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- Doctrinal Maneuver
- Soldier as a System-Ground, or SaaS-G
- TFT Integration Summary 30 JAN 08 : Run 1
- The End Finally Comes for FCS
- Ground Combat Vehicle
- The Army Network
- PRE-RELEASE VERSION; DO NOT QUOTE
Enemy Force. Though the results showing an increase in kills and a decrease in friendly losses as a result of SO2 [spinout 2] technology looked awfully impressive on the briefing slide, one must consider the fact that the enemy portrayed was significantly smaller than would have been expected in that environment, and that the officer commanding red forces was terribly inexperienced and not adequate for the mission. Had we fought against even a moderately manned, equipped and led red force things might have turned out quite different. Since that is what we will face when these systems are actually used, it seems counterproductive to portray anything different in simulation. Doctrinal Maneuver. Just as important as the above point, was that the model used by JANUS did not permit the blue force to maneuver anywhere close to the way we train our infantry forces to fight in an urban environment. This is significant because TRAC unambiguously portrayed the results of this simulation as being analogous to what actual combat forces executing a similar mission in the future would achieve. Again, it seems counterproductive to use TTPs in simulation we would never use in actual combat and then using those results to make future force decisions. [Soldier as a System-Ground, or SaaS-G] Some in the room voiced their opinion that the simulation implied that SaaS-G [a suite of technologies and applied doctrinal concepts projected to improve a future Soldier’s capabilities] was instrumental in lowering friendly casualties in vignette 1... I commanded the formation that fought there and I can tell you it played no role whatsoever – because it wasn’t represented. Who knows, it may well lower casualties, but it would be inaccurate to suggest that this simulation validated that. So far as I was ever made aware, the concerns I raised were not considered by General Terry and the impression that the simulation had proven the FCS technology to be effective in real combat remained unchallenged. In an effort to stimulate open debate on the FCS program, encouraging other members of the military to ask hard questions, I published my second article in the Armed Forces Journal in January 2008, entitled “Heavy & Agile: Nine Steps to a More Effective Force.” In that article I lauded some of the Defense Department’s modernization efforts but noted that “other elements are so far off the mark that if remedial actions are not taken, American forces could suffer a significant battlefield defeat in a future war.” I further explained that: the design of vehicles that are less armored than existing platforms and therefore less survivable in combat, which is illogical when one considers the certainty that time and technology will continue to see the development of stronger and more powerful weapon systems. How then, does it make sense to design a future fighting platform less survivable than today’s vehicles? Consider recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan… given the current state of technology, the probability of future development in nations across the globe, and a historical perspective on the performance of new and emerging technologies in the past, does (the Army’s FCS employment theory) stand up to rigorous examination? I argue that it does not. Aside from a near-faith-based, unsubstantiated belief in the efficacy of technology to do anything and everything imaginable, one of the primary factors upon which this assessment is based is its failure to give proper consideration to the capabilities of the future enemy force. Two months later the GAO published a new report. This one explained the genesis of many of the critical problems they had identified in their earlier work as well as pointing out additional concerns. The 7 March 2008 report stated: The Army started the FCS program in May 2003 before defining what the systems were going to be required to do and how they would interact. The Army moved ahead without determining whether the concept could be successfully developed with existing resources—without proven technologies, a stable design, and available funding and time. The Army projects the FCS program will cost $160.9 billion, which does not include all the costs to the Army, such as complementary programs… The progress made during the year by the FCS program, in terms of knowledge gained, is commensurate with a program in early development. Yet, the knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short of a program halfway through both its development schedule and its budget… Specifically, in the key areas for defining and developing FCS capabilities, we found requirements have been defined well enough to begin preliminary designs of the individual FCS systems. Requirements are still fluid, reflecting recent events such as the Army’s decision to reduce systems from 18 to 14, understanding what the FCS network needs to be, and the re-estimate of software from 63 million to 95 million lines of code… Beginning in 2008, the Army plans to make a series of commitments to produce FCS-related systems in advance of the production decision for the FCS core program in 2013. In general, production commitments are planned before key information is available. In 2008 and 2009, the Army plans to begin funding initial production of the first of