From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir
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The Sayad further tells me that Mian Gul, as well as the Baba Sahib, is rabidly antagonistic to the Government of India; that he has written to Sher Afzal not to stay longer than necessary at Kabul for all Dir, Bajaur and Swat are ready for an attack on Chitral in his support. He is further said to have gone to the superfluous trouble of urging the "Baba Sahib" to exert himself in the holy cause actively. Other accounts tell us that the Amir has sent messengers both to Umra Khan and Safdar Khan, begging them to settle their differences at once, and to say that the English are surrounding the Afghan territory on every hand, and that the only way for all to escape a common destruction is for all to sink minor differences and unite against the common destruction is for all to sink minor differences and unite against the common foe. Umra Khan is thought the idea Government of India only nominally give him its support against the Amir; and that its real object is to annex all /Dir and Bajaur to itself. It certainly seems true that in almost every Musjid in Yaghistan the prospects of a rapidly approaching religious war are being earnestly and far as the Dir and Bajaur people are concerned is not chiefly against the Bashgal valley Kafirs and that the threats against the Mehtar are not intended to prevent his interfering with the project. Time alone can show what substratum of truth there is in all these remours. Asmar. - The Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar is busily engaged carrying on intrigues with the Basshgal Kafirs, and it is rumoured sending messages through them from Sher-Afzal to the disaffected in Chitral. He has begun building a pukka bridge near Shurtan. He ordered the Mamunds to bring him in all kinds of supplies - grain, &c. - telling them that if they refused, he intended to move against them. The latter are in great perplexity, and know not what to do. They feel they, cannot resist the Commander-in-Chief now, Umra Khan has so much on his hands that he cannot be counted on to help them. The Commander-in Chief is encamped at the bridge site, which is one day's march from Asmar. He permits no merchants, to pass up the valley with salt or cotton cloth, and consequently causes great inconvenience to the Kafirs, who are continually coming to me with complaints on the subject. Kafiristan. - The Bashgal Kafirs, with the exception of one small tribe, who are actively intriguing with the Afghans against all the other tribes, are infuriated against Umra Khan. The war is being carried on languidly just now, but with the disappearance of the snow it \rill start into life again and be characterized by all its customary barbarity. To appreciate the present attitude of the Kafirs their mad anger against Umra Khan must be carefully kept in mind. To obtain revenge against him they will scruple at nothing, even if their action imperils the independence of their country. They believe the Mehtar' is impotent to help them, and of the other two powers, of which they have know ledge, India and Afghanistan, a great many believe the latter, will be more likely to listen to their representations and to give them assistance, while it has already showed its power of annoyance by cutting oil' the supplies of salt, &c., to Nasrat. As a consequence of this feeling, there is undoubtedly one spy, and probably many more, in the Kam country, sent there by the Amir, and well received by the Kafirs. The latter are in communication with the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar, have sent some of their men as a deputation to Kabul, and are believed to be actively engaged in carrying Sher Afzal's and the Amir's messages to the rebelliously disposed in Chitral. The Amir seems to be using he Kafirs with his customary skill. He alternately rewards them, pleases hem, and threatens them. In this last connection he is said to have assured hem that if they make overtures to the English or salaam to them, he will at once attack the Bashgal valley. If this is true, and his intention is real, the line of Afghan advance would be probably up the Dungun valley—a difficult road which runs up from Palasgar and cresses a steep pass of just over 10,000 fuet immediately above and to the south of Kamdesh. In any such attempt, he might rely upon the help of the tribe already referred to, which, though comparatively few in numbers, is well placed for rendering assistance to a ofrce advancing by the line suggested, and which would gladly seize the opportunity of thus avenging old in juries on the other tribes of the Bashgal valley. But a more pressing danger to the Bashgal Kafirs is a religious war starting in Bajaur and Dir. Unless Umra