Dec 1961 Ministerial Council Meeting. Agreement on Diplomatic Contacts with U. S. S. R. for Berlin Settlement. Defence Expenditures of nato countries. Joint Danish-German Command for Baltic Approaches

The North Atlantic Council held its regular ministerial meeting in Paris on Dec. 13-15, the sessions being attended by the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of the member-countries. The following communique was issued (cross-headings inserted):

“The aim of the peoples of the Atlantic Community is a stable order in which no man and no nation need fear for their existence, their liberty, or their future. World peace cannot indefinitely rest on a precarious balance of mutual terror.

“On the question of the abolition of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has argued, evaded, and obstructed for over three years and through more than 300 meetings. The Soviet Union, while professing to negotiate in good faith, must for many months past have been secretly preparing the longest series of nuclear tests yet carried out, culminating in the largest nuclear explosion yet known.

“Ministers expressed their sympathy with all those for whom the raising of this wall in Berlin has meant the separation of families and the denial of escape to freedom in the West. They also expressed their admiration of the courage and attachment to freedom of the people of Berlin, and reiterated their conviction that a just and peaceful solution of the problem of Germany, including Berlin, must be found on the basis of self-determination.

“In the spirit of the agreed policy of the Alliance, the Ministers recalled their communique on Berlin of Dec. 16, 1958 [see 17199 A], and reaffirmed their determination to protect and defend the liberties of West Berlin and ensure to its people the conditions for a free and prosperous life.

“Established rights and obligations, solemnly confirmed in international agreements, cannot be extinguished unilaterally by the stroke of a pen–by the signature by the Soviet Government of a ‘peace treaty’ with a regime which represents no one but its Soviet masters. The three Western Powers who bear special responsibilities for Berlin stand by their clear obligation to protect those who have put their trust in them.

“Acting in close co-operation with their NATO Allies, they have taken the necessary measures to maintain their rights and fulfil their obligations. Confirming their agreement on this policy, the members of the Alliance reaffirmed the responsibilities which each member-State has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three Powers in that city. They agreed to maintain close consultation on this question.

“The Council heard statements on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers of the countries most directly concerned, and was informed of the intention to resume diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union, in accordance with the aims which the West is pursuing for the maintenance of world peace and in the hope that these contacts might serve to determine whether a basis for negotiation could be found. Their colleagues approved the resumption of diplomatic contacts and expressed the hope that a negotiated settlement could be achieved. After full discussion of the situation, the Council agreed that the Alliance must continue on its resolute course, combining strength and firmness of purpose with a readiness to seek solutions by peaceful means.

“The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance threatens no one. In the world as it is today the Alliance must more than ever look to its defence, in view of the ever-increasing military capability of the Communist block and its manifest intention to expand its domination. So long as the Communist block is unwilling to agree to real disarmament, the countries of the Alliance must continue to strengthen their forces and modernize equipment so as to be able to deal with any form of attack. Only by an increased defence capability can the Alliance continue to deter Communist aggression. This will require still further dedication and effort from the NATO nations; but the clear and growing threat they face leaves no alternative.

“In considering civil emergency planning, particularly the protection of the civilian population, the Council recognized that such measures represented an essential element in the defence effort of NATO countries.

Economic Development. “In the economic field the Council noted that a mission of high-ranking personalities had been set up, in conformity with a decision taken at the last ministerial meeting, to study ways and means of assisting the efforts of Greece and Turkey to speed up their development programmes and improve the living standards of their peoples [see page 18445]. The mission will report to the Council before the end of April 1962.

“Ministers emphasized the importance for member-States, not only of raising the living standards of their peoples, while maintaining an economic structure capable of supporting an adequate defence system, but also of expanding aid to the developing countries. The economics of the NATO countries are far stronger now than when the Alliance was formed. Ministers stressed the need to strengthen and deepen co-operation between all member-countries in order to continue this progress.

The question of Berlin, as stated in the communiqué, was the main problem with which the Council dealt. According to press reports, the Council had difficulty in agreeing on that passage in the communique dealing with the possible reopening of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin problem; it was understood that the Council discussed the wording of the relevant paragraph for three hours at its closing session before finally adopting the above text.

It was reported that a number of Foreign Ministers, notably M. Spaak (Belgium), strongly urged a more definite statement of intention to reopen negotiations with the U.S.S.R., but that M. Couve de Murville (France) was unwilling to agree to any stronger wording in view of the French Government's scepticism about the value of full-scale negotiations with the Soviet Government at the present time. The Times commented in this connexion: “The essential thing from the British and American standpoints is that the [diplomatic] probings will be resumed in the name of the three occupying Powers in Berlin, and to this extent Western unity has been preserved, after one of the most fretful meetings ever held by the Atlantic Council. The reference to a ‘negotiated settlement’ is felt by many to be an important gain, though no one yet knows whether the Russians will be willing to enter into profitable negotiations.”

