cubic meter between 2001 and 2006), while Russia over the same period has been able to boost production by 70 billion cubic meters. Gazprom has unique experience, know-how, and modern technologies, and is the world’s most advanced company in the field of gas transmission via high-pressure gas pipelines. For this reason, for example, we are also interested in taking part in such major projects as the construction of a gas pipeline from Alaska. We have already made a related proposal to our partners –ConocoPhillips and BP. Gazprom hopes to serve the North American market from 2014 with liquefied natural gas from its proposed Shtokman project off Russia’s north coast. “We are currently assessing several options of accessing the North American market,” he said, adding that Gazprom had received “many interesting proposals” from Canadian companies. He also confirmed that Gazprom was interested in the proposed Alaska gas pipeline. In the coming years Gazprom will be not just a major company in the world, but the most influential in the energy business,” adding that its target was to reach a market capitalisation of $1,000bn.

US Key – Russia is too competitive to be lucrative for Russia


Fee 3

former executive with Chevron and Mobil, is managing director and chairman of F C Fee International, Inc, an energy risk management consultancy based in London, Russian And Iranian Gas And Future US Energy Security” IRAN/RUSSIA, VOL. XLVI No 37, 15-September-2003, http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a46n37d01.htm

Russian Gas Exports To The US

The US, faced with declining domestic gas production and rising gas demand for gas-fired power plants, will soon need to accelerate its importation of LNG. The US government, having recognized the need for action to protect and ensure US energy security, has already signaled its interest in possible Russian gas exports to both the US east and west coasts (Gulf of Mexico coast not being feasible for Russian exports). The Russian government, likewise, has begun to recognize the US as a potentially lucrative new export gas market. In 2003, the Russian government decided to enter for the first time the LNG export market, and to refocus its export gas strategy towards the US as a high priority. Moscow now sees the US gas market as highly lucrative as opposed to the European market which is mature and highly competitive, the latter especially true as a result of recent EU gas market liberalization. Nevertheless, Europe will continue to be of great importance for Moscow as proof of Russia maintaining its reputation as a reliable long-term supplier of pipeline gas.


AT: Oil Outweighs

Natural gas is key to Russia’s economy – it’s more sustainable than oil


Hill 2

(Fiona, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, “Russia: The 21st Century's Energy Superpower?”, Spring, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_russia_hill.aspx