Khan is so engaged with local fighting that he is unable to put forth his full strength against the Kafirs, it is merely certa in that he will organize and perhaps lead an expedition against Kamdesh, possibly in conjunction with the Baba Sahib from Dir. Such an attack, apart from other reasons, is most undesirable, because the Chitralis claim suzerainty over the whole of the Bashgal valley. This claim is admitted in a free and easy way by the Kafirs, and the opinion of holy men and Mullas, collected by the late Aman-ul-Mulk, confirmed the prevalent feeling that Chitral might and should resist any attempt by Umra Khan on a people which paid tribute and acknowledged the supremacy of the Mehtar. The Baba Sahib, I belve, endorsed this opinion of the learned men, and it may be that to reconcile his past declaration with his present intentions that he has; proclamied the Mehtar an infidel unless he quickly sends the English Mission out of the country. The Chitralis are certain to clamour for permission to attack Umra Khan if he invades the Bashgal valley, not necessarily because they are really anxious to fight the Jandol forces, but because they may want to be held back from engaging in a war they have little stomach for, and while asserting their spirit and patriotism put all unpopularity of losing the Kafir valley on the shoulders of their Mehtar and of the English according to the supposed exigencies of the moment. The Mehtar himself is no .............. behind his subjects in their ............... way of showing bravery, and has more than once asked to be allowed to march down and capture the Narsat fort, which, he professes to believe, could be done with the greatest ease. Chitralis, like many other eastern races, are extraordinarily resolute and enterprising in counsel. The triumph of their diplomacy would of course be to involve the Mission escort in their own frontier troubles, and they are quite fatuous enough*to believe in their ability to do this. The Russians.—I labour under the-greatest difficulty in getting trustworthy news from Badakhshan and Wakhan. The passes are, burdened with snowy and travelling is most irksome and dangerous; but natural obstacles are as nothing compared with those raised by two or three individuals equally remarkable for their love of intrigue, and their determination to upset existing arrangements in Chitral. The chief of these is a Moghli Pir named Shahzada Lais, who lives high up in tire Arkori valley. He is a hopeless rascal, but unfortunately has great influence and high prestige among his " Murids." All I can do at present is to try and buy him over, but my attempts so far have not been crowned with success. He accepts my money with gratitude, 'swears he is bound to me by personal ties no less than .by the orders-he has received from Bombay to always support English officers, yet he is strongly suspected of sending messengers over the passes, and even to the Russians, while he prevents, any men bringing news to me even if they Jiave succeeded in crossing the Hindu Kush. He is quite young, and probably so elated at his past success in getting presents all round and in traversing in safety the pathways so dangerous to most, that he intends to continue his ingenious methods of procedure, and may by this time be laying the Russians also under contribution. His time is, however, short, in two or three weeks the passes will be practicable, and rival Sayads will supply me with news—news which will require much sifting before it can be presented in proper form. At present our information amounts to this. The Russians have shifted their quarters from Murghabi, where they suffered terrible hardships from the cold and lost most of their cattle, to Aktash probably. Doubtless also parties have appeared in Wakhan. They requested or demanded that Kalai Panja should be made over to them by the Afghans because of the severity of the weather. The Afghans are believed to have' replied that the Russians must be mad to suppose their servants would surrender the Amir's territory and part to any one. The news has been corroborated by several messengers directly and by inference. It is also said that Russian purchases in Wakhan have so raised the prices of all such articles as ghi, &c., as well as sheep and cattle, that ordinary traders were in despair. This, I think, is all the news I have at present. Please let me know when his reaches you. I hope it will be all out of date long before the Government of India can receive it, and that my reports and Durand's telegrams, will have anticipated everything it contains. We are all well. No sickness. We have supplies in hand for another two months. There is much distress in several districts. We have had the vilest weather, and suffered greatly from leaky roofs, but the sun is shining again, and we have already forgotten our troubles. One does not expect pleasure in a Mission of this sort, and one is not disappointed; but we are all cheerful and ready to put the best faces on everything.
