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- Newcomb ’ s paradox
- Risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses
- Dutch book ; ordered vector space
- Dutch book ; Dutch book; ordered vector space dynamic consistency ; present value
- SEU = SEU inverse-S
| part-whole bias. It can be related to the findings of Wolfe & Kaplon (1941), Capaldi, Miller, & Alptekin (1989), Showers (1992), and Pelhan & Swann (1989), that splitting up a quantity into several smaller parts makes it look like more. %}
Weber, Martin, Franz Eisenführ, & Detlof von Winterfeldt (1988) “The Effects of Splitting Attributes on Weights in Multiattribute Utility Measurement,” Management Science 34, 431–445. {% %} Weber, Martin & Steven O. Kimbrough (1999) “An Empirical Comparison of Utility Assessment Programs.” In Kleinschmidt et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the 12. Symposium on Operations Reserach, 389–390, Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1989. {% Third paragraph (? says Stigler, 1950, may rather mean section?) on p. 361-368 says that Weber-Fechner law is not relevant for economics (Stigler, 1956, end of §IV). %} Weber, Max (1908) “Die Grenznutzlehre und das ‘Psychophysisches Grundgesetz’.” Reprinted in Max Weber, (1922) “Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre,” Mohr, Tübingen. {% Seems to be not the first, but the most influential, to argue for “verstehen” (similar to introspection) as a crucial tool in social sciences. %} Weber, Max (1922) “The Nature of Social Action.“From Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,” 1922. Reprinted in W.G. Runciman (1978) “Max Weber: Selections in Translation,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% %} Weber, Roberto A. & Colin F. Camerer (2006) “ ”Behavioral Experiments” in Economics,” Experimental Economics 9, 187–192. {% If in battle of sexes one player moves first but the other will not observe this move, then by rationality principles this should not matter. Yet players usually give the first-mover advantage to the first mover. %} Weber, Roberto A., Colin F. Camerer, & Marc Knez (2004) “Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games,” Experimental Economics 7, 25–48. {% Seems to have proposed Choquet-integral as integral w.r.t. fuzzy measures. %} Weber, Siegfried (1984) “-Decomposable Measures and Integrals for Archimedean t-Conorms ,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 101, 114–138. {% %} Weber, Siegfried (1986) “Two Integrals and some Modified Versions-Critical Remarks,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems 20, 97–105. {% Newcomb’s paradox: Takes it as a game Has the person assign subjective probabiities to the demon’s predictive power, and then SEU maximization decides. %} Weber, Thomas A. (2016) “A Robust Resolution of Newcomb’s Paradox,” Theory and Decision 81, 339–356. {% P. 429 2nd para of 2nd column erroneously writes that vNM EU would be based on long-run argument, with EU a long-run limit, and then cites the confused Lopes (1981) on this. %} Wedell, Douglas H. & Ulf Böckenholt (1990) “Moderation of Preference Reversals in the Long Run,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 16, 429–438. {% %} Weddepohl, Hubertus N. (1970) “Axiomatic Choice Models (and Duality).” Ph.D. Dissertation, Universitaire Pers Rotterdam, Wolters-Noordhoff, Rotterdam. {% conservation of influence; He investigates in this book and elsewhere when we think to decide something but maybe don’t. Seems that the philosopher Michael Bratman studies similar things but believes more in the freel will. %} Wegner, Daniel M. (2002) “The Illusion of Conscious Will.” MIT Press, Cambridge MA. {% Risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses? %} Wehrung, Donald A. (1989) “Risk Taking over Gains and Losses: A Study of Oil Executives,” Annals of Operations Research 19, 115–139. {% Translates the vNM EU axioms from lotteries to relative frequencies in infinite series with a limiting relative frequency existing. %} Wei Hu, Tai (2013) “Expected Utility Theory from the Frequentist Perspective,” Economic Theory 53, 9–25. {% Dutch book; ordered vector space %} Weibull, Jörgen W. (1982) “A Dual to the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 26, 191–203. {% Dutch book; ordered vector space %} Weibull, Jörgen W. (1984) “Continuous Linear Representations of Preference Orderings in Vector Spaces.” In Hans Hauptmann, Wilhelm E. Krelle, & Karl