M. Couve de Murville stated in a television interview after the meeting:

“No one can say that the solution of a problem does not lie in negotiation. But the problem which we are facing… is to know whether negotiation is possible. In this respect there are naturally various points of view–and as far as France is concerned, since she is in Europe and is obviously interested in what happens here, it is natural that her reactions should not be the same as those countries which are not situated on our continent. Having made that point, negotiation pre-supposes, first of all, that it can take place normally–that is to say, that it does not proceed under threats and insults. It is to find out about this that all the Western Allies have decided to renew contacts in the direction of Moscow. It is correct to say that certain of our Allies have the idea that it would be useful at this moment to make diplomatic contacts with Moscow with a view to determining if this basis for negotiation exists. Contacts are going to take place, and we shall then see if they lead to something which can make us think that negotiation would be possible in conditions which would be normal.” Asked if, in the latter eventuality, France would join in the negotiations, M. Couve de Murville replied: “Naturally, we have never said that France was opposed.”

It was understood in Paris after the issue of the communiqué that the Western “probe” would be undertaken by the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Llewelyn Thompson, with support from the British Ambassador, Sir Frank Roberts.

Other matters discussed by the Council included the question of an Atlantic nuclear deterrent force, as had been proposed by Mr. Herter, then U.S. Secretary of State, at the December 1960 meeting [see 17845 A]. It was reported that the West German representatives–Dr. Schroder (Foreign Minister) and Herr Strauss (Defence Minister)–had strongly urged the creation of such a force, but that the question had been left for further study by the Permanent Council, which (as stated in the communiqué) already has it under discussion.

The Council was also reported to have discussed, inter alia, the situation in the Congo; the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Senhor Alberto Franco Nogueira, was understood to have referred to the Angola problem and to the threat of Indian action against Goa; while the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Dr. Luns, made a statement on his country's policy on the Dutch New Guinea question [see 18121 A]. The Greek Minister of Co-ordination, Mr. P. Papaligouras, proposed in connexion with measures of aid to under-developed member-countries that a Special Fund should be established by NATO to support such countries in their defence effort while they were in the process of development.

Defence expenditures of member-countries for the period 1949-61 were shown in a table issued by NATO headquarters on Dec. 14, 1961. The figures for 1949-58 agreed with those issued in December 1960 [see page 17853], and are therefore not repeated. The actual figures for 1959-60, and the forecasts for 1961, were as follows (all figures in millions of the national currency unit except those for Italy, which are in milliards of life):

The figures relating to the United States and Canada include expenditures for military aid programmes. The figures shown for European NATO countries do not include the value of end-items received under military aid programmes from the U.S.A. and Canada.

It was announced in Oslo on Nov. 22 that after talks between Danish and West German military representatives, held at the headquarters of Allied Powers, Northern Europe, agreement had been reached on the establishment of a new unified NATO command covering Denmark and Northern Germany. The new command structure had been formally proposed to the Danish and German Federal Governments by General Norstad (the Supreme Allied Commander) in January 1961, but agreement on it was reported to have been delayed by the Danes’ initial reluctance to accept a German commander for any part of their forces as suggested in the Norstad plan.

The agreed proposals, which were submitted to General Norstad for his approval of details, provided:

(a) For the setting up of a Baltic Approaches Command (BALTAP) which would, however, operate only in the event of war and during NATO exercises.

(b) BALTAP, covering Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein together with the surrounding sea areas, would be under a Danish commander (Combaltap), with a German deputy commander and a Danish chief-of-staff, and would remain responsbile to the Allied C.-in-C., Northern Europe.

(c) The new Command area would comprise the following four sub-commands: (i) an air command under a Danish officer; (ii) a command for land forces in East Denmark, i.e. the islands of Zealand and Bornholm, under a Danish officer; (iii) a command for land forces in Jutland, Funen, and Schleswig-Holstein, to be headed alternately by a Danish and a German officer; (iv) a naval command, alternately under a German and a Danish officer.

The staff of the new Command would comprise one-third Danish personnel, one-third West German personnel, and one-third members from other NATO countries (probably British, American, Canadian, and Norwegian). All individual units in the Command would remain under officers of their own nationality.

Following the approval of the agreement by the Danish Parliament [see below], General Tage Andersen was appointed by General Norstad on Dec. 8 as the first Commander, Baltic Approaches. General Andersen (52) had been C.-in-C. Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe, since July 1959 [see page 17847], after having been C.-in-C. of the Danish Air Force, and is the highest-ranking Danish NATO officer. Major-General Peter yon der Groben, formerly commander of the 6th Panzer-Grenadier Division, was appointed Deputy Commander.

Appointments to the four subsidiary commands were announced on Dec. 19. In addition to the two Danish officers–Major-Generals H. J. Pagh and E. Kragh–appointed respectively to the air command and the land command in East Denmark, a Danish officer (Major-General F. B. Larsen) became commander of the land forces in Jutland, Funen, and Schleswig-Holstein, while a German officer (Rear-Admiral G. Wagner—see page k) became commander of the naval forces.