three planned spin outs of FCS technologies to current forces. The Army intends to commit to the first spin out before testing is complete and will rely partly on tests of surrogate systems. In response to the 2008 GAO report, the Army published a rebuttal on its FCS website. The rebuttals did not address some of the more serious deficiencies mentioned, instead choosing to paint the GAO as an organization that did not understand how to properly assess such a complicated program. There was no mention of the problems with the spike in the requirement for programming code, no comment regarding the spinout problems, and instead of addressing the problems my AFJ article noted about the vehicles, the Army simply claimed they were “state of the art” and “will” defeat any future threat. In its rebuttal, the Army wrote: FCS is the critical part of the Army’s modernization strategy focused on conflicts we face today and in the future. Our strategy takes a balanced approach dealing with the requirements of our current force and developing and procuring capabilities required by our future force to defeat our future advisories. The FCS Brigade Combat Team (FBCT) is an ambitious effort developing holistic brigade sets of capabilities that will defeat any future threat. FCS is the Army’s premiere modernization program that provides the country the required land force capabilities by replacing the Cold War armored vehicles with state of the art technologies. FCS empowers Soldiers and Leaders with 14 manned and unmanned air and ground systems connected by a network. Many critics of the FCS Program including the GAO continue to view the FCS Program through a single system procurement prism that equates the program to a platform rather than a family of systems with an integrated network. The Army and the GAO disagree about what constitutes a sound business case for weapons systems acquisition programs. In 2004, the Army restructured the program, largely based on GAO assessments and recommendations, to pursue a phased-development approach to the program. The integration phases inherent in the revised approach were specifically designed to reduce program risk and concurrency, provide for more experimentation and systems’ verification, and principally to build knowledge not only on the progress of each developmental phase, but also to inform subsequent developmental phases. GAO continues to asses risk using single system development metrics as benchmarks for assessing the FCS program. This approach does not give credit to the fact that verification of integration activities are occurring within each integration phase, which minimizes cost and risk later in the program. Whether intentionally or through taking the path of least resistance, the leaders the Army placed in charge of overseeing the institution’s premier modernization repeatedly told Congress the system was “on schedule, on budget” and would represent a dramatic improvement over current warfighter capabilities. Furthermore, the Army produced a series of video presentations that depicted the system dominating in precisely the environments in which their tests had shown they would instead suffer catastrophic defeat. Many of the physical tests conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas during my assignment there were abject failures. Instead of reporting honestly the tests had failed, the Army’s senior leaders in some cases released official Army press releases announcing instead the tests had been very successful. In one particular situation is deserving of specific mention owing to the egregious nature of the deception. In the spring of 2008, the FCS leaders began to take some public heat for designing a highly expensive system that was optimised for state-on-state warfare on a large scale and was not useful for the wars then underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to demonstrate the relevance of FCS to the present as well as the future, the Army decided to conduct what it called “spinouts,” which ostensibly meant that as components of the larger system became technologically mature, they would be ‘spun out’ to the active force ahead of full fielding of all components in the 2016 timeframe. The first of these was referred to as “spinout 1” or SO1. In keeping with what was already becoming standard practice by then, the “developed technology” the FCS leaders proposed spinning out consisted of items that had been developed outside of the program and grafted in. Thus, they were spinning out what other organizations had designed, characterizing it as a success of the FCS program. But while the items of SO1 functioned in a lab (items such as ground sensors, cameras, robots and other hardware and software), there were significant problems involved in its operation in a field or combat environment, even if only to gauge potential value-added to the warfighter. In order to validate whether the items were ready for use in Iraq or Afghanistan, a field test had to be conducted at Fort Bliss in the spring of 2008. As with almost every other test, this one (known as the Tactical Field Test, or TFT) failed miserably. Moreover, the negative results did not simply get suppressed—they were flipped 180-degrees and publicly proclaimed to be successes. The TFT was a comprehensively unqualified disaster. almost a failure in every aspect of the testing. Equipment malfunctioned or never worked at all; communications gear would barely work more than double-digit meters when it worked at all; and the integration kits (known as B-kits) for the