C. Mosler (eds.) Operations Research and Economic Theory, 291–305, Springer, Berlin. {% Dutch book; Dutch book; ordered vector space dynamic consistency; present value; characterizes some forms, well known nowadays, of discounting under linear utility; domain is a cone, so can’t be bounded. %} Weibull, Jörgen W. (1985) “Discounted-Value Representations of Temporal Preferences,” Mathematics of Operations Research 10, 244–250. {% %} Weibull, Jörgen, Lars-Göran Mattsson, & Mark Voorneveld (2007) “Better May Be Worse: Some Monotonicity Results and Paradoxes in Discrete Choice under Uncertainty,” Theory and Decision 63, 121–151. {% %} Weil, Philippe (1990) “Nonexpected Utility in Macroeconomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 29–42. {% deception: seems that in public good game, subjects were given false information about contributions by others. %} Weimann, Joachim (1994) “Individual Behaviour in a Free-Riding Experiment,” Journal of Public Economics 54, 185–200. {% This paper presents a model of inductive observation and updating, with expected value maximization based on subjective probabilities. There are some cases, with total probability assumed less than some , where the decision maker (DM) does not do Bayesian updating (called a shift or a paradigmatic shift). It is not specified what happens after a shift. It is shown in two propositions that the normalized expected losses due to arbitrage (if normalized by dividing by (roughly) the absolute value of the largest outcome involved) then cannot exceed .
Weinstein, Jonathan (2015) “A Bayesian Foundation for Classical Hypothesis Testing,” mimeo. {% Studies risk sensitivity in normal form games. That is, how the solution is affected by vNM utility becoming more concave or more convex. The set of rationalizable outcomes increases as utility becomes more concave. A generalization is in Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, & Marinacci (2016 Econometrica). %} Weinstein, Jonathan (2016) “The Effect Changes in Risk Attitude on Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica 84, 1881–1902. {% %} Weinstein, Milton C. (1986) “Risky Choices in Medical decision Making: A Survey,” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, 197–216. {% discounting normative: Bleichrodt, 1994: this paper argues that constant discounted utility can be placed normatively on the same footing as EU. %} Weinstein, Milton C. (1993) “Time-preference Studies in the Health Care Context,” Medical Decision Making, 218–219. {% simple decision analysis cases using EU: §9.3 (p. 270 ff.) has a nice case, although somewhat complex. %} Weinstein, Milton C., Harvey V. Fineberg, Arthur S. Elstein, Howard S. Frazier, Duncan Neuhauser, Raymond R. Neutra, & Barbara J. McNeil (1980) “Clinical Decision Analysis.” Saunders, Philadelphia. {% P. 1256 repeats in several places that community prefs, not patient prefs., should be used, confusing prefs representing best interest and prefs elicited in surveys. Tversky & Kahneman (1981 p. 458 1st/2nd column will argue differently. P. 1256, end: it remains an open question whether SG, TTO, VAS, produce the right weights for QALYs. P. 1257: sorting that out will be important to address in future research P. 1257 recommends discounting (after correction for inflation) by 3%. %} Weinstein, Milton C., Joanna E. Siegel, Marthe R. Gold, Mark S. Kamlet, & Louise B. Russell (1996, for the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine) “Recommendations of the Panel of Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine,” JAMA 276, 1253–1258. {% Seem to have been one of the first to state QALYs; Nice example of the conflicting effects of utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Wanted to determine most cost-effective way to control hypertension. That way is: target the patients already treated, don’t search much for new cases. That rule is not egalitarian, it’s bad for the poor etc. without regular access to medical care. Authors are well aware of that and acknowledge it, but conclude that here the utilitarian argument is too strong and decides here. “a community with limited resources would probably do better to concentrate its efforts on improving adherence of known hypertensives, even at a sacrifice in terms of the numers screened.” %} Weinstein, Milton C. & William B. Stason (1976) “Hypertension: A Policy Perspective.” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. {% %} Weinstein, Milton C. & William B. Stason (1977) “Foundations of Cost-Effective Analysis for Health and Medical Practices,” New England Journal of Medicine 296, 716–721. {% %} Weinstein, Neil D. (1980) “Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40, 822–832. {% correlation risk & ambiguity attitude: give evidence for positive a relation. Find usually positive relations between risk seeking and optimistic choices under uncertainty. To what extent the optimistic choices are due to optimism in the risk attitude, or to additional ambiguity-generated optimism, is not easy to identify. The authors discuss this point in §5. %} Weinstock, Eyal & Doron Sonsino “Are Risk-Seekers more Optimistic? Non-parametric Approach,” working paper. {% Newcomb’s paradox? %} Weintraub, Ruth (1995) “Psychological Determinism and Rationality,” Erkenntnis 43, 67–79. {% R.C. Jeffrey model; discusses an earlier criticism of Lewis on Jeffrey’s model joining decisions and beliefs. %} Weintraub, Ruth (2007) “Desire as Belief, Lewis Notwithstanding,” Analysis 67, 116–122. {% conditional probability; %} Weirich, Paul (1983) “Conditional Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition,” Philosophy of Science 50, 82–95. {% foundations of probability %} Weirich, Paul (1986) “Expected Utility and Risk,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, 419–442. {% Seems to argue that Ellsberg’s paradox can be explained by incorporating ambiguity as extra aspect of the outcomes. %} Weirich, Paul (2001) “Risk’s Place in Decision Rules,” Synthese 126, 427–441. {% Seems to argue for process-dependent utility, although I did not read enough to really pin this down. %} Weirich, Paul (2010) “Utility and Framing,” Synthese 176, 83–103. {% The journal has a whole issue on ambiguity in law. %} Weisbach, David (2015) “Introduction: Legal Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty,” Journal of Legal Studies 44, S319–S335. {% Propose a variation of expected utility where an extra weight is added: how salient the outcome is. The model (p. 175) is not formalized, as philosophical models often are not, being less precise but more open to interpretations. Thus, it is not specified in the formula on p. 175 what the domain is and how the salience weight MSj can be identified from utility or probability. The authors propose a definition of rationality amounting to sticking to your plans, i.e., similar to dynamic consistency (a term not used by the author). I wonder how it relates to other irrationalities such as violations of monotonicity. The text seems to assume that the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatization of EU was only for money, but it was for general outcomes. %} Weiss, Jie W. & David J. Weiss (2012) “Irrational: At the Moment,” Synthese 189, 173–183. {% Nicely written; p. 18: “That few aspects of utility analysis have been satisfactorily subjected to empirical testing is unfortunate for economics because of this key role [link human preferences with economic behavior] in (but )the theory of demand.” Footnote 5: SEU = SEU inverse-S?: explains ways in which people bet on horse races through utility of money. People overbet on longshot which suggests that utility is convex, indeed the optimal fit was from a slightly convex curve. This finding seems to be in agreement with Griffith (1949) who explained it in terms of probability transformation. %} Weitzman, Martin L. (1965) “Utility Analysis and Group Behavior: An Empirical Study,” Journal of Political Economy 73, 18–26. {% Argues that a discount rate of .04 for the immediate future is appropriate, then should go down to zero. One reason is that if all individuals want constant discounting but don’t agree on which rate, then in the aggregate the proposal made here comes out. Emailed with over 2,000 economists over the world, also with 50 distinguished, on what they consider an appropriate discount rate. %} Weitzman, Martin L. (2001) “Gamma Discounting,” American Economic Review 91, 260–271. {% %} Weller, Joshua A., Irwin P. Levin, Baba Shiv, & Antoine Bechara (2007) “Neural Correlates of Adaptive Decision-Making in Risky Gains and Losses,” Psychological Science 18, 958–964. {% dynamic consistency; argues that (dyn.?) consistency can hold only under EU but, according to Johnsen and Donaldson (1985, Econometrica) implicitly assumes EU in the second stage. %} Weller, Paul (1978) “Consistent Planning under Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies 45, 263–266. {% value of information: about the expected value gain. This paper is the editorial of a whole issue on this topic. %} Welton, Nicky J. & Howard H. Z. Thom (2015) “Value of Information: We’ve Got Speed, What More Do We Need? (editorial),” Medical Decision Making 35, 564–566. {% Seems to contain survey on unrealistic optimism. %} Wenglert, Leif & Anne-Sofie Rosen (2000) “Measuring Optimism-Pessimism from Beliefs about Future Events,” Personality & Individual Differences 28, 717–728. {% Assume one fixed probability vector (p1,…,pn), and prospects for those with real-valued outcomes. Assume an additively decomposable representation V1(x1) + … + Vn(xn), so kind of state-dependent utility. If risk aversion (preference of expected value to prospect) holds on this limited domain, then already state independent EU holds, with respect to the given probabilities. %} Werner, Jan (2005) “A Simple Axiomatization of Risk-Averse Expected Utility,” Economics Letters 88, 73–77. {% Introduces mean-independent risk aversion. is mean-independent risk at z if conditional expectation of given z is 0. So, in discrete case, the conditional expectation of given each value of z is 0. x differs from y by mean-independent risk if then x = z+ and y = z+ with 01, where this is transitively extended. This condition is studied in DUU with states of nature with, obviously, probabilities given, but dropping the DUR assumption that only the probability distributions generated over outcomes matter. So state-dependence could in principle be. Shows that under sure-thing principle (implying state-dependent EU) the condition will imply EU, so state independence, after all. Under EU, aversion to mean-independent risk is equivalent to risk aversion (i.e., concave U). In general it is implied by Rotschild-Stiglitz aversion to mean-preserving spreads. Non-EU, with violation of the sure-thing principle, can also be in this model. This paper denotes the general representing functional by U (I usually denote it by V), which is what I will do here. For every prospect x, the condition is, under differentiability, equivalent to the derivative of U w.r.t. x(s) (s state of nature) being anticomonotonic (the author says negatively comonotonic) with x(s): the worse an outcome is ranked within a prospect, the more impact it has on the preference value. §6 extends to nondifferentiability using superdifferentials. A restriction of the analysis of this paper is that its playing ground, with probabilities needed to be available but DUR not holding, is not big. %} Werner, Jan (2009) “Risk and Risk Aversion when States of Nature Matter,” Economic Theory 41, 231–246. {% This paper is on decision under risk. Several papers have shown how endogenous utility-midpoint outcomes can be derived for outcomes under EU, RDU, and PT. Then, under continuity of utility, preference foundations can be obtained of the models of interest by imposing consistency on such endogenous midpoints. This paper uses a duality between outcomes and goodnews probabilities (for losses: badnews probabilities) to obtain an endogenous weighting-function-midpoint probability. It will thus provide a generalization of the appealing derivations of RDU by Nakamura (1995), Abdellaoui (2002), and Abdealloui & Wakker (2005) to PT, providing the most appealing axiomatization of PT presently available. The paper imposes, first, a common elementary probability shift condition (= sure-thing principle/separability but taken dually, in the probability dimension) to get a general additive rank-dependent representation. Then it adds consistency of endogenous probability midpoints, separately for gains and losses, to axiomatize PT. Remarkable is that no richness of outcomes is uses. Only richness in probability is used, which is available anyhow. %} Werner, Katarzyna Maria & Horst Zank (2013) “Foundations for General Prospect Theory through Probability Midpoint Consistency,” working paper. {% Seems to introduce a “scale of competition” to compare within-group selection with between-group selection, a hot topic in debates on evolution. %} West, Stuart A., Andy Gardner, David M. Shuker, Tracy Reynolds, Max Burton-Chellow, Edward M. Sykes, Meghan A. Guinnee, & Ashleigh S. Griffin (2006) “Cooperation and the Scale of Competition in Humans,” Current Biology 16, 1103–1106. {% %} Wester, Jeroen & Peter P. Wakker (2012) “Heffen op Nationale Hobby: Verzekeren,” Interview in NRC 04 Oct 2012. (National Dutch newspaper) Link to paper
