MR and the Charter
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pre-Charter, only presumptions of subjective MR for murder, etc
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s.7 of Charter = most important section for development of criminal law:
i) minimum MR for true crimes is penal negligence Hundal above)
ii) subjective MR for stigma offences (see Vallaincourt, Martineau,)
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**Constitutional Bar** - Stigma Offences
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constitutionally, a stigma offence requires subjective MR (Vallaincourt in obiter, Martineau)
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Only 4 recognized stigma offences (no specified criteria)
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murder
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attempted murder
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crimes against humanity (Finta)
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theft
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court has not been keen to expand this list
R. v. Vallaincourt
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felony/constructive murder (s. 230) does not require MR = unconstitutional
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Held: gets rid of felony murder (= accidental killings cannot result in murder conviction, only manslaughter?)
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Uses PFJ: “must be some special element with respect to the death before a culpable homicide can be treated as murder”
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Notion of a ‘stigma’ offence mentioned in obiter
R. v. Martineau 1990 SCC
- deceased deliberately shot by accused’s accomplice during a robbery
- adopts obiter from Vallaincourt re: stigma offences
- s. 230 Felony murder offends PFJ of proportionality
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- “to label and punish a person as a murderer who did not intend and foresee death unnecessarily stigmatizes and punishes those whose moral blameworthiness is not that of a murderer”
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L’H-D dissents
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Says the act was so bad that it shouldn’t require subjective MR
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Majority lets MR carry too much weight
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Misplaces compassion
Finta 1994 SCC
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Crimes against humanity (senior officer at concentration camp)
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Held: accused was subjectively aware that it would shock the conscience of the community
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= adopts Martineau
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crimes against humanity are a stigma offence
R. v. DeSousa SCC
- Unlawfully causing bodily harm (s. 269)
- ONLY need objective MR
- result-driven/predicate offences…
Strict and Absolute Liability
Regulatory Offences vs. True Crimes (not in Code)
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3 step test from Prue & Baril look at:
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nature of offence
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seriousness of offence
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seriousness of penalty
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General penalty for regulatory offences (unless otherwise stated) is from s. 4 of BC Offence Act:
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over 2 years in jail = much more serious
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Determining nature of prohibited conduct – 3 tools: First 2 from Wholesale Travel, 3rd from Berger:
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mala in prohibita vs. mala inse
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mala in prohibita = bad b/c its prohibited = regulatory offence
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mala inse = bad in and of itself = true crime
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purpose of legislation
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to establish standard of conduct/prevent future harm (forward looking) = regulatory offence
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condemnation/punishment (backward looking) = true crime
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moral disapprobation
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failure to act up to standard of conduct = regulatory offence
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conduct has high moral stigma = true crime
*Note: these tools useful for new legislation, but issue doesn’t often arise*
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Absolute Liability: Upon proof by the crown BRD that AR is made out, accused is found guilty = NO requirement of MR
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Strict Liability: Upon proof by the crown BRD that AR is made out, burden shifts to accused to prove due diligence on BOP (developed in SSM)
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Reversal of burden of proof is constitutional (Wholesale Travel)
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2: doesn’t breach s. 11(d)
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3: breaches s. 11(d) but is justified under s. 1
Development of law re: Absolute and Strict Liability
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Late 50s, for true crimes, absolute liability is unfair (Beaver)
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But for regulatory crimes, absolute liability is imposed (Pierce Fisheries)
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By late 70s, for regulatory crimes, unless otherwise stated, presume strict liability: (SSM) b/c:
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If purpose of statute is to establish higher standards of care, absolute liability goes too far
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Should be general proportionality b/w punishment and moral blameworthiness (not yet a PFJ b/c pre-Charter)
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1982 Charter - s. 7 makes it no longer permissible to expose someone to loss of liberty without some element of MR (PFJ) (BCMV)
***Constitutional Bar***
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imprisonment from Absolute Liability = unconstitutional (BCMV)
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= affirmed and made constitutional the presumption from SSM of strict liability for regulatory offences
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Absolute liability is still okay as long as there’s no imprisonment (Pontes)
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Legislative response to constitutional bar in BCMV is:
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s. 6 of BC Offence Act: Despite s. 4 (general rule) or provision of any other act, no person is liable to imprisonment with respect to an Absolute Liability Offence
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essentially a catch-all fix that takes imprisonment off the table and keeps existing legislation within constitutional boundaries
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Absolute liability still okay as long as no imprisonment Pontes
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Shouldn’t fines be considered a loss of liberty?