From - Colonel D.W.K. Barr, To - Sir H. Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. In continuation of Kayo's demi-official letter No. 2067, dated the 18th May 1893, to Cunningham's address, I enclosed for information the marginally noted demi-official letters, with enclosures in original, received on the 19th May l893, forwarding copies of demi-official letters from Robertson containing information in regard to the state of affairs in Chitral up to the 20th April 1893. From Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B. British Agent at Gilgit; (1) No. 1733.R. of 4th May 1893. (2) No. 1752.R. of 5th May 1893. (3) No. 1753.R. of 5th May 1893. _______________ Demi-official No. 1733-R., dated Gilgit, the 4th May 1893. From - Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit, To - Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir. Herewith Robertson's last of 20th April. It contains nothing of importance, but is satisfactory in tone. I forwarded the Foreign Secretary's telegram, which went also by Peshawar to Robertson yesterday. _____________ Demi-official No. 47, dated Chitral, the 20th April 1893. From— G. S. Robertson, Esq., in charge Chitral Mission, To—Colonel A. G. Durand, c.b., British Agent at Gilgit. Our Mehtar is beginning to think of his dignity seriously. In a conversation a few days ago with the Khan Sahib, he observed that Chitral from its position was much more important to the Government of India than Gilgit or Kashmir, and remarked that when I go away my successor ought not to be a small person, but an official of even superior rank to the British Agent or the Resident of Kashmir. I am very triad to get good news about Yasin from the Jemadar who arrived here yesterday. Safedullah Khan made one last effort for Mohamad Wali. He persuaded about thirty families to start with him for Gilgit, saying that Nizam's sending a force into" Yasin was distasteful to the British Agent, Gilgit, who intended to start an army to oppose it. However, the Jemadar met the wretched people at Rosham, who, hearing what he had to say, were only "too" delighted to return to their homes. Mohamad Wali & Co. have fixed, all their hopes on a clashing of authority between Chitral and Gilgit, and appear to have thought themselves diplomatists clever enough to bring-about the impossible collision they desired. The Ghizr delegates, in conversation with our Sikhs, asked the latter if they would fight, supposing they were told to. The Sikhs replied they of course would fight, and wished they might get such an order, and no doubt swaggered tremendously. The Ghizr men finally said they could not fight Sikhs of course, but if they were out of the country, they would fight fast enough. I am very glad we brought up Sikhs instead of bodyguard and Dogras. The size and bearing of the men have impressed the Chitralis very greatly, while their volley firing astounded the people and led to all manners of exaggerated rumours of the marvelous prowess of the Panjabis. The Sikhs are wonderful fellows. Their absolute belief in themselves and their simplicity and dignity are delightful. One of them quietly remarked on the road here, "How astonished the people must be at seeing suck splendid youngmen as we are marching into their country." It was perfectly true also. Everything seems quiet. The people still look hopefully for a sign from Sher Afzal, and many still believe he will return when the passes open. Nizam is behaving very well indeed. He gate away yesterday for the Eed festival 400 garments-of different kinds. The result at the polo ground last night was most striking. The audacity of some of the colour combinations was startling. One player wore a dark red cap, bright scarlet coat and greenish-yellow trousers, which made the eyes ache. Bound the bottom of the trousers and the skirt of the coat were huge gold letters several inches long. If you express admiration for such a get-up, the wearer is so happy and grateful that he wants to kiss your feet in return for your gracious condescension. The enormous ill-shaped scarlet trousers are said to be especially adapted for work on the saddle You would be surprised at the change, which has come over Chitral in 'court circles.' The turbans of the high officers of State are no longer used as spittoons or pocket-handkerchiefs by the Mehtar. All ceremonies are conducted with ordinary civilized politeness, decorum; and, it must be admitted, with excessive dullness also. The introduction of a polo hero after, the game to the notice of the sheeted female bundles seated behind the walls