Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Pointer/Gordon/Watts/Samuels Turkey Neg



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Link (Hurts Relations)


TNWs key to U.S.-Turkey cohesion

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF

Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.


US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations

Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf

On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system. They also see the presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to out-of-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation. The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country.


Removal of US tnw’s from Europe encourages Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, and would be a major setback for global security

Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe) MAH

In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from Europe would send the message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability.



Link (Hurts Relations)


US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations

Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf

On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system. They also see the presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to out-of-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation. The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country.


Turkey wants nukes- removing of TNWs causes U.S.-Turkey conflict

NTI 09 (Turkey Profile, Monterey Institute of International Studies James Martin Center, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html)

As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. Although Turkey's interest in nuclear technology dates to at least 1956, when the government founded the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), Ankara's nuclear capabilities never moved beyond the research and development stages. Thus while Turkey conducts sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle research—primarily at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNRTC) and the Istanbul Technical University—it does not possess nuclear power reactors or industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.[6] Ankara possesses only two small research reactors, the TRIGA Mark II 250-KWt reactor and the TR-2 5MWt reactor—the former operates on 20% U-235 fuel, while the latter possesses a mixed HEU/LEU core that will soon be fully converted to run on LEU.[7] While past decades have witnessed numerous attempts by the government to acquire power reactors, all failed for a variety of political, diplomatic, and economic reasons.[8] However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP-led government is aggressively pursuing nuclear energy. While the government's announcement in 2006 that it would install 5,000MW nuclear energy by 2015 (3 reactors) has encountered numerous feasibility problems—and may not yield even one reactor by that date—the AKP remains unwaveringly politically committed to the endeavor.[9] After a troubled tender process in 2008, the government began assessing the sole bid for construction of the first nuclear plant. The offer from Russian-led consortium Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik is still under consideration.



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