From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir

The Sayad also tells me there is some one whose name cannot be mentioned in a letter, who prevents all news from Wakhan reaching me. I imagine that this is the Mehtar himself, who fears that Russian movements on the ........ . . .. .

From - J. L Kaye, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar,

To - W.J. Cunningham, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

In the absence of Colonel Barr from Srinagar, I forward, in continuation of his demi-official letter No. 1833, dated the 8th May 1893, to the address of Sir Mortimer Durand, the marginally noted demi-official letter, with enclosures in original, received yesterday, forwarding a copy of a demi-official letter, dated the 10th April, and of its enclosure, from Robertson, regarding the state of affairs in Chitral.

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Demi-official No. 1698-R., dated Gilgit, the 2nd May 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. Durand, British Agent, Gilgit.

To - Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar.

His remarks about Mahomed Wali refer to the latter having proposed to return to Yasin, while I was away in Chilas, on the rumour of Nizam's having sent an army there.

I put the matter quite plainly to him on my return, said Government had recognised Nizam as Mehtar of Chitral, which includes Yasin, and that, as he had refused to submit to Nizam, the latter would appoint his own Governor. I told him I would not tolerate any fighting in Yasin — a piece of bluff which had the desired effect, and I advised him to get his family out of Yasin and to lie low, which advice ho has taken. I did my best to make it up between him and Nizam in November, but they are deadly enemies, personal and by race. The boy is all right here, and does not think we have played him false, I think.

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Demi-official No. 42, dated the 10th April 1893.

From - G. S. Robertson, Esq., C.S.I. Chitral,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durand, C.B., Gilgit.

I enclose a copy of a demi-official to Deane at Peshawar, in reply to one from him containing a message from the Foreign Office asking for news; but I hope that my report is well on its way to Kashmir, and that the telegraph line has long ago supplied the Government with all the information it requires.

Two fugitives were captured a short time ago. It leaked, out that a death sentence was to be inflicted, which was to be carried into execution by the fathers of the prisoners. I sent for Inayat Khan and mentioned to him the sentiment of Christians on such an atrocious proposal. He was a little ashamed of the whole business, and said the sentence was merely a threat to frighten people, it was never intended to carry it put. I then pointed out the effect even the rumour of such a punishment would, have in India. Of course, it is all right now. The Mehtar, is by no means bad hearted. I strictly abstain from interfering in internal matters in Chitral, but here one had to draw the line. There was recently a case in which the ears of two men were cut off with more than usual barbarity, I believe. It was kept very secret, and I heard nothing of it till afterwards. Such proceedings must not go on while we are in Chitral. They are as contrary to sound policy as they are to humanity. As I said before, the Mehtar is not particularly cruel, but it would be difficult to guess to what extremes Waffadar, Bahadur Shah & Co. would not go if they had a free hand frontier might compel me to go to Mastuj. Nizam has, of course all manner of hopes and fears, which he does not communicate to lie. He now talks of going down to Drosh to inspect the fort, and suggested I should go with him. This may mean that lie is also disturbed about the rumour from Dir and Bajaur, and wants to display the Mission escort on the Dir frontier and overawe the enemy with his resources. I need hardly say I have no intention whatever of acceding to this request.

There is a general belief amongst the disaffected Chitral, and those really well affected to Nizam rarely to be met with that Sher Afzul has been released by the Amir and is to he sent to Badakhshan or to Asmar or Peeh ; also that his son is still in Zebak with a large force, only waiting for the passes to open before ho makes things unpleasant for us on that direction. It will take a year of patience before the. Chitralis will become reconciled to having Nizam as their King. Their imaginations are so vivid and their hopefulness is so great that every thing must be left to kindness and to time. The utter want of any tiling approaching to veracity in these people is an anthropological phenomenon. Childish credulity and absolute seepticism are so mixed up in their minds that it is difficult to know how to permanently influ­ence them. The only ways are by carefully studied accuracies of statement even in trivial matters, by indomitable patience and unswerving good temper.