above the ground by Waffadar and Shah Sultan in a humourous speech, accompanied by appropriate facetious gestures, is very amusing. ______________ Demi-official No. 1752-R., dated Gilgit, the 5th May 1893. From—Colonel A. G. Durand, c.b., British Agent at Gilgit, To—Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar. Herewith Robertson's of 13th, the contents of which I have telegraphed on to you. The reference in the first paragraph is to my interview with Mohamad Wali mentioned in the Office diary, 1st April 1893. Umra Khan and the Kafirs are a nuisance. We shall have the Amir cutting in there and absorbing the Kafir (not that I care about the. Kafir, he is bound to be absorbed), and in so doing getting a very close hold over Chitral. The only effectual way to prevent all this is to order Umra Khan, out of Narsat. But it is a risky game to play if you don't mean to enforce your orders. It is satisfactory that there seems not much chance of the hinted Bajaur Dir attack on Chitral. It would have gone very hard with us indeed and this letter has been a great relief to me. l am not quite sure that we are out of the wood yet. The rest of the letter is satisfactory enough, and we have only to persevere to keep things straight up here. I am thinking of sending Stewart into Yasin so soon as the Indus valley game is over in order that he may know something of the country which he would probably have to remain in as Political Officer. I hope the cloud is bursting or has burst by now. _______________ Demi-official No. 43, dated Chitral, the 13th April 1893. From - G. S. Robertson, Esq., C.S.I., To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., Gilgit. Your demi-official of the 2nd arrived last night. It has relieved my mind very greatly. I was afraid that in your absence there might have possibly been a little too much diplomacy with Mohamad Wali, and that he might have become impressed with the idea that we were tricking him about Yasin. Now you have seen the boy, and he has heard your clear and decided words on the subject of his resisting the Mehtar, this fear has been entirely removed. Our latest news from Badakhshan is that the Amir is concentrating his troops somewhere Kolab way, and has dispatched in that direct on all the men at Fyzahad and Rastak. He has also lately relieved the garrison the now maintains in Minjan. The Russians, or a party of them, are said to be at a place equidistant (one day's march) from Toshangazand Sarhad, possibly not far from Langa Kisht; but the one-day's march must be an extremely long one. The Dir-Chitral-Kafiristan frontier question; promises to give trouble. The Kafirs are urgent to know if Chitral means to protect their valley (Bashgal). They ask for a decided answer. If they are left to shift for themselves, they say they know what to do, but will not mention, the course they have decided to follow. It is nearly certain, however, that they intend to make submission to the Amir and invoke his help against Umra Khan — a proceeding which •would please the Amir, annoy Umra Khan, and be most inconvenient for Chitral. I intend to write fully on this matter officially in a day or two. It seems pretty certain that if Umra Khan retains Nursat, the Kafirs of the Bashgal valley will repudiate their past nominal allegiance to Chitral altogether. l am anxious to find out how matters stand between Umra Khan and the Government of India, and what amount of influence the latter may be supposed to he capable of exerting over the actions of the former. Please telegraph for this information, and let me have it as soon as possible. I imagine Umra Khan thinks it better policy to enter into no friendly relations with the Mission and to stick to Peshawar exclusively, In this he may be influenced by the native political officials there, who may think their importance would be diminished and their usefulness doubted if any one else had a word in their communication and arrangements with Umra Khan. In any case, I can do nothing more with him at present. He has promised to write a full answer to my letter, but I doubt if he really intends doing so. Two of Mohamad Sharif Khan's men have arrived here with messages for the Mehtar. They report that their master is in Swat as determined s ever in his hostility to Umra Khan, and ready to take any advantage of the latter attacking the Bashgalis to attempt another invasion of Dir. Mohamad Sharif Khan lost his country so easily that perhaps I have always underrated the strenuousness of the man. Time will show. The messengers also say that the Sultan Khels in the late fighting lost 300 men, and are mad for revenge on the Jandolis; that Umra Khan has lately observed that there are now 80 Martini rifles in Chitral, which God has given to him. No opportunity is ever lost by the