Beaver 1957 SCC
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charged with possession of heroin, didn’t think he had it but Crown argues he did
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Crown pushes for Absolute liability = requires NO MR
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Held: For true crimes, if there’s silence, MUST be subjective MR
Pierce Fisheries 1970 SCC
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charged with fishing undersized lobsters = regulatory offence
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Held: Absolute Liability imposed
Sault Ste. Marie 1978 SCC
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accused polluted stream
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Held: absolute liability is too harsh
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Introduces halfway house of strict liability
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For regulatory offences, unless otherwise stated, presume strict liability
Pontes 1995 SCC
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Absolute liability is still okay as long as it doesn’t involve a loss of liberty
Wholesale Travel 1991 SCC
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SCC unanimous:
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It is NOT an infringemenf of Charter (s.7) to create an offence for which the mental element is negligence (in strict liability cases)
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Reverse onus to prove due diligence is upheld as constitutional
Sexual Assault
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Criminal Law deals with social breakdown, but at the point crime has been committed, so much has already gone wrong
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women are disproportionately at a higher risk of violence because of their gender
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isn’t this a bigger gender equity issue than pay equity, etc?
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fundamental disconnect: reality of historic gender roles vs. assumption of neutrality in criminal law
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can’t take expressiveness out of criminal law, but we must change what we are expressing
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Berger’s 3 ideal goals for reform:
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1) target at systemic structures that allow gendered violence
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2) protect dignity/privacy/security of complainant
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3) not make it any more likely that the innocent will be convicted
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2 objectives of sexual assault laws:
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1) eradicate hidden myths/assumptions stereotypes that conflict with gender equality
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2) presumption of innocence
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because sexual assault happens in private = very difficult to prosecute
Development of Sexual Assault Laws
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Rape Shield Laws: Prior legislation
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Waiting before making complaint = presumption of fabrication
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Could not convict on uncorroborated evidence
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Twin Myths – a woman with a past sexual history is:
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More likely to consent – once a woman is sexually active she’s sexually available
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Less believable – links chastity to honesty
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Legislative amendments 1983
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s. 276 – past sexual history is inadmissible as evidence (twin myths not acceptable
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Rape no longer about personal property, now about personal integrity
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Canada no longer has “rape”, now only “sexual assault” and degree of assault is addressed in sentencing
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Rape rooted in notion of theft – should we bring back that terminology?
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Response to legislative amendments
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McLachlin for the court says s.276 is overbroad
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While twin myths don’t have a place in our laws, past sexual history may be relevant in certain cases (Seaboyer)
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Legsilature amends s. 276 with Bill C-49 (1992) to eliminate twin myths, but sexual history may be admissible evidence if it’s highly relevant
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SCC supports new legislation in Darrach
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Fair trials are about truth seeking and fair process
Elements of Sexual Assault:
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Actus Reus:
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i) unconsented to
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ii) touching
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iii) of a sexual nature
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Mens Rea:
*Note: consent arises in both AR and MR – this will become important for
defence of Mistake of Fact*
R. v. Chase 1987 SCC
- test to be applied in determining whether conduct has requisite sexual nature is OBJECTIVE (reasonable observer)
- Not necessary that sexual touching was done for sexual gratification
R. v. Seaboyer 1992 SCC
- SCC majority (McLachlin):
- rape shield provisions unconstitutional
R. v. Darrach 2000 SCC
- supports Bill C-49
Defences
Several categories of defence
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Negative Defences (negates MR and/or AR)
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Ex: Mistake of Fact, Intoxication
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Positive/Affirmative Defences (does NOT negate MR or AR)
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Excuses: Concessions to human frailty
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Ex: duress, provocation
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Civil liability
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CAN be party to an excused action
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Justifications: Acting rightly, though illegally
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Ex: self-defence
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NO civil liability
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Can NOT be party to justified action
*Note: in most countries defences are split into excuses and justifications*
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Procedural Stops: (penalties assigned to government)
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Doesn’t change culpability of accused, but case mishandled by government