The Danish Government's acceptance of the new command structure was approved by the Folketing on Dec. 7 by 149 votes to 13, those voting against the agreement comprising the 11 members of the extreme left-wing Socialist People's Party, one Social Democrat, and one Radical, while another Radical abstained. The majority consisted of the two Government parties–the Social Democrats and Radicals (with the above exceptions)–and three Opposition parties–the Agrarians (Venstre), Conservatives, and Independents.

A special congress of the Radical Party had previously (on Dec. 4) authorized the five Radical Ministers to accept the agreement. The party's decision was, however, made by a narrow majority (34 votes to 31), and many speakers at the congress argued against acceptance of the new command, in keeping with the party's former policy (now officially abandoned) of opposition to Danish membership of NATO.

The seven-hour debate in the Folketing had been opened by the Foreign Minister, Hr. Jens Otto Krag.

Hr. Krag said that it was a natural consequence of the defensive NATO Alliance that its members should prepare for military co-operation to meet the possibility of aggression, and that the Soviet Government's protests, as expressed in its Notes to Denmark in August and to Finland in October [see 18414 A], were “surprising.” He rejected the Soviet allegations that Denmark and other countries had become “servants of aggression” and were turning the Baltic area into a trouble centre as “absurd, without any connexion with reality, and quite unreasonable,” and added: “We wish to defend ourselves, and as we have not the forces to do this alone we have joined NATO. We have the same right to protect our security as the Soviet Union has to protect its security. The fact that Western Germany's combined armed forces have been integrated in NATO is an important proof of Germany's desire for peace. The more Western Germany is economically, politically, and defensively integrated with the rest of Western Europe, the less chance there is that an unknown development in the future could lead that country into a course which might be fatal.”

Hr. Poul Hansen, the Defence Minister, emphasized that the new command would be effective only in time of war and during NATO exercises, and that its commander, and three of the four sub-commanders, would be Danish officers.

Hr. Axel Larsen (leader of the Socialist People's Party), who was the principal speaker against the agreement, moved that a decision on the new command should be deferred pending a referendum [Hr. Larson's resolution was automatically lost by the adoption of the Government motion.].

During the debate some 2,000 people held a protest demonstration outside the Parliament building, while inside the Chamber protest leaflets were showered on the deputies by Hr. Larsen's supporters in the public gallery; those responsible were removed by ushers, five of them being detained for a short time. Later, representatives of a number of associations delivered protests to the various parliamentary party groups.

A new Soviet protest against the establishment of the joint Danish-German Baltic Command was handed to the Danish Ambassador in Moscow (Hr. Holten Eggert) on Dec. 12, copies of the Note also being sent to the Governments of Norway and Sweden.

Recalling that the Soviet Government had “repeatedly called the Danish Government's attention to the dangerous consequences to the cause of peace of Denmark's military and political co-operation with the German Federal Republic,” the Note declared that “unfortunately… the Danish Government has refused to heed the considerations of the Soviet Government” and, “yielding to pressure from Bonn, has agreed to satisfy the demands of the West German militarists for setting up a Joint military command.” Rejecting the Danish Government's reasons for accepting the new command system, including its argument that the new command would be a NATO agency under Danish leadership and not a bilateral arrangement between Denmark and Western Germany, the Soviet Government asserted that “it is not difficult to foresee that the Bonn generals… will… run the unified command just as they already run other NATO agencies and headquarters.”

Denmark, the Soviet Government alleged, had therefore taken “a new and most dangerous step,” which “helps to convert the area of the Baltic Sea into a military base for aggression against the U.S.S.R.and other peace-loving States” and “will worsen Soviet-Danish relations and complicate the position of Denmark's neutral neighbours.” The Note further asserted that “the planned inclusion of the island of Bornholm… into the sphere of control of the unified command… runs counter to the spirit and letter of the assurances given by the Danish Government on March 8, 1946, to the effect that Denmark was ready by her own forces, without participation of foreign troops, to occupy Bornholm and administer it fully.” In conclusion, the Soviet Government declared that it would be “compelled to retaliate by taking the necessary measures to safeguard the security of its country and its allies.”

The Danish reply to the Soviet Note was handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Copenhagen (Mr. Kliment Levytchine) by Hr. Viggo Kampmann, the Danish Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister, on Dec. 14, after its terms had been approved by the Folketing foreign affairs committee.

Rejecting the Soviet Government's allegations, the Danish Note pointed out that they were essentially the same as those made in the earlier Soviet Note of Aug. 31, which had been fully answered by Denmark both in a Note of Oct. 7 and in the Folketing debate on Dec. 7. The Note stressed that it was for Denmark alone to judge what measures were appropriate for her own defence; emphasized again the purely defensive character of the NATO Alliance, which was not changed by Western Germany's membership; and reiterated that the new Baltic Command was a NATO command under a Danish head, and not a bilateral Danish-German agency dominated by the Germans as alleged by the Soviet Government.

At the same time the Note pointed out that there was no change in the defence arrangements for Bornholm, the Danish force there remaining under Danish command as agreed in 1946 when the Russians evacuated the island. In conclusion the Danish Government expressed its wish that Denmark should continue “to live in understanding and friendship with the Soviet Union, in the spirit of good neighbourliness.”