Chitralis to try and alarm me about Umra Khan and his evil intentions towards the Mission and the English. This, of course, is natural enough. I should like to know the nature of the communication between Nizam and the Baba Sahib. It is easy to suspect their drift, especially as the Mehtar keeps it a profound secret. The Bashkaris (not Bashgalis) have been appealing to the Mehtar for help against Umra Khan. This seems to show also that the rumour of a general confederacy against us was more talk than anything else. All the fugitives who were captured and imprisoned in the fort awaiting punishment have been unconditionally pardoned and liberated. I am by no means certain that certain of them should not have been punished, but my disapproval of the proposed execution of sons by their own fathers may have caused the Mehtar to err on the side of leniency. However that may b, I am not in a position, nor have I the inclination, to interfere with doings in that direction. I have a suspicion that Nizam is getting afraid of me. It certainly appears so. If ever he makes a remark, which he thinks may have displeased me, he gets red all over and watches me anxiously. It may be I want a change altogether for a time to try and regain any geniality I am have one possessed and prevent my failing into austere ways and manners. My wishes are law to such an extent that I have to be most cautious in expressing them Nizam remarks that his life and that of all his subjects are at my disposal and asks me the shall keep an army in Yasin. His meaning is that he is quite ready to attack Tangir Darel, &c., &c. if he is asked to do so. He continually enquiries what he is to do about these tribes. I invariably reply that he should use all his influence in the cause of peace, and point out the advantages to themselves of the Shinaki being better neighbours to Gilgit. He declares he longs for the day when all the countries round shall be brought under the rule of the Government of India I reply very truly that Government has neither desire nor intention of accepting such responsibilities. All it wants is peace and friendly neighbours. Affairs generally wear a much quieter aspect than they did. The conspiracy against Nizam seems to have only been formidable from the number, which joined it or sympathized with its objects. I may perhaps after the Eed go with Nizam up to Lutko, leaving Younghusband here. It would probably have an excellent effect, and tip people there think it would be to their advantage if I went. While writing, news has come that Sher Afzal is to he deported from Kabul and interned at Ghuzni. The pacification of Yasin seems to be having an excellent effect, and ought to strengthen the Mehtar's hands very greatly. His position up till now has never been considered really secure either by himself or by his people. His prestige may be expected to gradually increase. Sher Afzal's impossible promise will be forgotten, and the Chitral will gradually settle down as more or less faithful subjects. Umra Khan is a trouble, and may become a greater one in the near future unless he can be influenced in the proper direction by Government. His ambition is very great, his energy considerable, while his abilities seem to be of a high order. If matters go on as they seem at present tending, and there are no commotions about the time of the Eed, I can, I believe, leave the Mission and return to Gilgit, &c., with a clear conscience. I do not now anticipate a general rising. The Shinaki time for lighting is nearly over. They must look after the grazing of their flocks, and probably cannot assemble in great numbers. If the Amir is be having properly and Umra Khan is not mad, we shall only have our old friends, the Russians, to bother us. Demi-official No. 1753-R., dated Gilgit, the 5th May 1893. From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit, To—Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir. Herewith two demi-officials of Robertson's of 17th April. The most important point is that Umra Khan's success over the Khan of Dir has broken up the confederacy, which the Baba Sahib was trying to arrange. But Umra Khan, if he is successful against the Paindah Khel, &c., means evidently to go for Chitral as far as Killa Darosh. If this conies off and the Bashkar Kohistan is laid over on to Laspur, the other side of the Shandur from here, we may have trouble. The Indus valley attack may in this case be against Gupis; and, as I have telegraphed, I have heard rumours from there of a Tangiri gathering, to which indeed I do not attach much importance, but which may mean business. But I am keeping the levies here for a day or two to see if anything of importance takes place. Download 1 Mb. Share with your friends:
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