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Ex: entrapment, abuse of process, unfit to stand trail (ish)
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Exemptions: (not subject to criminal liability)
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Ex: mental disorder, children under 12, foreign dignitaries
How to raise a defence:
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Accused must establish to a judge that there is an air of reality to the defence (Osolin)
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Accused must show some evidence (evidentiary burden) = very low threshold
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“Is there some evidence on the basis of which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could acquit?” (Cinous)
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Once air of reality is established, burden is on Crown to disprove defence BRD
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Exceptions where the burden is reversed (Osolin):
Fontaine
Mistake of Fact
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The Defence:
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Made an honest mistake
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Negates MR = negative defence
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Applies to any crime where an awareness of a fact is involved
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Ex: Beaver – honestly thought heroin was milk powder
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Requirement for standard of belief (subjective or objective) mirrors requisite MR:
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If required MR is subjective, only need an honest belief
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If required MR is objective, need both honest and reasonable belief
**Now an exception to this rule re: sexual assault**
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even though MR for sexual assault is subjective, belief in consent must be both honest and reasonable (s. 273.2)
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Development of Defence of Mistaken belief in consent re: sexual assault
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In 1980 SCC confirmed that general rule applies for sexual assault: since MR for sexual assault is subjective = only need an honest belief (Pappajohn)
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Decision heavily criticized:
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Boyle: gives full reign for people to rely on their myths and stereotypes
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Pickard: it is not onerous to ask people to act reasonably in sexual relations – it makes good sense and protects women
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In 1985 SCC limits (but does not change) the rule in Pappajohn – although there is NO requirement of a reasonable belief, the honestly held belief must NOT be from willful blindness (Sansregret)
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Legislative response in 1992 had two effects:
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1) defined consent in 3 sections (273.1(1)(2) and (3))
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requires an affirmative consent
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lists examples of where consent is NOT obtained
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can withdraw consent at any time
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no consent where application of force/power or abuse of authority
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2) creates special rule re: standard of belief for mistake of fact as applied to sexual assault (s. 273.2)
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belief in consent is NOT a defence where:
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belief arose out of self-induced intoxication, recklessness or willful blindness (codification of rule in Sansregret)
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accused did NOT take reasonable steps to ascertain consent
*an example of Criminal Law being used to shape behaviour and achieve greater equality
- In 1999 SCC holds that as long as victim is believable, if she says there
is no consent, that is proof BRD that there was no consent (Ewanchuk)
Pappajohn 1980 SCC
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confirms general rule that standard of belief mirrors requisite MR
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since sexual assault requires subjective MR, only need an honest belief in a mistaken fact
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Held: no air of reality to defence = guilty
Sansregret 1985 SCC
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trial judge applied Pappajohn and acquitted
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SCC puts limit on subjective belief of consent:
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Did NOT change rule in Pappajohn (still don’t need a reasonable belief) but put a limit on it:
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Honest belief can NOT be from willful blindness
Ewanchuk 1999 SCC
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leading case on consent
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accused lures victim into van, makes several advances even though she protests
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Held:
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No such thing as implied consent
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If victim says there’s no consent (and is believed by judge), that is proof enough, Crown discharges burden of proving lack of consent
Darrach Ont. CA
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upholds C-49
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subjective ONLY for belief in consent
Mistake of Law/Ignorance of Law
General Rule s.19 of Code: “Ignorance of the law is not an excuse for committing an offence”
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codification of common law rule
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can be harsh and unjust:
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Bailey 1800: at sea when law changed
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Esop 1836: foreign sailor engaged in act legal in his own country but not in England
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Dalley 1957 Ont CA: relied on lawyer’s advice that something was legal, it wasn’t = prosecuted under Securities Act (provincial offence)
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Brinkley 1907 Ont CA: relied on lawyer’s advice that first marriage was dissolved, re-married, charged with bigamy = guilty
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Note: today this case would be resolved under Prue & Baril
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Campbell 1972 Alta DC: relied on Alt SC decision that nude dancing was allowed (it wasn’t, decision was overturned)
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But did act BEFORE decision overturned
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Held: doesn’t matter, trial judge was wrong, law never changed = shouldn’t trust a trial judge?!?