If, as seems possible, Umra Khan intends attacking the Kafirs after the Eed, it will be exceedingly inconvenient to us. The question is a complicated one. The Mehtar claims suzerainty over the. Bashghal Kafirs, a claim they readily concede, particularly as lie gives them in presents twenty times as much as lie receives in nominal tribute. All the Mullahs and learned men gave their opinion to the late Mehtar that he was justified in defending the Kafirs by force of arms in the event of "their being attacked by Umra Khan, because they admitted his paramount authority over them and paid him tribute. I am almost sure that the Baba Sahib subscribed to this opinion, but of course the prospect of a religious war will make him turn round at once without shame, or without thinking it necessary to justify his conduct. On the other hand, the Afghans of Dir and Bajaur have been warring with the Kafirs for over a year without any interference 'on the part of the Chitralis. This has been chiefly due to the intestine commotion in the country, hut partly, especially before Aman-ul-Mulk died, to a fear that the Government of India would be exceedingly annoyed if Umra Khan were attacked. Every Chitrali from the highest to the lowest will, affirm with conviction that it was entirely due to the insistence of the English that Umra Khan must not be interfered with.

Umra Khan attacked the Kafirs traitorously and villanously in the usual Afghan way, while he was professing friendship and alliance with them. The Kafirs have avenged this action in their, usual murderous way. Their little de­tached parties have killed men and women right in Bajaur, and actually under, the walls of Dir fort. Not less than 200 men and women have been slain in this way. Both sides are equally exasperated; the rights and wrongs of the origi­nal quarrel count as nothing and it must be fought out to the end, as there is no strong outside authority to insist on a cessation of hostilities.

The Kafirs are badly armed and must be vanquished in the believe, unless internal troubles in Bajaur and Dir prevent Umra Khan putting forth his whole strength.

They could not be safely given arms and ammunition; they are too wild and excitable. The Chitralis will clamour to be allowed to fight Umra Khan in defence of their own country, as they pretend that the Bashghat valley is their territory as well as the Kunar valley down to Bailan. I doubt very much if they really care to encounter Umra Khan's veterans; but being ordered to retrain from doing so will give Nizam and his advisers an opportunity of trying to turn the present feeling of unpopularity they inspire in the direction of the British Mission, and of posing as patriots only kept from fighting for their country by the irresistible orders of the Government of India. Their policy is always decided to the exigencies of the moment.

They are too customarily untruthful to argue from past events; they are
incapable of looking forward.

Bat the complications do not cease here. 'The Kafir tribes of the Bashghal valley are not unanimous in heir hostility to Umra Khan. One small tribe is making overtures to him and offering assistance.

Lastly, Umra Khan declares that Nizam on flying to Gilgit sent him a message, and subsequently a second through Waffadar, that in return for help against Afzal he was prepared to cede the whole of the Kunar valley below Garijat (Gairat)?

This will be strenuously denied by Nizam and Waffadar, but it is very likely true all the same, and Uma Khan may have documentary evidence in support of his statements. Umra Khan has not written to me to this effect; but he has proclaimed it in Durbar, and may be keeping certain letters back to produce them with strong dramatic effect if necessity arises.

I need hardly say that the triumph of Chitral diplomacy would be to embroil us with Umra Khan and get us to fight their battles for them, or failing this, to cast on our shoulders the blame of any indignity the country may suffer at Umra Khan's hands.

It is quite impossible for me to try and discuss matters directly with Umra Khan. He would at once begin playing off the Peshawar authorities against me. I imagine he is trying to do this already, one has to be very cautious. Any conflict in opinion or advice between my letters and those of the Political officers at Peshawar would not only give the enemy cause to blaspheme and rejoice greatly, but would create a suspicion that we were not acting in good faith and had similar ulterior designs in Bajaur which we were not clever enough to decently veil. So under present arrangements it is better that Umra Khan should be left to the Peshawar people to deal with, while it would be most convenient if all those portions of the Peshawar political diary relating to him should be sent to Chitral for us to see. Indeed this seems absolutely necessary.

