Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Pointer/Gordon/Watts/Samuels Turkey Neg

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NATO Good-Sea Power

NATO protects the oceans with sea power

Sokolsky 97 (Joel, Professor of Political Science at Royal Military College of Canada, “PROJECTING STABILITY: NATO AND MULTILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA,” http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/sokolsky.pdf) MJ

Had strategic nuclear deterrence been the sole, or even dominant, role of sea power in the Cold War, then the USN and other western navies would never have attained the size and sophistication that they did. But navies continued to be concerned with traditional roles, protection of the sea lanes of communication(SLOC), the projection of force ashore, gun-boat diplomacy, and naval presence. Even in the absence of a comparable rival Soviet high seas fleet, sea power maintained a relevance in the global balance of power. Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington argued in 1954 that the USN’s monopoly of the seas and Soviet land power in Eurasia had resulted in a new kind of navy -- a “transoceanic” one. The USN’s role was not to prepare for a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet struggle for the high seas but to apply power on the “narrow lands and the narrow seas which like between” the “great oceans on the one hand and the equally immense spaces of the Eurasian heartland on the other.”5 This was especially the case for the NATO alliance. From its earliest days the Alliance focused on securing the seas immediately adjacent to Europe. Moreover, while it was the case as Huntington argued that the USN and its allies dominated the high seas, in the “narrow seas” around Western Europe the Soviet Union could, even in these early years, deploy sea denial forces (principally submarines) that would have made the immediate projection of force ashore difficult. In later years when, due to the emergence of a more powerful and high seas capable Soviet fleet along with a considerable land-based naval aviation capability, NATO grew increasingly apprehensive about its ability to protect the transatlantic SLOC upon which the strategy of flexible response rested, sea power had been an essential component of collective defence.6
Sea power deters wars

Conway et al 7 (James, General, U.S. Marine Corps and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard and Commandant of the Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf) MJ

No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

NATO Good-Prevents Wars

NATO deters war

Kober 98 (Stanley, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 3 Kaliningrad,” Foreign Policy Briefing, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-046.pdf) MJ

NATO expansion is based on the premise that deterrence is the best way to prevent war. According to that view, NATO prevented war in Europe during the Cold War by deterring Soviet aggression, and what worked during the Cold War should work just as well, if not better, in the aftermath of the Cold War, when the military balance has shifted so decisively in favor of the United States. According to the conventional wisdom, countries embraced by NATO have an absolute guarantee of protection, since Russia would not dare challenge the United States. That pervasive belief explains the scramble of countries in the former Soviet bloc to join NATO and their fear of being left out of the alliance. According to the logic of advocates of expansion, gray areas--that is, countries not within NATO but not in the Russian orbit either-- invite aggression because "nature abhors a vacuum."

NATO Good-Soft Power

NATO successfully uses soft power to stop conflicts

Tarvainen 8(Tina, Doctoral research fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Turku , “NATO and the CBRN terrorism - mission: An Overview,” Journal of Security Issues, 2(1) pg 38)

Views of these threats are, therefore, not apolitical or indifferent. On the contrary, threat estimations affect on counterterrorist and non-proliferation efforts and finally even to foreign policy-making. NATO’s role is so linked with the current risk assessment and threat analyses: how severe they are and how to resist them. It is surprising, even paradoxical, that while critics of the Alliance blame it for being too militaristic organization, its counterterrorist role has still been quite moderate. It participates to the ‘global fight against terrorism’ by offering its material resources and by acting in different kind of crisis management operations, which, on the long run, can help to prevent conflicts and further radicalization. NATO does, indeed, use not only the hard power, but the soft power as well. Compared to the counterterrorist strategies of the United States, NATO’s guidelines can be described more defensive and reactive. De Nevers argues that NATO has ‘soft’ strategy in this regard due its focus on vulnerability reducing and capability-enhancing, while the United States uses harder measures in order to prevent terrorists’ strikes against the homeland (de Nevers, 2007, p. 38). The idea behind ‘protecting the homeland’ –rhetoric is closely related to the claimed change of the current security environment.

Soft power key to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, global warming, and create democracy

Nye 4 (Joseph, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, “Soft power: the means to success in world politics,” pg 17) MJ

Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan. Finally, though soft power sometimes has direct effects on specific goals-witness the inability of the United States to obtain the votes of Chile or Mexico in the UN Security Council in 2003after our policies reduced our popularity-it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks. Fifty years ago, Arnold Wolfers distinguished between the specific “possession goals” that countries pursue, and their broader “milieu goals,” like shaping an environment conducive to democracy. Successful pursuit of both types of goals is important in foreign policy. If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less relevant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and protecting allies. But soft power is particularly relevant to the realization of “milieu goals.” It has a crucial role to play in promoting democracy, human rights, and open markets. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. The fact that the impact of attraction on achieving preferred outcomes varies by context and type of goals does not make it irrelevant, any more than the fact that bombs and bayonets do not help when we seek to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, slow global warming, or create democracy.

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