M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles failed almost entirely. At that time it was clear that the scheduled limited user test (LUT) – the results of which were required by law to be reported to Congress – would likewise founder because there was almost literally no time after the previous test to make any changes or modifications in order to materially change the results of the LUT. I have been told by officers personally present at deliberations within FCS program that the senior leadership decided to recommend shelving the tank and Bradley integration kits for the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) because they had too many problems to overcome in a short period of time and instead refocus on the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), as they would have fewer integration requirements. Some leaders voiced concern that pushing back the timeline for the program at this crucial juncture could lend more ammunition to those advocating cancelation of the program. It was in June 2008 that two certain general officers went to Capitol Hill to brief members of the House Armed Services Committee on the progress of testing. As I stated earlier, from 1997-98 I was a foreign affairs and defense aide for Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and maintained contacts on the Hill. One such colleague from the House Armed Services Committee was physically present in the room when these two generals briefed Members of Congress about the reasons for changing Spinout 1 from HBCT to IBCT. What those two officers told the Members bore almost no relation to the truth of why we made the change. The official FCS story at the time was that we made the change for two important reasons: 1) we needed to get FCS spinout technologies into the hands of Soldiers in the current fight as soon as possible, and 2) since the testing at Fort Bliss had shown success we would be able to get these items out faster than we expected so we were going to “accelerate” the spinout. This story gained official traction in the draft of the FCS Spinout Capabilities Production Document (CPD) dated 20 January 2009, which says, “In June 2008, the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a refocused effort for the SO1 capability fielding from the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) to the IBCT. ‘We are listening to our Soldiers and commanders in the field, and we are giving them the capabilities they need-as fast as we can so that they can win in the current fight. We are able to do this due to the technologies that have matured over the past few years.’” The tests that were actually performed demonstrated precisely the opposite of what those general officers told the Congressmen in that meeting. The details of the test showed that the sensors failed in almost every assessment, that critical information necessary to share on the network did not function, and repeated re-runs to give the system “second chances” likewise failed. Had the Army’s senior leaders simply been honest in reporting the failures, it could have spurred greater innovation and changes of direction to technologies that might have proven useful. Instead, we deceived the American public and US Congress into believing the new capabilities were proving successful. Thus, as as can now be demonstrated in a widening pattern, instead of accepting the test results at face value we reinforced failure and guaranteed ultimate failure – which is precisely what happened six months later when the tests were repeated. When the Army reported the results in a June 11, 2008 press release, a rather different outcome was described. In order to demonstrate the vast gulf between what happened and what was reported, I will provide a few excerpts of the raw test results and follow immediately with an article authored by the program’s Director, then-Brigadier General James Terry, showing how the Army communicated those results to the American public. TFT Integration Summary 30 JAN 08: Run 1 (Abrams C34): Connected Abrams C34 [M1 Battle Tank] to T-UGS [Tactical unmanned ground sensor] field 3B and got the field to display on the FBCB2 [the command and control software that runs our tactical computers]. While the remaining sensors were coming online a light vehicle drove down the road and set off detections from the T-UGS field. The detection was sent from the T-UGS gateway to C34's Battle Command (BC). BC generated a (‘hit’) and sent it to the FBCB2 which generated an unknown icon on the screen. Abrams C34 was able to change the unknown icon to a hostile icon. When the Abrams attempted to forward the hostile icon into the network it was discovered that Abrams C34 EPLRS [another type of computer command software] was down. Restarted the Abrams and attempted to reconnect without success it was determined that Abrams C34 was not transmitting... We were unable to connect two T-UGS fields to Abrams C34. At this point it was decided to remove Abrams C34 and replace it with Bradley A33. Run 2 (Bradley A33): Connected Bradley A33 to T-UGS field 5B and got the field to display on the FBCB2. T-UGS field appeared on Bradley's FBCB2. Got 9 T-UGS Nodes to display but before the remaining nodes came online Battle Command crashed. Restarted Battle Command and the FBCB2 did not come up so the system had to be restarted. Bradley A33 was restarted but while we were bringing up the T-UGS fields Bradley A33 crashed [meaning it’s computer software crashed, not the vehicle]. We replaced Bradley A33 with HMMWV 1 [formal designation for a Hummer].