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Molis 1980 SCC: makes drug that’s legal, druge later restricted by Regulation, published in Gazette = due diligence in knowing law at outset not enough – need to know when it changes too
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Jones & Pamajewon 1991 SCC: bingo on Indian reserve without a provincial license – their belief that CC didn’t apply was a mistake of law and no defence
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Gunn 1997 Alt. CA: lawyer interfered with client’s arrest b/c he thought it was illegal (it wasn’t) = charged with obstruction of justice
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Distinguished Docherty: here lawyer’s mistake of law did not negate the MR of “willfully” obstructing a peace officer
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Widely criticized
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Rationales for harsh rule:
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1) Defence would involve impossible evidentiary burden for Crown
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2) Encourage ignorance
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3) Anarchy
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4) Ignorance of the law is blameworthy in itself
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Fine line b/w mistake of law and fact
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In criminal law, provincial laws are treated as facts IF they form part of Criminal offence = mistake of provincial law = use Mistake of Fact defence (Prue & Baril)
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BUT in MacDougall he was in realm of provincial laws, with provincial effects, but found guilty: law is law
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Obiter in Pontes seemed to side with MacDougall and criticize Prue&Baril’s distinction b/w provincial law as fact and Criminal law as law as incorrect
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BUT P&B NOT overruled = still out there
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4 Exceptions:
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If government didn’t publish law in the gazette (Ross)
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MR requires knowledge of the law (Docherty)
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If Theft, Colour of Right (Howson)
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s. 322(1) – everyone commits offence who takes item without colour of right
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basically, you don’t have the right but it looks/seems like you do
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if you have honest but mistaken belief that you have a right to that property, then you have colour of right = can’t be charged
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to claim, must be in provision in Code
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Officially Induced Error (Jorgensen, adopted in Levis) (allowed in Cancoil)
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1) an error of law or mixed fact/law was made
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2) considered legal position
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3) consulted appropriate legal official (someone in charge of administering law)
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4) reasonable reliance on advice
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Clarified that reliance must be “objectively reasonable” and factors considered (Levis):
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Clarity of obscurity of law
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Position and role of official who gave info
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Clarity, definitivenesss/reasonableness of opinion
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Efforts made by accused to obtain info
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5) Reliance has to be on an erroneous legal opinion of an official
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6) Must demonstrate ACTUAL reliance
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advice given before actions
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were questions poses specifically tailored to circumstances
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successful defence in 4) limited to stay of proceedings/procedural stop
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similar to entrapment – state has disentitled itself from a conviction
Prue & Baril SCC
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charged with Code offence driving with a suspended license
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had been charged with provincial offence = his license had been suspended but he didn’t know that
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mistake of law or fact?
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Fact: didn’t know license was suspended
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Law: didn’t know it’s illegal to drive with a suspended license
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Held: mistake of FACT = not guilty
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Effects of provincial law will be considered facts IF they are part of Code offence
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If they are part of provincial offence, then NOT mistake of fact, but a mistake of law
MacDougall SCC
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charged with provincial offence of driving with suspended licence
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prior: had been charged with prov. Offence, had received notice of license suspension, appealed = license reinstated
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lost appeal = license revoked, sent new notification
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thought license was valid until he received notice, but it was suspended the moment he lost appeal
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Held: mistake of law = no defence = guilty
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Law is law
Pontes
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Held: ignorance of automatic suspension of licence under provincial Motor Vehicle Act is a mistake of LAW (different than P&B though doesn’t overrule it since in that case accused was charged under Code)
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BUT P&B is still alive and well
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Cast doubt on decision in P&B
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P&B and MacDougall are irreconcileable
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Obiter:
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Suggested P&B is wrong – law is law
Docherty SCC
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While on probation, found drunk in car but car turned off
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accused charged with willfully not following order of probation officer
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accused said didn’t know it was illegal to just be drunk in his car
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Held:
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Defence allowed
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Offence required “willful” breach of law – since he didn’t know it was illegal, couldn’t fulfill the MR requirement
Howson
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tow truck driver charged with theft of car when he refused to give back towed car without payment
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Held: had colour of right = has a defence in mistake of law = acquittal
Jorgensen
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Affirms OIE in Cancoil
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did accused sell obscene material without excuse?
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Held: Film Board approval is sufficient authority for reasonable reliance/officially induced error
Levis v. Tetreault
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Adopted scheme in Jorgensen
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Clarified that reliance must be “objectively reasonable” and factors considered:
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Clarity of obscurity of law
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Position and role of official who gave info
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Clarity, definitivenesss/reasonableness of opinion
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Efforts made by accused to obtain info
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took reasons from Jorgensen
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similar to entrapment
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procedural stop – accused is still morally blameworthy but a stay should be entered for the following reasons:
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1) an error of law or mixed fact/law was made
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2) considered legal position
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3) consulted appropriate legal official (someone in charge of administering law)
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4) reasonable reliance on advice
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5) Reliance has to be on an erroneous legal opinion of an official
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6) Must demonstrate ACTUAL reliance
Intoxication
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When using intoxication as a defence, it doesn’t matter what substances you used and whether or not they’re legal is irrelevant
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Can’t use intoxication as a defence when intoxication is an element of the offence (ex: impaired driving) (Penno SCC 1990) duh!
Important distinctions:
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