Nizam is delighted with a letter from Ghulam telling him of the success in Yasin. He declares we may command his life and the lives subjects in any way we please. He says that now his authority will be greatly strengthened, and it will be apparent to every one that he is the real Mehtar of Chitral. Ghulam seems to be behaving with great prudence and moderation, and lam so far very pleased with him. It is unfortunate that you were obliged to be away from Gilgit while Mohamed Wali was there. I cannot help thinking that if Napier had carefully considered your demi-officials to me he might have though that your hint about Nizam sending a Governor into Yasin would bear fluid, and this would have prevented his making those decided statements to Mohamed Wall which may give the latter the idea we have not been behaving quite straightforwardly with him. It almost appears, too, as if Mohamed Wall had been treated as the de facto King of Yasin, and his right to light Nizam admitted. He asked permission to attack u purely imaginary army sent into Yasin by the Mehtar. He was dissuaded from leaving Gilgit, not on the ground that he must not oppose the lawful authority of Nizam-ul-Mulk, but on the ground that the rumour was false, and that we should never tolerate such an unwise action on Nizam's part. But the rumour was merely prophetic, as you now know. Ghulam of course took with him a strong escort, overwhelmingly strong, so that any small party of rebels or rascals might at once see the hopelessness of disputing the Mehtar's authority. It may be that Napier's demi-official to me does not clearly shew what actually took place between him and Mohamed Wali, but I hope you will get hold of the latter and explain matters fully to him, and disabuse his mind from any idea that either you, Napier, or myself had the slightest intention of misleading him. The absolute certainty that we always act in absolutely good faith with our frontier friends and enemies is always worth a brigade to us. It is part and parcel of our prestige, and makes these people marvel at the strength of our resources, which is the only explana­tion they can offer of our habits of straightforward dealing. They think a power must be very conscious of its own strength, which is able to put aside the arts of native diplomacy and abide by clear unmistakable statements of policy. I am more troubled about this matter than I can tell you.

It seems impossible that Mohamed Wali could ever have seriously thought of opposing Ghulam or any other Governor of the Mehtar; but more likely that he was attempting to play oft' Gilgit against the Mission in the usual way, and use the British cantonment at Thayer Lasht as an argument and a scare­crow. He plays a bold game, and a wily one too; but it is less bold than it seems and more wily than it appears.

The Mehtar is anxious to built us a house he supplying labour, etc., we getting up skilled artisans from Peshawar or Gilgit. I have thanked him for the kind offer, but hinted the subject may be conveniently deferred for sub­sequent discussion. He declares his desire is that English officers may always have a suitable "clean" house to live in; but be does not seek to disguise his sincere wish that British officers should always remain in the country. If my suggestions were accepted by Government, the Mission would certainly require a good well-built defensible building; it would strengthen our position greatly, it could easily be made impregnable, But you already know my views and I need not repeat them.

I hear the Amir has for some time been trying to get a news-writer Gilgit, and is prepared to pay the official Bs. 2,000 a year.

All the news I can get about the Russian is the Badakhshan that district and Balkh this year. Four of the Mehtar's men are returning from Zebak and are now at Lutkho.

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Demi-official No. 41, dated Chitral, the 9^th April 1893.

From - G.S. Robertson, Esq. O.S.I., in charge Chitral Mission,

To - Captain Deane Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar,

Your letter, dated the 6^th of Mareh, reached me last night. We sent the first letters through Dir to see if they would arrive safely or not.

If the telegraph line between Gilgit and Srinagar is working, news ought to reach Government more quickly that way than through Dir, where the delay in getting letters through is extremely great.

I have sent in a full report on Chitral affairs to the Resident through Durand. It should have reached Gilgit about the 30th of last month, and be now well on its way to India. It contains statements and opinions very confidential in their nature, and I still hesitate to send a copy through; the unsettled Dir country, for fear lest it might fall into wrong hands, which would be awkward.

I now send you a rapid resume of affairs generally. Please telegraph the more important matters and send on my letter subsequently by post.

Chitral - Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mull is still decidedly unpopular. The reasons for this are given in my report. The great majority of the Chitralis are unsettled and disaffected, and still look for a sign from Kabul and Sher Afzal. There are loose intrigues and nebulous conspiracies everywhere; but there is no one at present strong enough, or with sufficient authority, to join all together and make them really dangerous. Numbers of men are continually fleeing the country, or attempting to do so. All fugitives are said to be kindly received and entertained at a place called Tuti, near Jelalabad, where all are collected, pending instructions and ordeis from Kabul, where Sher Afzal now is. Our information's concerning the Amir's relations with Sher Afzal are to the follow­ing effect.