After the January 2008 test failed so completely, there was serious discussion in the FCS headquarters about the implications for the upcoming Limited User Test, set for June 2008. Most officers reported that there was simply not enough time to make any meaningful changes or alterations to the equipment to get a different result for the LUT, which, if it failed, would carry serious negative implications for the whole program. After much deliberation, a decision was made to delay the LUT until the summer of 2009, and during the summer of 2008 to hold a less rigorous test which would not have to be reported to Congress. It was called the “preliminary” limited user test, or P-LUT. As expected, the P-LUT, too, failed to nearly the same standard as the TFT. Yet the senior leaders continued to represent a picture of success to the American public and Congress that things were going well. In light of the above, including the actual test results, this passage from the official publication of the FCS program – known as “FCS Communications” – places into stark relief the integrity problem we have in the Army. In its 9-13 June 2008 edition the magazine reported, "A quarterly CEO council (including the civilian CEOs of the various companies providing goods and services for FCS) was held on 10 June in the pentagon with Army Secretary Pete Geren, General Wallace, Jim Albaugh, and several other One Team CEOs to review the progress of the FCS program. Thanks to all the great work of the entire FCS team we were able to demonstrate the program is making excellent progress en route to our next key milestone..." 
The above photo was published on 8 June 2008 on the Army’s official website (downloaded from http://www.army.mil/article/9874/nlos-c-unveiled-on-capitol-hill on 18 December 2011). The cutline read in part: “Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George Casey Jr., viewed the system. Casey said the unveiling is a milestone in Future Combat Systems development. ‘We have been talking and briefing and telling people about the FCS, and right here today it is real. After a decade of hard work and planning and effort, it is real,’ he said.” A high-ranking source who used to work on the FCS program for the GAO told me that this “real” vehicle was effectively a shell and could not in any real way be called a prototype (as claimed). It did not function, but was only a “representative” of the real thing. But the Chief of Staff of the US Army explicitly told the American public – and the Congressman in Washington who attended the display – that it was “real.” It was not. The next day (June 11, 2008), an article released by the Army News Service and written by the program’s Director, Brigadier General James Terry, explained how the test had achieved great success: It was the first time FCS equipment has been tested in continuous operations under stressful, realistic conditions in the hands of Soldiers. By any measure, officials said it was a huge success. Soldiers verified that the equipment performed to acceptable standards, and added operational value to their formation. Soldiers were able to validate that the equipment worked as designed, with the normal challenges one would expect in an early test, and, as Soldiers are prone to do, they also discovered new and different ways to employ the systems under combat conditions to provide the most value added. The End Finally Comes for FCS From the initial concept for future battle the Army promoted in 1996 of “Army After Next”, through the first identified problems with the concept gained through testing and simulation in 1998, and then numerous rounds of identified problems via testing and GAO reports through 2008, the Army leadership resisted all evidence and warning that existing programs were failing. Lieutenant-General Michael Vane, Director of the ARCIC (Army Capabilities Integration Center), which oversaw the FCS program, wrote in June 2008 that “This year represents a critical step forward for FCS. For the first time, the program is using procurement funds to deliver FCS systems and components for evaluation.” Yet less than one year after the publication of this article and after years of Army refusals to acknowledge problems, the Secretary of Defense would cancel the program. On April 7th, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James E. Cartwright held a press conference involving the cancelation of the FCS Manned Ground Vehicles; the full program would be canceled the following month. Secretary Gates justified the cancelation by explaining, “first of all, the vulnerability of lighter armor to EFPs [explosively formed penetrator, a type of powerful roadside bomb]; the design of some of the vehicles in terms of learning some of the lessons in protecting the troops, and so on. But it also did not reflect, as far as I could tell, the lessons learned of operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan… But let me ask General Cartwright to add.” General Cartwright reiterated the Secretary’s concerns about the suitability of the proposed vehicles to operate in the full spectrum of combat and concluded by saying, “so when you put all that together, what we're asking is for the Army to step back, revisit the so-called requirements, revisit the realities that we've discovered over the last nine years in the development of this program -- do they really fit? Can we really adapt the basic chassis to that broader range of activities and expect these vehicles to last and survive?” These are the same concerns the GAO raised as early as 2005 and echoed in my AFJ reports in 2005 and 2008. Had the Army leadership