Westerbaan, Kayleigh L. (2014) “Cognitieve Vaardigheden en Risico-Attituden: Is er een Verband?”, bachelor’s thesis, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam. {% Summarizes contributions to an international colloquium on the foundations and applications of the theory of risk, held from May 12 to May 17, 1952 at Paris under the sponsorship of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. P. 3, condition (2) describes in the summary of Savage’s exposition the sure-thing principle in lotteries with one nonzero outcome %} Weyl, F. Joachim (1952) “Preference Patterns in the Face of Uncertainty;” Summary of contributions to the international “Colloquium on the Foundations and Appications of the Theory of Risk,” held from May 12 to May 17 at Paris under the sponsorship of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Technical Report ONRL-115-52, November 5, Office of Naval Research, London. {% Theorem 3 is Yaari’s (1987) result for the finite case!!!! %} Weymark, John A. (1981) “Generalized Gini Inequality Indices,” Mathematical Social Sciences 1, 409–430. {% %} Weymark, John A. (1993) “Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle,” Social Choice and Welfare 10, 209–221. {% %} Weymark, John A. (1995) “Further Remarks on Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle,” Social Choice and Welfare 12, 87–92. {% %} Weymark, John A. (1991) “A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism.” In John Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, 255–320, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% proper scoring rules; They elicit only first-order probabilities; then they apply the famous de Finetti theorem for exchangeable variables and interpret the density resulting from that as second-order probability %} Whitcomb, Kathleen & P. George Benson (1994) “Evaluating Second-Order Probability Judgments with Strictly Proper Scoring Rules,” Draft copy. {% %} White, Douglas John (1982) “Optimality and Efficiency.” Wiley, New York. {% %} White, Douglas John (1985) “Operational Research.” Wiley, New York. {% In the beginning of 2000, this was the most cited of all economics papers published between 1975 and 2000. The statistics is at White, Halbert (1980) “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica 48, 817–838. {% %} Whitmore, George A. & Merlin C. Findlay (1978, eds.) “Stochastic Dominance.” Heath, Lexington, MA. {% In WTP people have particular preferences for round numbers such as 5, 10, 20, etc. %} Whynes, David K., Zoe Philips, & Emma Frew (2005) “Think of a Number … Any Number?,” Health Economics 14, 1191–1195. {% Ask managers hypothetical choices of wildfire risks. Want to fit prospect theory, but do the Edwards fixed-probability weighting. They only fit the Prelec (1998) one-parameter CI family, and then small risks at catastrophes are overweighted. %} Wibbenmeyer, Matthew J., Michael S. Hand, David E. Calkin, Tyron J. Venn, & Matthew P. Thompson (2012) “Risk Preferences in Strategic Wildfire Decision Making: A Choice Experiment with U.S.Wildfire Managers,” Risk Analysis 32,. {% The topic of this paper is how emotions affect perception and cognition (cognitive ability related to risk/ambiguity aversion). In particular, subjects were shown high-arousal aversive slides, and then predecisional information search was tested. The results are in line with the attention-narrowing hypothesis. Emotional stress limits info search, leading to simpler decision strategies. Not concretely, but vaguely, this fits with more inverse S. %} Wichary, Szymon, Rui Mata, & Jörg Rieskamp (2016) “Probabilistic Inferences under Emotional Stress: How Arousal Affects Decision Processes,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 29, 525–538. {% gender differences in risk attitudes: argue that differences happen if probabilities are known, but not if they are based on subjective estimations. %} Wieland, Alice & Rakesh Sarin (2012) “Gender Differences in Risk Aversion: A Theory of when and why,” working paper. {% Spits is a free daily newspaper, with 500,000 copies per day distributed over the Netherlands, estimated to have 2,000,000 readers per day. %} Wijers, Suzanne, Guus de Jonge, & Peter P. Wakker (2013) “Effectieve Dekking zonder Oververzekering,” Spits 11 June 2013, Personal Finance p. 6. Link to paper
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