Last fall and winter, as tensions increased in the Middle East and as speculation grew that the Bush administration might extend the war on terrorism into Iraq, the world's news media began trumpeting Russia as a new power in global energy markets. In the Washington Post in December, David Ignatius claimed that Moscow is "on its way to becoming the next Houston—the global capital of energy." By January, Russia's President Putin had been hailed by a Canadian paper as "the world's new oil Czar," and the Russian media were replete with commentary on Russia's role as the power broker in world energy markets. The heightened media attention has raised the possibility that Russia could take on OPEC and help shift global oil supply away from the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Could Russia be poised to become an energy superpower in the 21st century? The short answer is yes, but not in the near future—and not in oil. Russia may well break into some global energy markets as an alternative supplier to unstable states in the Persian Gulf. But Russia's energy future is in natural gas. As the next decade unfolds, continued crises in the Middle East and growing concern about pollution and global climate change will inevitably focus attention on Russia's vast reserves of cheaper, cleaner natural gas. Russia's success in international gas markets, however, is not a given. It will depend on major increases in production, serious investments—both foreign and domestic—in infrastructure, and the development of fully functioning gas markets in Asia. Petrodollars and the Russian Economy Gas and oil have been the mainstay of the Soviet and now Russian economy for decades. Energy accounts for about half of Russian export earnings. According to Brookings economist Clifford Gaddy, "Every dollar's increase in the price of a barrel of petroleum translates into roughly $1.5-$2.0 billion of additional yearly export revenues." During 1999-2000, energy exports accounted for some 90 percent of Russia's growth in GDP. Thanks to high oil prices, at the end of 2001 the economy had enjoyed its best three-year performance since 1966-69. Russia's oil industry slumped badly during the 1990s. As the economy contracted sharply from 1990 to 1995, domestic demand for oil fell more than 40 percent, causing a glut on the domestic market. Capacity limits in the country's pipeline system kept lucrative oil exports down. Between 1988 and 1998, Russian oil production fell almost in half—from 11 million to around 6 million barrels a day (mbd). Drilling fell off sharply, as did investment. International investors exploring the Russian oil industry were scared away by the uncertain business climate. Russian oil seemed like a money-loser. Russia's August 1998 financial crisis, the devaluation of the ruble, and the subsequent—although entirely unrelated—rise in oil prices revived the industry. The devaluation drastically lowered input costs for Russian energy producers, while sharply higher oil prices boosted revenues even without new investments or production increases. In 2001, oil companies boosted production and expanded their international reach. Russian companies are drilling for oil in Algeria, Sudan, and Libya. In 2000, LUKoil acquired a chain of gas stations along a stretch of the American East Coast and planned to strengthen its position in the United States by refining crude oil. In Eastern Europe, LUKoil acquired refineries in Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria; and YUKOS purchased a major stake in Transpetrol, a Slovak crude pipeline operator. New regulatory instruments and fixed tax rates implemented by the Putin government in 2001 greatly improved the investment climate for international operators. In October 2001, Exxon Mobil announced a five-year $4 billion commitment—Russia's largest single foreign investment to date—to its projects in Sakhalin, Russia's energy-rich island in the North Pacific. By the end of 2001, Russia was becoming a real international energy player. New stretches of export pipelines had been completed, and a new Russian oil terminal was operating on the Gulf of Finland. Russia concluded an ambitious agreement with the European Union on long-term energy cooperation that would increase oil exports to its neighbor. The European Union already buys more than half of Russia's total oil exports, accounting for some 16 percent of its oil consumption. Limits on Russian Oil But for all its recent success, Russia will never displace OPEC in world oil markets. Over the long term, it cannot match OPEC's oil reserves. In oil production, Russia ranks third behind Saudi Arabia and the United States, at just over 7 mbd. In exports, it ranks second, at about 4 mbd, behind Saudi Arabia with close to 7 mbd. But it ranks seventh in proven oil reserves, with only 5 percent—as against the OPEC countries' collective 77 percent. Because of OPEC's huge reserve base the International Energy Agency predicts that increases in world production during 2010-20 will primarily be from Middle East OPEC countries. One sign of Russia's reserve limits is that its recent oil industry boom was caused by increases in oil prices, not production. In fact, Russia has yet to restore production to the 11 mbd peak it reached before the collapse of the USSR. And high production costs, together with its limited reserves, will keep Russia from increasing its production capacity far beyond that point. It costs Saudi Arabia a little more than $5 to produce a barrel of oil; it costs Russia, on average, twice that. If global recession and depressed world demand send oil prices down again, Russian oil companies could easily slide back into the troubles of the 1990s. For Russia, oil is too volatile a commodity on which to bet its entire future. Turning Up the Gas Will Russia fare any better with natural gas? Many in Russia's energy complex think so, and many Russian oil companies are expanding their activities in the gas sector. Russia's gas reserves far exceed those of any other country. Indeed, Russia is to natural gas what Saudi Arabia is to oil. With 32 percent of proven world reserves, Russia far outranks Iran (15 percent), Qatar (7 percent), Saudi Arabia and the UAE (4 percent), and the United States and Algeria (3 percent). Single-handedly, Gazprom, Russia's giant gas company, holds a quarter of all world gas reserves, controls 90 percent of Russian output, and is Russia's largest earner of hard currency. Its tax payments account for around 25 percent of total federal government tax revenues. Although oil remains the dominant global fuel source, natural gas is increasing in importance. It now accounts for about 23 percent of world energy consumption and will soon displace coal (at just over 24 percent) in world markets. Increased use of liquefied natural gas and improvements in pipeline technology have transformed gas from a local commodity into an international business.

Relations Mod

Gas exports key to relations


America.gov 5

Russia, United States Seek To Intensify Energy Cooperation,” 2/24/05 http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/February/20050224142819SAikceinawz0.4095423.html



Russia, United States Seek To Intensify Energy Cooperation Pipeline system, liquefied natural gas viewed as areas of interest The United States and Russia have pledged to intensify their cooperation on removing barriers to energy trade and investment and other issues through the existing energy dialogue. President Bush and President Putin said in a joint statement issued after their February 24 meeting in Bratislava, the Slovak Republic, that they want U.S. and Russian officials to develop recommendations and specific proposals in areas of energy security, transparency, commercial energy partnerships and energy-related environmental problems. The statement cited support for the expansion of the pipeline system and liquefied natural gas capacity in Russia with a view that such enhancements, together with a more transparent business and investment environment, will help increase Russian oil and gas exports to the U.S. and other markets. At a news conference following the meeting Putin said: “In the years 2010, 2011, a large amount of liquefied natural gas can be supplied from Russia to the United States.” Several energy projects should be initiated no later than 2008, the statement said. According to the U.S. Energy Department's Energy Information Administration, Russia has the world's largest natural gas reserves and the eighth-largest reserve of proven crude oil. The original 2002 joint statement of the two leaders in which they launched the U.S.-Russia Energy Dialogue can be viewed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-8.html. Following is the text of the 2005 joint statement: THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary (Bratislava, Slovak Republic) February 24, 2005 Joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin U.S.-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION Cooperation on energy issues remains an area of great promise for U.S.-Russian relations.  We will work further to realize the vision for our energy cooperation in all aspects described in our statement in May 2002, including through the mechanisms of the Commercial Energy Dialogue and the Energy Working Group.  Accordingly, we have instructed our ministers to continue their energy dialogue, concentrating on ways to enhance energy security, diversify energy supplies, improve the transparency of the business and investment environment, reduce obstacles to increased commercial energy partnerships, and develop resources in an environmentally safe manner. We call upon our Ministers of Energy and Commerce to develop recommendations, which we can support at one of our upcoming meetings, on how to further intensify and develop our energy dialogue.  Those recommendations will focus on identifying barriers to energy trade and investment, promoting initiatives to remove them on the basis of predictability, fairness and law, and suggesting specific proposals for cooperating in developing energy trade and investment. We will promote the creation of transparent tax, legal, regulatory, and contractual conditions for our companies' cooperation, and support Russia's pipeline system development, which will create the preconditions for increasing deliveries of oil and gas export, including to the U.S. market. We are interested in increasing U.S. commercial investment in Russia, so as to create additional capacity for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Russia, and also with the aim of increasing LNG exports to U.S. markets.  We would welcome increased Russian oil exports to the world market and an increased presence of imports from Russia in the United States.  We would also welcome expanding mutual investments in the energy sectors of both countries.

