1) Permutation: Do both. The United States and the European Union should both give economic assistance. Cooperation solves the Harms better because both agencies will be giving assistance, and it avoids the links to their disadvantages because the U.S. can successfully argue that the E.U. is responsible for the plan which solves Congressional and international scrutiny.
[ODA = Official Development Assistance]
FLANAGAN AND CONLEY, 11
[Stephen, Henry A. Kissinger Chair and senior vice president at Center for Strategic International Studies; Heather, senior fellow and director of the CSIS Europe Program, “A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? the impact of the financial crisis on european defense and foreign assistance capabilities;” May, http://csis.org/files/publication/110427_Flanagan_FinancialCrisis_web.pdf]
The EU and the United States provide approximately 80 percent of the world’s ODA. 11 As European and American foreign assistance budgets receive closer political scrutiny from parliaments and the U.S. Congress during times of greater austerity, there will be increasing pressure to maximize administrative efficiencies as well as develop enhanced assistance collaboration and cooperation. Known as “Europe’s 28th donor,” the European Commission contributed €12 billion in assistance in 2009 and is the sixth-largest contributor of global international aid. In recognition of the Commission’s major contributing role, the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit announced that the decade-long defunct High Level Consultative Group on Development would be re-launched as the EU-U.S. Development Dialogue. The focus of the Development Dialogue is on three development pillars: the global health, food security, and climate change initiatives of the Millennium Development Goals. During their November 2010 summit, the United States and the EU committed “to collaboration and coordinated action on development, recognizing that [their] goals and objectives are aligned as never before.”
2) The Counterplan does not solve our Harms.
[Insert Plan-Specific Solvency Deficit]
2AC Frontline: European Union Counterplan 389
3) International Actor Fiat is illegitimate. This is a voting issue since such a substantial portion of the negative position and this debate round itself is premised on a theoretically abusive argument.
A) Education and Fairness: There are thousands of countries, international organizations and NGOs that could all do something similar to the plan. Affirmatives would never be able to predict who the Negative would use, and they will win with a generic solvency card that affirmatives cannot possibly predict or research responses to.
B) Infinite Regression: Allowing the Negative to test the agent in the resolution by fiating through any other actor has no objective limit and would regress to allowing them to fiat a change in action through Latin American countries themselves, or through the agents with those countries that are responsible for the Harms, enabling them to win debates by fiat alone.
C) Artificial Ground: No literature writes about their disadvantage in the context of a foreign country acting, meaning we cannot find specific turns or links to the Counterplan before the round. This allows them to artificially outweigh our Affirmative.
D) Our standard is that the Negative should be limited to counterplans that use the U.S. as its agent.
2AC Frontline: European Union Counterplan 390
4) No Solvency: The E.U.’s economy is too weak to support foreign assistance, and U.S. assistance will be needed to bail out the E.U.
FLANAGAN, ET AL, 11
[Stephen, Henry A. Kissinger Chair and senior vice president at Center for Strategic International Studies, “A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? the impact of the financial crisis on european defense and foreign assistance capabilities;” May, http://csis.org/files/publication/110427_Flanagan_FinancialCrisis_web.pdf]
Over the past five decades, the United States, its NATO allies, and other European Union countries have been partners in maintaining transatlantic security and leading contributors to international stability and economic development. As President Barack Obama wrote on the eve of NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the U.S. relationship with “our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world and a catalyst for global cooperation.” 1 This report explores the impact of the global financial crisis, and the subsequent European recession and sovereign debt crisis, on Europe’s ability to sustain its valuable contributions to this partnership. It concludes that as the ongoing economic and political crisis deepens, Europe is likely to be a less capable, less willing, and less interested partner in those endeavors. Measures of this shift in burden sharing are already evident. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Ramsussen noted at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, a decade ago the United States accounted for just under 50 percent of total Alliance defense spending. Today the U.S. share is closer to 75 percent and this transatlantic imbalance of defense effort and capabilities is projected to grow. 2 As the Secretary General also observed, some in Europe are not alarmed by this shift, because they are content with the EU’s status as the leading provider of official humanitarian and development assistance. But this de facto division of labor that is emerging, where the United States takes on hard-power missions and Europe opts for soft-power tasks, will have a corrosive effect on the transatlantic relationship. Moreover, the analysis in this report suggests that the economic crisis is likely to result in a significant contraction of European soft power, as official development assistance budgets come under pressure from governmental austerity measures.
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