acknowledge the deficiencies noted by the GAO in the early years of the program and made appropriate changes, it is very possible FCS could have been reformed and ultimately fielded in a modified form. Regrettably, the Army leadership did not learn those lessons and in fact repeated them in its attempt to produce the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Ground Combat Vehicle Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arguably made a good decision to shutter the FCS program in 2009, but then inexplicably placed the same men in charge of the follow-on program, the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The results were predictable. In October 2009, then-Chief of Staff General George Casey confidently asserted that the Army would produce the GCV in “five to seven years.” In October 2009 DoDBuzz.com reported that General Casey told reporters “that the first version of the vehicle ‘would probably’ be ‘too heavy’ and he acknowledged those who say the Army is risking much as it plans to deploy the first vehicles within five to seven years. But he answered those critics, saying ‘it just makes sense that we ought to be able to do this.’” In June of the following year he repeated his aspiration, but still used the same five to seven year timeframe, noting “We're at the beginning of the process. This thing is going to take about seven years to get on the street." In March 2012 current Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and noted in his prepared remarks: “The GCV is the...centerpiece of the Army’s overall combat vehicle investment strategy…. The GCV acquisition strategy implements affordability measures designed to ensure the long-term success of the program as the Army faces constrained resources in the future. To develop this acquisition strategy, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a comprehensive review to make sure the program is both achievable and affordable within a 7-year timeframe.” Yet less than one year later, the program was pushed back yet again. In a 17 January 2013 memorandum Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall conceded the technology was still not where it needed to be and thus ordered a six month delay in the Technology Development phase. But barely three months later, the Army pushed the program back yet again. DoDBuzz.com reported on 12 April 2013, “The new delay — which is part of the Army’s proposed fiscal 2014 defense spending plan — adds another six-month delay to the GCV program’s engineering, manufacturing and development phase — making the new delay ‘a total of 12 months,’ Bourke said.” New timelines for the program now called for Milestone C decision by 2019. But as the April 2013 CBO report on the GCV noted, that would result in the first production models rolling off the assembly line – assuming all development performed precisely according to their desired timelines – shortly thereafter, but based on the maximum projected production rate of 156 a year, it would take through 2030 before all were fielded. But based on the Army’s near unbroken record of performance over the past two full decades, it is unlikely any of the targets will be hit. Indeed, based on track records earned, it isn’t certain the GCV will ever exist beyond powerpoint slides. Whether it was the Crusader, the Comanche, the FCS program, or the GCV, the pattern has been virtually identical, as detailed above: the Army tries to develop a new capability that sets enormous aspirations, conducts testing and simulation to validate the concept, but then irrespective of the results pushes forward with the program; when the GAO, CBO, or other credible voice identifies serious problems, the Army refutes the criticism, suggests those conducting the report don’t know what they’re doing, and continues to push through – but ultimately have the program either canceled or pared back so far that insufficient quantities are ever produced that will have an impact on a current or future battlefield. Such proclivities are not limited to hardware, however. The Army Network In January 2013, the GAO published a report entitled, “Army Networks: Size and Scope of Modernization Investment Merit Increased Oversight.” On the opening page the report states, “for nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network...” Despite the near-two decades the Army has already spent trying to define requirements, “the network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet executed one full cycle of the agile process… Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to spend billions of dollars netting together dozens of disparate systems to form a network that is intended to enhance warfighter effectiveness and survivability. Specifically, the Army has identified that over $3 billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of the Army’s most costly investments.” Simply the fact the Army senior leaders have been unable to make the network function after nearly two decades ought to be enough to convince them to adopt an alternative approach. But in order to place this sad record in context, it is instructive to examine just how unsuccessful the Army has been in trying to make the radios upon which this network is expected to function. The backbone of Army Networks was originally designed to be the Joint Tactical Radio System, or JTRS, first established as a program of record in1997. Two years into the program, the GAO’s Allen Li testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the program was having difficulties. On 9 September 1999 he said, “DOD faces three key challenges to successful realization