Strong US- Russian relations are necessary to access pretty much ever major impact imaginable


Nixon Center 3

Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-Russian Relationship: INTERIM REPORT,” SEPTEMBER 2K3 HTTP://WWW.NIXONCENTER.ORG/PUBLICATIONS/MONOGRAPHS/FR.HTM



The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question: why does Russia matter?  How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia?  Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests?  As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests.  Why? § First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions.  By virtue of its size and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia.  Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan.  In addition, Russia shares the world’s longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests.  The bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s geopolitical weight still exceeds that of London or Paris. § Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere.  Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic challenges, including in the war on terrorism. § Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States.  Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically since the Cold War.  But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not being used against America or our allies. § Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is essential in combating the threat of “loose nukes.”  The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. § Fifth, Russian stockpiles, technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons.  Working with Russia may similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines. § Sixth, as the world’s largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy. § Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests.  In a world in which many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America’s success at providing global leadership.  More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states’ behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support.

Gas Key to Relations

U.S.-Russian investment cooperation over natural gas and energy issues is critical to boosting overall relations


Johnson 5

David, research director at the Center for Defense Information, "RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE `ENEMY IMAGE" Jan 29 05

http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9040-3.cfm

MOSCOW, January 29 (RIA Novosti) -Russia has been lately witnessing a lot of outside criticism which distorts the actual state of affairs in the country and aims to set Russia at odds with the USA, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the Russian-American Business Cooperation Council.



The highlights of the Minister's speech at the Council can be seen at the Russian Foreign Ministry's web site. "We have been lately hearing voices of those who urge the US business community to refrain from investing in Russia, citing unfavorable investment climate and an alleged `clamp down on democracy` in our country", Lavrov said. According to him, he has repeatedly pointed out that Russia is open for criticism in case the latter "stems from bona fide intentions and an honest interest in developing fair partnership". "Unfortunately, such is not always the case. Every now and then we face criticism that does not only distort the actual state of affairs but also pursues an ill-concealed aim to damage the Russian-US relations and restore, in one way or another, the `enemy image`. Apparently, this approach is totally inadmissible," the Russian Foreign Ministry said He pointed to a new trend in the Russian-US cooperation - a notable growth of Russian investment in the US economy and illustrated his words with a number of recent transactions including acquisition by Russia's Severstal of US fifth steel producer RJ Industries, and Lukoil's purchase of Conoco Philips' chain of gas stations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. As a result, Lukoil now owns one of the biggest chains of gas stations in North America. "The overall volume of Russian investment in the USA is currently about $1 billion and is commensurate with the level of American investment in Russia. In a nutshell, our investment cooperation has been steadily becoming a two-way street," Sergei Lavrov pointed out. In his opinion, "the Russian-US cooperation in the energy sector holds the most potential, and not only in terms of bilateral relations." According to him, the Russian-US cooperation in this vital area can substantially strengthen the world's energy security and stabilize supply of energy resources on a global scale, including an increased share of Russian energy resources in the North American market (from 2 to 10 percent). "Among other things, the Russian side is interested in adjusting the terms of competition on the world oil market, primarily those set by the Arab countries," the Russian Foreign Minister said. The potential projects in the energy sector include construction of a pipeline linking Western Siberia with the Barents Sea, expansion of the Russian facilities for liquefying natural gas with the aim of boosting natural gas supplies to North America, and further R&D efforts in exploring new sources of energy, such as hydrogen..

Econ/Low Oil Prices t/c

Low oil prices and underperforming economy drive away investment


Callow 12 Lin Callow, LTLC Consulting, “Oil and Gas Exploration & Development Activity Forecast: Canadian Beaufort Sea 2012-2027” prepared for Beaufort Regional Enviornmental Assessment Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada April 2012 http://www.beaufortrea.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Beaufort-Sea-OG-activity-forecast-2012-2017.pdf

Although, current oil prices appear to be moving towards historical highs, global economic instability threatens to reverse this trend. This combined with high costs and industry uncertainty, as to how equivalency to the NEB Same Season Relief Well Policy can be achieved, may result in shifts in corporate exploration and development expenditures away from the Beaufort Sea. However, a sustained global economic recovery with accompanying increases in oil prices would encourage exploration and development.


Download 2.21 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   63




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2020
send message

    Main page