Sher Afzal is not really a prisoner, nor in actual disfavour, although he may be nominally under arrest at Kabul. On arrival he had an interview with the Amir, who reproached him for not holding Chitral and fighting Nizam; also for having brought disgrace on the Afgan Government Sher Afzal's answer was that he withdrew entirely for a regard for His Holiness honour, for since the latter was an ally of the English, he thought it would not be advisable to attack Nizam, seeing the latter was supported by the English.

The Ghizr headmen are said to be already on their way to Chitral to make submission to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who will certainly receive them most kindly Mohamed Wali is actually only less unpopular in Worshgom than Nizam-ul-Mulk. If obliged to choose, the people would prefer a Khushwakt to a Kator prince, but they were so delighted with the Mission that' they entreated to be taken under the protection and rule of the Government of India forever. Although such sentiment may be evanescent, they were sincere enough at the moment of utterance, and might be fostered into something real and lasting. The Mission on its way devoted itself to the task of conciliating the people so as to leave only friends behind it; its success was so great as to be embarrassing at times.

The Malik of Barirholi, who had been appointed to that position by Umra Khan, but had thrown of his allegiance and joined Pamjan, attacked Mohamed Shah Khan at a place just above Khal. He was defeated and made prisoner, and it is said has been publicly executed by Umra Khan.

Although the Painda and Sultan Khels have suffered severely, they seem to have been able to successfully resist Mohamed Shah carrying out Umra Khan's orders to build a fort at Khal. The position is declared to be an important one, as it commands the Sultan and Painda Khel districts and Umra Khan is determined the work shall be done. He feels too that he must do something to recover the prestige his troops have unable to make any impression on Pamjan.

Mohamed Shah Khan has returned to his Governorship of Dir, but Majid Khan remains with Umra Khan at Munda.

Amir-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar's half brother and heir, remains with Umra Khan. According to some accounts he is forcibly prevented from returning to Chitral by the latter. This is the Mehtar's version, but other and more probable information relates that he refuses to return unless. Drash, &c., be ceded to him and that Umra Khan hopes to extend his authority in Chitral possibly even as far as Misty, using Amir-ul-Mulk as his puppet.

Bapi Lal, the Mehtar's envoy in their negotiations with Umra Khan is being detained by the later unit he returns from his projected expedition against Pamjan.

There is at present a kind of truce between Umra and Safdar Khan of Nawagal, although active hostilities are expected to recommence after the Eed. Nawagal forces under the Khan of Jar have returned from the siege of Gorangi, having only succeeded -in demolishing a portion of one of the towers of the fort. It is said that the retirement was hurried forward because Safdar Khan suspected that Mohamed. Shah's troops returning from Sin were intended for the relief of Gorangi.

Intrigues are as usual going on between the leading men on both sides

Nawagai's brother, the Khan of Jar, refused, so if is said, to combine with the Otman Khels in a genera] assault on Gorangi because the Otman Khels claim Gorangi and Kulala as their own and Safdar Khan's commanders protested they would merely lose many men in enabling the Otman Khels to get possession of Gorangi for the selves; but the Khan of Nawagai was very annoyed at this breach of faith with the Otman Khels, and expressed his opinion that, if. Umra Khan succeeded in defeating Pamjan, he would at once attack and crush the Otman Khels and advance against Jar. In consequence of this the Khan of Jar with his two guns is to return to Gorangi and renew the siege.

There seems to be considerable religious excitement in Bajaur and Dir. The persistent and circumstantial accounts we get on the subject point to no other conclusion, but its extent and precise object cannot be properly estimated. A friendly Sayad keeps sending me warning that it is our presence in Chitral which is the exciting cause of the ferment, and that the threatened religious war after the Eed is to he made against us. The Baba Sahib is reported to have made the characteristic announcement that it is even more meritorious to tight against the Chitrulis and their Mehtar than against any one else, because they have introduced the English into their country. He is also said to have written directly to Nizam-ul Mulk demanding the expulsion of the Mission under the penalty of war at once. If he has so written, the Mehtar his told us nothing of the letter. Our going away would probably mean his retirement from Chitral also. He is so assured of this in his mind that; lately, when I hinted at going to Mastuj for a short time for certain reasons; he declared that my moving would endanger his position, and that if I went he must go also. He will do all in his power to prevent any information reaching me, which might, in his opinion, influence me into leaving Chitral.