of the JTFS program objectives. First, despite DOD’s expectations of success, recent studies indicate that current commercial technology may not be available to fully support the replacement of existing service radios with JTRS products and may not support future JTRS requirements… Third, the JTRS Operational Requirements Document, although developed with input from warfighters, does not fully define interoperability goals for joint and coalition warfare operations.” On August 11, 2003 Paul Francis testified that despite four more years of effort, “the program still faces several managerial and technological challenges that could affect the Department of Defense’s ability to develop and procure JTRS radios successfully. These include managing requirements and funding, maturing key technologies, integrating system components, testing, and developing secure communications. The most significant challenge we identified is the lack of a strong, joint-management structure.” Nine years later – on 14 December 2012 – GAO published a report summarizing the status of a number of troubled acquisition programs, one of which was JTRS. In it the author wrote, “since it was established in 2009, the [DoD’s Developmental Test and Evaluation] office has assessed whether 15 programs were ready to begin operational testing. The office recommended that 5 of the programs—Global Hawk Block 20/30, Standard Missile 6, Joint Tactical Radio System Handheld Manpack Small Form (HMS) Rifleman Radio, Joint Tactical Radio System HMS Manpack, and MQ-1C Gray Eagle—not proceed into operational testing.” After 15 years of foundering and the Department of Defense organization responsible for validating the readiness of weapons’ programs recommending against producing the JTRS radios, it might seem reasonable to expect the senior Army leaders to have accepted that JTRS is unlikely to ever produce what was promised. That’s not what happened. Instead, as the GAO report dryly noted, “however, military service acquisition chiefs decided to allow all 5 of these programs to proceed anyway. Four of the programs—Global Hawk Block 20/30, Standard Missile 6, Joint Tactical Radio System HMS Rifleman Radio and Joint Tactical Radio System HMS Manpack—demonstrated poor performance in operational testing, in areas such as reliability, effectiveness, or suitability.” Just months ago – 16 years after program launch – the GAO published its latest assessment of major weapons programs and had this to say about the JTRS HMS radio: “Despite initiating operational testing on both variants, JTRS HMS has not demonstrated the maturity of all its critical technologies. JTRS HMS has yet to demonstrate one of the Rifleman radio's three critical technologies—the soldier radio waveform—or any of the Manpack radio's four critical technologies in a realistic environment.” To sum: after nearly two decades of effort, the Army’s senior leaders have been unable to even fully define the strategy they wish to use to make the network function, and despite report after report by the GAO and numerous other defense analysts over the past 16 years citing continuing problems, still the radios do not function properly. Nevertheless, the Army is requesting over $3 billion each year for the foreseeable future attempting to reach functionality despite evident weaknesses, disregarding the lessons from more than $11 billion already lost. The significance of these serious problems is highlighted by the fact the Army claims the network is critical to its future success. The Army’s 2013 Strategic Planning Guidance claims that: a critical component to empowering our Soldiers is the Army’s Network. The Army is building a single, secure, standards-based, versatile network that provides the overarching end-to-end architecture connecting Soldiers and their equipment to vital information and our Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners that will create overwhelming synergy and technology overmatch on future battlefields… In total, Army modernization efforts will prepare the entire force for the complex and uncertain battlefield by putting small units with precise information and overmatch capability in the right place at the right time to accomplish their mission. Army senior leaders have been made aware – as the GAO noted above – for “nearly 20 years” that efforts to produce an actual network that performs according to the aspiration cited above have not succeeded. Yet they continue to build an Army predicated upon the successful accomplishment of this network. How much longer should America give the benefit of the doubt to the Army’s senior leaders before demanding performance to standard – or accountability and the elevation of others to be given a chance to succeed? Conclusion Over the past two decades, the US Army has failed to produce almost every major weapon system or organizational transformation it has undertaken. The failures were the result, in most cases, of known problems. Recommendations made by expert, independent third parties were usually rejected. If there is no change in the ranks or the culture of the Army’s senior leaders, it is reasonable to expect that the next 20 years will produce a similar caliber of failure. If neither the White House nor Congress nor the American people demand a change in the way the Army’s senior leaders are selected and promoted – and most importantly, held accountable for their performance – then we will all be equally culpable for the predictable results. Page of PRE-RELEASE VERSION; DO NOT QUOTE Download 187.24 Kb. Share with your friends:
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